Kansas–Nebraska Act
Long title | An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas |
---|---|
Enacted by | the 33rd United States Congress |
Effective | May 30, 1854 |
Codification | |
Acts repealed | Missouri Compromise |
Legislative history | |
|
The Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 (10
The United States had acquired vast amounts of land in the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, and since the 1840s Douglas had sought to establish a territorial government in a portion of the Louisiana Purchase that was still unorganized. Douglas's efforts were stymied by Senator David Rice Atchison of Missouri and other Southern leaders who refused to allow the creation of territories that banned slavery; slavery would have been banned because the Missouri Compromise outlawed slavery in the territory north of latitude 36°30' north (except for Missouri). To win the support of Southerners like Atchison, Pierce and Douglas agreed to back the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, with the status of slavery instead decided based on "popular sovereignty". Under popular sovereignty, the citizens of each territory, rather than Congress, would determine whether slavery would be allowed.[1]
Douglas's bill to repeal the Missouri Compromise and organize Kansas Territory and Nebraska Territory won approval by a wide margin in the Senate, but faced stronger opposition in the House of Representatives. Though Northern Whigs strongly opposed the bill, it passed the House with the support of almost all Southerners and some Northern Democrats. After the passage of the act, pro- and anti-slavery elements flooded into Kansas to establish a population that would vote for or against slavery, resulting in a series of armed conflicts known as "Bleeding Kansas".[2] Douglas and Pierce hoped that popular sovereignty would help bring an end to the national debate over slavery, but the Kansas–Nebraska Act outraged Northerners. The division between pro-slavery and anti-slavery forces caused by the Act was the death knell for the ailing Whig Party, which broke apart after the Act. Its Northern remnants would give rise to the anti-slavery Republican Party. The Act, and the tensions over slavery it inflamed, were key events leading to the American Civil War.
Background
In his 1853 inaugural address, President
The topic of a transcontinental railroad had been discussed since the 1840s. While there were debates over the specifics, especially the route to be taken, there was a public consensus that such a railroad should be built by private interests, and financed by public land grants. In 1845, Stephen A. Douglas, then serving in his first term in the U.S. House of Representatives, had submitted an unsuccessful plan to organize the Nebraska Territory formally, as the first step in building a railroad with its eastern terminus in Chicago. Railroad proposals were debated in all subsequent sessions of Congress with cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, Quincy, Memphis, and New Orleans competing to be the jumping-off point for the construction.[4]
Several proposals in late 1852 and early 1853 had strong support, but they failed because of disputes over whether the railroad would follow a northern or a southern route. In early 1853, the House of Representatives passed a bill 107 to 49 to organize the Nebraska Territory in the land west of Iowa and Missouri. In March, the bill moved to the Senate Committee on Territories, which was headed by Douglas. Missouri Senator
During the Senate adjournment, the issues of the railroad and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise became entangled in Missouri politics, as Atchison campaigned for re-election against the forces of
Representatives then generally found lodging in boarding houses when they were in the nation's capital to perform their legislative duties. Atchison shared lodgings in an F Street house shared by the leading Southerners in Congress. He was the
Iowa Senator Augustus C. Dodge immediately reintroduced the same legislation to organize Nebraska that had stalled in the previous session; it was referred to Douglas's committee on December 14. Douglas, hoping to achieve the support of the Southerners, publicly announced that the same principle that had been established in the Compromise of 1850 should apply in Nebraska.[9]
In the Compromise of 1850, Utah and New Mexico Territories had been organized without any restrictions on slavery, and many supporters of Douglas argued that the compromise had already superseded the Missouri Compromise.[10] The territories were, however, given the authority to decide for themselves whether they would apply for statehood as either free or slaves states whenever they chose to apply.[11] The two territories, however, unlike Nebraska, had not been part of the Louisiana Purchase and had arguably never been subject to the Missouri Compromise.[12]
Congressional action
Introduction of Nebraska bill
The bill was reported to the main body of the Senate on January 4, 1854. It had been modified by Douglas, who had also authored the
Furthermore, any decisions on slavery in the new lands were to be made "when admitted as a state or states, the said territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union, with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission."[13] In a report accompanying the bill, Douglas's committee wrote that the Utah and New Mexico Acts:
... were intended to have a far more comprehensive and enduring effect than the mere adjustment of the difficulties arising out of the recent acquisition of Mexican territory. They were designed to establish certain great principles, which would not only furnish adequate remedies for existing evils, but, in all times to come, avoid the perils of a similar agitation, by withdrawing the question of slavery from the halls of Congress and the political arena, and committing it to the arbitrament of those who were immediately interested in, and alone responsible for its consequences.[14]
The report compared the situation in New Mexico and Utah with the situation in Nebraska. In the first instance, many had argued that slavery had previously been prohibited under
Douglas's attempt to finesse his way around the Missouri Compromise did not work. Kentucky Whig Archibald Dixon believed that unless the Missouri Compromise was explicitly repealed, slaveholders would be reluctant to move to the new territory until slavery was approved by the settlers, who would most likely oppose slavery. On January 16 Dixon surprised Douglas by introducing an amendment that would repeal the section of the Missouri Compromise that prohibited slavery north of the 36°30' parallel. Douglas met privately with Dixon and in the end, despite his misgivings on Northern reaction, agreed to accept Dixon's arguments.[16]
A similar amendment was offered in the House by Philip Phillips of Alabama. With the encouragement of the "F Street Mess", Douglas met with them and Phillips to ensure that the momentum for passing the bill remained with the Democratic Party. They arranged to meet with President Franklin Pierce to ensure that the issue would be declared a test of party loyalty within the Democratic Party.[17]
Meeting with Pierce
Pierce was not enthusiastic about the implications of repealing the Missouri Compromise and had barely referred to Nebraska in his State of the Union message delivered December 5, 1853, just a month before. Close advisors Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, a proponent of popular sovereignty as far back as 1848 as an alternative to the Wilmot Proviso, and Secretary of State William L. Marcy both told Pierce that repeal would create serious political problems. The full cabinet met and only Secretary of War Jefferson Davis and Secretary of Navy James C. Dobbin supported repeal. Instead, the president and cabinet submitted to Douglas an alternative plan that would have sought out a judicial ruling on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Both Pierce and Attorney General Caleb Cushing believed that the Supreme Court would find it unconstitutional.[18]
Douglas's committee met later that night. Douglas was agreeable to the proposal, but the Atchison group was not. Determined to offer the repeal to Congress on January 23 but reluctant to act without Pierce's commitment, Douglas arranged through Davis to meet with Pierce on January 22 even though it was a Sunday when Pierce generally refrained from conducting any business. Douglas was accompanied at the meeting by Atchison, Hunter, Phillips, and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky.[19]
Douglas and Atchison first met alone with Pierce before the whole group convened. Pierce was persuaded to support repeal, and at Douglas' insistence, Pierce provided a written draft, asserting that the Missouri Compromise had been made inoperative by the principles of the Compromise of 1850. Pierce later informed his cabinet, which concurred with the change of direction.[20] The Washington Union, the communications organ for the administration, wrote on January 24 that support for the bill would be "a test of Democratic orthodoxy".[21]
Debate in Senate
On January 23, a revised bill was introduced in the Senate that repealed the Missouri Compromise and split the unorganized land into two new territories: Kansas and Nebraska. The division was the result of concerns expressed by settlers already in Nebraska as well as the senators from Iowa, who were concerned with the location of the territory's seat of government if such a large territory were created. Existing language to affirm the application of all other laws of the United States in the new territory was supplemented by the language agreed on with Pierce: "except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March 6, 1820 [the Missouri Compromise], which was superseded by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures [the Compromise of 1850], and is declared inoperative." Identical legislation was soon introduced in the House.[22]
Historian
The day after the bill was reintroduced, two Ohioans, Representative
We arraign this bill as a gross violation of a sacred pledge; as a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from our States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves.[24]
Douglas took the appeal personally and responded in Congress, when the debate was opened on January 30 before a full House and packed gallery. Douglas biographer Robert W. Johanssen described part of the speech:
Douglas charged the authors of the "Appeal", whom he referred to throughout as the "Abolitionist confederates", with having perpetrated a "base falsehood" in their protest. He expressed his sense of betrayal, recalling that Chase, "with a smiling face and the appearance of friendship", had appealed for a postponement of debate on the ground that he had not yet familiarized himself with the bill. "Little did I suppose at the time that I granted that act of courtesy", Douglas remarked, that Chase and his compatriots had published a document "in which they arraigned me as having been guilty of a criminal betrayal of my trust", of bad faith, and of plotting against the cause of free government. While other Senators were attending divine worship, they had been "assembled in a secret conclave", devoting the Sabbath to their own conspiratorial and deceitful purposes.[25]
The debate would continue for four months, as many Anti-Nebraska political rallies were held across the north. Douglas remained the main advocate for the bill while Chase, William Seward, of New York, and Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, led the opposition. The New-York Tribune wrote on March 2:
The unanimous sentiment of the North is indignant resistance. ... The whole population is full of it. The feeling in 1848 was far inferior to this in strength and universality.[26]
The debate in the Senate concluded on March 4, 1854, when Douglas, beginning near midnight on March 3, made a five-and-a-half-hour speech. The final vote in favor of passage was 37 to 14.[29] Free-state senators voted 14 to 12 in favor, and slave-state senators supported the bill 23 to 2.[30]
Debate in House of Representatives
On March 21, 1854, as a delaying tactic in the House of Representatives, the legislation was referred by a vote of 110 to 95 to the
It was not until May 8 that the debate began in the House. The debate was even more intense than in the Senate. While it seemed to be a foregone conclusion that the bill would pass, the opponents went all out to fight it.[34] Historian Michael Morrison wrote:
A filibuster led by
well oiled and well-armed, had to be restrained from making a violent attack on Campbell. Only after the sergeant at arms arrested him, the debate was cut off, and the House adjourned did the melee subside.[35]
The floor debate was handled by
The final House vote in favor of the bill was 113 to 100.[37] Northern Democrats supported the bill 44 to 42, but all 45 northern Whigs opposed it. Southern Democrats voted in favor by 57 to 2, and southern Whigs supported it by 12 to 7.[38]
Enactment
President Franklin Pierce signed the Kansas–Nebraska Act into law on May 30, 1854.[1][39][40]
Aftermath
Immediate responses to the passage of the Kansas–Nebraska Act fell into two classes. The less common response was held by Douglas's supporters, who believed that the bill would withdraw "the question of slavery from the halls of Congress and the political arena, committing it to the arbitration of those who were immediately interested in, and alone responsible for, its consequences".[42] In other words, they believed that the Act would leave decisions about whether slavery would be permitted in the hands of the people rather than the Federal government. The far more common response was one of outrage, interpreting Douglas's actions as, in their words, "part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region emigrant from the Old World, and free laborers from our States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves".[43] Especially in the eyes of northerners, the Kansas–Nebraska Act was aggression and an attack on the power and beliefs of free states.[44] The response led to calls for public action against the South, as seen in broadsides that advertised gatherings in northern states to discuss publicly what to do about the presumption of the Act.[45]
Douglas and former Illinois Representative
Bleeding Kansas
Bleeding Kansas, Bloody Kansas, or the Border War was a series of violent political confrontations in the
Pro-slavery settlers came to Kansas mainly from neighboring
Successive territorial governors, usually sympathetic to slavery, attempted to maintain the peace. The territorial capital of Lecompton, the target of much agitation, became such a hostile environment for Free-Staters that they set up their own, unofficial legislature at Topeka.[51]
John Brown and his sons gained notoriety in the fight against slavery by murdering five pro-slavery farmers with a broadsword in the Pottawatomie massacre. Brown also helped defend a few dozen Free-State supporters from several hundred angry pro-slavery supporters at Osawatomie.[52]
Effect on Native American tribes
Before the organization of the Kansas–Nebraska territory in 1854, the Kansas and Nebraska Territories were consolidated as part of the
The passing of the Kansas–Nebraska Act came into direct conflict with the relocations. White American settlers from both the free-soil North and pro-slavery South flooded the Northern Indian Territory, hoping to influence the vote on slavery that would come following the admittance of Kansas and, to a lesser extent, Nebraska to the United States.To avoid and/or alleviate the reservation-settlement problem, further treaty negotiations were attempted with the tribes of Kansas and Nebraska. In 1854 alone, the U.S. agreed to acquire lands in Kansas or Nebraska from several tribes including the Kickapoo, In exchange for their land cessions, the tribes largely received small reservations in the Indian Territory of Oklahoma or Kansas in some cases.
