Korean Armistice Agreement
Korea | |
Signatories | |
---|---|
Parties | |
Languages | English, Korean, Chinese |
The Korean Armistice Agreement (
During the
South Korea never signed the Armistice Agreement, due to President
Background
By mid-December 1950, the United States was discussing terms for an agreement to end the Korean War.
While talk of a possible armistice agreement was circulating, in late May and early June 1951, the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)
Like Syngman Rhee, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung also sought complete unification. The North Korean side was slow to support armistice talks and only on 27 June 1951 – seventeen days after armistice talks had begun – did it change its slogan of "drive the enemy into the sea" to "drive the enemy to the 38th parallel."[13] North Korea was pressured to support armistice talks by its allies the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, whose support was vital to enabling North Korea to continue fighting.
Negotiations
Talks concerning an armistice started 10 July 1951, which guided talks until the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953. The items to be discussed were:
- Adoption of an agenda.
- Fixing a military demarcation line between the two sides to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
- Concrete arrangements for realization of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervisory organization to carry out the terms of a truce and armistice.
- Arrangements relating to prisoners-of-war.
- Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.[17]
After the agenda was decided, talks proceeded slowly. There were lengthy intervals between meetings. The longest gap between discussions started on 23 August 1951,
A major, problematic negotiation point was the repatriation of prisoners-of-war.
In 1952, the United States elected a new president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and on 2 December 1952,[26] he went to Korea to investigate what might end the war.[27] With the UN accepting India's proposed Korean War armistice,[28] the KPA, PVA, and UNC ceased fire with the battle line approximately at the Kansas Line, a line of UN positions north of the 38th parallel, which had been established in Operation Rugged.[29] Upon agreeing to the armistice, the belligerents established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which has since been patrolled by KPA, ROKA, United States, and Joint UNC forces. Discussions continued slowly because of difficulties regarding demarcation of the border between North and South Korea. China and North Korea expected the line to remain at the 38th parallel. Within weeks, however, both nations accepted the Kansas Line.[14] In March 1953, the death of Joseph Stalin helped spur negotiations. While the Chinese leader Mao Zedong was not then willing to compromise, the new Soviet leadership issued a statement two weeks after Stalin's death, which called for a quick end to hostilities.[30]
On 19 July 1953, the delegates reached agreement covering all issues on the agenda.[31] On 27 July 1953, at 10:00 a.m., the Armistice was signed by Nam Il, a delegate of the KPA and PVA, and William K. Harrison Jr., a UNC delegate.[2] Twelve hours after the signing of the document, all regulations that were approved in the armistice went into effect.[32] The agreement provided for monitoring by an international commission. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was established to prevent reinforcements being brought into Korea, whether additional military personnel or new weapons, and NNSC member inspection teams from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland operated throughout Korea.[13]
Terms
A key feature of the armistice is that no nation is a signatory to the agreement; it is purely a military document.[33] The signed Armistice established a "complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces,"[2] which was to be enforced by the commanders of both sides. The armistice is, however, only a ceasefire between military forces, rather than an agreement between governments to normalize relations.[34] No formal peace treaty was signed, and normalized relations were not restored. The armistice established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the DMZ. The DMZ was agreed as a 2.5-mile -wide (4.0 km) fortified buffer zone between the two Korean nations.[14] The DMZ follows the Kansas Line, where the two sides actually confronted each other at the time of the signing of the Armistice. The DMZ is currently the most heavily-defended national border in the world as of 2018[update].[citation needed]
The Armistice also established regulations regarding prisoners-of-war. The agreement stated:
Within sixty (60) days after this agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture.[2]
Ultimately, more than 22,000 KPA or PVA soldiers refused repatriation. On the opposite side, 327 South Korean soldiers, 21 American soldiers, and 1 British soldier also refused repatriation and remained in North Korea or in China. (See list of American and British defectors in the Korean War.)
With the signing of the Armistice, the war ended. Despite the three-year war, the international border remained at a similar location as from before the war.
Subsequent events
Failure of the Geneva Conference
Article IV (Paragraph 60) of the Armistice Agreement calls for a political conference to be held within 3 months of the signing of the agreement in order "to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question."[2] A conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland in April 1954, missing the 3 month timeline by 6 months. The conference focused on two separate conflicts: the conflict in Korea; and the conflict in Indochina. Participants in the talks on the conflict in Korea were the US, the USSR, France, China, and North and South Korea. The peace agreement on the Korean peninsula was officially raised at the conference, by Chinese diplomat Zhou Enlai with the US Secretary of Defense, John Foster Dulles, but no progress was made.[3] The United States intentionally avoided discussing the “Peace Treaty on the Korean Peninsula,” in spite of criticism from the other representatives at the conference about the negative attitude of the United States.
