Julian's Persian expedition
Julian's Persian expedition | |||||||||
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Part of the Roman–Persian Wars | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Roman Empire Armenia |
Sasanian Empire Arab allies | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Emperor |
Nohodares (KIA) Narseus Podosaces Mamersides | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
120,000 men | Unknown, but probably fewer[7] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Heavy | Moderate[8] |
Julian's Persian expedition began in March 363 AD and was the final military campaign of the Roman emperor Julian. The Romans fought against the Sasanian Empire, ruled at the time by Shapur II.
Aiming to capture the Sasanians' winter capital of
The Romans won a victory outside the city, but the northern army failed to arrive, and the fortified capital seemed impregnable. Due to these complications, Julian did not attempt to
The
Aims and preparations
The military and political aims of the campaign are uncertain, and they are also disputed by both ancient and modern sources and historians.
Julian asked several major oracles about the outcome of his expedition. These preparations are thought by scholars to have suggested to Shapur that an invasion from the north, by way of the Tigris valley, was Julian's plan.
Advance
Julian had wintered at Antioch in Roman Syria. On 5 March 363, he set out north-east with his army by way of Beroea (Aleppo)[17] and Hierapolis (Manbij), where fifty soldiers were killed when a portico collapsed while they were marching under it.[18] The whole army mustered there, crossed the middle Euphrates and proceeded to Carrhae (Harran), the site of the famous battle in which the Roman general Crassus was defeated and killed in 53 BC. "From there two different royal highways lead to Persia," writes the eyewitness Ammianus Marcellinus: "the one on the left through Adiabene and across the Tigris; the one on the right through Assyria and across the Euphrates."[19] Julian made use of both. He sent a detachment, which ancient sources variously estimated between 16,000–30,000 in strength, under Procopius and Sebastianus towards the Tigris where they were to join Arshak and his Armenian army. They were then to attack the Persians from the north.[20][9] Thus, by tying Shapur down in northern Mesopotamia, Julian would have been able to quickly advance down the Euphrates without opposition, while the group in Armenia was supposed to join up with Julian in Assyria. Many modern scholars have praised the choice of routes, rapid movements, and deception, while some consider the plan to be inadequate with regard to supply, communication, climate consideration, and the difficulty of crossing between Euphrates and Tigris near Naarmalcha.[9]
Julian himself, with the larger part of his army of 65,000, of which it is unclear whether that was before or after Procopius' departure, turned south along the Balikh River towards the lower Euphrates, reaching Callinicum (al-Raqqah) on 27 March and meeting the fleet of 1,100 supply vessels and 50 armed galleys under the command of Lucillianus.[21][9][22] There he was met by leaders of the "Saraceni" (Arab nomads), who offered Julian a gold crown. He refused to pay the traditional tribute in return;[23] though he later requested their envoys to join him.[24] The army followed the Euphrates downstream to the border city of Circesium and crossed the river Aboras (Khabur) with the help of a pontoon bridge constructed for the purpose.[9]
Progress of the war
From Circesium to Ctesiphon
Once over the border,
Julian then penetrated rapidly into Assyria. Similarly to the concentration of
Arshak II's preparations in Armenia might have deceived Shapur II, but he must have been soon informed of the advance of the main Roman army along the Euphrates. Modern scholars have noted this avoidance of a full-scale field battle and letting the main Roman army advance deep into Assyria.[9]
Ctesiphon
After destroying the private residence, palaces, gardens and extensive menagerie of the Persian monarchy north of Ctesiphon, and securing his position by improvised fortifications, Julian turned his attention to the city itself. The twin cities of Ctesiphon and Seleucia (rebuilt as Veh-Ardashir) lay before Julian to the south. In order to invest the place on both sides, Julian first dug a canal between the Euphrates and Tigris, allowing his fleet to enter the latter river, and by this means ferried his army to the further bank. A large Persian army had assembled in Ctesiphon, which was the appointed place of rendezvous for Shapur's army at the outset of the campaign; this was arrayed along the eastern bank in strong defensive positions, and it required the advantages of night-time and surprise, and subsequently a prolonged struggle on the escarpment, reportedly lasting twelve hours, to gain the passage of the river. But in the contest victory lay ultimately with the Romans, and the Persians were driven back within the city walls after sustaining losses of twenty-five hundred men; Julian's casualties are given at no more than 70.[30]
