Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), face a crossroads in the political trajectory of Iraqi Kurdistan.[3]
History
The Kurdish people are an ethnic group whose origins are in the
Persians, Arabs, and Ottomans were kept away, and a space was carved out to develop Kurdish culture, language, and identity.[4] Arabs applied the name "Kurds" to the people of the mountains after they had conquered and Islamicized the region.[5]
Classical period
Saladin, of Kurdish origin, who founded Ayyubid dynasty, was born in Tikrit in present-day Iraq.
Several Kurdish dynasties such as Annazids (990/1–1117)[6][7] and Hasanwayhids (or Hasanuyids, 959–1015)[7] ruled in northern Iraq. The Kurdish[8][7][9]Marwanid dynasty (983–1096) temporarily ruled over Mosul.[10] The Ayyubid dynasty, a powerful Islamic dynasty of Kurdish origin[11] and also ruled northern Iraq.
Ottoman conquest and after
In the 1500s most Kurds fell under Ottoman Rule. Iraqi Kurds developed as a subgroup of the Kurdish peoples when
Iraqi independence, didn't see any provisions for a Kurdish autonomy.[14]
no fly zone initiative in Iraqi Kurdistan for the Kurds as an asylum away from the Iraqi government.[18]United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 in 1991 condemned and forbade "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population... in Kurdish populated areas."[18] After many bloody encounters, an uneasy balance of power was reached between the Iraqi forces and Kurdish troops, ultimately allowing Iraqi Kurdistan to function independently. The region continued to be ruled by the KDP and PUK and began to establish a stable economy and national identity. Iraqi Kurdistan built a socioeconomic infrastructure from scratch, completely independent from the centralized framework of Ba'athist Iraq.[20] Though civil war broke out in the north between Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party and Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from 1994 to 1998, Kurds were still able to maintain a democratic and prosperous foundation for their region.[21]
US invasion of Iraq
When the US invaded to oust the Iraqi government in 2003, the northern Kurdish border with Iraqi central state was moved considerably southward.
centralized or not, how the US should respond to civil conflict between the Arabs and Kurds, and how previous promises to the Kurdish and Iraqi people would be achieved in a future state.[21]
Flickr – The U.S. Army – 1st 'Panthers' Battalion prepares to replace 'Warriors,' assume mission in east Rashid
Kurdish people have played an important role in Iraqi state-building since the United States invaded in 2003. Many Kurds seek to build an autonomous federal state in the post-Hussein era, however, a solution for Kurdish problems in Iraq was not even mentioned in the 2004 UN resolution that established Iraq's interim government.[21]
Politics
See also:
Disputed territories of Northern Iraq
Factors that play into their future include Kurdish diversity and factions, Kurdish relationships with the United States, Iraq's central government, and neighboring countries, previous political agreements, disputed territories, and Kurdish nationalism.
Disputed internal boundaries have been a core concern for Arabs and Kurds, especially since US invasion and political restructuring in 2003. Kurds gained territory to the south of Iraqi Kurdistan after the US-led invasion in 2003 to regain what land they considered historically theirs.[22]
One of the major problems in trying to implement Article 140 was a discrepancy in the definition of 'disputed area'.[22] The article only refers to regions that would go through this normalization process as "Kirkuk and other disputed area".[22] In 2003 Kurdish negotiator Mahmud Othman suggested that Kurdish majority areas below the Green line be attached to the KRG immediately, and 'mixed areas' should be questioned on a case-by-case basis.[22] Sunnis felt as if Kurds should gain no additional land as a result of the US invasion.[22] Reattaching Kirkuk districts to reflect the 1975 boundaries posed many problems to Iraqis and brought along unintended consequences.[22]
2014 Northern Iraq offensive
Disputed areas in Iraq prior to the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive.
Disputed and part of the Kurdish Regional Government since 1991.
Disputed and under the control of central government.
During the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive, Iraqi Kurdistan seized the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding area, as well as most of the disputed territories in Northern Iraq.[23]
Article 140
Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution vowed to place disputed areas under the jurisdiction of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) by the end of 2007.[24] The three phases that were going to aid this process were normalization, census, and referendum. The normalization phase was supposed to undo the 'Arabization' policies Kurds faced from 1968 to 2003 that were designed to alter the demographic in the city of Kirkuk and other disputed areas to favor the Arab population.[24] These policies included deportation, displacement, house demolition, and property confiscation.[24] Institutionalized boundaries as a result of past gerrymandering were also to be reversed. After this normalization process, a census would talk place and the populous would choose to be governed by either the KRG or Baghdad.[24]
Article 140 was not implemented by 2007. At this time the Presidency Council also recommended to reattach all previously detached districts of Kirkuk.
