Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi
Akagi conducting flight operations, April 1942
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Class overview | |
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Operators | Imperial Japanese Navy |
Preceded by | Hōshō |
Succeeded by | Kaga |
Built | 1920–1927 |
In service | 1927–1942 |
In commission | 1927–1942 |
Completed | 1 |
Lost | 1 |
History | |
Empire of Japan | |
Name | Akagi |
Namesake | Mount Akagi |
Ordered | 1920 |
Builder | Kure Naval Arsenal |
Cost | ¥53 million ($36.45 million) |
Laid down | 6 December 1920 |
Launched | 22 April 1925 |
Commissioned | 25 March 1927 |
Reclassified | 21 November 1923 as an aircraft carrier |
Refit | 24 October 1935 – 31 August 1938 |
Stricken | 25 September 1942 |
Fate | Damaged by aircraft during the Battle of Midway and scuttled, 5 June 1942 |
General characteristics (after 1938 modernization) | |
Class and type | None |
Type | Aircraft carrier |
Displacement | |
Length | 260.67 m (855 ft 3 in) |
Beam | 31.32 m (102 ft 9 in) |
Draught | 8.71 m (28 ft 7 in) |
Installed power |
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Propulsion | 4 shafts; 4 geared steam turbines |
Speed | 31.5 knots (58.3 km/h; 36.2 mph) |
Range | 10,000 nmi (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph) |
Complement | 1,630 |
Armament |
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Armor | |
Aircraft carried |
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Service record | |
Part of: |
First Air Fleet (Kido Butai) |
Commanders: |
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Operations: |
Akagi (Japanese: 赤城, "red castle") was an
Akagi's aircraft served in the
After a brief refit, Akagi and three other fleet carriers of the
Design
Construction and launch
Akagi was laid down as an
Construction of Akagi as an aircraft carrier began on 19 November 1923. Amagi's hull was damaged beyond economically feasible repair in the Great Kantō earthquake of 1 September 1923 and was broken up and scrapped. Akagi, the only remaining member of her class, was launched as a carrier on 22 April 1925 and commissioned at Kure Naval Arsenal on 25 March 1927, although trials continued through November 1927. She was the second carrier to enter service with the IJN, after Hōshō and before Kaga (which replaced Amagi).[1][6]
Since Akagi was initially conceived as a battlecruiser, the prevailing
Akagi was completed at a length of 261.21 meters (857 ft)
Flight deck arrangements
Akagi and Kaga were completed with three superimposed flight decks, the only carriers ever to be designed so. The British carriers converted from "large light cruisers", Glorious, Courageous, and Furious, each had two flight decks, but there is no evidence that the Japanese copied the British model. It is more likely that it was a case of convergent evolution to improve launch and recovery cycle flexibility by allowing simultaneous launch and recovery of aircraft.[10] Akagi's main flight deck was 190.2 meters (624 ft 0 in) long and 30.5 meters (100 ft) wide,[11] her middle flight deck (beginning right in front of the bridge) was only 15 meters (49 ft 3 in) long and her lower flight deck was 55.02 meters (180 ft 6 in) long. The utility of her middle flight deck was questionable as it was so short that only some lightly loaded aircraft could use it, even in an era when the aircraft were much lighter and smaller than during World War II.[12] The upper flight deck sloped slightly from amidships toward the bow and toward the stern to assist landings and takeoffs for the underpowered aircraft of that time.[13]
As completed, the ship had two main hangar decks and a third auxiliary hangar, giving a total capacity of 60 aircraft. The third and lowest hangar deck was used only for storing disassembled aircraft. The two main hangars opened onto the middle and lower flight decks to allow aircraft to take off directly from the hangars while landing operations were in progress on the main flight deck above. The upper and middle hangar areas totaled about 80,375 square feet (7,467.1 m2), the lower hangar about 8,515 square feet (791.1 m2). No catapults were fitted. Her forward aircraft lift was offset to starboard and 11.8 by 13 meters (38 ft 9 in × 42 ft 8 in) in size. Her aft lift was on the centerline and 12.8 by 8.4 meters (42 ft 0 in × 27 ft 7 in). The aft elevator serviced the upper flight deck and all three hangar decks. Her arresting gear was an unsatisfactory British longitudinal system used on the carrier Furious that relied on friction between the arrester hook and the cables. The Japanese were well aware of this system's flaws, as it was already in use on their first carrier, Hōshō, but had no alternatives available when Akagi was completed. It was replaced during the ship's refit in 1931 with a Japanese-designed transverse cable system with six wires and that was replaced in turn before Akagi began her modernization in 1935 by the Kure Model 4 type (Kure shiki 4 gata). There was no island superstructure when the carrier was completed; the carrier was commanded from a space below the forward end of the upper flight deck.[12][14] The ship carried approximately 150,000 US gallons (570,000 L) of aviation fuel for her embarked aircraft.[15]