Though Julian had brought with him through Assyria a large train of siege engines and offensive weapons, and he was supplied by an active fleet that possessed the undisputed navigation of the river, the Romans appear to have been at some difficulty in putting Ctesiphon to the siege.[31] Although it had fallen on several previous occasions to the Romans, the city was better fortified than in the second century.[9]
Confronted with the difficulty to capture the city, Julian called a council of war, at which it was decided not to besiege the city and march into Persia's interior instead[32]—a turning point of the campaign. Apparently, it met with resistance within the army. The reasons for this decision are uncertain; according to Ammianus, it was due to the fear of a two-front war, since Shapur II's army was apparently nearby. According to Libanios, Shapur II sent an emissary to Julian, who refused it. After abandoning the siege, Julian burned his fleet of provisions to avoid its fall into the Sasanians' hands, as Julian's army now had to move upstream the river. Another theory is that Julian was deceived by Sasanian deserters. Julian was possibly still hoping to join up with the reinforcements from Armenia and then defeat Shapur II's army in a regular battle.[9]
It is possible the intention was justified by the hope of destroying the army of Shapur before the latter should join with the already numerous garrison of Ctesiphon to besiege the camp of the besiegers. More inexplicable is the burning of the fleet, and most of the provisions, which had been transported the whole course of the Euphrates with such monumental cost.[33] Although ancient and modern historians have censured the rashness of the deed, Edward Gibbon palliates the folly by observing that Julian expected a plentiful supply from the harvests of the fertile territory by which he was to march, and, with regard to the fleet, that it was not navigable up the river, and must be taken by the Persians if abandoned intact. Meanwhile, if he retreated northward with the entire army immediately, his already considerable achievements would be undone, and his prestige irreparably damaged, as one who had obtained success by stratagem and fled upon the resurgence of the foe. There were therefore no negligible reasons for his abandonment of the siege, the fleet, and the safe familiarity of the river bank.[34]
Ctesiphon to Samarra
After spending several days outside Ctesiphon, Julian directed his army toward the inner regions of Persia east of Ctesiphon. Shapur II's army avoided being dragged into battle while following a
At this stage, Shapur II's army appeared and began to engage Julian's army by ceaseless skirmishing.[9] The Sasanian cavalry repeatedly assailed the Romans' extended columns in the retreat; at Maranga a sharp skirmish developed into a battle; the Sasanians were repulsed, and Julian's army retired to rest in the hills south of Samarra, on July 25, 363.[36]
Samarra: Julian's death
The next day, 26 July, the advance resumed over the sloping hills and valleys in the arid wastelands south of modern Samarra. The heat of the day had already impelled Julian to divest himself of his helmet and protecting armor, when an alarm reached him from the rear of the column that the army was again under assault. Before the attack could be repelled, a warning from the vanguard revealed that the army was surrounded in an ambush, the Persians having stolen a march to occupy the Roman route ahead. While the army struggled to form up so as to meet the manifold threats from every side, a charge of elephants and cavalry rattled the Roman line on the left, and Julian, to prevent its imminent collapse, led his reserves in-person to shore up the defense. The light infantry under his command overthrew the massive troops of Persian heavy cavalry and elephants, and Julian, by the admission of the most hostile authorities, proved his courage in the conduct of the attack. But he had plunged into the fray still unarmored, due to the desperateness of the situation, and fell stricken from a Persian dart even as the enemy fell back. The emperor toppled to the ground off his horse and was borne in an unconscious state from the field of battle.[37] That midnight Julian passed away in his tent; "Having received from the Deity", in his own words to the assembled officers, "in the midst of an honorable career, a splendid and glorious departure from the world."[38]
The battle, which ended indecisively, raged until night-time. The emperor's death was offset by the heavy losses sustained by the Persians in their repulse on the main sector of the front but in a profound sense the battle was disastrous to the Roman cause; at best, a momentary reprieve was purchased by the loss of the stay of the army of the east and the genius of the Persian war.
