Islam in Afghanistan

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Afghan Muslims (مسلمانان افغان)
Total population
38,200,000[1] (2022 est.)
Regions with significant populations
Throughout Afghanistan
Religions
Predominantly Sunni Islam, Minority :
Quranic Arabic[2]
Common
Dari (Persian), Pashto, Uzbek, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashayi

Islam in Afghanistan (Pew)[3]

  
Shia
(13%)
Religion Percent
Islam
99.7%
Others
0.3%
Distribution of religions

Islam in Afghanistan began to be practiced after the Arab

Ismailism.[4]

After the

Kabul Shahi
kings.

History

Friday Mosque of Herat is one of the oldest mosques in Afghanistan
.

During the 7th century, the

Nihawand. After this colossal defeat, the last Sassanid emperor, Yazdegerd III, fled eastward deep into Central Asia. In pursuing Yazdegerd, the Arabs entered the area from northeastern Iran[7] via Herat
, where they stationed a large portion of their army before advancing toward northern Afghanistan.

Many of the inhabitants of northern Afghanistan accepted Islam through Umayyad missionary efforts, particularly under the reign of

Abdur Rahman bin Samara made incursions into Zabulistan which was ruled by the Zunbils.[9]

A miniature from Padshahnama depicting the surrender of the Shia Safavid at Kandahar in 1638 to the Sunni Mughal army commanded by Kilij Khan

During the reign of

Qur'an into Persian
was made in the 9th century. Since then, Islam has dominated the country's religious landscape. Islamic leaders have entered the political sphere at various times of crisis but rarely exercised secular authority for long.

The remnants of a

Friday Mosque of Herat is one of the oldest mosques in the country, believed to have been first built under the Ghurids in the 12th century. During this period, known as the Islamic Golden Age, Afghanistan became the second major center of learning in the Muslim world after Baghdad.[11][12]

After the Mongol invasion and destruction, the

Mir Wais Hotak liberated the Afghans in 1709, the Kandahar region of Afghanistan was often a battleground between the Shia Safavids and the Sunni Mughals
.

Conquest by Abdur Rahman Khan

.

The first systematic employment of Islam as an instrument of state-building was initiated by King Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901) during his drive toward centralization. He decreed that all laws must comply with Islamic law and thus elevated the Shariah over customary laws embodied in the Pashtunwali. The ulama were enlisted to legitimize and sanction his state efforts as well as his central authority. This enhanced the religious community on the one hand, but as they were increasingly inducted into the bureaucracy as servants of the state, the religious leadership was ultimately weakened. Many economic privileges enjoyed by religious personalities and institutions were restructured within the framework of the state; the propagation of learning, once the sole prerogative of the ulama, was closely supervised; and the Amir became the supreme arbiter of justice.

Hazrat Ali Mazar in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif

Abdur Rahman Khan's successors continued and expanded his policies as they increased the momentum of secularization. Islam remained central to interactions, but the religious establishment remained essentially non-political, functioning as a moral rather than a political influence. Nevertheless, Islam asserted itself in times of national crisis. Moreover, when the religious leadership considered themselves severely threatened, charismatic religious personalities periodically employed Islam to rally disparate groups in opposition to the state. They rose up on several occasions against King

Amanullah Shah
(1919–1929), for example, in protest against reforms they believed to be western intrusions inimical to Islam.

Subsequent rulers, mindful of traditional attitudes antithetical to secularization, were careful to underline the compatibility of Islam with modernization. Even so, and despite its pivotal position within the society, which continued to draw no distinction between religion and state, the role of religion in state affairs continued to decline.

Lashkar Gah
, in the south of the country

The 1931

Islamist
Movement into a national revolt; Islam moved from its passive stance on the periphery to play an active role.

Politicized Islam in Afghanistan represents a break from Afghan traditions. The Islamist Movement originated in 1958 among faculties of Kabul University, particularly in the Faculty of Islamic Law, which had been founded in 1952 with the stated purpose of raising the quality of religious teaching to accommodate modern science and technology. The founders were largely professors influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a party formed in the 1930s that was dedicated to Islamic revivalism and social, economic, and political equity. Their objective is to come to terms with the modern world through the development of a political ideology based on Islam. The Afghan leaders, while indebted to many of these concepts, did not forge strong ties to similar movements in other countries.