As originally completed, Akagi carried an air group of 28 Mitsubishi B1M3 torpedo bombers, 16 Nakajima A1N fighters and 16 Mitsubishi 2MR reconnaissance aircraft.[8]
Armament and armor
Akagi was armed with ten 50-caliber 20 cm 3rd Year Type No. 1 guns, six in casemates aft and the rest in two twin-gun turrets, one on each side of the middle flight deck. They fired 110-kilogram (240 lb) projectiles at a rate of 3–6 rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 870 m/s (2,900 ft/s); at 25°, this provided a maximum range between 22,600 and 24,000 meters (24,700 and 26,200 yd). The turrets were nominally capable of 70° elevation to provide additional anti-aircraft fire, but in practice the maximum elevation was only 55°. The slow rate of fire and the fixed 5° loading angle minimized any real anti-aircraft capability.[16] This heavy gun armament was provided in case she was surprised by enemy cruisers and forced to give battle, but her large and vulnerable flight deck, hangars, and superstructure made her more of a target in any surface action than a fighting warship. Carrier doctrine was still evolving at this time and the impracticality of carriers engaging in gun duels had not yet been realized.[17][Note 1]
The ship carried dedicated anti-aircraft armament of six twin 45-caliber
Akagi's waterline armored belt was reduced from 254 to 152 mm (10 to 6 in) and placed lower on the ship than originally designed. The upper part of her torpedo bulge was given 102 mm (4 in) of armor. Her deck armor was also reduced from 96 to 79 mm (3.8 to 3.1 in).[21] The modifications improved the ship's stability by helping compensate for the increased topside weight of the double hangar deck.[13]
Propulsion
In Akagi's predecessor, Hōshō, the hot exhaust gases vented by swivelling funnels posed a danger to the ship, and wind-tunnel testing had not suggested any solutions. Akagi and Kaga were given different solutions to evaluate in real-world conditions. Akagi was given two funnels on the starboard side. The larger, forward funnel was angled 30° below horizontal with its mouth facing the sea, and the smaller one exhausted vertically a little past the edge of the flight deck. The forward funnel was fitted with a water-cooling system to reduce the turbulence caused by hot exhaust gases and a cover that could be raised to allow the exhaust gases to escape if the ship developed a severe list and the mouth of the funnel touched the sea. Kaga adopted a version of this configuration when she was modernized during the mid-1930s.[22]
Akagi was completed with four Gihon geared
Early service
Akagi joined the
Akagi was reduced to second-class reserve status on 1 December 1931 in preparation for a short refit in which her arresting gear was replaced and her radio and ventilation systems were overhauled and improved. After completion of the refit, Akagi became a first-class reserve ship in December 1932. On 25 April 1933, she resumed active service and joined the
At this time, the IJN's carrier doctrine was still in its early stages. Akagi and the IJN's other carriers were initially given roles as tactical force multipliers supporting the fleet's battleships in the IJN's "
Reconstruction
Akagi's modernization involved far less work than that of Kaga, but took three times as long due to financial difficulties related to the Great Depression.[28] The ship's three flight decks were judged too small to handle the larger and heavier aircraft then coming into service.[29] As a result, the middle and lower flight decks were eliminated in favor of two enclosed hangar decks that extended almost the full length of the ship. The upper and middle hangar areas' total space increased to about 93,000 square feet (8,600 m2); the lower hangar remained the same size.[9] The upper flight deck was extended to the bow, increasing its length to 249.17 meters (817 ft 6 in) and raising aircraft capacity to 86 (61 operational and 25 in storage). A third elevator midships, 11.8 by 13 meters (38 ft 9 in × 42 ft 8 in) in size, was added. Her arrester gear was replaced by a Japanese-designed, hydraulic Type 1 system with 9 wires.[9][30] The modernization added an island superstructure on the port side of the ship, which was an unusual arrangement; the only other carrier to share this feature was a contemporary, the Hiryū. The port side was chosen as an experiment to see if that side was better for flight operations by moving the island away from the ship's exhaust outlets.[29] The new flight deck inclined slightly fore and aft from a point about three-eighths of the way aft.[31]
