James M. Buchanan
James M. Buchanan | |
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Awards | Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (1986) |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc |
James McGill Buchanan Jr. (
Early life
Buchanan was born in
World War II
Buchanan attended the United States Naval Reserve Midshipmen's School in New York starting in September 1941. He was assigned to Honolulu, Hawaii in March 1942, where he served as an officer on Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's operations planning staff in the United States Navy.
Buchanan attributed his dislike of what he considered "Eastern elites" to his six months of Navy officer training in New York in 1941.[Works 2]: 49 He believed that there was overt discrimination against young men from the South or West in favor of those who had attended what he called establishment universities in the Northeast. In a 2011 interview, Buchanan said that out of twenty "boys from the establishment universities, 12 or 13 were picked against a background of a total of 600 [men]."[6]: 94–95 He was completing his last month of training in New York during the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.[Works 2]: 50 Buchanan said that "in balance" his work in operations planning during the war was "easy."[Works 2]: 67 He was discharged in November 1945.[Works 2]: 48
Education
With the support of his wife, Ann Bakke, and the generous G.I. Bill education subsidy available to war veterans, Buchanan applied to graduate school.[4]: 4 In his 1992 autobiography, Buchanan said that when he began his graduate studies in 1945 at the University of Chicago, he was unaware of how market-oriented the Chicago school of economics was. He stated that he was essentially socialist until he enrolled in a course taught by Frank Knight. Knight, who also taught leading economic thinkers such as Milton Friedman and George Stigler at the University of Chicago, was a founding member of the Mont Pelerin Society.[7] Within six weeks of starting his studies, Buchanan said he was "converted into a zealous advocate of the market order".[Works 2][4][8] Knight became Buchanan's "de facto" PhD supervisor,[9] and his 1948 dissertation, "Fiscal Equity in a Federal State", was heavily influenced by Knight. Buchanan did not consider himself as belonging to the Austrian or the Chicago schools of economics. But he was a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, and served as its president from 1984 to 1986 just before he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He did share many of their common beliefs.[1] As Buchanan puts it: "I certainly have a great deal of affinity with Austrian economics and I have no objections to being called an Austrian. Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises might consider me an Austrian but, surely some of the others would not." Buchanan went on to say that: "I didn't become acquainted with Mises until I wrote an article on individual choice and voting in the market in 1954. After I had finished the first draft I went back to see what Mises had said in Human Action. I found out, amazingly, that he had come closer to saying what I was trying to say than anybody else."[10]
It was also at Chicago that he first read and found enlightening the work of Swedish economist Knut Wicksell.[11] Photographs of Knight and Wicksell hung on his office walls ever after.
Academic career
After completing his PhD in 1948, Buchanan taught at the University of Tennessee as associate professor and later full professor from 1948 until 1951.[12] He was a professor of economics at Florida State University from 1951 until 1956 and served for two years as the department chair. From 1955 to 1956 he was a Fulbright Scholar in Italy.
He taught at the
In 1983 he became a professor at George Mason University where he remained until his retirement, after which he continued with emeritus status.[14]
Professional organizations
Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy
In 1956 Buchanan and G. Warren Nutter approached the president of the University of Virginia to discuss the creation of a new school within the university, "The Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy and Social Philosophy".[15] Nutter, who studied under Friedman and Knight at the University of Chicago in the late 1940s, was working at that time under the sponsorship of the Brookings Institution's National Bureau of Economic Research (INBR) on his 1962 book The Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union.[16] It was Thomas Jefferson who founded the University of Virginia in 1819 in Charlottesville, Virginia as a public research university. The next year the school was founded[17][18] with the intention of preserving a "social order built on individual liberty, and . . . as an educational undertaking in which students will be encouraged to view the organizational problems of society as a fusion of technical and philosophical issues."[15][19][16]
One of the Center's early publications that reached a wider audience was a 1959 report Buchanan co-authored with Nutter, "The Economics of Universal Education".[Works 3][20][21] In it they wrote that the, "case for universal education is self-evident: a democracy cannot function without an informed and educated citizenry. . . . If education is to be universal, compulsion must be exercised by government—that is, by the collective organ of society—since some parents might choose to keep their children out of school. For similar reasons, minimum standards of education must be determined by government. Otherwise, the requirement of education is empty and meaningless."[Works 3][15] Buchanan was not against "state participation in education" although he strongly opposed " state monopoly of education".[15]
Its publication provided the Center and its authors, their first opportunity to be involved in a major public policy issue related to constitutional reform.