United States violation of paragraph 13d
Paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement mandated that neither side introduce new weapons into Korea, other than piece-for-piece replacement of equipment.
Following the abrogation of paragraph 13d, the NNSC largely lost its function, and became primarily office based in the DMZ with a small staff. North Korea denounced the abrogation of paragraph 13d.[39] North Korea responded militarily by digging massive underground fortifications resistant to nuclear attack, and by the forward deployment of its conventional forces so that the use of nuclear weapons against it would endanger South Korean and U.S. forces as well. In 1963 North Korea asked the Soviet Union and China for help in developing nuclear weapons, but was refused.[38]
United Nations statements
In 1975, the
In October 1996, the
North Korean announcements to withdraw from the agreement
North Korea has announced that it will no longer abide by the armistice at least six times, in 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013.[50][51][52]
On 28 April 1994, North Korea announced that it would cease participating in the Military Armistice Commission, but would continue contact at Panmunjom through liaison officers and maintain the general conditions of the armistice. North Korea stated it regarded the U.S. deployment of
On 3 September 1994 China joined North Korea in withdrawing from and ceasing participation in the Military Armistice Commission.[7]
In January 2002 U.S. President
In 2011, South Korea stated that North Korea had violated the armistice 221 times.[8]
In 2013 North Korea argued that the Armistice was meant to be a transitional measure and that North Korea had made a number of proposals for replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, but the U.S. had not responded in a serious way. It further argued that the Military Armistice Commission and the NNSC had long been effectively dismantled, paralysing the supervisory functions of the Armistice. North Korea believes the annual U.S. and South Korean exercises
In March 2013, North Korea announced that it was scrapping all non-aggression pacts with South Korea. It also closed the border and closed the
In August 2016, North Korea installed anti-personnel mines to prevent the defection of its front-line border guards around the Bridge of No Return, situated in the Joint Security Area (JSA).[65] The UN Command protested this move as it violates the Armistice Agreement which specifically prohibits armed guards and anti-personnel mines.[65]
In 2016, when North Korea proposed formal peace talks, the U.S. adjusted its position from the pre-condition that North Korea should have already taken "irreversible steps toward denuclearization," to a negotiating stance that includes North Korea halting its nuclear program. The discussions did not take place. A State Department spokesman said that "[North Korea] periodically raise[s] the idea and it never really gets far."[66][67]
Panmunjom Declaration
On 27 April 2018 the
- The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
- The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
- Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.
The joint statement also includes Trump's commitment to providing security guarantees to North Korea and that there will be follow-up negotiations between
At the start of a three-day summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in Pyongyang, the pair's third meeting of 2018, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stated that his meeting with Trump "provided geopolitical stability and that he expects more progress in talks between his nation and Washington."[74] Kim also credited Moon with making the "historic" U.S.–DPRK summit in Singapore possible.[75] The third day of the Moon–Kim summit yielded a joint statement from the two leaders announcing an agreement to pursue a co-host bid for the 2032 Olympic Games. Further, the joint statement announced that the two nations will now "participate jointly" at international competitions, including the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games.,[76] although North Korea did not ultimately attend the Tokyo games.[77]
Commemorations
Over the years, United States Presidents have made
North Korea commemorates 27 July as a national holiday known as Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War.[81][82]
Gallery
See also
- Korean conflict
- Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea
- Northern Limit Line
- Korean reunification
- North Korea and weapons of mass destruction
- Hambakdo
References
Citations
- ^ "Document for July 27th: Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State". Archived from the original on 19 October 2012. Retrieved 13 December 2012.
- ^ a b c d e "Korean War Armistice Agreement". FindLaw. Canada and United States: Thomson Reuters. 27 July 1953. Archived from the original on 5 March 2014. Retrieved 5 March 2014.
- ^ a b "North Korea: Why negotiations can't wait for denuclearisation". www.afr.com. 9 February 2018. Archived from the original on 15 February 2018. Retrieved 15 February 2018.
- ISBN 978-1-4094-7798-3.
- ^ a b c Stueck 1995, p. 214.
- ^ "Chinese and South Koreans Formally Establish Relations". The New York Times. 24 August 1992.
- ^ a b "China, Backing North Korea, Quits Armistice Commission". The New York Times. 3 September 1994.
- ^ a b "N.K. commits 221 provocations since 1953". The Korea Herald. 5 January 2011. Retrieved 10 February 2020.