For the nations that remained in Kansas beyond 1854, the Kansas–Nebraska Act introduced a host of other problems. In 1855, white "squatters" built the city of Leavenworth on the Delaware reservation without the consent of either Delaware or the US government. When Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny ordered military support in removing the squatters, both the military and the squatters refused to comply, undermining both Federal authority and the treaties in place with Delaware.[66] In addition to the violations of treaty agreements, other promises made were not being kept. Construction and infrastructure improvement projects dedicated to nearly every treaty, for example, took a great deal longer than expected. Beyond that, however, the most damaging violation by white American settlers was the mistreatment of Native Americans and their properties. Personal maltreatment, stolen property, and deforestation have all been cited.[67] Furthermore, the squatters' premature and illegal settlement of the Kansas Territory jeopardized the value of the land, and with it the future of the Indian tribes living on them. Because treaties were land cessions and purchases, the value of the land handed over to the Federal government was critical to the payment received by a given Native nation. Deforestation, destruction of property, and other general injuries to the land lowered the value of the territories that were ceded by the Kansas Territory tribes.[68]
Manypenny's 1856 "Report on Indian Affairs" explained the devastating effect on Indian populations of diseases that white settlers brought to Kansas. Without providing statistics, Indian Affairs Superintendent to the area Colonel Alfred Cumming reported at least more deaths than births in most tribes in the area. While noting intemperance, or
Destruction of the Whig party
From a political standpoint, the Whig Party had been in decline in the South because of the effectiveness with which it had been hammered by the Democratic Party over slavery. The Southern Whigs hoped that by seizing the initiative on this issue, they would be identified as strong defenders of slavery. Many Northern Whigs broke with them in the Act.[72]
The American party system had been dominated by Whigs and Democrats for decades leading up to the Civil War. But the Whig party's increasing internal divisions had made it a party of strange bedfellows by the 1850s. An ascendant anti-slavery wing clashed with a traditionalist and increasingly pro-slavery southern wing. These divisions came to a head in the 1852 election, where Whig candidate Winfield Scott was trounced by Franklin Pierce. Southern Whigs, who had supported the prior Whig president Zachary Taylor, had been burned by Taylor and were unwilling to support another Whig. Taylor, who despite being a slave owner, had proved notably anti-slave despite campaigning neutrally on the issue. With the loss of Southern Whig support and the loss of votes in the North to the Free Soil Party, Whigs seemed doomed. So they were, as they would never again contest a presidential election.[73]
The Kansas–Nebraska Act was the final nail in the Whig coffin. It was also the spark that began the
The first anti-Nebraska local meeting where "Republican" was suggested as a name for a new anti-slavery party was held in a Ripon, Wisconsin schoolhouse on March 20, 1854.[76] The first statewide convention that formed a platform and nominated candidates under the Republican name was held near Jackson, Michigan, on July 6, 1854. At that convention, the party opposed the expansion of slavery into new territories and selected a statewide slate of candidates.[77] The Midwest took the lead in forming state Republican Party tickets; apart from St. Louis and a few areas adjacent to free states, there were no efforts to organize the Party in the southern states.[78][79] So was born the Republican Party—campaigning on the popular, emotional issue of "free soil" in the frontier—which would capture the White House just six years later.[73]
Later developments
The Kansas–Nebraska Act divided the nation and pointed it toward civil war.[80] Congressional Democrats suffered huge losses in the mid-term elections of 1854, as voters provided support to a wide array of new parties that opposed the Democrats and the Kansas–Nebraska Act.[81] Pierce deplored the new Republican Party, because of its perceived anti-southern, anti-slavery stance. To Northerners, the President's perceived Southern bias did anything but de-escalate public mood and helped inflame abolitionist anger.[82]
Partly due to the unpopularity of the Kansas–Nebraska Act, Pierce lost his bid for re-nomination at the
Guerrilla warfare in Kansas continued throughout Buchanan's presidency and extended into the 1860s.[88] Buchanan attempted to admit Kansas as a state under the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution,[89] but Kansas voters rejected that constitution in an August 1858 referendum.[90] Anti-slavery delegates won a majority of the elections to the 1859 Kansas constitutional convention, and Kansas won admission as a free state under the anti-slavery Wyandotte Constitution in the final months of Buchanan's presidency. [91]
See also
References
Citations
- ^ a b Sutton, Robert K. (August 16, 2017). "The Wealthy Activist Who Helped Turn 'Bleeding Kansas' Free". Smithsonian.
