Jiffs
Jiffs was a
Background
The prestige of the
Intelligence summaries initially did not believe the INA to be a substantial force or have any purpose more than propaganda and
Around this time, the
Wren report
In December 1942, a certain Lt. Col G.W Wren attached to
Wren's analysis of the problems facing the British Indian Army, though highly controversial, was supported by later recommendations derived from Noel Irwin's reports following the Eastern Armies debacle at Arakan. Irwin's analysis further supported the notion that although the desertions by the Indian soldiers at Arakan were alarming, it was a purely military problem, and could be addressed to a large extent by making a declaration of a free or freer India similar to the US declaration for Philippines. However, Churchill's, as well as Linlithgow's opposition and outright hostility to any declaration that committed towards India's independence meant the Wren report went unimplemented.[4]
Jiffs campaign
By 1943 the INA is known to have been "target of utmost value". Wavell assigned a whole separate department to deal with it.[5] Not willing to commit to a declaration of independence, and thus unable to implement the Wren report, The Raj chose instead to oppose the INA and the IIL strategy by employing propaganda measures that would ensure that little about the INA and Bose came to be known in India, and what did seep through was stressed to be as derisive, monstrous and loathsome as could be possible.[6] The psychological warfare section of the India Command, known as GSI(q), was entirely dedicated to the JIFF propaganda under Lt Colonel Hunt working with Cawthorne.[5][7]
JIFFs
The first of the measures taken was to emphasise a news blackout on the existence of the INA from newspapers, book or any publications. Not until after a few days after the fall of Rangoon two years later was this ban to be lifted.[8] Among other policies adopted at the time were the decisions to only refer to the INA "Traitor Army", which was later superseded by the use of the term Jiffs.
Josh
At the same time, policies were adopted that saw the formation of "Josh Groups" to preserve morale of the Indian troops and engage greater co-operation among European officers and Indian troops.[9] Amongst other decision, meetings of the Josh groups were used as a platform to circulate stories of Japanese atrocities on Prisoners of War and the occupied countries, as well as associate the INA troops to these atrocities.[10][11] Every commanding officer of every British-Indian Army unit were instructed to create a Josh group. Through the activities of these groups, any antipathy the Sepoy may have for "Britishers" would be paled by the hatred that was to be fanned for the Japanese. As Gajendra Singh notes, the work of Josh groups aimed to:[12]
- Build in every Indian soldier the firm belief that the Japanese and everyone who worked with the Japanese were the Sepoy's own "personal enemies"....
- Introduce stories of British victories against the Japanese, which would turn the conversation around to why Japanese were enemies of India and how they would be defeated.
- Introduce stories of bravery of Indian soldiers in comradeship-in-arms with allies.
- Use entertainment, radio, drama and picture-layouts to impress on the Sepoy that his chief enemy in existence is the Japanese.
- Provide sound information to the Indian soldiers to counteract Japanese and INA propaganda.
Indian Captains or majors gave anti-Japanese and anti-Bose lectures in Urdu and Gurkhali to the troops, and emphasised India's stake in Britain's war aims.[13] "Jap-orientation courses" were organised for Indian and British officers, under the stewardship of Indian officers led by "Jick" Rudra, Lt Himmatsinhji and Ali Noon (brother of Feroz Khan Noon.
CSDIC
In addition to implementing the Josh measures, the CSDIC(I) was expanded in November 1942 to identify men of the British-Indian Army who may already have been affected by the INA propaganda, and to interrogate captured INA men.[14]
Impact
These measures, along with measures to improve morale in the recruiting areas in Indian hinterland, began having palpable results. This was particularly so as victories began to be registered against the Japanese by the end of 1944.[13] By the end of March 1945, the Sepoy of the British-Indian Army was reinvigorated, and perceived the men of the INA little more than savage turncoats and cowards. Senior British officers in the Indian army considered them "rabble".[15] Historians Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper mention that many a times, the Sepoys in the field units shot captured or wounded INA men, relieving their British officers of the complex task of formulating a formal plan for captured men.[16] After Singapore was retaken, Mountbatten ordered the INA's war memorial to its fallen soldiers to be blown up.[17]
Cultural references
Notes
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 423
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 409
- ^ a b c Fay 1993, p. 410
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 416,417
- ^ a b Aldrich 2000, p. 159
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 417
- ^ Aldrich 2000, p. 163
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 418
- ^ Christopher Bayly (26 November 2003) The Nation Within: British India at War 1939-1945 p.17 British Academy; retrieved 28 August 2023
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 422
- ^ Singh 2005, p. 162
- ^ Singh 2005, pp. 163–164
- ^ a b Bayly & Harper 2005, p. 305
- ^ Singh 2005, p. 164
- ^ Toye 1959, pp. Mason, in foreword pp-xix 41
- ^ Marston 2014, p. 118
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 523
References
- Aldrich, Richard J. (2000), Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-64186-1.
- Bayly, Christopher; Harper, Tim (2005), Forgotten Armies: Britain's Asian Empire and the War with Japan, Penguin Books (UK) Ltd, ISBN 978-0-14-192719-0
- Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942–1945, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, ISBN 0-472-08342-2.
- Marston, Daniel (2014), The Indian Army and End of the Raj, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-89975-8.
- Raj, James L. (1997) Making and unmaking of British India, Abacus.
- Singh, Gajendra. (2005), The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy, Bloomsbury, ISBN 9781780938202.
- Sundaram, Chandar (1995), "A Paper Tiger: the Indian National Army in Battle, 1944-1945", War & Society, 13 (1): 35–59, .
- Toye, Hugh (1959), The Springing Tiger: A Study of the Indian National Army and of Netaji, Allied Publishers, ISBN 978-81-8424-392-5.