Aftermath: Jovian
Defeat: Samarra to Dura
Within a few hours of Julian's death, his generals gathered under the necessity of determining a successor.[39] Exigency settled on Jovian, an obscure general of the Domestic Guard, distinguished primarily for a merry heart and sociable disposition.[40] His first command subscribed the continuation of a prompt retreat. During four further days the march was directed up the river towards Corduene and the safety of the frontier, where supplies sufficient for the famished army were expected to be obtained. The Persians, revived by the intelligence of their conqueror's demise, fell twice on the rear of the retreat, and on the camp, one party penetrating to the imperial tent before being cut off and destroyed at Jovian's feet. At Dura on the fourth day the army came to a halt, deluded with the vain hope of bridging the river with makeshift contraptions of timber and animal hide. In two days, after some initial appearance of success, the futility of the endeavor was proved; but while hope of a crossing was abandoned, the march was not resumed. The spirit of the army was broken, its provisions were four days from giving out, and the verges of Corduene a hundred miles further north as yet.[41]
Peace
At this juncture, the emissaries of
Consequences
Reign of Jovian; reinstatement of Christianity
The Army had not rested long under the walls of
The death of Julian without naming a successor allowed the accession of the Christian Jovian, and thus destroyed Julian's ambitions of reestablishing Paganism, for the indisputably most consequential act of
Although very briefly under
Shapur and the fate of Armenia
Without assistance from Rome, Armenia was invaded and conquered by Shapur II. Arshak II of Armenia, Julian's ally, maintained resistance for up to four years longer, but was abandoned by his nobles, and eventually captured by Shapur. He died in captivity in Ecbatana in 371, reportedly by suicide.[53]
His queen
At the death of Shapur in 379 AD, the Persian throne passed to his brother, the moderate
See also
- Siege of Pirisabora
- Siege of Maiozamalcha
- Battle of Ctesiphon (363)
- Battle of Maranga
- Battle of Samarra
- Perso-Roman Peace Treaty of 363
Sources
Primary sources on the Julian's campaign are as follows:
- Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23–25
- Magnus of Carrhae FGrH 225 (fragments)
- Zosimus, Historia nova 3.12–31
- Eutropius, Breviarium 10.16
- Festus, Breviarium 28–29
- Libanius, Orations 1, 16, 17, 18, 24; Letters 737, 1367, 1402, 1508
- Ephraem Syrus, Hymns against Julian 2, 3 (Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) pp. 240–245)
- Eunapius, History after Dexippus (fragments)
- Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations 5.9–15
- Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica 3.21–22
- Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica 6.1–3
- Philostorgius, Historia ecclesiastica 7.15
- Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Historia ecclesiastica 3.21–26
- Passion of Artemius 69–70 (Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) pp. 238–239)
- Chronicon Pseudo-Dionysianum year 674 = 363
- John Malalas, Chronographia 13 pp. 328–337
- Zonaras, Epitome 13.13
The course of Julian's campaign has been discussed in detail in the following commentaries and secondary sources:[9]
- J. Fontaine, Ammien Marcellin. Histoire. Tome IV (Livres XXIII-XXV), Paris, 1977.
- J. den Boeft, J. W. Drijvers, D. den Hengst, and H. C. Teitler, Philological and Historical Commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus XXIII, Groningen, 1998
- Idem, Philological and Historical Commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus XXIV, Leiden, Boston, and Köln, 2002.
- F. Paschoud, Zosime, Histoire Nouvelle II, part 1 (Book III), Paris, 1979.
- G. Reinhardt, Der Perserkrieg des Kaisers Julian, Dessau, 1892. (in German)
However, Reinhardt's view of the sources is now considered invalid.[9]
The route of the campaign has been discussed in the following sources:[9]
- B. von Borries, “Iulianus (26),” in RE X 1, 1918, pp. 58–63.
- O. Seeck, Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste für die Jahre 311 bis 476 n. Chr., Stuttgart, 1919, pp. 212–213. (in German)
- F. Cumont, Etudes Syriennes. La marche de l’empereur Julien d’Antioche à l’Euphrate, Paris, 1917, pp. 1–33. (for the first part of the campaign up to Hierapolis) (in French)
- A. Musil, The Middle Euphrates. A Topographical Itinerary, American Geographical Society. Oriental Explorations and Studies 3, New York, 1927, pp. 232–242. (for the advance along the Euphrates)
- F. Paschoud, "Der Feldzug Iulians gegen die Sāsāniden (363)", in Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, B VI 4, Wiesbaden, 1984. (in German)
- F. Paschoud, Zosime, Histoire Nouvelle II, part 1 (Book III), Paris, 1979, maps 2 and 3.
However, Musil's identifications have now met with skepticism.[9]
References
- ^ Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter, "Rome & Persia in Late Antiquity; Neighbours & Rivals", (Cambridge University Press, English edition, 2007), p131.
- ^ Potter, David S., "The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180–395", Routledge, First Edition, (Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), p520 & p527
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus,xxv.7.9–14, ed. W. Seyfarth, (Leipzig 1970-8; repr.1999)
- ^ "Welcome to Encyclopaedia Iranica".
- ^ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, (HarperCollins, 1993), 168.
- ^ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, p168.
- ISBN 964-423-738-2, p176.
- ^ Ghafouri, Ali. "Tarikh-e Janghay-e Iran; Az Madha ta be Emrouz", The History of Persia's Wars; From the Medes to the Present", Entesharat Etela'at 1388, p176.
- ^ Encyclopaedia Iranica. Retrieved 11 February 2020.