In later years, Buchanan no longer held the same ideas on school vouchers as those expressed in the 1959 report. He cautioned in a 1984 letter to the
Public Choice Society and Public Choice journal
With the publication of The Calculus of Consent in 1962 and
Virginia school of political economy
Buchanan remained at the University of Virginia until 1968. The work of Buchanan, Nutter, and other colleagues including Tullock, Stigler, Ronald Coase, Alexandre Kafka, and Leland B. Yeager later came to be seen as the start of the Virginia school of political economy as separate from the Chicago school of economics.[28] Buchanan stated that Mancur Olson came up with the term some time after the Center for Study of Public Choice was founded at Virginia Tech.[27] In a 1997 interview with Reason, Coase discussed the atmosphere in the university's economics department in the 1960s, in which he and Buchanan, Tullock, and Nutter felt that their work was considered to be "disreputable" and they were considered to be "right-wing extremists." Coase stated that he believed there was general suspicion towards anyone who supported an unregulated free market at that time.[29]
Center for Study of Public Choice
In 1969, Buchanan, Tullock, and Charles J. Goetz established the Center for Study of Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI) in Blacksburg, Virginia with Buchanan as its first director.
In 1983, Buchanan relocated the entire Center for Study of Public Choice unit, which included its seven faculty members to George Mason University (GMU) in Fairfax, Virginia.[14] Buchanan complained to then-GMU economics department chair Karen Vaughn that VPI was losing its status as unique center for public choice.[30] Buchanan was offered an annual salary of over $100,000 at George Mason,[31]: 27 At the time, George Mason was a relatively unknown state university, having just gained independent status from the University of Virginia in 1972.[30] Buchanan was drawn to GMU's leadership.[31]: 27 Vaughn stated that she believed the addition of the Center contributed to GMU's rapid growth.[30] Over the next decades, GMU became the largest public university in Virginia.[32]
Economist
Other activities and associations
Buchanan was president of the Southern Economic Association in 1963 and of the Western Economic Association in 1983 and 1984, and vice president of the American Economic Association in 1971.[citation needed]
Buchanan was associated with the Indianapolis-headquartered Liberty Fund, a free-market think tank which was founded in 1960 by Pierre F. Goodrich. Goodrich became a member of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1953 and had formed friendships with Hayek, Mises, Friedman and others. The Liberty Fund hosted conferences and symposiums on Buchanan's economic policy, liberalism and liberty.[34]: 162 The entire collection of his publications are hosted on the Online Library of Liberty (OLL) site. The Liberty Fund also published The Collected Works of James Buchanan.[35]
Major research themes
Buchanan broad themes include
In 1948, Buchanan first read the Swedish economist, Wicksell's Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen 1896 essay, "A New Principle of Just Taxation." He translated it from German and in his 1986 Nobel Prize lecture Buchanan said that Wicksell was an "important precursor of modern public-choice theory."had informed his own concept of unanimity-voting.[Works 5][38] Wicksell investigated a mechanism for voting how public goods could be financed in order to ensure that the tax burden was fairly distributed.[Works 6][39][40][38] Wicksell applied the benefit principle to taxation.[Works 5] By using the mechanism of unanimity-voting, everyone involved would have a guarantee of receiving "benefits commensurate to their tax cost from any public good". Wicksell said that no would be able to complain if he were able to receive "a benefit which he himself considers to be (greater or at least) as great as the price he has to pay".[39]
