Jacobite rising of 1745
| Jacobite rising of 1745 | |||||||
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 Great Britain |
 Jacobites Supported by:  France | ||||||
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The Jacobite rising of 1745, also known as the Forty-five Rebellion or simply the '45 (
.Charles launched the rebellion on 19 August 1745 at Glenfinnan in the Scottish Highlands, capturing Edinburgh and winning the Battle of Prestonpans in September. At a council in October, the Scots agreed to invade England after Charles assured them of substantial support from English Jacobites and a simultaneous French landing in Southern England. On that basis, the Jacobite army entered England in early November, reaching Derby on 4 December, where they decided to turn back.
Similar discussions had taken place at Carlisle, Preston and Manchester and many felt they had gone too far already. The invasion route had been selected to cross areas considered strongly Jacobite but the promised English support failed to materialise; they were outnumbered and in danger of having their retreat cut off. The decision was supported by the vast majority, but caused an irretrievable split between Charles and his Scots supporters. Despite victory at Falkirk Muir in January 1746, the Battle of Culloden in April ended the Rebellion and significant backing for the Stuart cause. Charles escaped to France, but was unable to win support for another attempt, and died in Rome in 1788.
Background
, the 'Old Pretender,' or 'Chevalier de St George' portrait from 1748The 1688
, chief minister of France 1723 to 1743; he viewed the Jacobites as an ineffective weapon for dealing with British powerAt the same time, by the late 1730s French statesmen viewed the post-1713 expansion in British trade as a threat to the European balance of power and the Stuarts became one of a number of potential options for reducing it.[6] However, a low-level insurgency was far more cost-effective than an expensive restoration, especially since they were unlikely to be any more pro-French than the Hanoverians.[a] The Scottish Highlands was an ideal location, due to the feudal nature of clan society, their remoteness and terrain; but as many Scots recognised, an uprising would also be devastating for the local populace.[7]
Opposition to taxes levied by the government in London led to the 1725
Trade disputes between Spain and Britain led to the 1739
Post-1715; Jacobitism in the British Isles
Although Jacobitism remained a significant political movement in 1745, its internal divisions became increasingly apparent during the Rising; historian Frank McLynn identifies seven primary drivers, with Stuart loyalism the least important.[14] Charles himself had little knowledge of the kingdoms he hoped to regain, while many of his senior advisors were Irish exiles, who wanted an autonomous, Catholic Ireland and the return of lands confiscated after the Irish Confederate Wars.[15] His grandfather James II had promised these concessions in return for Irish support in the 1689 to 1691 Williamite War in Ireland, and only a Stuart on the throne of Great Britain could ensure their fulfillment.[16]
Such concessions were firmly opposed by Protestants who were the overwhelming majority in England, Wales and Scotland, while estimates of English support in particular confused indifference to the Hanoverians with enthusiasm for the Stuarts.[17] After 1720, Robert Walpole tried to bind English Catholics closer to the regime by refusing to enforce laws against them. Many became government supporters, including the Duke of Norfolk, unofficial head of the English Catholic community. Sentenced to death in 1716, he was reprieved and remained in London during the 1745 rebellion, visiting George II to confirm his loyalty.[18]
Most English Jacobite sympathisers were Tories who resented their exclusion from power since 1714, and viewed Hanover as a liability which involved them in expensive Continental wars of minimal benefit to Britain.[19] These sentiments were particularly strong in the City of London, although diplomats observed opposition to foreign entanglements was true "only so long as English commerce does not suffer".[20] However, even this group was far more concerned to ensure the primacy of the Church of England, which meant defending it from Charles and his Catholic advisors, the Scots Presbyterians who formed the bulk of his army, or Nonconformists in general; many "Jacobite" demonstrations in Wales stemmed from hostility to the 18th century Welsh Methodist revival.[21]
The most prominent Welsh Jacobite was Denbighshire landowner and Tory Member of Parliament, Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn, head of the Jacobite White Rose society. He met with Stuart agents several times between 1740 and 1744 and promised support "if the Prince brought a French army"; in the end, he spent the Rebellion in London, with participation by the Welsh gentry limited to two lawyers, David Morgan and William Vaughan.[22]