The liberalization of government attitudes following the passage of the 1964 Constitution ushered in a period of intense activism among students at Kabul University. Professors and their students set up the Muslim Youth Organization (Sazmani Jawanani Musulman) in the mid-1960s at the same time that the leftists were also forming many parties. Initially

Mazari Sharif and Herat. Some of these professors and students became the leaders of the Mujahideen
rebels in the 1980s.

Radicalization and NATO presence

The 1979 Soviet invasion in support of a communist government triggered a major intervention of religion into Afghan political conflict, and Islam united the multiethnic political opposition. With the takeover of government by the PDPA in April 1978, Islam had already become central to uniting the opposition against the communist ideology of the new rulers. As a politico-religious system, Islam is well-suited to the needs of a diverse, unorganized, often mutually antagonistic citizenry wishing to forge a united front against a common enemy, and war permitted various groups within the mujahideen to put into effect competing concepts of organization.

Mujahideen praying in Kunar Province during the 1980s Soviet–Afghan War

The Soviet invasion and the Iranian Revolution not only led national uprisings but also the importation of foreign radical Muslims to Afghanistan. The mujahideen leaders were charismatic figures with dyadic ties to followers. In many cases military and political leaders replaced the tribal leadership; at times the religious leadership was strengthened; often the religious combined with the political leadership. Followers selected their local leaders on the basis of personal choice and precedence among regions, sects, ethnic groups or tribes, but the major leaders rose to prominence through their ties to outsiders who controlled the resources of money and arms.

With the support of foreign aid, the mujahideen were ultimately successful in their jihad to drive out the Soviet forces, but not in their attempts to construct a political alternative to govern Afghanistan after their victory. Throughout the war, the mujahideen were never fully able to replace traditional structures with a modern political system based on Islam. Most mujahideen commanders either used traditional patterns of power, becoming the new khans, or sought to adapt modern political structures to the traditional society. In time the prominent leaders accumulated wealth and power and, in contrast to the past, wealth became a determining factor in the delineation of power at all levels.

Muslims praying together during an Eid al-Adha worship service at Kandahar Air Base in southern Afghanistan

With the departure of foreign troops and the long sought demise of Kabul's leftist government, The

Drug trafficking
increased alarmingly; nowhere were the highways safe. The mujahideen had forfeited the trust they once enjoyed.

In the fall of 1994 a group called the

Jamaat-e-Islami
and longtime supporter of the mujahideen.

Headquartered in

cockfights, prohibition of music and videos, proscriptions against pictures of humans and animals, and an embargo on women's voices over the radio. Women were to remain as invisible as possible, behind the veil, in purdah in their homes, and dismissed from work or study outside their homes. They were toppled by a combined Afghan-NATO military force in late 2001. Majority of them escaped to neighboring Pakistan from where they launched insurgency
against the current NATO-backed Afghan government. Peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government was ongoing as of 2013.

Islam in Afghan society

For Afghans, Islam represents a potentially unifying symbolic system which offsets the divisiveness that frequently rises from the existence of a deep pride in tribal loyalties and an abounding sense of personal and family honor found in multitribal and multiethnic societies such as Afghanistan.

Afghans conducting their afternoon prayer in Kunar Province (December 2009)

Islam is a central, pervasive influence throughout Afghan society; religious observances punctuate the rhythm of each day and season. In addition to a central

Masjids serve not only as places of worship, but for a multitude of functions, including shelter for guests, places to meet, the focus of social religious festivities and schools. Almost every Afghan has at one time during his youth studied at a mosque school; for many this is the only formal education they receive.[citation needed
]

Because Islam is a totalitarian way of life and functions as a comprehensive code of social behavior regulating all human relationships, individual and family status depends on the proper observance of the society's value system based on concepts defined in Islam. These are characterized by honesty, frugality, generosity, virtuousness, piousness, fairness, truthfulness, tolerance and respect for others. To uphold family honor, elders also control the behavior of their children according to these same Islamic prescriptions. At times, even competitive relations between tribal or ethnic groups are expressed in terms claiming religious superiority. In short, Islam structures day-to-day interactions of all members of the community.

