Joseph Gallieni
Joseph Gallieni | |
---|---|
112th Minister of War | |
In office 29 October 1915 – 16 March 1916 | |
President | Raymond Poincaré |
Prime Minister | Aristide Briand |
Preceded by | Alexandre Millerand |
Succeeded by | Pierre Roques |
Personal details | |
Born | Versailles, French Republic | 24 April 1849
Nationality | French |
Spouse | Marthe Savelli |
Children | Théodore François Gaëtan Gallieni |
Alma mater | |
Military service | |
Allegiance | |
Branch/service | French Army |
Years of service | 1868 – 1916 |
Rank | Division general[a] |
Commands |
|
Battles/wars | Franco-Prussian War World War I |
Joseph Simon Gallieni (24 April 1849 – 27 May 1916) was a French military officer, active for most of his career as a military commander and administrator in the
He was recalled from retirement at the beginning of the
From October 1915 he served as Minister of War, resigning from that post in March 1916 after criticizing the performance of the French Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Joffre (formerly his subordinate, earlier in their careers), during the German attack on Verdun. He died later that year and was made Marshal of France posthumously in 1921.
Early life and career
Gallieni was born in 1849 at
He was educated and a hard-working student at the
Gallieni fought at
Colonial Service
He was promoted to
In 1888 he was appointed to the War College. In 1892-6 he served as a colonel in
In 1896 he was promoted to General and made Governor of Madagascar, then a new French possession, where the French had just been defeated[
In 1905 Gallieni defended the code de l’indigenat (the right of French officials to mete out summary punishment, including corporal punishment and confiscation of property, to individuals and to entire villages), as it administered punishment more arbitrarily and swiftly than would be possible under due legal process.[22]
Return to France
In 1905 Gallieni was appointed Military Governor of Lyon and commandant of the Army of the Alps (XIV Corps). Also in 1906 he became a member of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre (the Superior War Council, a body of senior generals chaired by the President).[23][24]
General
Following Michel's removal Gallieni, who was the preferred choice of Prime Minister Caillaux, declined the job of Army Chief of Staff.[26] This was partly because of scruples after having forced Michel out, partly because of age—he was two and a half years away from retirement—and partly because the Metropolitan Army might resent a colonial soldier getting the job ("une question de bouton"). His former subordinate Joffre was appointed instead.[27][28]
Pre-World War I
Gallieni commanded
Like a number of officers with colonial experience, Gallieni wanted the French army to give up the pantalon rouge (red trousers worn by French soldiers, allegedly as a boost to morale) and adopt a less conspicuous uniform. This was vetoed on the grounds that dull uniforms might be confused with those of the enemy and might turn the army into a citizen militia like the Boers.[31]
At the 1911 manoeuvres Gallieni used air reconnaissance to capture a colonel of the Supreme War Council and his staff.[32] He expressed reservations about the limited offensive strategy. His views on fortifications, artillery, and use of information obtained from aviation and intelligence were seen as unusual views for a colonial soldier.[33]
In the same year, Gallieni was considered the logical choice for supreme commander of the French Army, but because of advanced age and poor health, he declined in favour of Joffre.[34]
His date of retirement is given as February[35] or April 1914.[36] His wife died in early summer 1914.[37]
Before the war he wrote of Joffre in his diary, "When I was riding I passed him in the bois [woods] today—on foot as usual—how fat and heavy he is; he will hardly last out his three years."[38] He warned Joffre, correctly as it would turn out, that the Germans would come west of the Meuse in strength (i.e. make an enveloping move deep into Belgium, rather than a shallow incursion through the south-east corner of Belgium and down through the Ardennes).[39]
First World War
The Marne
Gallieni was designated as Joffre's successor "in case of emergency" on 31 July.[40] Joffre refused to have him at his headquarters, saying "He is difficult to place. I have always been under his orders. Il m’a toujours fait mousser [He always riled me]."[41] On 14 August, as the Lorraine offensive was beginning, Gallieni visited Joffre at the insistence of War Minister Adolphe Messimy, who felt intimidated by Joffre. Messimy imagined that Joffre would be more likely to listen to his former superior, but he was quickly palmed off onto the staff officer General Belin and his deputy Berthelot.[42][43]
Military Governor of Paris
As a condition of becoming
On 28 August the "Zone of Armies" was extended to cover the Paris suburbs. From 10 am to 10:15 am Gallieni held his one and only Council of Defence, at which his military and civil cabinets, standing up and without discussion, were made to sign the order placing Paris in a state of defence. He sacked two generals in his first two days.[47]
On 2 September, the anniversary of the
Army of Paris,
Residents of Paris,
The members of the Government
of the Republic have left Paris to give
a new impulse to the national defense.