After the Jacobite rising of 1719, new laws imposed penalties on nonjuring clergy, those who refused to swear allegiance to the Hanoverian regime, rather than the Stuarts.[23] For most English Non-Jurists, the issue was whether it was permissible to swear allegiance twice and so the problem naturally diminished as these priests died. In Scotland, doctrinal differences with the majority Church of Scotland meant they preserved their independence, which continues today in the Scottish Episcopal Church; many of those who participated in the Rising came from non-juring Episcopalian congregations.[24] However, the most powerful single driver for Scottish support in 1745 was opposition to the 1707 Union, whose loss of political control was not matched by perceived economic benefit. This was particularly marked in Edinburgh, former location of the Scottish Parliament, and the Highlands.[25]
In summary, Charles wanted to reclaim the throne of a united Great Britain and rule on the principles of the divine right of kings and absolutism, ideas rejected by the 1688 Glorious Revolution but which were reinforced by his trusted advisors, most of whom were long-term English or Irish Catholic exiles.[b][26] They differed sharply from the Scottish Protestant nationalists who formed the bulk of the Jacobite army in 1745, and opposed the Union, Catholicism and "arbitrary" rule.[27] At the same time, Jacobite exiles failed to appreciate the extent to which Tory support derived from policy differences with the Whigs, not Stuart loyalism.[19]
Charles in Scotland
Under the 1743 Treaty of Fontainebleau, or Pacte de Famille, Louis XV and his uncle, Philip V of Spain, agreed to co-operate in taking a number of measures against Britain, including an attempted restoration of the Stuarts.[28] In November 1743, Louis advised James the invasion was planned for February 1744 and began assembling 12,000 troops and transports at Dunkirk, selected because it was possible to reach the Thames from there in a single tide.[29] Since the Royal Navy was well aware of this, the French squadron in Brest made ostentatious preparations for putting to sea, in hopes of luring their patrols away.[30]
James remained in Rome while Charles made his way in secret to join the invasion force, but when Admiral Roquefeuil's squadron left Brest on 26 January 1744, the Royal Navy refused to follow.[31] Naval operations against Britain often took place in the winter, when wind and tides made it harder for the British to enforce a blockade due to the increased risks of winter storms. As in 1719, the weather proved the British government's best defence; storms sank a number of French ships and severely damaged many others, Roquefeuil himself being among the casualties.[32] In March, Louis cancelled the invasion and declared war on Britain.[33]
In August, Charles travelled to Paris to argue for an alternative landing in Scotland: John Gordon of Glenbucket had proposed a similar plan in 1738, when it had been rejected by the French, and James himself.[5] Charles met Sir John Murray of Broughton, liaison between the Stuarts and their Scottish supporters, who claimed he advised against it but Charles was "determined to come [...] though with a single footman".[34] When Murray returned with this news, the Scots reiterated their opposition to a rising without substantial French backing, but Charles gambled that the French would have to support him, should he make the attempt.[35]
He spent the first months of 1745 purchasing weapons, while
Many of those contacted advised him to return to France, including
On 19 August, the rebellion was launched with the raising of the Royal Standard at
The government in London, in order to divert as few troops as possible from the war effort in Europe, had decided to use auxiliary forces to suppress the rebellion. They asked the Dutch Republic to fulfil their part of
The senior government legal officer in Scotland, Lord President
On 17 September, Charles entered Edinburgh unopposed, although Edinburgh Castle itself remained in government hands; James was proclaimed King of Scotland the next day and Charles his Regent.[47] On 21 September, the Jacobites intercepted and scattered Cope's army in less than 20 minutes at the Battle of Prestonpans, just outside Edinburgh. The Duke of Cumberland, commander of the British army in Flanders, was recalled to London, along with 12,000 troops.[48] To consolidate his support in Scotland, Charles published two "Declarations" on 9 and 10 October: the first dissolved the "pretended Union", the second rejected the Act of Settlement.[49] He also instructed the 'Caledonian Mercury' to publish minutes of the 1695 Parliamentary enquiry into the Glencoe Massacre, often used as an example of post-1688 oppression.[50]
Jacobite morale was further boosted in mid-October when the French landed supplies of money and weapons, together with an envoy, the
These internal tensions were highlighted by the meetings held on 30 and 31 October to discuss strategy. Most of the Scots wanted to consolidate their position and revive the pre-1707 Parliament of Scotland to help defend it against the "English armies" they expected to be sent against them.[55] Charles argued an invasion of England was critical for attracting French support, and ensuring an independent Scotland by removing the Hanoverians. He was supported by the Irish exiles, for whom a Stuart on the British throne was the only way to achieve an autonomous, Catholic Ireland. Charles also claimed he was in contact with English supporters, who were simply waiting for their arrival, while d’Éguilles assured the council a French landing in England was imminent.[16]
Despite their doubts, the Council agreed to the invasion, on condition the promised English and French support was forthcoming.