- ^ Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (2006) ch 1
- ^ Holt (2010), pp. 53–54, 72–73
- ^ Potter pp. 146–149
- ^ Potter pp. 150–152
- ^ Potter pp. 154–155
- ^ Freehling pp. 550–551. Johanssen p. 407
- ^ Robert W. Johansson, Stephen A. Douglas (Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 374–400
- ^ McPherson 1988, p. 123.
- ^ Johannsen pp. 402–403
- ^ Allan Kent Powell, Encyclopedia of Mormonism, "Utah Territory"
- ^ McPherson 1988, p. 124.
- ^ Johanssen p. 405
- ^ a b Johanssen p. 406
- ^ Holt (1978) p. 145
- ^ Nevins pp. 95–96
- ^ Johanssen pp. 412–413. Cooper pp. 350–351
- ^ Potter p. 161. Johanssen pp. 413–414
- ^ Potter p. 161. Johanssen p. 414
- ^ Johanssen pp. 414–415
- ^ Foner p. 156
- ^ Johanssen pp. 415–417
- ^ Nevins p. 111
- ^ Nevins pp. 111–112. Johanssen p. 418
- ^ Johanssen p. 420
- ^ Nevins p. 121
- ^ Nevins p. 144
- ^ a b Nevins p. 156
- ^ "To Pass S. 22. – Senate Vote No. 52 – Mar 3, 1854". GovTrack.us.
- ^ Potter p. 165. The vote occurred at 3:30 a.m. and many senators, including Houston, had retired for the night. Estimates on what the vote might have been with all still in attendance vary from 40–20 to 42–18. Nevins p. 145
- ^ Nevins p. 154
- ^ Potter p. 166
- ^ Chambers p. 401
- ^ Nevins pp. 154–155
- ^ Morrison p. 154
- ^ Nevins p. 155
- ^ "To Pass H.R. 236. (P. 1254). – House Vote No. 309 – May 22, 1854". GovTrack.us.
- ^ Nevins pp. 156–157
- ^ "U.S. Senate: The Kansas–Nebraska Act". www.senate.gov.
- ^ Sutton, Lee. "Pierce signs the Kansas–Nebraska Act". American Heritage.
- ^ Nevins p. 139
- ^ Senate Reports, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 15.
- ^ Congressional Globe, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 281.
- JSTOR 1902683.
- ^ "American Broadsides and Ephemera, Series I. "To the People of Massachusetts:" Worcester, MA: 1854. Accessed 3 March 2016".
- ^ The Lincoln Institute (2002–2008). "1854 – Abraham Lincoln and Freedom". Archived from the original on 2008-12-20. Retrieved 2008-08-25.
- ^ Lehrman, Lewis E. "Abraham Lincoln at Peoria: The Turning Point". Retrieved 2008-08-25.
- ^ The Lincoln Institute; Lewis E. Lehrman (2002–2008). "Preface by Lewis Lehrman, Abraham Lincoln and Freedom". Archived from the original on 2008-12-20. Retrieved 2008-08-25.
- ^ "Bleeding Kansas | History, Effects, & John Brown | Britannica". www.britannica.com. 2023-06-09. Retrieved 2023-06-23.