I have received the mandate to defend Paris
against the invader.
This mandate, I shall carry out to the end.
Paris, 3 September 1914
The Military Governor of Paris,
Commanding the Army of Paris,
GALLIENI
Gallieni believed that Joffre's strategy of retreating behind the Seine was "divorced from reality" as the Germans would not allow his forces enough time to rally. He spent the night of 2/3 September at his new HQ at Lycee Victor-Duruy, expecting a German attack the next day. On the morning of 3 September he learned that von Kluck was marching southeast across Paris, offering his flank to a French counterattack.[55][56] The first public proclamation on the morning of 3 September promised to defend Paris "to the last extremity." That morning Gallieni set engineers and civilian labourers to work cutting down woods and trees, and preparing bridges and buildings for demolition to clear lines of sight for guns. For three days concrete was poured and barbed wire strung up. Even the Eiffel Tower was prepared for demolition. Paris had 2,924 guns, ranging from 155mm to 75mm. Hospitals and fire departments put on alert. Gas for three months of electricity was stockpiled, along with bread for 43 days, salt for 20 days and meat for 12 days. Pigeons were brought under state control for carrying messages. Lt-Col Dreyfus rejoined the artillery. Civilian paniquards were encouraged to leave and reconnaissance patrols were set up.[57][58][59]
Planning the counterattack
On the night of 3–4 September Joffre sent a handwritten note to Gallieni, wanting Maunoury's Sixth Army to push east along the north bank of the Marne, although not specifying a date. This was in line with his modification of Instruction General No 4 (2 September), envisaging a giant pocket from Paris to Verdun, of which he enclosed copies to Gallieni.[60]
Gallieni decided that it was "vital to act quickly" so as not to leave Paris uncovered. At 09:10 on 4 September, based on the previous day's reports of Paris aviators, which he had passed on to Joffre, and on his own authority, he sent orders to Maunoury to be ready to move his army that afternoon (now reinforced with Drude's 45th Infantry Division) and to be ready to come to Paris for a conference. Having first informed
Joffre's reply, saying he preferred the southern option (which would take a day longer as it forced
In the absence of news from Franchet d'Esperey, Joffre ordered Major Gamelin to draft orders for Maunoury to attack south of the Marne on 7 September. That evening Gallieni, who returned to Paris find Joffre's message from earlier in the day and a message from Wilson, insisted on speaking to Joffre personally on the telephone, informing him that it was too late to cancel the movement of Maunoury's Army. Joffre agreed to bring forward the Allied offensive to 6 September and to have Sixth Army attack north of the Marne instead, later writing that he had done so reluctantly as Maunoury would probably make contact with the Germans on 5 September, but that an extra day would have left the Germans in a more "disadvantageous" position. Tuchman argues that he may simply have been swayed by the dominant personality of Gallieni, his former superior. At 8:30 pm Gallieni ordered the attack by Maunoury's Army, which was in fact already under way. At 10 pm Joffre issued General Order No 6, ordering a General Allied Offensive.[68][69][70][71]
Taxicab Army and the Battle of the Ourcq
On 5 September Gallieni informed Maunoury that there was to be no retreat and issued secret orders for the destruction of important parts of Paris, including the Pont Neuf and the Pont Alexandre III.[72]
On 7 September Gallieni, concerned that with Maunoury's Sixth Army fighting out in the open, Paris was now vulnerable, telegraphed the government in Bordeaux to discuss the possible evacuation of the civilian population from the Paris suburbs, and ordered