Invasion of England
; soldiers mustered to defend London against Jacobite forcesMurray divided the army into two columns to conceal their destination from General George Wade, government commander in Newcastle, and entered England on 8 November unopposed.[59] On 10th, they reached Carlisle, an important border fortress before the 1707 Union but whose defences were now in poor condition, held by a garrison of 80 elderly veterans. However, without siege artillery the Jacobites would still have to starve it into submission, an operation for which they had neither the equipment or time. Despite this, the castle capitulated on 15 November, after learning Wade's relief force was delayed by snow. This success reinvigorated the Jacobite cause and when he retook the town in December, Cumberland wanted to execute those responsible.[60]
Leaving a small garrison, the Jacobites continued south to Preston on 26 November, then Manchester on 28th. Here they received the first notable intake of English recruits, which were formed into the Manchester Regiment. Their commander was Francis Towneley, a Lancashire Catholic and former French Royal Army officer, whose elder brother Richard had narrowly escaped execution for his part in the 1715 Rising.[61] At previous Council meetings in Preston and Manchester, many Scots felt they had already gone far enough, but agreed to continue when Charles assured them Sir Watkin Williams Wynn would meet them at Derby, while the Duke of Beaufort was preparing to seize the strategic port of Bristol.[40]
commemorates the Jacobite army reaching the town in 1745When they reached Derby on 4 December, there was no sign of these reinforcements or any other French landing in England and the Council convened on 5th to discuss next steps.[62] Despite the large crowds that turned out to see them on the march south, only Manchester provided a significant number of recruits; Preston, a Jacobite stronghold in 1715, supplied three.[63] Murray argued they had gone as far as possible and now risked being cut off by superior forces, with Cumberland advancing north from London, and Wade moving south from Newcastle. Charles admitted he had not heard from the English Jacobites since leaving France; this meant he lied when claiming otherwise and his relationship with the Scots was irretrievably damaged.[64]
The Council voted overwhelmingly to retreat, a decision strengthened by a report received from Lord John Drummond that French ships had landed supplies and money at the port of Montrose, Angus. They included "volunteers" from the "Royal Écossais" and the Irish Brigade, units of the regular French Royal Army.[65] While these troops numbered less than 200 in total, Drummond allegedly suggested another 10,000 were preparing to follow, "greatly influencing" the decision.[66]
While debated ever since, contemporaries did not believe the Hanoverian regime would collapse, even had the Jacobites reached London.[67] The decision to retreat was driven by lack of English support or of a French landing in England, not proximity to the capital, and its wisdom supported by many modern historians.[68] One reason was that their lack of heavy weapons allowed the Jacobites to out-march their opponents, but would be a disadvantage in a set piece battle. In a letter of 30 November, the Duke of Richmond, who was with Cumberland's army, listed five possible options for the Jacobites, of which retreating to Scotland was by far the best for them, and the worst for the government.[69]
, ca 1757The British government was concerned by reports of an invasion fleet being prepared at Dunkirk but it is unclear how serious these plans were. Over the winter of 1745 to 1746, Maréchal Maurice de Saxe was assembling troops in Northern France in preparation for an offensive into Flanders, while Dunkirk was a major privateer base and always busy.[29] Threatening an invasion was a far more cost-effective means of consuming British resources than actually doing so and these plans were formally cancelled in January 1746.[70]
The retreat badly damaged the relationship between Charles and the Scots, both sides viewing the other with suspicion and hostility. Elcho later wrote that Murray believed they could have continued the war in Scotland "for several years", forcing the Crown to agree to terms as its troops were desperately needed for the war on the Continent.[71] This seems unlikely since despite their victories in Flanders, in early 1746 Finance Minister Machault warned Louis that the British naval blockade had reduced the French economy to a 'catastrophic state'.[72]
The fast-moving Jacobite army evaded pursuit with only a minor skirmish at Clifton Moor, crossing back into Scotland on 20 December. Cumberland's army arrived outside Carlisle on 22 December, and seven days later the garrison was forced to surrender, ending the Jacobite military presence in England. Much of the garrison came from the Manchester Regiment and several of the officers were later executed, including Francis Towneley.[73]
Road to Culloden
; the Jacobites spent two months unsuccessfully besieging the strongest fort in ScotlandThe invasion itself achieved little, but reaching Derby and returning was a considerable military achievement. Morale was high, while reinforcements from Aberdeenshire and Banffshire under Lewis Gordon along with Scottish and Irish regulars in French service brought Jacobite strength to over 8,000.[74] French-supplied artillery was used to besiege Stirling Castle, the strategic key to the Highlands. On 17 January, the Jacobites dispersed a relief force under Henry Hawley at the Battle of Falkirk Muir but the siege itself made little progress.[60]