Gardens of Babur
in Kabul

The religious establishment has several levels. Any Muslim can lead informal groups in prayer.

Shariah
, they must ensure that their communities are knowledgeable in the fundamentals of Islamic ritual and behavior. This qualifies them to arbitrate disputes over religious interpretation. Often they function as paid teachers responsible for religious education classes held in mosques where children learn basic moral values and correct ritual practices. Their role has additional social aspects for they officiate on the occasion of life crisis rituals associated with births, marriages and deaths.

Afghan politicians and foreign diplomats praying at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul

But rural mullahs are not part of an institutionalized hierarchy of clergy. Most are part-time mullahs working also as farmers or craftsmen. Some are barely literate, or only slightly more educated than the people they serve. Often, but by no means always, they are men of minimal wealth and, because they depend for their livelihood on the community that appoints them, they have little authority even within their own social boundaries. They are often treated with scant respect and are the butt of a vast body of jokes making fun of their arrogance and ignorance. Yet their role as religious arbiters forces them to take positions on issues that have political ramifications and since mullahs often disagree with one another, pitting one community against the other, they are frequently perceived as disruptive elements within their communities.

Veneration of saints and shrines is opposed by some Islamic groups, particularly those ascribing to the

Ahle Hadith
. Nevertheless, Afghanistan's landscape is liberally strewn with shrines honoring saints of all descriptions. Many of Afghanistan's oldest villages and towns grew up around shrines of considerable antiquity. Some are used as sanctuaries by fugitives.

Shrines vary in form from simple mounds of earth or stones marked by pennants to lavishly ornamented complexes surrounding a central domed tomb. These large establishments are controlled by prominent religious and secular leaders. Shrines may mark the final resting place of a fallen hero (shahid), a venerated religious teacher, a renowned Sufi poet, or relics, such as a hair of

caliph
and the first Imam of Shi'a Islam believed to be buried at the nation's most elaborate shrine located in the heart of Mazari Sharif, the Exalted Shrine. Ali is revered throughout Afghanistan for his role as an intermediary in the face of tyranny.

Festive annual fairs celebrated at shrines attract thousands of pilgrims and bring together all sections of communities. Pilgrims also visit shrines to seek the intercession of the saint for special favors, be it a cure for illness or the birth of a son. Women are particularly devoted to activities associated with shrines. These visits may be short or last several days and many pilgrims carry away specially blessed curative and protective

tawiz
) to ward off the evil eye, assure loving relationships between husbands and wives and many other forms of solace. Like saint veneration, such practices are generally not encouraged in Islam according to classical understanding of the Holy Qu'ran and Hadiths (prophetic sayings of the Rabi)

Shia Islam in Afghanistan

Abul Fazl Mosque in Kabul during construction in 2008, the largest Shia mosque in Afghanistan[13]

Roughly 10% of the

Hazara ethnic group and the smaller urbanized Qizilbash
group, who are originally from eastern Iran.

Politically aware Shia students formed the Afghan

Maoist movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. After the Saur Revolution (April Revolution) of 1978 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Shia rebel groups in the Hazarajat region, although frequently at odds with one another, became active in mujahideen
activities. They were aided by Shi'a Iran and fought against the Soviet-backed Afghan government as well as other mujahideen groups.

During the political maneuvering leading up to the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992, the Shi'a groups unsuccessfully negotiated for more equitable, consequential political and social roles.

Ismailism

The

Jafar as-Sadiq. Ismaili communities in Afghanistan are less populous than the Twelver who consider the Ismaili heretical. They are found primarily in and near the eastern Hazarajat, in the Baghlan area north of the Hindu Kush, among the mountain Tajik of Badakhshan, and amongst the Wakhi in the Wakhan Corridor. The Ismailis believe that the series of Imamat or in another word Welayat that comes from the first Imami, Hazar-e-Ali, will never end. The 49th imam is Aga Khan IV. [14] [15][16]

Largest Quran in Afghanistan

During the 1980s Soviet war in Afghanistan Sayed Jafar Naderi was the Ismaili commandar, called the 'Warlord of Kayan' in a documentary by Journeyman Pictures. [17] [18]

Following the fall of Taliban in 2001, Ismailis established a political party called the

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah in 2019.[19] [20] [21]

Sufi influences

Three Sufi orders are prominent: the

Moghul Emperor Akbar
in the sixteenth century.