- ^ a b c d e f Stueck 1995, p. 212.
- ^ Stueck 1995, p. 211.
- ^ a b c Stueck 1995, p. 215.
- ^ "Allies Ready to Sign Armistice Without Syngman Rhee". Spokane Daily Chronicle. Spokane, Washington: Cowles Company. Associated Press. 1 July 1953. Archived from the original on 4 April 2017. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
- ^ a b Stueck 1995, p. 216.
- ^ a b c d Mount & Laferriere 2004, p. 123.
- ^ Stokesbury 1988, p. 145.
- ^ Mount & Laferriere 2004, p. 122.
- ^ a b c Stueck 1995, p. 225.
- ^ Stueck 1995, p. 229.
- ^ Catchpole 2000, p. 320.
- ^ Stueck 1995, p. 237.
- ^ Stokesbury 1990, p. 147.
- ^ Stokesbury 1990, pp. 187–99.
- ^ Boose, Donald W. Jr. (Spring 2000). "Fighting While Talking: The Korean War Truce Talks". OAH Magazine of History. Bloomington, Indiana: Organization of American Historians. Archived from the original on 12 July 2007. Retrieved 7 November 2009.
... the UNC advised that only 70,000 out of over 170,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners desired repatriation.
- ^ Stokesbury 1990, pp. 189–90.
- ^ Stokesbury 1990, pp. 24––45.
- ^ "Online Documents: Korean War". Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
- ^ Stokesbury 1990, p. 240.
- ^ Harrison, William T. "Military Armistice in Korea: A Case Studyfor Strategic Leaders". Defense Technical Information Center. Fort Belvoir: United States Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 1 August 2013. Retrieved 11 April 2013.
- ^ "KOREA 1951–1953" (PDF). Center of Military History, Department of the Army. 1997 [1989]: 25.
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help) (Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 56–60005) - ^ Agov 2013, p. 238.
- ^ "The Korean War Timeline". The Authentic History Center. United States: Salem Media Group. Archived from the original on 4 November 2012. Retrieved 13 December 2012.
- ^ Catchpole 2000, p. 322.
- ^ "United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)". Canadian Armed Forces. Government of Canada. 14 March 2019.
- ^ "Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State (1953) July 27, 1953". U.S. Department of State. 2013. Archived from the original on 18 May 2015. Retrieved 27 July 2013.
- ^ Robert R. Bowie; Mansfield D. Sprague; F.W. Farrell (29 March 1957), "New Equipment for U.S. Forces in Korea", Memorandum to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, archived from the original on 22 May 2013, retrieved 21 March 2013
- ^ ISBN 978-0393347531. Archivedfrom the original on 19 February 2014. Retrieved 7 November 2013.
- ^ "Defense proposal to authorize the introduction of 'Honest John' and the 280 millimeter gun in Korea", Memorandum of a Conversation, United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, 28 November 1956, archived from the original on 22 May 2013, retrieved 21 March 2013,
Summing up, Mr. Phleger stated our view as lawyers that introduction of the two weapons could not be successfully supported as a matter of liberal interpretation, would upset the balance established under the agreement, and would generally be regarded as a violation of the agreement under existing circumstances. He reaffirmed that the agreement should not, however, stand in the way of any action which it might be considered necessary and wise to take, now or in the future, in view of the military and political situation, and with full awareness of all the consequences.
- ^ a b c Selden & So 2004, pp. 77–80.
- ^ )
- ^ "KOREA: The End of 13D". Time. 1 July 1957. Archived from the original on 19 October 2011. Retrieved 4 April 2012.
- ^ Statement of U.S. Policy toward Korea. National Security Council (Report). United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. 9 August 1957. NSC 5702/2. Archived from the original on 3 February 2014. Retrieved 17 April 2012.
- ^ "News in Brief: Atomic Weapons to Korea". Universal International Newsreel. 6 February 1958. Archived from the original on 7 July 2013. Retrieved 4 April 2012.
- ^ Mizokami, Kyle (10 September 2017). "The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea". scout.com. CBS Interactive. Retrieved 13 September 2017.
- ^ "'Detailed Report' Says US 'Ruptured' Denuclearization Process". Korean Central News Agency. 12 May 2003. Archived from the original on 6 February 2012. Retrieved 4 April 2012.
- ^ Pak Chol Gu (7 May 1997). "Replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement: Prerequisite to a lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula". Nautilus Institute. Archived from the original on 2 February 2014. Retrieved 2 May 2013.