- ^ Libanius, Orations 17.19, 18.164
- ^ Libanius, Letters 1402.3
- ^ Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History 3.21–25
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.5.4
- Socrates Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History 3.21.6
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.2.2; Libanius, Orationes 18.215; Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History 6.1.2
- Malalas, Chronography 13 pp. 328–329)
- ^ Dodgeon and Lieu (1991) p. 231
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.2.6
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.3.1
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.3.4–5; Zosimus, New History 3.12.3–5; Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History 6.1.2
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.3.6–9; Zosimus, New History 3.13.1–3
- ISBN 978-1-85109-667-1.
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 23.3.8, 25.6.10
- ISBN 978-1-134-96114-6.
- ^ Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire, (The Modern Library, 1932), ch. XXIV., p. 808
- ^ Gibbon, p. 809
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 809–11
- ISBN 978-90-04-38863-5.
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 812–813
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 817–20
- ^ Gibbon, p. 821
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 820, 821
- ^ Gibbon, p. 822
- ^ Gibbon, p. 822, 823
- ^ Gibbon, p. 824
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 825, 826
- ^ Gibbon, p. 827
- ^ Gibbon, p. 828
- ^ Gibbon, p. 829
- ^ Gibbon, p. 830
- ^ Gibbon, p. 831
- ^ Gibbon, p. 832
- ^ Gibbon, p. 833
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 835, 836
- ^ Gibbon, p. 838
- ^ Gibbon, chap. XXV., p. 844
- ^ Gibbon, Ibid
- ^ An Encyclopedia Of World History, (Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1952) chap. II., Ancient History, p. 120
- ISBN 9780197600702.
- ^ Gibbon, p.841, 842
- ^ Gibbon, chap. XXIII., p. 769
- ^ Gibbon, chap. XXV., p. 843
- ^ Gibbon, p. 886
- ^ Gibbon, pp. 887–890
- ^ An Encyclopedia Of World History, (Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1952) Chap. II. Ancient History, p. 125
Bibliography
- Вус, Олег. Юлиан Апостат. Персидский поход и загадка битвы у Туммара 26 июня 363 г. // МАИАСП. 2019. Вып. 11. С. 271—299. ISSN 2219-8857. [In Russian] https://www.academia.edu/85590664/Julian_the_Apostate_The_Persian_campaign_and_the_riddle_of_battle_at_Tummar_on_June_26_363
- R. Andreotti, "L'impresa di Iuliano in Oriente" in Historia vol. 4 (1930) pp. 236–273
- Timothy D. Barnes, Ammianus Marcellinus and the Representation of Historical Reality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8014-3526-9) pp. 164–165
- Glen Warren Bowersock, Julian the Apostate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- J. den Boeft, J. W. Drijvers, D. den Hengst, H. C. Teitler, Philological and Historical Commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus XXIV. Leiden: Brill, 2002 Preview at Google Books
- Walter R. Chalmers, "Eunapius, Ammianus Marcellinus, and Zosimus on Julian's Persian Expedition" in Classical Quarterly n.s. vol. 10 (1960) pp. 152–160
- Franz Cumont, "La marche de l'empereur Julien d'Antioche à l'Euphrate" in F. Cumont, Etudes syriennes (Paris: Picard, 1917) pp. 1–33 Text at archive.org
- L. Dillemann, "Ammien Marcellin et les pays de l'Euphrate et du Tigre" in Syria vol. 38 (1961) p. 87 ff.
- M. H. Dodgeon, S. N. C. Lieu, The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars: 363–628 AD: a narrative sourcebook (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 231–274 Preview (with different page numbers) at Google Books
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- Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, The Modern Library, 1932, New York. Chap. XXIV., XXV., pp. 798–845
- David Hunt, "Julian" in
- W. E. Kaegi, "Constantine's and Julian's Strategies of Strategic Surprise against the Persians" in Athenaeum n.s. vol. 69 (1981) pp. 209–213
- Erich Kettenhofen, "Julian" in Encyclopaedia IranicaOnline (2009–2012)
- John Matthews, The Roman Empire of Ammianus (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. ISBN 9780801839658) pp. 140–161
- A. F. Norman, "Magnus in Ammianus, Eunapius, and Zosimus: New Evidence" in Classical Quarterly' n.s. vol. 7 (1957) pp. 129–133
- F. Paschoud, ed., Zosime: Histoire nouvelle. Vol. 2 pars 1. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1979 (Collection Budé)
- David S. Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180–395 (London: Routledge, 2004.
- R. T. Ridley, "Notes on Julian's Persian Expedition (363)" in Historia vol. 22 (1973) pp. 317–330 esp. p. 326
- Gerhard Wirth, "Julians Perserkrieg. Kriterien einer Katastrophe" in Richard Klein, ed., Julian Apostata (Darmstadt, 1978) p. 455 ff.
External links
- Media related to Julian's Persian War at Wikimedia Commons