Buchanan said that his 1949 paper, "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach" published in the Journal of Political Economy[Works 7] he was influenced by Wicksell. to improve the rules and structure of politics, and particularly to recognize that politicians behave like most people, according to their own self-interests.[27] It was a way of thinking about politics that was based on common sense reality, not romanticism. In that paper he called on economists to clarify their own assumptions about politics and to think about their political models before talking about "good taxation" and "good spending."[27] "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach" published in the Journal of Political Economy[Works 7] It contained core ideas that Buchanan continued to develop over his career which spanned six decades, according to his biographer Richard E. Wagner.[41][42] In his 1989 address on Buchanan's contributions, Tony Atkinson said that it "reads like a manifesto for his life's work."[43] In it Buchanan clarified that the democratic state is not a single decision-making unit as in a monarchy. In democratic societies, the state can only represent the collective will of the sum of its individual members.[43]
His 1950 article, "Federalism and Fiscal Equity"
In 1955 Buchanan spent the year in Italy reading the works of the neoclassical economist
In the late 1940s and early 1950s as Buchanan was developing his own thoughts on the concept of the state, Kenneth Arrow published his influential 1951 monograph, Social Choice and Individual Values.[43][47] which was the catalyst for debate on social choice. The monograph was based on ideas Arrow first developed in 1948 as a RAND Corporation intern and in his PhD dissertation in 1950 combining social ethics, voting theory and economics in his social choice theory.[37] Arrow examined the role of individual preferences in the process of collective decision-making regarding aggregate or group preferences, for example, in voting and establishing underlying constitutions for the common good.[48] Arrow concluded that it was generally impossible to assess the "common good", for example, the design of a social welfare function through a fair ranked voting electoral system because individual preferences within the aggregate differ.[47] The paradox is the impossibility of majority voting yielding a stable result or pareto efficiency with existing rules of the game. Buchanan critiqued Arrow's impossibility theorem or Arrow's paradox. The thesis in Arrow's 1951 book that "majority rule would not give you a political equilibrium" created a lot of debate.[27] Buchanan responded that his idea was anti-majoritaire—if that is what the preferences are, then in a democracy we ought to have a rotation, so there is not just one majority simply ruling. Most political scientists in the 1950s believed in majoritarian democracy as the ideal parliamentary model. Buchanan's ideal was more of a constitutional structure.[27] Buchanan described himself as a constitutional political economist who writes from an economic point of view within a structure of American politics that aligns with James Madison's vision of the ideal democratic parliamentary model, which was not a majority democracy.[27] In public choice theory, Buchanan raises concerns about minorities being exploited under permanent majorities
While in Italy on a Fulbright Scholarship in 1956 - 1957 he became aware of how his generation of Americans—those born in the decades after WWI—had a view of politics that was too romanticized. Italians took a more skeptical, realistic, and critical view of politics. When he returned to the US in 1956, he carried that skepticism with him. In 1958, Tullock took time off from his position at the U.S. Department of State that he had held since 1949, to do research at the University of Virginia focused on majority rule.[27] Buchanan described Tullock as a natural realist about politics; his skepticism had increased in Washington.[27]
Buchanan met Tullock, who had a law degree but no formal training in economics, when Tullock accepted a postdoctoral position at the University of Virginia in 1958.[49] Although Tullock's PhD was in law and he had little formal training in economics, the two complemented each other; Buchanan as the philosopher and Tullock the scientist.[37] Together, they set out to provide an "optimal set of the political rules of the game".[37][50]
In 1962, Buchanan and Tullock published