It was Gallieni's decision to send 103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments (5 battalions, part of Trentinian's 7th Infantry Division, itself part of IV Corps; most of 7th Infantry Division, including artillery, had been sent to the front by rail and truck the previous night) to the front on the night of 7/8 September, in taxicabs commandeered the previous evening. The division's attack failed completely so the taxicab troops had even less impact than sometimes supposed. Although "great publicity for Gallieni; militarily it was insignificant" in Herwig's view. Upon seeing the "taxicab army" ferrying troops to the front, Gallieni made one of the most oft-quoted remarks of the First World War: "Eh bien, voilà au moins qui n'est pas banal!" ("Well, here at least is something out of the ordinary!").[76][77][78]
Learning of Gallieni's contingency plans to evacuate Paris the previous day, Joffre telegraphed Millerand (8 September) demanding that he cancel Gallieni's "dangerous" message, and insisting that Gallieni was under his orders and had no business communicating directly with the government.[79] On 8 September Gallieni ordered Maunoury, under heavy pressure from von Kluck, to hold his ground. Joffre gave permission for Maunoury to pull back his left if necessary. The Germans, concerned at the gap between their First and Second Armies, began to pull back on 9 September, giving the Allies a strategic victory in the Battle of the Marne.[80]
After the Marne
When the German warships Goeben and Breslau went to Constantinople, Gallieni proposed attacking the Turkish straits.[81]
By early December 1914 some of Gallieni's supporters were suggesting that he be appointed Commander-in-Chief in Joffre's place, or be made Minister of War, or both.[82]
Gallieni was an early supporter of some kind of expeditionary force to the Balkans.[83] Early in 1915 Gallieni supported the proposal of Franchet d’Esperey and Aristide Briand (Justice Minister) for an expedition to Salonika, which he hoped would detach first Turkey then Austria-Hungary, leaving Germany "doomed." President Poincare came out in favour of such a scheme, over Joffre's opposition, on 7 January 1915.[84]
Minister of War
Appointment
With
Since July 1915 Joffre had been demanding that he be appointed commander-in-chief over all French forces, including those at the Dardanelles and Salonika. By November 1915 President Poincare was persuaded, and Briand, initially reluctant because of the difficulty of defending Gallieni's inclusion in his new ministry, agreed and on his first day in office asked Poincare to help him persuade Gallieni to accept Joffre's enhanced role. Gallieni agreed and wrote to Joffre—having first shown the letter to Briand—assuring him that "you can count on me." Briand had the two men meet and shake hands.[86][87]
At the meeting of the Superior Council of Defence (24 November 1915) Joffre had Briand address the demarcation of his own and Gallieni's authority, and objected to the Council discussing operational matters, threatening to resign if they attempted to interfere with his "liberty." Joffre met with Poincare and Briand both before and after the meeting to discuss the issue. Gallieni complained bitterly in his diary about the politicians’ unwillingness to stand up to Joffre. On 1 December Poincare and Briand met with Gallieni. They rejected the proposal prepared by his staff to vest authority in the Minister of War, Briand objecting that he would be obliged to answer questions in the Chamber about operational matters. Gallieni agreed that Joffre be commander-in-chief, with de Castelnau—who was soon sidelined—as his chief of staff, and under the War Minister's orders. A Presidential Decree of 2 December 1915 made Joffre "Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies" (generalissimo) over all theatres apart from North Africa. After considerable discussion this was approved by the Chamber of Deputies by 406-67 on 9 December.[88][89]
Policies
Gallieni cleared out soldiers from cushy jobs—three Paris theatres had been directed by Army officers. He authorised the renewed use of black African troops—50,000 in total—on the Western Front.[90] He introduced foyers du soldat—waiting rooms for soldiers in transit at railway stations.[91]
Although Gallieni supported the
With evacuation of the Gallipoli bridgeheads under discussion, Gallieni was willing to divert troops there from Salonika for one last attempt.