Hawley's forces were largely intact and advanced on Stirling again once Cumberland arrived in Edinburgh on 30 January, while many Highlanders had gone home after Falkirk; on 1 February, the siege was abandoned and the Jacobite main force retreated to Inverness.[75] Cumberland's army advanced along the coast, allowing it to be resupplied by sea, and entered Aberdeen on 27 February; both sides halted operations until the weather improved.[76]
A few French shipments evaded the Royal Navy's blockade but by spring, the Jacobites were short of both food and money to pay their men and when Cumberland left Aberdeen on 8 April, the leadership agreed giving battle was their best option. Arguments over the location stem from post-war disputes between supporters of Murray and O'Sullivan, largely responsible for selecting it, but defeat was a combination of factors.[77] In addition to superior numbers and equipment, Cumberland's troops had been drilled in countering the Highland charge, which relied on speed and ferocity to break the enemy lines. When successful it resulted in quick victories like Prestonpans and Falkirk, but if it failed, they could not hold their ground.[78]
The Battle of Culloden on 16 April, often cited as the last pitched battle on British soil,[79] lasted less than an hour and ended in a decisive government victory. Exhausted by a night march carried out in a failed attempt to surprise Cumberland's troops, many Jacobites missed the battle, leaving fewer than 5,000 to face a well-rested and equipped force of 7,000 to 9,000.[80]
Fighting began with an artillery exchange: that of the government was vastly superior in training and coordination, particularly as James Grant, an officer in the Irish Brigade who served as the Jacobite army's artillery colonel, was absent, having been wounded at Fort William. Charles held his position, expecting Cumberland to attack, but he refused to do so and unable to respond to the fire, Charles ordered his front line to charge. As they did so, boggy ground in front of the Jacobite centre forced them over to the right, where they became entangled with the right wing regiments and where movement was restricted by an enclosure wall.[81]
, where over 1,500 Jacobite survivors assembled after CullodenThis increased the distance to the government lines and slowed the momentum of the charge, lengthening their exposure to the government artillery, which now switched to grapeshot.[82] Despite this, the Highlanders crashed into Cumberland's left, which gave ground but did not break, while Loudon's regiment fired into their flank from behind the wall. Unable to return fire, the Highlanders broke and fell back in confusion; the north-eastern regiments and Irish and Scots regulars in the second line retired in good order, allowing Charles and his personal retinue to escape northwards.[83]
Troops that held together, like the French regulars, were far less vulnerable in retreat and many Highlanders were cut down by government
Lord Elcho later claimed to have told Charles he should "put himself at the head of the [...] men that remained to him, and live and die with them," but he was determined to leave for France.[87] After evading capture in the Western Highlands, Charles was picked up by a French ship commanded by Richard Warren on 20 September; he never returned to Scotland but the collapse of his relationship with the Scots always made this unlikely. Even before Derby, he accused Murray and others of treachery; these outbursts became more frequent due to disappointment and heavy drinking, while the Scots no longer trusted his promises of support.[88]
Aftermath
, on his way to London for trial and later executionAfter Culloden, government forces spent several weeks searching for rebels, confiscating cattle and burning non-juring Episcopalian and Catholic meeting houses.[24] The brutality of these measures was partly driven by a widespread perception on both sides that another landing was imminent.[89] Regular soldiers in French service were treated as prisoners of war and exchanged regardless of nationality, but 3,500 captured Jacobites were indicted for treason. Of these, 120 were executed, primarily deserters from government forces and members of the Manchester Regiment. Some 650 died awaiting trial, 900 were pardoned and the rest transported to the colonies.[90]
The Jacobite lords
The government limited confiscations of Jacobite property, since the experience of doing so after 1715 and 1719 showed the cost often exceeded the sales price.[94] Under the 1747 Vesting Act, the estates of 51 attainted for their role in 1745 were surveyed by the Court of Exchequer, and 41 forfeited.[95] The majority of these were either purchased or claimed by creditors, with 13 made crown land in 1755.[96] Under the 1784 Disannexing Act, their heirs were allowed to buy them back, in return for a total payment of £65,000.[97]
Once north of Edinburgh or inland from ports like Aberdeen, the movement of government troops was hampered by lack of roads or accurate maps of the Highlands.