Akagi's speed was already satisfactory and the only changes to her machinery were the replacement of the mixed coal/oil-fired boilers with modern oil-fired units and the improvement of the ventilation arrangements. Although the engine horsepower increased from 131,200 to 133,000, her speed declined slightly from 32.5 to 31.2 knots (60.2 to 57.8 km/h; 37.4 to 35.9 mph) on trials because of the increase in her displacement to 41,300 long tons (42,000 t). Her bunkerage was increased to 7,500 long tons (7,600 t) of fuel oil which increased her endurance to 10,000 nautical miles (18,520 km; 11,510 mi) at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph). The rear vertical funnel was changed to match the forward funnel and incorporated into the same casing.[30][32]
The two gun turrets on the middle flight deck were removed and 14 twin
The ship's anti-aircraft guns were grouped amidships and placed relatively low on the hull. Thus, the guns could not be brought to bear directly forward or aft. Also, the island blocked the forward arcs of the port battery. As a result, the ship was vulnerable to attack by dive bombers. The ship's 12 cm 10th Year Type guns were scheduled to be replaced by more modern 12.7 cm (5 in) Type 89 mounts in 1942. The anti-aircraft sponsons were to be raised one deck to allow them some measure of cross-deck fire as was done during Kaga's modernization. However, the ship was lost in combat before the upgrade could take place.[36]
Several major weaknesses in Akagi's design were not rectified. Akagi's aviation fuel tanks were incorporated directly into the structure of the carrier, meaning that shocks to the ship, such as those caused by bomb or shell hits, would be transmitted directly to the tanks, resulting in cracks or leaks. Also, the fully enclosed structure of the new hangar decks made firefighting difficult, at least in part because fuel vapors could accumulate in the hangars. Adding to the danger was the requirement of the Japanese carrier doctrine that aircraft be serviced, fueled, and armed whenever possible on the hangar decks rather than on the flight deck. Furthermore, the carrier's hangar and flight decks carried little armor protection, and there was no redundancy in the ship's fire-extinguishing systems. These weaknesses would later be crucial factors in the loss of the ship.[37]
Lead-up to World War II
Akagi's modernization was completed on 31 August 1938. She was reclassified as a first reserve ship on 15 November, but did not rejoin the First Carrier Division until the following month. In her new configuration, the carrier embarked 12 Mitsubishi A5M Type 96 "Claude" fighters with four disassembled spares, 19 Aichi D1A "Susie" dive bombers with five spares, and 35 Yokosuka B4Y "Jean" horizontal/torpedo bombers with 16 spares.[38] She sailed for southern Chinese waters on 30 January 1939 and supported ground operations there, including attacks on Guilin and Liuzhou, until 19 February, when she returned to Japan. Akagi supported operations in central China between 27 March and 2 April 1940. She was reclassified as a special purpose ship (Tokubetse Ilomokan) on 15 November 1940, while she was being overhauled.[39][40]
The Japanese experiences off China had helped further develop the IJN's carrier doctrine. One lesson learned in China was the importance of concentration and mass in projecting naval air power ashore. Therefore, in April 1941, the IJN formed the
The Japanese doctrine held that entire carrier air groups should not be launched in a single massed attack. Instead, each carrier would launch a "deckload strike" of all its aircraft that could be spotted at one time on each flight deck. Subsequent attack waves consisted of the next deckload of aircraft. Thus, First Air Fleet air attacks would often consist of at least two massed waves of aircraft. The First Air Fleet was not considered to be the IJN's primary strategic striking force. The IJN still considered the First Air Fleet an integral component in the Combined Fleet's Kantai Kessen or "decisive battle" task force centered on battleships.[42][43][44] Akagi was designated as the flagship for the First Air Fleet, a role the ship retained until her sinking 14 months later.[45]
Although the concentration of so many fleet carriers into a single unit was a new and revolutionary offensive strategic concept, the First Air Fleet suffered from several defensive deficiencies that gave it, in Mark Peattie's words, a "'glass jaw': it could throw a punch but couldn't take one."[46] Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire-control systems had several design and configuration deficiencies that limited their effectiveness. Also, the IJN's fleet combat air patrol (CAP) consisted of too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including lack of radar. In addition, poor radio communications with the fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control of the CAP. Furthermore, the carriers' escorting warships were not trained or deployed to provide close anti-aircraft support. These deficiencies, combined with the shipboard weaknesses previously detailed, would eventually doom Akagi and other First Air Fleet carriers.[47]
World War II