- ^ Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (2006)
- ^ Thomas Goodrich, War to the Knife: Bleeding Kansas, 1854–1861 (2004)
- ^ James C. Malin, John Brown and the legend of fifty-six (1942)
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2015-12-07. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2015-12-13. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2015-02-13. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2015-12-07. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2015-12-07. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2015-12-13. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-03-03. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-01-20. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-01-15. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-01-15. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. Vol. 2, Treaties". digital.library.okstate.edu. Archived from the original on 2016-01-14. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ George W. Manypenny, Our Indian Wards (1880) 123–124
- ^ George W. Manypenny, Our Indian Wards (1880) 127
- ^ "History: Annual report of the commissioner of Indian affairs, for the year 1855: [Central superintendency]". digicoll.library.wisc.edu. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ "History: Annual report of the commissioner of Indian affairs, for the year 1856: [Central superintendency]". digicoll.library.wisc.edu. Retrieved 2015-12-14.
- ^ a b Louis F. Burns, A History of the Osage People (2004) 239
- ^ a b Louis F. Burns, A History of the Osage People (2004) 243
- ^ Cooper p. 350
- ^ a b c McPherson 1988, pp. 117–119.
- ^ Paul Finkelman, and Peter Wallenstein, eds. The encyclopedia of American political history (2001) p. 226.
- ^ Eric Foner, Free soil, free labor, free men: the ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (1970). [ISBN missing] [page needed]
- ^ A.F. Gilman, The origin of the Republican Party (1914). online
- ^ William Stocking, ed. Under the Oaks: Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republican Party, at Jackson, Michigan, July 6, 1854 (1904) online
- ^ Allan Nevins, . The ordeal of the Union: A house dividing, 1852–1857. Vol. 2 (1947) pp. 316–323.
- ^ William E. Gienapp, The origins of the Republican Party, 1852–1856 (1987) pp. 189–223.
- ^ Tom Huntington Archived 2010-01-02 at the Wayback Machine "Civil War Chronicles: Abolitionist John Doy", American Heritage, Spring 2009.
- ^ McPherson (1988), pp. 129–130.
- ^ Holt (2010), pp. 91–94, 99, 106–109
- ^ Rudin, Ken (July 22, 2009). "When Has A President Been Denied His Party's Nomination?". NPR. Retrieved February 15, 2017.
- ^ Holt (2010), loc. 1610.
- ^ Holt (2010), pp. 109–110
- ^ Klein 1995, p. 316.
- ^ Baker 2004, pp. 120–121.
- ^ McPherson 1988, p. 784.
- ^ Smith 1975, pp. 40–43.
- ^ Baker 2004, pp. 100–105.
- ^ McPherson 1988, p. 169.
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- Childers, Christopher. "Interpreting Popular Sovereignty: A Historiographical Essay", Civil War History Volume 57, Number 1, March 2011 pp. 48–70 in Project MUSE
- Etcheson, Nicole. Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (2006)
- ISBN 0-19-509497-2.
- Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay 1776–1854 (1990) ISBN 0-19-505814-3.
- Holt, Michael. The Political Crisis of the 1850s (1978)
- Holt, Michael F. (2010). Franklin Pierce. The American Presidents (Kindle ed.). Henry Holt and Company, LLC. ISBN 978-0-8050-8719-2.
- Huston, James L. Stephen A. Douglas and the dilemmas of democratic equality (2007)
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- Morrison, Michael. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (1997) online edition Archived 2012-05-24 at the Wayback Machine
- ISBN 0-684-10424-5
- Nichols, Roy F. "The Kansas–Nebraska Act: A Century of Historiography". Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43 (September 1956): 187–212. Online at JSTOR
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- Stewart, Matthew G. The Burden of Western History: Kansas, Collective Memory, and the Reunification of the American Empire, 1854–1913 (2014)
- Wolff, Gerald W., The Kansas–Nebraska Bill: Party, Section, and the Coming of the Civil War, (Revisionist Press, 1977), 385 pp.
- Wunder, John R. and Joann M. Ross, eds. The Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854 (2008), essays by scholars.
External links
- Media related to Kansas–Nebraska Act at Wikimedia Commons
- An annotated bibliography
- Millard Fillmore on the Fugitive Slave and Kansas–Nebraska Acts: Original Letter[permanent dead link] Shapell Manuscript Foundation
- The Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854: Popular Sovereignty and the Political Polarization over Slavery
- Kansas–Nebraska Act and related resources at the Library of Congress
- President Pierce's Private Correspondence on the Kansas–Nebraska Act[permanent dead link] Shapell Manuscript Foundation
- Transcript available via the National Archives