In 1967 Buchanan co-authored Public Debt in a Democratic Society with Wagner.[Works 14] Buchanan considered his work on public debt as an important extension of his work on public choice theory. Public choice theory examined political decision-making structures as applied to budget policy, specifically as related to fiscal deficit. Buchanan said that there was government overreach in totalitarian regimes but also in the 1960s in Western democratic welfare-state nations, such as President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society programs designed to eliminate poverty and racial injustice. As more people became critical of government programs during the 1970s, in his view public choice theory provided some common sense answers, as opposed to romance. He said that he did not want to "lead the way", he wanted to provide a way for people to "interpret better what they were seeing".[27] He described how politicians provide their constituents with programs that benefit them, paying for the new programs with deficit to avoid having to raise taxes to pay for them in order to remain in office. Public choice policies called for constitutional amendments to prevent the deficit from accelerating even more. In his 1986 chapter "Budgetary Bias in Post-Keynesian Politics" in Deficits, he wrote, "The most elementary prediction from public choice theory is that in the absence of moral or constitutional constraints democracies will finance some share of public consumption from debt issue rather than from taxation and that, in consequence, spending rates will be higher than would accrue under budget balance."[Works 15]: 471
In 1968, Buchanan left the University of Virginia and spent a year at the
Buchanan's 1969 work Cost and Choice[Works 17] is often overlooked for its contributions in defining the parameters of opportunity cost. In it, he writes that the costs to individuals determine what the price of a good or service is. For example, the physical work that is required to hunt an animal as well as the price of the tools necessary to hunt it and the time spent hunting all play a factor in the price an individual places on the meat. The asking price of the meat will vary from person to person because the input costs required for each person are not the same.
In his 1964 article "What Should Economists Do?", which was based on his 1963 address to the Southern Economic Association (SEA), Buchanan distinguished between economics and politics.[Works 18] The former studies "the whole system of exchange relationships" while the latter studies "the whole system of coercive or potentially coercive relationships".[52] One of Buchanan's definitive statements on the re-orientation of the two academic disciplines of economics and political science was found in this 1963 SEA address.[53] Buchanan told his contemporaries in the field of economics that
Michael Munger described three elements of Buchanan's concept of public choice theory—behavioural symmetry, methodological individualism, and politics as exchange, or "politics without romance".
In his 1966 publication Public Finance in a Democratic Process[Works 19] Buchanan began to develop applications based on The Calculus of Consent using a multidisciplinary approach through the lens of both economics and politics .[38]
Buchanan was largely responsible for the rebirth of political economy as a scholarly pursuit.
In his 1975 book, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, which has been described as his magnum opus, Buchanan examined the concept of a social contract.[36] In The Limits of Liberty Buchanan did support some redistribution; his proposed social contract of a "productive" state includes tax-financed goods and some social insurance. He felt this would have unanimous agreement.[Works 20]: 124 In the summer of 1975 at a Liberty Fund conference in Ohio with most of the economists in attendance saying there should be no estate tax, Buchanan passionately disagreed. He thought that there should be a 100% marginal tax on all estates over a relatively modest amount,[34]: 162 to prevent an aristocracy from forming in America and to ensure equal opportunity.[58]
Buchanan was a vocal critic of the 1994
Public choice theory
Buchanan is the chief architect and the leading researcher of
In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock cited Swedish economist Knut Wicksell's standpoint on public choice in their argument for the need for unanimous agreement on constitutional rules.[40] Anthony Atkinson cited the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences describing the significant role of Wicksell in the development of Buchanan's thinking.[43] It was Buchanan who translated Wicksell's A New Principle of Just Taxation from German in 1958.[43]: 6 [Works 21] Within the framework of public choice, they described the potential for logrolling as enhancing rather than reducing welfare.[61][Works 6] Logrolling refers to politicians' vote-trading on provisions as part of an endgame of achieving their political or economic goals.