Pearl Harbor and subsequent operations
In preparation for the attack, the ship was anchored at Ariake Bay, Kyushu beginning in September 1941 while her aircraft were based at Kagoshima to train with the other 1st Air Fleet air units for the Pearl Harbor operation. Once preparations and training were completed, Akagi assembled with the rest of the First Air Fleet at Hitokappu Bay in the Kuril Islands on 22 November 1941. The ships departed on 26 November 1941 for Hawaii.[48]
Commanded by Captain
In January 1942, together with the rest of the First and Fifth Carrier Divisions, Akagi supported the invasion of Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago, as the Japanese moved to secure their southern defensive perimeter against attacks from Australia. She provided 20 B5Ns and 9 Zeros for the initial airstrike on Rabaul on 20 January 1942. The First Carrier Division attacked Allied positions at nearby Kavieng the following day, of which Akagi contributed 9 A6M Zeros and 18 D3As. On the 22nd, Akagi's D3As and Zeros again attacked Rabaul before returning to Truk on 27 January.[51] The Second Carrier Division, with Sōryū and Hiryū, had been detached to support the invasion of Wake Island on 23 December 1941 and did not reunite with the rest of the carrier mobile striking force until February 1942.[52]
Akagi, along with Kaga and the carrier
Indian Ocean raid
On 26 March, Akagi set sail for the
On 19 April 1942, while near Taiwan during the transit to Japan, Akagi, Sōryū, and Hiryū were sent in pursuit of the American carriers
Midway
Concerned by the US carrier strikes in the Marshall Islands,
On 25 May 1942, Akagi set out with the Combined Fleet's carrier striking force in the company of carriers Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū, which constituted the First and Second Carrier Divisions, for the attack on Midway Island. Once again, Nagumo flew his flag on Akagi. Because of damage and losses suffered during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Fifth Carrier Division with carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku were absent from the operation. Akagi's aircraft complement consisted of 24 Zeros, 18 D3As, and 18 B5Ns.[62][Note 2]
With the fleet positioned 250 nautical miles (460 km; 290 mi) northwest of Midway Island at dawn (04:45 local time) on 4 June 1942, Akagi's portion of the 108-plane combined air raid was a strike on the airfield on Eastern Island with 18 dive bombers escorted by nine Zeros. The carrier's B5Ns were armed with torpedoes and kept ready in case enemy ships were discovered during the Midway operation. The only loss during the raid from Akagi's air group was one Zero shot down by AA fire and three damaged; four dive bombers were damaged, of which one could not be repaired.[64] Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the US Navy had discovered the Japanese MI plan by breaking the Japanese cipher and had prepared an ambush using its three available carriers, positioned northeast of Midway.[65]
One of Akagi's torpedo bombers was launched to augment the search for any American ships that might be in the area.[Note 3] The carrier contributed three Zeros to the total of 11 assigned to the initial combat air patrol over the four carriers. By 07:00, the carrier had 11 fighters with the CAP which helped to defend the Kido Butai from the first US attackers from Midway Island at 07:10.[67]
At this time, Nagumo's carriers were attacked by six US Navy
At 07:15, Nagumo ordered the B5Ns on Kaga and Akagi rearmed with bombs for another attack on Midway itself. This process was limited by the number of ordnance carts (used to handle the bombs and torpedoes) and ordnance elevators, preventing torpedoes from being struck below until after all the bombs were moved up from their magazine, assembled, and mounted on the aircraft. This process normally took about an hour and a half; more time would be required to bring the aircraft up to the flight deck, warm up and launch the strike group. Around 07:40, Nagumo reversed his order when he received a message from one of his scout aircraft that American warships had been spotted. Three of Akagi's CAP Zeroes landed aboard the carrier at 07:36. At 07:40, her lone scout returned, having sighted nothing.[70][Note 4]
Sinking
At 07:55, the next American strike from Midway arrived in the form of 16 Marine
Akagi reinforced the CAP with launches of three Zeros at 08:08 and four at 08:32.[76] These fresh Zeros helped defeat the next American air strike from Midway, 11 Vought SB2U Vindicators from VMSB-241, which attacked the battleship Haruna starting around 08:30. Three of the Vindicators were shot down, and Haruna escaped damage.[77] Although all the American air strikes had thus far caused negligible damage, they kept the Japanese carrier forces off-balance as Nagumo endeavored to prepare a response to news, received at 08:20, of the sighting of American carrier forces to his northeast.[78]
Akagi began recovering her Midway strike force at 08:37 and finished shortly after 09:00.