Resignation
Gallieni made an effort to unite soldiers and politicians, and to establish a working relationship in which he concentrated on supplying resources (not dissimilar to the role to which Kitchener was restricted in the UK from the end of 1915).[97] However, Gallieni had prostate cancer, with pain making him less tolerant of criticism at a time when political disquiet was growing after the failure of the Second Battle of Champagne, especially the failed attack on Hartmannswillerkopf and its subsequent total loss.[98][99]
In Clayton's view, Gallieni may well have been sceptical of Joffre's plans for a massive Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, to be accompanied by Italian and Russian offensives, as floated at the Chantilly meeting in 6–8 December 1915.[100] There was also friction over Gallieni's assertion of his right to appoint generals, Joffre's practice of communicating directly with the British generals rather than going through the War Ministry, and Gallieni's maintaining contacts with generals whom Joffre had replaced.[101]
In autumn 1915 Lt-Colonel Driant, a member of the Chamber of Deputies and commander of a chasseurs brigade, complained to Gallieni of how Joffre had been removing guns and garrisons from Verdun and even preparing some forts for demolition. Joffre was furious and disputed Gallieni's right to comment.[102][103] Driant, who had served at Verdun, was a member of the Army Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. The Council of Ministers discussed his reports and President Poincare asked Gallieni to investigate. Gallieni wrote to Joffre (16 or 18 December 1915) expressing concern at the state of trenches at Verdun and elsewhere on the front—in fact matters were already being taken in hand at Verdun.[104]
The political atmosphere was poisonous after the opening of the German attack at Verdun (21 February). Rumours circulated in Paris that Joffre had ordered the abandonment of Verdun at the end of February 1916 when the Germans first attacked. Gallieni demanded to see all paperwork from the period, but Joffre had made no such order in writing, merely despatching de Castelnau to assess the situation. Gallieni launched an angry report at the Council of Ministers on 7 March—read in his usual precise way—criticising Joffre's conduct of operations over the last eighteen months and demanding ministerial control, then resigned. Gallieni was falsely suspected of wanting to launch a military takeover of the government. Poincare wrote that Gallieni was trying to force Joffre's resignation, although it is unclear whether he was specifically trying to do so. Briand knew that publication of the report would damage morale and might bring down the government. Gallieni was persuaded to remain in office until a replacement had been designated and approved.[105][106]
Rocques was appointed as his successor after it had been ensured that Joffre had no objections.[107] This would be the last attempt to assert ministerial control over the army until Clemenceau became Prime Minister late in 1917.[108]
Later life
The strain of high office having broken his already fragile health, Joseph Gallieni died in May 1916.
Gallieni's Memoirs were published posthumously in 1920.[109]
He was posthumously made
Assessments
Clayton describes him as a dry precise man, a secular republican (views which influenced his colonial policy) but one who kept aloof from politics.[112] Herwig describes him as "formidable" and "France’s most distinguished soldier" whose "physical appearance alone commanded respect": he was of straight bearing and always wore full dress uniform.[113]
By the time Gallieni complained about Joffre's handling of Verdun, there was already public debate, much of it politically motivated, about which of them had "won" the
Ethnology
From the beginning of his colonial career he became interested in ethnology. He amassed a large collection of objects from
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Shepherd HatMHNT
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Saber and its sheathMHNT
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MHNT
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Ankle bracelets. Culture DanMHNT
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Pair of sandals (MHNT
Works by Joseph Gallieni
- Voyage au Soudan Français, 1879-1881, Paris, Hachette, 1885, avec 140 gravures dessinées sur bois par Édouard Riou
- Deux campagnes au Soudan français, 1886-1888, Paris, Hachette, 1891
- Trois colonnes au Tonkin, 1894-1895, 1899
- Rapport d’ensemble sur la pacification, l’organisation et la colonisation de Madagascar, 1896-1899, Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle, 1900
- Madagascar de 1896 à 1905, Tananarive : Impr. officielle, 1905, 2 vol.
- Neuf ans à Madagascar, 1906
- Mémoires du Général Galliéni - Défense de Paris (25 août - 11 septembre 1914), Paris, Payot et Cie, 1920[120]
- Les Carnets de Galliéni, publiés par son fils Gaëtan Galliéni, avec des notes de Pierre-Barthélemy Gheusi, Paris, Albin Michel, 1932
References
- ^ "Gallieni, Joseph Simon | Encyclopedia.com". www.encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 136–137
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ISBN 9782907016131.
- ^ PenseeCourtemanche (12 June 2017). "Joseph Simon Gallieni (1849-1916)". webAfriqa (in French). Retrieved 27 January 2024.
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 226
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 339–340
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ISBN 978-0-19-166209-6.
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 136–137
- ISBN 978-0-521-22803-9.
- ^ Aldrich 1996, p. 63
- S2CID 154508657.