According to a 1992 journal article by George Mason University economists,
In the Dictionary of Economics, Tullock said that public choice theory applies methodologies from economics to the study of political behavior.[65] Public choice theory assumes that people are mainly guided by self-interest, including politicians, bureaucrats, and government officials.[11] Public choice theory focuses on democratic decision-making process within the political realm. Buchanan used both fields of economics and political science to help develop his theory of public choice. The same principles used to interpret people's decisions in a market setting are applied to voting, lobbying, campaigning, and even candidates. Buchanan maintains that a person's first instinct is to make their decisions based upon their own self-interest, which varied from previous models where government officials acted in constituents' best interest. Buchanan explains public choice theory as "politics without romance" because, he says, many of the promises made in politics are intended to appear concerned with the interest of others, but in reality, are the products of selfish ulterior motives. According to this view, political decisions, on both sides of the voting booth, are rarely made with the intention of helping anyone but the one making the decision. Buchanan argues that the actions of voters and politicians can be predicted by analyzing their behaviors.
In the 1960s when Buchanan first began to formulate his public choice theory, he was one of the few, if not the only economist, who was critical of
Constitutionalism
Within
There was a long history of neoliberal economists in Chile even before
Awards
- 1986: Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for "development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision making"
- 2001: Honorary doctoral degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, in Guatemala City, Guatemala, for contribution to economics.[74]
- 2006 National Humanities Medal for his development of economic analysis of politics.[75]
Legacy
Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU) Honors College's Buchanan Fellowship program, named for Buchanan, is awarded to 20 first-year student at MTSU annually.[76] Additionally, MTSU's Buchanan Family Reading Room at the James E. Walker Library was funded with a gift by Buchanan's family to honor Buchanan and the contributions of the family as a whole to the state of Tennessee.[77]
In his 2017 publication, Richard Wagner described how Buchanan's scholarship continues to influence law, ethics, political science, and economics in the 21st century.[41]
Nicolás Cachanosky and Edward J. Lopez suggest that Buchanan's research can inform work on trade restrictions and populism in the twenty-first century.[53]
Buchanan is a central figure in the 2017 nonfiction book Democracy in Chains by Duke University professor and historian Nancy MacLean.[78] MacLean traced Buchanan's concept of power to the 1950s and 1960s. Buchanan had become concerned that the federal government was channeling too many resources to the public.[79] As he witnessed the federal government increasing its power, Buchanan sought ways to protect the wealthy from being forced to support programs that seemed to him to be a move towards socialism.[79] MacLean described how Buchanan and other libertarians seek to protect capitalism by preventing government overreach. MacLean described Buchanan's concept of human nature as "dismal" and that he believed that politicians and government workers are motivated by self-interest and that government would continue to increase in scale and power unless there were constitutional limits in place.[80] MacLean raised concerns that Buchanan and Charles Koch mutually supported one another to the detriment of democratic participation for all. Koch provided millions in funding to libertarian university programs and Buchanan provided the intellectual arguments from political economy to place limits on democracy.[80] MacLean's book became a catalyst for discussion online and in journals.[81] The New York Review of Books, Boston Review of Books, and Los Angeles Review of Books gave the book positive reviews. Her critics include David Bernstein who wrote a series of Washington Post opinion pieces as part of the Volokh Conspiracy blog.[82] In a 2018 Journal of Economic Literature review of MacLean's book, Jean-Baptiste Fleury and Alain Marciano said that MacLean misunderstood public choice theory and that she had overlooked some significant aspects of Buchanan's biography and thinking and had over-interpreted others.[81] MacLean, who spent years studying Buchanan's copious archives after his death, says that the influence of Buchanan's six decades of work on modern conservatism is not well-enough appreciated or understood by liberal politicians, economists, and journalists.[79]