Shortly afterwards 14 Devastators from VT-6 from the carrier Enterprise, led by Eugene E. Lindsey, attacked. Lindsey's aircraft tried to sandwich Kaga, but the CAP, reinforced by an additional eight Zeros launched by Akagi at 09:33 and 09:40, shot down all but four of the Devastators, and Kaga dodged the torpedoes. Defensive fire from the Devastators shot down one of Akagi's Zeros.[81][82][Note 6]
Minutes after the torpedo plane attacks, American carrier-based dive bombers arrived over the Japanese carriers almost undetected and began their dives. It was at this time, around 10:20, that in the words of Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, the "Japanese air defenses would finally and catastrophically fail."[85] Twenty-eight dive bombers from Enterprise, led by C. Wade McClusky, began an attack on Kaga, hitting her with at least four bombs. At the last minute, one of McClusky's elements of three bombers from VB-6, led by squadron commander Richard Best who deduced Kaga to be fatally damaged, broke off and dove simultaneously on Akagi. At approximately 10:26, the three bombers hit her with one 1,000-pound (450 kg) bomb and just missed with two others. The first near-miss landed 5–10 m (16–33 ft) to port, near her island. The third bomb just missed the flight deck and plunged into the water next to the stern. The second bomb, likely dropped by Best, landed at the aft edge of the middle elevator and detonated in the upper hangar. This hit set off explosions among the fully armed and fueled B5N torpedo bombers that were being prepared for an air strike against the American carriers, resulting in an uncontrollable fire.[86][Note 7]
At 10:29, Aoki ordered the ship's magazines flooded. The forward magazines were promptly flooded, but the aft magazines were not due to valve damage, likely caused by the near miss aft. The ship's main water pump also appears to have been damaged, greatly hindering fire fighting efforts. On the upper hangar deck, at 10:32 damage control teams attempted to control the spreading fires by employing the one-shot CO2 fire-suppression system. Whether the system functioned or not is unclear, but the burning aviation fuel proved impossible to control, and serious fires began to advance deeper into the interior of the ship. At 10:40, additional damage caused by the near-miss aft made itself known when the ship's rudder jammed 30 degrees to starboard during an evasive maneuver.[89]
Shortly thereafter, the fires broke through the flight deck and heat and smoke made the ship's bridge unusable. At 10:46, Nagumo transferred his flag to the light cruiser Nagara.[Note 8] Akagi stopped dead in the water at 13:50 and her crew, except for Aoki and damage-control personnel, was evacuated. She continued to burn as her crew fought a losing battle against the spreading fires.[92][Note 9] The damage-control teams and Aoki were evacuated from the still floating ship later that night.[96][Note 10]
At 04:50 on 5 June, Yamamoto ordered Akagi scuttled, saying to his staff, "I was once the captain of Akagi, and it is with heartfelt regret that I must now order that she be sunk."[98] Destroyers Arashi, Hagikaze, Maikaze, and Nowaki each fired one torpedo into the carrier and she sank, bow first, at 05:20 at 30°30′N 178°40′W / 30.500°N 178.667°W. Two hundred and sixty-seven men of the ship's crew were lost, the fewest of any of the Japanese fleet carriers lost in the battle.[98][Note 11] The loss of Akagi and the three other IJN carriers at Midway, comprising two thirds of Japan's total number of fleet carriers and the experienced core of the First Air Fleet, was a crucial strategic defeat for Japan and contributed significantly to Japan's ultimate defeat in the war.[100] In an effort to conceal the defeat, Akagi was not immediately removed from the Navy's registry of ships, instead being listed as "unmanned" before finally being struck from the registry on 25 September 1942.[101]
Wreck survey
On 20 October 2019, the Director of Undersea Operations for
The wreck of Akagi was visited and photographed by the research vessel EV Nautilus in September 2023. [103]
Notes
- ^ The United States Navy did much the same with the provision of four twin 8-inch (203 mm) gun turrets on their Lexington-class carriers.[18]
- ^ Six of the Zeros were intended to be stationed on Midway after the invasion and belonged to the 6th Air Group. At least three of these six aircraft were used for combat operations by the carrier's crew during the resulting battle.[63]
- ^ Akagi's torpedo-bomber scout plane was assigned a search line of 181 degrees from the mobile striking force out to 300 nautical miles.[66]