The Jacobite cause did not entirely disappear after 1746, but the conflicting objectives of its participants ended the movement as a serious political threat. Many Scots were disillusioned by Charles' leadership while the decline in English Jacobitism was demonstrated by the lack of support from areas strongly Jacobite in 1715, such as Northumberland and County Durham.[102] Irish Jacobite societies increasingly reflected opposition to the existing order rather than affection for the Stuarts and were eventually absorbed by the Society of United Irishmen.[103]
In June 1747, D’Éguilles produced a report on the Rising that was critical of the Jacobite leadership in general, while his opinion of Charles was so negative that he concluded France might be better served by supporting a Scottish Republic.
Charles continued his attempts to reignite the cause, including making a secret visit to London in 1750, when he met supporters and briefly converted to the Non-Juring Anglican Communion.[f][106] In 1759, he met to discuss another invasion with Choiseul, then Chief minister of France, but the latter dismissed him as incapable through drink.[107] Despite Henry's urgings, Pope Clement XIII refused to recognise him as Charles III after their father died in 1766.[108] He died of a stroke in Rome in January 1788, a disappointed and embittered man.[40]
Legacy
, published 1906Writing in the mid-20th century, Scottish historian Winifred Duke claimed "...the accepted idea of the Forty-Five in the minds of most people is a hazy and picturesque combination of a picnic and a crusade ... in cold reality, Charles was unwanted and unwelcomed."[109] Modern commentators argue the focus on "Bonnie Prince Charlie" obscures the fact that many of those who participated in the Rising did so because they opposed the Union, not the Hanoverians, a nationalist aspect making it part of an ongoing political idea, rather than the last act of a doomed Highland cause and culture.[110] One example of how this influenced historical perspectives is the tendency to portray the Jacobite Army as composed largely of Gaelic-speaking Highlanders. As recently as 2013, the Culloden Visitors Centre listed Lowland regiments such as Lord Elcho's and Balmerino's Life Guards, Baggot's Hussars and Viscount Strathallan's Perthshire Horse as "Highland Horse".[111] Although a significant proportion were Highlanders, the army included many Lowland units, limited numbers of English, and several hundred French and Irish regulars.[112]
After 1745, the popular perception of Highlanders changed from that of "wyld, wykkd Helandmen", who were racially and culturally distinct from other Scots, to members of a noble warrior race.
Before 1707, Scots writers were part of a wider and often uniform European literary culture. The creation of a uniquely Scottish style began as a reaction to Union, with poets like Allan Ramsay using Scots vernacular for the first time.[117] After the Rising, reconciling the Jacobite past with a Unionist present meant focusing on a shared cultural identity, made easier by the fact it did not imply sympathy for the Stuarts; Ramsay was one of those who left Edinburgh when it fell to the Jacobites in 1745.[118] However, the study of Scottish history itself was largely ignored by schools and universities until the mid-20th century.[119]
The vernacular style was continued after 1745, most famously by
The Rising has been a popular topic for writers such as
Replacing a complex and divisive historical past with a simplified but shared cultural tradition led to the Victorian inventions of
Notes
- ^ Summarised in a British intelligence report of 1755; "...'tis not in the interest of France that the House of Stuart should ever be restored, as it would only unite the three Kingdoms against Them; England would have no exterior [threat] to mind, and [...] prevent any of its Descendants (the Stuarts) attempting anything against the Libertys or Religion of the People.
- ^ Scots made up less than five percent of the Jacobite court in 1696 and 1709: by far the largest element were English, followed by Irish and French.
- ^ In his Diary, Lord Elcho later wrote that "...the majority of the Council was not in favour of a march to England and urged that they should remain in Scotland to watch events and defend their own land. This was also the opinion in secret of the Marquis d’Éguilles; but the wishes of the Prince prevailed."[56]
- ^ Lovat was the last person executed by this method in Britain
- ^ He later returned to the Catholic church
- ^ In his novels, Scott provided a highly romanticised view of both English and Scottish history, which one contemporary described as "crude, uncertain and often false", but which still inform modern perspectives [121]
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- ^ Zimmerman 2003, p. 133.