University of Chicago economist Luigi Zingales has been influenced by public choice theory which provides a toolbox for understanding how the political system can be corrupted by powerful business interests.[83] His 2021 book, A Capitalism for the People: Recapturing the Lost Genius of American Prosperity, is a call for populist agenda that reflects a distrust of government and supports more competition and free markets. He suggests limiting regulations and relying on a "whistleblower reward system" .[84][85]
Personal life and death
Buchanan met Ann Bakke, who was of Norwegian descent, in Hawaii while they were both serving in the military during World War II. Bakke served with the Army Air Transport Command at Hickam Field as a secretary.[86]
They married on October 5, 1945, in San Francisco. Ann died in 2005. They had no children.[5]
In a 1986 Chicago Tribune interview Buchanan said, "I want a private sphere in which I am protected, where nobody can invade...I don't feel the need to be a part of a community or a team." According to a Washington Post obituarist he was not known for his warm personality, and that even his "staunchest admirers admitted that he was forbidding."[5] Even though he had a long career at George Mason University in Fairfax, Buchanan and his wife chose to spend most of their time a four-hour drive away on their 400-acre working farm near Blacksburg.[11] They had vegetable gardens and raised cattle.[5]
Buchanan died at their farm on January 9, 2013, at age 93.[11]
The New York Times obituary said that the Nobel Prize-winning economist who championed public choice theory influenced a "generation of conservative thinking about deficits, taxes and the size of government".[11] The Badische Zeitung (Freiburg) called Buchanan, who showed how politicians undermine fair and simple tax systems, the "founder of the new political economy".[87]
Selected publications
- Politics of Bureaucracy by Gordon Tullock, foreword by James M. Buchanan (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965)
- Academia in Anarchy (with Nicos E. Devletoglou), 1970
- Democracy in Deficit (with Richard E. Wagner), 1977
- Freedom in Constitutional Contract, 1978
- The Power to Tax (with Geoffrey Brennan), 1980
- The Reason of Rules (with Geoffrey Brennan), 1985
- Liberty, Market and State, 1985
- Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar), 2005
A listing of Buchanan's publications from 1949 to 1986 can be found at the Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1987, 89(1), pp. 17–37.
See also
Works
- ^ Buchanan, James M; Burton, John; Wagner, R.E. (1978a). The consequences of Mr. Keynes (PDF). Institute of Economic Affairs. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 28, 2020. Retrieved September 24, 2019.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-58544-603-2.
- ^ a b Buchanan, James M.; Nutter, G. Warren (1959). The Economics of Universal Education (unpublished monograph). Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy (Report). Buchanan House Archives. Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
- ^ Institute for Economic Affairs via Hoover Institution, Archive: Vouchers . . . Correspondence Buchanan Box 162.2, Stanford, California, 1984
- ^ a b Buchanan, James M. (December 8, 1986). "The Constitution of Economic Policy". Nobel Prize. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. Retrieved April 3, 2022.
- ^ OCLC 494115.
- ^ S2CID 154436270. Retrieved April 3, 2022.
- ^ a b Buchanan, James M. (September 1950). "Federalism and Fiscal Equity". American Economic Review. 40: 583–599.
- ^ a b Buchanan, James M. (1959) [September 1950]. "Federalism and Fiscal Equity". In Musgrave, Richard A.; Shoup, Carl S. (eds.). Readings in the economics of taxation. Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin.
{{cite book}}
:|journal=
ignored (help) - OCLC 750831024.
- ^ Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement. 1958.
{{cite book}}
:|work=
ignored (help) - ^ a b Buchanan, James M. (1960). "The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory". Fiscal Theory and Political Economy. Chapel Hill.
{{cite book}}
:|work=
ignored (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ OCLC 652228888.
- ISBN 978-0-8447-3055-4.
- ISBN 978-0-631-14918-7.
- ^ The Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company. 1968.
- ^ Buchanan, James M. (1969). Cost and Choice.
- S2CID 145706292. Retrieved April 3, 2022.
- ISBN 978-0-8078-1014-9.
- ISBN 978-0-226-07820-5.
- ^ Wicksell, Knut (1958). A New Principle of Just Taxation. Translated by James M. Buchanan. Musgrave and Peacock.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-255-36110-1.
- ISBN 978-0-86597-227-8.