- ^ This recorded return time for Akagi's scout aircraft is odd since all the other carrier striking force scout planes had been assigned 600-mile search patterns and would not return for another one and a half to two hours.[71]
- ^ To this day there is much confusion about VMSB-241 at Midway. At that time, the squadron was in transition from the obsolete SB2U Vindicator to the modern SBD-2 Dauntless and flew both aircraft during the battle.[73]
- ^ At 10:15, a torpedo bomber had departed the carrier on a scouting mission, but turned back, for unknown reasons, shortly thereafter. The aircraft was recovered by Hiryū and took part in that carrier's second strike against Yorktown.[83]
- ^ American carrier dive bomber doctrine dictated that when two squadrons were presented with two priority targets, in this case Kaga and Akagi, the first squadron on scene was to attack the more distant target, in this case, Akagi. Apparently unfamiliar with this doctrine, McClusky led his squadron, the first to arrive, at Kaga. Best, following the doctrine, also initially went after Kaga. Only after seeing McClusky's squadron dive past him did Best decide to take his squadron after Akagi. However, most of VB-6 stuck with their original target, so only the lead element took part.[87] Shortly before the dive bomber attack, Akagi had recovered five of its CAP Zeros. One Zero relaunched soon afterwards at 10:25, just as Best's bombers were entering their dives on his ship. The other recently landed Zeroes had probably already been taken to the hangar deck. There may have been two or three other Zeroes spotted on the flight deck when the ship was hit by Best's bomb.[67][88]
- ^ Nagumo and his staff were forced to evacuate through the forward windows of the bridge by rope. Nagumo's chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka, badly sprained both ankles and was burned during the evacuation.[90] At 11:00, seven of Akagi's airborne CAP Zeros were recovered by Hiryū just after she had launched her first strike against the US carriers.[91]
- ^ Destroyers Arashi and Nowaki were directed to stand by the carrier throughout the rest of the day and through the night as she burned uncontrollably. After Kaga sank, Hagikaze and Maikaze joined Akagi's escorts.[93] The carrier's engines, for unknown reasons, restarted around 12:30 and slowly moved the ship, still with a jammed rudder, in a large circle to starboard until they failed again at 13:50. Also, at 13:00, the aft magazines were finally flooded.[94] A large explosion occurred at 15:00, blowing open the bulkhead overhanging the anchor deck.[95]
- ^ Aoki refused to abandon ship with the damage control teams at 22:00 and had himself tied to the anchor capstan. Two hours later, the carrier's senior staff, accompanied by Captain Kosaku Ariga, commander of Destroyer Division 4, reboarded the carrier. Ariga, who was senior to Aoki, ordered him to abandon ship. Aoki was the only Japanese fleet carrier commander to survive the battle. He retired from the navy in October 1942 but was recalled to service a year later, and survived the war.[97]
- ^ Of the ship's fatalities, 115 were engineers, giving that department a 36 per cent casualty rate (the ship had 303 total personnel assigned to engineering), the highest on the carrier. Seven of the carrier's aircrew members were killed, also the fewest of any of the four fleet carriers lost in the battle. Other crewmembers killed included 72 seamen, 68 mechanics, one maintenance man, and five clerks. After returning to Japan, some of the carrier's injured survivors were quarantined in hospitals for almost a year.[99]
Footnotes
- ^ a b Lengerer, p. 128
- ^ Peattie, p. 54; Watts, p. 171; Jentschura, Jung and Mickel, p. 36; Parshall and Tully, pp. 6–7
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 7, 535
- ^ Gibbs, p. 217
- ^ Gibbs & Tamura, pp. 192, 194
- ^ Watts, p. 65; Jentschura, Jung and Mickel, p. 36
- ^ Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, p. 8
- ^ a b Lengerer, p. 129
- ^ a b c d Parshall and Tully, p. 463
- ^ Brown, p. 2
- ^ Peattie, p. 229
- ^ a b Lengerer, p. 130
- ^ a b Peattie, p. 54
- ^ Peattie, pp. 54–55; Parshall and Tully, pp. 462–463
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 477
- ^ Campbell, pp. 185–188
- ^ Peattie, pp. 53, 55
- ^ Gardiner and Gray, p. 110
- ^ Lengerer, p. 131
- ^ Campbell, p. 194
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 128, 130
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 130–131, 137; Peattie, p. 54
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 129, 131
- ^ Tully; Peattie, pp. 72, 323; Hata and Izawa, p. 20; Lengerer, pp. 130, 170–171; Hoyt, pp. 60–63.