Other illegal introductions spotted by NNITs in the period from August 1953 to 15 April 1954 included, for example, 177 planes, 465 guns of different calibres, 6,400 rockets, 145 mortars and 1,365 machine-guns.
- ^ "Modernization of United States Forces in Korea", Record of a Meeting, United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, 17 June 1957, archived from the original on 3 February 2014, retrieved 21 March 2013,
Sir Harold then asked what plans were being made to inform not just the United Nations but the press and the world at large of the Communist violations of the Armistice. Mr. Robertson said the Defense Department and the Secretary of State concurred that at the MAC meeting it would be inadvisable to submit any supplementary data on violations. Furthermore, the Secretary felt very strongly that the release of such information would give the Communists ammunition for their propaganda. We would not, therefore, submit any evidence to accompany the statement.
- ^ a b Patrick M. Norton (March 1997). "Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues". Nautilus Institute. Archived from the original on 18 August 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help) - ^ "Resolution 3390" (PDF). United Nations General Assembly. 18 November 1975. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2 June 2013. Retrieved 12 April 2013.
- ^ Person, James (26 September 2017). "Chinese-North Korean Relations: Drawing the Right Historical Lessons". 38 North. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Archived from the original on 27 September 2017. Retrieved 28 September 2017.
- ^ "Chronology of major North Korean statements on the Korean War armistice". News. Yonhap News Agency. 28 May 2009. Archived from the original on 12 March 2013.
- ^ "North Korea ends peace pacts with South". BBC News. 8 March 2013. Archived from the original on 11 March 2013.
- ^ "The End of The Korean War Cease-Fire: Does It Matter?". BBC. 5 June 2009. Archived from the original on 5 June 2012.
- ^ "DPRK: New Arrangements – The Secretary's Morning Intelligence Summary" (PDF). Bureau of Intelligence and Research. U.S. Department of State. 29 April 1994. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 April 2013. Retrieved 6 August 2013.
- ^ "DPRK: Raising the Armistice Issue – The Secretary's Morning Intelligence Summary" (PDF). Bureau of Intelligence and Research. U.S. Department of State. 10 September 1994. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 April 2013. Retrieved 6 August 2013.
- ^ Siegfried S. Hecker (12 January 2017). "The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
- ^ Niksch, Larry A. (5 January 2010). North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. p. 2. RL33590. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 March 2013. Retrieved 12 December 2015.
North Korea's position on a Korean peace treaty (an old North Korean proposal going back to 1974) contrasted sharply in three respects with positions of the Obama Administration, which [Stephen] Bosworth reiterated and reportedly were contained in a letter from President Obama to North Korean leader, Kim Jong‑il, delivered by Bosworth. First, as reportedly stated by Bosworth, the Obama Administration would engage in a negotiation of a peace treaty when North Korea 'takes irreversible steps toward denuclearization'. North Korea appears to seek the denuclearization issue merged into a U.S.–North Korean peace treaty negotiation. Second, Bosworth repeated the position of the Obama Administration (and the Bush Administration) that U.S. normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea would be a main element of U.S. reciprocity in return for North Korean denuclearization. North Korea rejects diplomatic relations as a quid pro quo for denuclearization (a position that North Korea set out in January 2009). Third, North Korea's longstanding agenda for a peace treaty and its repeated definition of 'denuclearization of the Korean peninsula' have focused on securing a major diminution of the U.S. military presence in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula (which North Korea defines as elimination of 'the U.S. nuclear threat'). The Obama Administration, like the Bush Administration, never has expressed a willingness to negotiate on U.S. military forces as part of a denuclearization negotiation.
- ^ "Korean Armistice Agreement Will No Longer Exist: Rodong Sinmun". Korean Central News Agency. 7 March 2013. Archived from the original on 12 March 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
- ^ "U.S. nukes to remain in South". JoongAng Ilbo. 12 March 2013. Archived from the original on 15 March 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
{{cite news}}
: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link) - ^ Choe Sang-Hun (21 March 2013). "North Korea Threatens U.S. Military Bases in the Pacific". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 March 2013. Retrieved 21 March 2013.
- ^ a b "North Korea ends peace pacts with South". BBC. 8 March 2013. Archived from the original on 11 March 2013.
- ^ "UN Says Korean War Armistice Still in Force". Associated Press. 11 March 2013. Archived from the original on 2 April 2013. Retrieved 28 March 2013.
- ^ Thom Shanker; Choe Sang-Hun (28 March 2013). "U.S. Runs Practice Sortie in South Korea". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 1 May 2013. Retrieved 1 May 2013.