- ^ a b Buchanan, James M. (1999). The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Vol. 1. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
References
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- ^ "Meet the Economist Behind the One Percent's Stealth Takeover of America". Institute for New Economic Thinking. Archived from the original on March 26, 2019. Retrieved April 25, 2020.
- ^ OCLC 24953375.
- ^ ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved April 4, 2022.
- ISBN 978-1-84844-694-6.
- ^ "F.A. Hayek". Mont Pelerin Society (MPS). Archived from the original on February 14, 2016. Retrieved April 4, 2022.
- ^ "Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates". Econ Journal Watch. Archived from the original on August 9, 2020. Retrieved February 17, 2016.
- SSRN 3722977. Retrieved April 4, 2022.
- Ludwig von Mises Institute. July 30, 2014. Archivedfrom the original on September 14, 2014. Retrieved July 15, 2017.
- ^ from the original on June 14, 2020. Retrieved August 25, 2016.
- ^ "Vita for Dr. James M. Buchanan". Retrieved April 4, 2022.
- ^ "About". Virginia Tech. Retrieved April 6, 2022.
- ^ S2CID 153671519.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Munger, Michael C. (June 29, 2017). "On the Origins and Goals of Public Choice: Constitutional Conspiracy?". The Independent Institute. Retrieved April 3, 2022.
- ^ OCLC 589727286.
- ^ "About the Center". The Center for Study of Public Choice. George Mason University (GMU). Retrieved April 5, 2022.
- ISBN 978-0-86597-520-0. Retrieved April 5, 2022.
- ^ Working Papers for Internal Discussion Only—General Aims, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1959
{{citation}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ a b c d e f g Hershman, James H. Jr. (November 9, 2020). "James M. Buchanan, Segregation, and Virginia's Massive Resistance". Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved April 8, 2022.
- S2CID 241726550. Retrieved April 11, 2022.
- ^ a b Trevor Burrus and Aaron Ross Powell (hosts), Richard E. Wagner (Department of Economics; George Mason University, Mercatus Center) (October 5, 2017). The Real James Buchanan. Free Thoughts. CATO institute Libertarianism.org. Retrieved April 8, 2022.
- ^ "Massive Resistance". Encyclopedia Virginia. Retrieved April 8, 2022.
- ^ Hershman, James Howard (January 1, 1978). A rumbling in the museum : the opponents of Virginia's massive resistance (PhD). University of Virginia. Retrieved April 8, 2022.
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- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Interview with James Buchanan". Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 1995. Retrieved April 10, 2022.
- – via ProQuest.
- ^ Hazlett, Thomas W. (January 1, 1997). "Looking for Results: An Interview with Ronald Coase". Reason. Retrieved April 6, 2022.
- ^ ISSN 0890-913X.
- ^ a b Center for Study of Public Choice Annual Report (1985) (Report). Annual report. p. 43.
- ^ Barakat, Matthew (April 30, 2018). "Documents show ties between university, conservative donors". AP NEWS. Fairfax, Virginia. Retrieved April 7, 2022.
- ^ "About the James Buchanan Center". February 17, 2003. Archived from the original on February 17, 2003. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
- ^ ISBN 9781461459095. Archivedfrom the original on April 18, 2021. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
- ^ "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan in 20 vols. | Online Library of Liberty". oll.libertyfund.org. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
- ^ ISBN 978-94-009-0901-4. Retrieved April 8, 2022.
- ^ S2CID 238043786. Retrieved April 5, 2022.
- ^ a b c d e "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1986". Nobel Prize. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
- ^ S2CID 154281229.
- ^ S2CID 153358039. Retrieved April 3, 2022.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-4985-3907-4.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-88975-638-0. Retrieved April 3, 2022.
- ^ JSTOR 3440481. Retrieved April 9, 2022.
- ISBN 0-87014-303-4. Archived from the original(PDF) on April 10, 2022.