- ^ Groves 2017, pp. 3–4.
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- ^ Szechi 1994, pp. 94–95.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 19–20.
- ^ Zimmerman 2003, p. 51.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 20.
- ^ McLynn 1982, pp. 97–133.
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- ^ a b Stephen 2010, pp. 55–58.
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- ^ McLynn 1982, pp. 102–103.
- ^ a b Shinsuke 2013, p. 37 passim.
- ^ Somerset 2012, p. 166.
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- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Strong 2002, p. 15.
- ^ a b Szechi & Sankey 2001, pp. 90–128.
- ^ Cruikshanks 2008, pp. 96–97.
- ^ Corp 2014, p. 29.
- ^ Stephen 2010, p. 49.
- ^ Harding 2013, p. 171.
- ^ a b Bromley 1987, p. 233.
- ^ a b Duffy 2003, p. 43.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 27.
- ^ Fremont 2011, p. 48.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 29.
- ^ Murray 1898, p. 93.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 55–56.
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- ^ Graham 2014, p. 2.
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- ^ a b c Pittock 2004.
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- ^ McCann 1963, p. 13.
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- ^ Oates 2007, p. 29-38.
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- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 95–97.
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- ^ Riding 2016, p. 195.
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- ^ Hopkins 1998, p. 1.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 185.
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- ^ Wemyss 2003, p. 81.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 175–176.
- ^ Stephen 2010, p. 53.
- ^ Wemyss 2003, p. 85.
- ^ Stephen 2010, pp. 60–61.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 200–201.
- ^ Duffy 2003, p. 223.
- ^ a b Riding 2016, pp. 209–216.
- ^ Gooch 2004.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 298–299.
- ^ Pittock 1998, p. 115.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 299–300.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 304–305.
- ^ Winchester 1870, p. 50.
- ^ Stephen 2010, p. 63.
- ^ Colley 2009, pp. 72–79.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 256.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 354.
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- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 328–329.
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- ^ Chambers 2018, pp. 353–354.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 377–378.
- ^ Pittock 2016, pp. 58–98 passim.
- ^ Reid 1996, p. 9.
- ^ Jacobite stories: Battle.
- ^ Gold & Gold 2007, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Royle 2016, p. 87.
- ^ Battle of Culloden.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 427.
- ^ Inventory of Historic.
- ^ Zimmerman 2003, p. 25.
- ^ Stuart 1746.
- ^ Elcho 2010, p. 207.
- ^ Riding 2016, p. 493.
- ^ Anderson 1902, p. 332.
- ^ Roberts 2002, pp. 196–197.
- ^ Lewis 1977, pp. 287–288.
- ^ Quynn 1941, pp. 236–258.
- ^ Lenman 1980, p. 27.
- ^ Szechi & Sankey 2001, pp. 110–111.
- ^ Smith 1975, pp. 7, 380–382.
- ^ Smith 1975, p. 7.
- ^ Millar 1907, p. xii.
- ^ Higgins 2014, p. 138.
- ^ Seymour 1980, pp. 4–9.
- ^ Devine 1994, p. 16.
- ^ Campsie 2017.
- ^ '45 in Northumberland.
- ^ Szechi 1994, p. 133.
- ^ McLynn 1980, pp. 177–181.
- ^ Riding 2016, pp. 496–497.
- ^ Robb 2013.
- ^ Zimmerman 2003, p. 273.
- ^ Blaikie 1916, p. Ixxxvi.
- ^ Duke 1927, p. 66.
- ^ Kidd 2013.
- ^ Pittock 2016, p. 135.
- ^ Aikman 2001, p. 93.
- ^ Devine 1994, p. 2.
- ^ Mackillop 1995, p. 2.
- ^ Mackillop 1995, pp. 103–148.
- ^ Streets 2010, p. 52.
- ^ Buchan 2003, p. 311.
- ^ Royle 2016, p. 25.
- ^ Kidd 1997, pp. 86–102.
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External links
- 1745 Rebellion on the UK Parliament website
- The Jacobite Rebellion, BBC Radio 4 discussion with Murray Pittock, Stana Nenadic & Allan Macinnes (In Our Time, May 8, 2003)
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