- ^ North Korea readying rockets to aim at U.S. targets, state media says Archived 29 March 2013 at the Wayback Machine. CNN. Retrieved 12 July 2013.
- ^ Sangwon Yoon (17 June 2013). "N. Korea's Peace Talks Proposal Meets With U.S. Skepticism". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 9 November 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.
- ^ a b KBS (23 August 2016). "Source: N. Korea Installs Land Mines near Truce Village to Stop Escapes". Source: N. Korea Installs Land Mines near Truce Village to Stop Escapes. Korean Broadcasting System. Archived from the original on 5 September 2016. Retrieved 5 September 2016.
- ^ Elise Labott, Nicole Gaouette (23 February 2016). "North Korea offered -- then rebuffed -- talks with U.S." CNN. Archived from the original on 21 September 2017. Retrieved 21 September 2017.
- ^ Talmadge, Eric (5 March 2016). "Could peace talks help defuse North Korea?". The Japan Times. Associated Press. Retrieved 21 September 2017.
- ^ Griffiths, James (27 April 2018). "North and South Korea vow to end the Korean War in historic accord". CNN. Archived from the original on 27 April 2018. Retrieved 27 April 2018.
- ^ "Koreas make nuclear pledge after summit". BBC News. 27 April 2018. Archived from the original on 27 April 2018. Retrieved 27 April 2018.
- ^ "US 'still hopeful' about N Korea summit". BBC News. 16 May 2018. Archived from the original on 27 June 2018. Retrieved 20 June 2018.
- ^ Mason, Jeff (15 May 2018). "Trump says 'We'll see' on North Korea summit, to insist on..." Reuters. Archived from the original on 17 May 2018. Retrieved 17 May 2018.
- National Archives.
- ^ "Trump and Kim's joint statement". Reuters. 12 June 2018. Archived from the original on 26 September 2018. Retrieved 26 September 2018.
- ^ "North Korea's Kim says summit with Trump stabilized region, sees..." Reuters. 18 September 2018. Retrieved 3 March 2019 – via www.reuters.com.
- ^ kim-trump-singapore-summit-stability-827908
- ^ "Donald Trump hails 'exciting' summit agreements reached by Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in | the Straits Times". The Straits Times. 19 September 2018. Archived from the original on 26 September 2018. Retrieved 26 September 2018.
- ^ Klug, Foster (28 July 2021). "Even in absence, North Korea's presence felt at Tokyo Games". Associated Press. Retrieved 11 October 2021.
- ^ Office of the Press Secretary (26 July 2017). "President Donald J. Trump Proclaims July 27, 2017, as National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day". whitehouse.gov. Washington, D.C.: White House. Archived from the original on 27 July 2017. Retrieved 28 July 2017.
- ^ Trump, Donald [@realDonaldTrump] (27 July 2017). "President Trump Proclaims July 27, 2017, as National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day" (Tweet). Retrieved 28 July 2017 – via Twitter.
- ^ Eschiliman, Bob (27 July 2017). "President Trump Vows America Will Never Forget the Veterans of the 'Forgotten War'". Charisma. Lake Mary, Florida: Charisma Media. Archived from the original on 28 July 2017. Retrieved 28 July 2017.
- ^ 조국해방전쟁 승리의 날 [Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War Day] (in Korean). Archived from the original on 11 October 2014.
- ^ Se Young Lee; Maxim Duncan. "Kim Jong Un visits war graves ahead of North Korea's 'Day of Victory'". NBC News. Archived from the original on 16 January 2014. Retrieved 16 September 2014.
Sources
- Agov, Avram (2013). "North Korea's Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War". The Journal of Korean Studies. 18 (2). S2CID 145216046.
- Catchpole, Brian (2000). The Korean War (1st ed.). ISBN 978-0786707805.
- Mount, Graeme S.; Laferriere, André (2004). The Diplomacy of War: The Case of Korea. ISBN 978-1551642390.
- Stokesbury, James L. (1988). A Short History of the Korean War (1st ed.). ISBN 978-0688063771.
- Stokesbury, James L. (30 January 1990). Korean Short History. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-688-09513-0.
- Stueck, William Whitney (1995). The Korean War: An International History (1st ed.). ISBN 978-0691037677.
- Selden, Mark; So, Alvin Y. (2004). War and state terrorism: the United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the long twentieth century. ISBN 978-0742523913.
Further reading
- Watry, David M. (2014). Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. ISBN 978-0807157183.
- United Nations command Korean armistice negotiations, 1951-1953, US National Archives and Records ServiceMF-13198 T1152 (1962)
External links
- Works related to Korean Armistice Agreement at Wikisource