- ^ Peattie, pp. 72, 323; Hata and Izawa, p. 20; Lengerer, pp. 130, 170–171
- ^ Peattie, pp. 72–76; Stille, p. 13; Goldstein and Dillon, pp. 76–78
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 130, 170–171
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 466
- ^ a b Parshall and Tully, p. 7
- ^ a b Lengerer, pp. 137–138
- ^ Watts, pp. 171–172; Jentschura, Jung and Mickel, p. 44
- ^ Watts, pp. 172–173
- ^ Lengerer, p. 139
- ^ Campbell, p. 200
- ^ Jentschura, Jung and Mickel, p. 44
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 138
- ^ Peattie, pp. 65, 70, 159; Stille, pp. 15–16; Willmott, p. 415; Parshall and Tully, p. 245
- ^ Hata and Izawa, p. 20
- ^ a b Lengerer, p. 171
- ^ Hata and Izawa, p. 11
- ^ Lengerer, p. 171; Parshall and Tully, pp. 82, 86, 137–138, and 416; Peattie, pp. 124–125, 147–53; Tully; Stille, pp. 13–14; Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 101–106
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 86–87
- ^ Peattie, p. 152
- ^ Goldstein and Dillon, pp. 78–80
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 266–267
- ^ Peattie, p. 159
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 85, 136–145; Peattie, pp. 155–159; Stille, pp. 14–15, 50–51
- ^ Hata, Izawa & Shores, p. 151
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 172, 174–175; Parshall and Tully, p. 131; Werneth, pp. 16–17, 274; Hata and Izawa, p. 21; Evans and Fuchida, p. 54; Prange, "Dec 7", p. 265
- ^ Prange, "At Dawn", pp. 199, 258, 266, 365, 390; Prange, "Dec 7", pp. 87, 192, 321; Evans and Fuchida, pp. 42–43
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 175–176
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 11
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 176–177, 305–307; Gill, p. 14; Dull, pp. 57–58
- ^ Shores, et al., pp. 395, 403–404, 406, 413, 421–426
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 145, 549
- ^ Lengerer, pp. 306, 308–309
- ^ Lengerer, p. 319; Tully; Parshall and Tully, p. 42
- ^ Tully
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 12
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 10, 88
- ^ Stille, p. 22
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 3, 10, 450
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 90, 149
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 112, 129, 204; Werneth, p. 20
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 151, 154; Stille, p. 59
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 107–111
- ^ a b Parshall and Tully, p. 500
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 151–152; Lundstrom, p. 337
- ^ Prange, Goldstein and Dillon, pp. 207–212; Parshall and Tully, pp. 149–152; "Office of Naval Intelligence Combat Narrative: "Midway's Attack on the Enemy Carriers"". Retrieved 28 January 2012.
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 156–159, 500
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 550
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 181
- ^ Condon, p. 13
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 176
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 178, 180
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 508
- ^ Lundstrom, p. 338
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 183–188
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 154–155
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 205–209
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 213–214
- ^ Stille, p. 62
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 265, 522
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 239; Cressman, et al., p. 103
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 219
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 239–242
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 228, 239
- ^ Werneth, p. 92
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 254–259; Peattie, p. 159; Werneth, p. 24
- ^ Dull, p. 161; Parshall and Tully, p. 260
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 264, 500–501
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 276–278, 299–300
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 267, 339
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 286–288
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 309–310
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 281, 340–341
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 340–341, 569
- ^ a b Parshall and Tully, p. 353
- ^ Parshall and Tully, pp. 281, 386–387, 417, 476, 561
- ^ Fuchida and Okumiya, p. 231; Parshall and Tully, pp. 419, 421
- ^ Parshall and Tully, p. 388
- ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 21 October 2019.
- ^ "The aircraft carrier Akagi has been seen for the first time in 81 years since it sank in the Battle of Midway". 12 September 2023.
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External links