- ^ Aldrich 1996, p. 106
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Aldrich 1996, p. 214
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 136–137
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 10, 14
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 136–137
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 48
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 14–15
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 41
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 181
- ^ Clayton 2003, 38
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 261
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ "Joseph-Simon Gallieni | Colonial administrator, Governor of Madagascar | Britannica". www.britannica.com. 23 May 2023. Retrieved 15 July 2023.
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 181
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 339–340
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 340
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 136-137
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 82
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 184 literally: "he has always made me froth"
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 233
- ^ Clayton 2003, p. 47
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 82–84
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 53–57
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 399
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 364-365
- ^ Greenhalgh 2014, pp. 44–46
- ^ Greenhalgh 2014, pp. 44–46
- Paris had been besieged and eventually taken by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 392–394, 397
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 537
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 85
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 226–227
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 399
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 53–57
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 53–57
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 397
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 226–227
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 87
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 408–409
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 86–89
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 227
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 228
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 87–89
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 411–412
- ^ Senior 2012, p. 188
- ^ Tuchman 1962, pp. 416–417
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 229
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 87–90
- ^ Senior 2012, pp. 190–191
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 419
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 254
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 111
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 253
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 53–57
- ^ Senior 2012, pp. 253–254, 375
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 248, 262
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 254
- ^ Herwig 2009, p. 263
- ^ Tuchman 1962, p. 161
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 151
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 204
- ^ Palmer 1998, p. 29
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 226–229
- ^ Doughty’s account is sourced to Gallieni’s carnets — the wording implies, without explicitly saying so, that he had already sent the letter to Joffre by the time he showed it to Poincare.
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 229–231
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 231–232
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 82–83
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 82–83
- ^ Clayton 2003, p. 88
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 226–227, 232
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 232
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 82–83
- ^ Palmer 1998, p. 47
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 236–237
- ^ Clayton 2003, p. 88
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 97–98
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 284–285
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 82–83
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 97–98
- ^ Sumner 2014, p. 97
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 97–99
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 264, 266
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 97–98
- ^ Doughty 2005, pp. 272, 284–285
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 285
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 97–98
- ^ Senior 2012, p. 381
- doi:10.1086/531320. Archived from the originalon 21 November 2013.
- ^ "Ministère de la défense | République de Côte d'Ivoire".
- ^ Clayton 2003, pp. 215–216
- ^ Herwig 2009, pp. 136–137
- ^ Greenhalgh 2014, pp. 131–132
- ^ Churchill, Winston. 1923. The World Crisis
- ^ Senior 2012, p. 379
- ^ André Adamlien (1966). Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée 1(1): 254–258.
- ^ Doughty 2005, p. 97
- ^ "Mémoires du Maréchal Galliéni - Histoire - Les Éditions Blanche de Peuterey". www.peuterey-editions.com. Retrieved 3 March 2024.
- ^ "Mémoires du Maréchal Galliéni - Galliéni". peuterey-editions.com (in French). Retrieved 21 September 2018.
Notes
- ^ Marshal of France is a dignity and not a rank.
Further reading
- Cassar, George H. (2011). Lloyd George at War, 1916-18. Anthem Press, London. ISBN 978-0-857-28392-4.
- Clayton, Anthony (2003). Paths of Glory. Cassell, London. ISBN 0-304-35949-1.
- ISBN 978-0-674-02726-8.
- Greenhalgh, Elizabeth (2005). Victory Through Coalition. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-09629-4.
- Greenhalgh, Elizabeth (2014). The French Army and the First World War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60568-8.
- ISBN 1-85409-102-6
- Herwig, Holger (2009). The Marne. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8129-7829-2.
- Palmer, Alan (1998). Victory 1918. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-84124-6.
- Prete, Roy (2009). Strategy And Command, 1914. McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 978-0-7735-3522-0.
- Sumner, Ian (2012). They Shall Not Pass: The French Army on the Western Front 1914-1918. Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-848-84209-0.
- Tuchman, Barbara (1962). August 1914. Constable & Co. ISBN 978-0-333-30516-4.
External links
- Newsreel of the British Pathé: Gallieni visits a hospital (c. 1914)
- Newspaper clippings about Joseph Gallieni in the 20th Century Press Archives of the ZBW