Another famous

Mawlana Faizani came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, and was a leading critic against the creeping influence of communist philosophy. Jailed in the mid-70s, Mawlana Faizani disappeared when the khalqis
came to power and remains missing to this day.

The

and Chehst-i-Sharif, is very strong locally and maintains madrasas with fine libraries. Traditionally the Cheshtiya have kept aloof from politics, although they were effectively active during the resistance within their own organizations and in their own areas.

Herat and its environs has the largest number and greatest diversity of Sufi branches, many of which are connected with local tombs of pir (ziarat). Other Sufi groups are found all across the north, with important centers in

Shindand, Farah Province. The Cheshtiya are centered in the Hari River valley. There are no formal Sufi orders among the Shi'a in the central Hazarajat, although some of the concepts are associated with Sayyids
, descendants of Mohammad, who are especially venerated among the Shi'a.

Afghanistan is unique in that there is little hostility between the

Sufi
orders. A number of Sufi leaders are considered as ulama, and many ulama closely associate with Sufi brotherhoods. The general populace accords Sufis respect for their learning and for possessing karamat, the psychic spiritual power conferred upon them by God that enables pirs to perform acts of generosity and bestow blessings (barakat). Sufism therefore is an effective popular force. In addition, since Sufi leaders distance themselves from the mundane, they are at times turned to as more disinterested mediators in tribal disputes in preference to mullahs who are reputed to escalate minor secular issues into volatile confrontations couched in Islamic rhetoric.

Despite the Afghan Sufis' stable position in Afghan society, Sufi leaders were among those executed following the

See also

References

  1. ^ "Afghanistan". The World Factbook (2024 ed.). Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 8 October 2022. (Archived 2022 edition.)
  2. .
  3. ^ "Religious Identity Among Muslims". 9 August 2012.
  4. ^ a b c "Chapter 1: Religious Affiliation". The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity. Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. August 9, 2012. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
  5. ^ a b "People and Society:: Afghanistan". The World Factbook. www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2017-05-22.
  6. ^ "Afghanistan | history - geography". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2018-01-09.
  7. ^ Arabic as a Minority Language, by Jonathan Owens, pg. 181
  8. ^ The preaching of Islam: a history of the propagation of the Muslim faith, By Thomas Walker Arnold, pg. 183
  9. .
  10. ^ ""Ghaznavid Dynasty", History of Iran, Iran Chamber Society". Iranchamber.com. Archived from the original on 24 November 2010. Retrieved 14 November 2010.
  11. ^ "Afghanistan – John Ford Shroder, University of Nebraska". Webcitation.org. Archived from the original on 31 October 2009. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  12. ^ "Masjid Jame, Kabul". 22 June 2010.
  13. ^ "World View – Aga Khan". Archived from the original on 24 July 2011. Retrieved 15 September 2010.
  14. S2CID 160596479
    .
  15. ^ "The Aga Khan's Direct Descent From Prophet Muhammad: Historical Proof". Ismaili Gnosis Research Team. 9 July 2016. Retrieved 9 July 2016.
  16. ^ "Warlord of Kayan (1989) Trailer". Journeyman Pictures. Retrieved 28 March 2024.
  17. ^ "Warlord of Kayan (1989) - Full Documentary". Hassan bin Sabbah Youtube Channel. Retrieved 28 March 2024.
  18. ^ "Afghan Ismailis supports Ashraf Ghani in presidential elections". Khaama Press. Retrieved 28 March 2024.
  19. ^ "Karzai Campaigns in Remote Afghan Valley". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 March 2024.
  20. ^ "Sayed Mansoor Naderi formally endorses Abdullah for upcoming presidential elections". Khaama Press. Retrieved 28 March 2024.

External links