- ^ "Brookings Institution: History, Research, & Influence". Britannica. Retrieved April 10, 2022.
- ^ Wagner, Richard E. "Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance" (PDF). Retrieved April 9, 2022.
- ^ ISBN 0-300-01364-7.
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- ^ S2CID 154198573. Retrieved April 6, 2022.
- ^ Hayek, Friedrich (1941). Pure Theory of Capital.
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- Political Economy", in Against the Grain: Dissent in Economics, ed. S. Press and R. Holt (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998), pp. 21-39.
- ^ Amartya Sen, in Economics and Sociology, ch. 14, Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 263
- ^ R. Swedberg, Economics and Sociology: On Redefining Their Boundaries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 263.
- ^ "Where Economics and Philosophy Meet: Review of The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy with responses from the authors", The Economic Journal, 116 (June), 2006
- ^ Vallier, Kevin (2021). "Neoliberalism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved April 7, 2022.
- JSTOR 2118030.
- ^ Buchanan, James M. (April 25, 1996). "Quotation of the day". American Enterprise Institute (AEI) via The Wall Street Journal via.
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Further reading
- Atkinson, Anthony B."James M. Buchanan's Contributions to Economics". Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1987, vol. 89, no. 1, pp. 5–15.
- Boettke, P.J., Candela, R.A. Where Chicago meets London: James M. Buchanan, Virginia Political Economy, and cost theory. Public Choice (2020).
- Boettke, P., Kroencke, J. The real purpose of the program: a case study in James M. Buchanan's efforts at academic entrepreneurship to “save the books” in economics. Public Choice (2020).
- Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., and Tollison, R.D. (eds.) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics: Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan. Berlin: Springer, 2002. ISBN 9783642075513
- Horn, Karen Ilse. "Roads to Wisdom, Conversations with Ten Nobel Laureates in Economics",94-95 Edward Elgar, 2011.
- Kasper, Sherryl. The Revival of Laissez-Faire in American Macroeconomic Theory: A Case Study of Its Pioneers, Chapter 6. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002. ISBN 9781840646061
- ISBN 9781412965804
- Marciano, Alain. 2020. "Buchanan, Popular Myths, and the Social Responsibility of Economists." Journal of the Southern Economic Association.
- ISBN 9781101980965
- Meadowcroft, John. James M. Buchanan. London: Continuum, 2011. ISBN 9781501301513
- Munger, M. Moral community and moral order: Buchanan's theory of obligation. Public Choice (2020).
- Palda, Filip. A Better Kind of Violence: Chicago Political Economy, Public Choice, and the Quest for an Ultimate Theory of Power. Kingston: Cooper-Wolfling, 2016. ISBN 9780987788078
- Pittard, Homer. The First Fifty Years, pp. 136, 173. Murfreesboro, TN: Middle Tennessee State College, 1961.
- Reisman, David A. The Political Economy of James Buchanan. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990. ISBN 9780333476390
- Vanberg, V.J. J. M. Buchanan's contractarian constitutionalism: political economy for democratic society. Public Choice (2020).
External links
- Quotations related to James M. Buchanan at Wikiquote
- James M. Buchanan papers, C0246, Special Collections Research Center, George Mason University Libraries.
- Biography at GMU
- James M. Buchanan publications indexed by Microsoft Academic
- Ideological Profile from Econ Journal Watch
- Appearances on C-SPAN
- James M. Buchanan, The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, vol. 7 (The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan) [1975]
- Member of the Board of Advisors at The Independent Institute
- YouTube Reflections on the Life and Work of James Buchanan
- "James M. Buchanan (1919–2013)". Library of Economics and Liberty (2nd ed.). Liberty Fund. 2013.
- 'The Hobbes Problem: From Machiavelli to Buchanan' by Deirdre McCloskey
- James M. Buchanan Jr. on Nobelprize.org
- Works by or about James M. Buchanan at Internet Archive