Tuz district would be reattached from the Salah ad-Din district. In 2008, the 140 Committee announced inaction on these initiatives.[24]
In 2008, the Iraqi, Kurdish and US governments came to the consensus that these types of reparations to the Kurdish people would not be able to be carried out without further negotiations and political agreements on boundaries.[24] The US government faced many problems trying to implement Article 140. This was not an ideal form of reparation for many Kurds. After being displaced, many formerly Kurdish regions lacked in development and agricultural upkeep.[24] Educational and economic opportunities were often greater for Kurds outside of these disputed territories, so many people did not want to be forced to return.[24]
Culture and diversity
Religion
Yazidi temple
Before the spread of
Shia population following the Ja'fari school, called the Feylis who live in the central and eastern parts of Iraq. Their population is estimated to be around 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 in Iraq which is about 30% of the Iraqi Kurdish population. They are known for being very wealthy businessmen, merchants, politicians, highly educated and have dominated the politics and economy of Iraq especially during the 60s and 70s.[25] Unlike the other sunni Kurds the feylis speak the southern Kurdish dialect which is more closer to the Persian language.[4][26] The feylis have been a subject of discrimination by their fellow sunni Kurds and even sunni Arabs for belonging to the Shiite faith, the common terms such as “Safavid”, ”Rafidah”, “Persian” or “Ajam” is used against the feylis to degrade them. Despite that many feylis are secular or moderate, the alienation by their fellow sunni Kurds have pushed them closer to the Shia regime in Iran. The Feyli Kurdish merchant establishment have very close ties with the Shiite clergy, for example the merchants helps the clergy by financing the opening of new mosques and other religious affairs. Islam is thought to be a religion of governance as well as spirituality, Kurds make sure to keep both their spiritual identity and national identity strong.[4] Today, many Muslim Kurds consider themselves religious when it comes to adhering to the call to prayer as they often try to keep up and pray all five prayers, also secondary practices of Islam have a stronghold in Kurdish culture.[4] Such as, following Islamic food restrictions, refraining from the consumption of alcohol, circumcising male newborns, and wearing a veil are all very popular customs and rituals among Kurds.[4]
Language
In May 1931 the
nomadic and therefore had a very limited written tradition.[4]
After political changes in Iraq in the 1990s, however, Kurdish was increasingly used in the regional administration and education system, given their greater autonomy.[4]
Political parties
PDK KurdistanKDP and PUK-controlled areas of Kurdistan
A major weakness of Kurdish national cohesiveness has been the strength of tribal and regional factions, often resulting in strong breaks between
Marxist ideals during their liberation struggle and has a stronghold in the southern Iraqi Kurdistan.[20] They have tended to seek support from Iran and Syria. Throughout the 1990s a continuous power struggle ensued over political representation in parliament and oil revenues, resulting in an armed conflict in 1994.[20] Fighting again broke out in 1996, the KDP looked for assistance from the central Iraqi government and the PUK sought out support for the United States. This clash divided the two rival zones into "Barzanistan" and "Talabanistan", establishing two administrations, cabinets, parliaments, and state flags.[20] Political party infighting ruined a chance for the Kurdish peoples to unify and establish an autonomous state, completely separate from the Iraqi central government.[20] Within a factionalized atmosphere, other groups established a presence, such as the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), radical Islamist groups, and other Turkish political groups. The PKK has been a major party seeking state autonomy and cultural, linguistic, and ethnic rights for Kurds in Turkey.[31]
Kurdish leaders in Iraq have pushed for the prosperity of divided local governments rather than an independent state; this is because leadership is derived from tribal legitimacy, rather than political institutions. Talabani and Barzani, for instance, did not come from the most populous Kurdish tribe, but rather from well-organized tribes.[21] This could be an inhibitor to democracy in the region since those trying to preserve the status quo hold power but do not represent the majority.[21]
From 1986 to the present, Turkey has held different alliances with the KDP and PUK parties of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey has protected the KDP from the PKK and PUK. Turkey has also attacked the political parties PUK and PKK, while keeping good relations with the KDP, partially for access to cheap
independence referendum of 2017
the relations between Turkey and political parties in the KRG cooled down.
National identity
Throughout the 1990s, when Kurds were given regional control after the
Kurdish flag, a Kurdish hymn, and public recognition of the Kurdish people.[20]
Development of Kurdish infrastructure has also become an integral aspect of their successful autonomy.[20] Previously dependent on the socioeconomic infrastructure of Baghdad, Kurds were able to efficiently build up their region, physically and politically, from scratch.[20] They built a fully functioning autonomous government, free from Ba'athist Iraq. They were able to manage local governments, establish free and active Kurdish political parties, and institutionalize a Kurdish parliament.[20] With these developments, the de facto Kurdish government gained recognition for the first time in the international sphere. They have quasi-official representation in Turkey, Iran, France, Britain, and the United States.[20]
Though Kurdish people had some success in forming a national identity, there have been factors that have stunted its growth. Under the state of Iraq, Kurds were subjugated to the nationalism process for all Iraqis, given the arbitrary state lines.[21] Kurds were starting to think of themselves as Iraqis, rather than focus on their collective development as Kurds. Nationalism was also hindered by divisions of tribes, languages, and geography that prevented the Kurdish people from identifying completely as one unit.[21] No leader has yet to rise above this tribal status and the infighting hurts those fighting for Kurdish autonomy because they are divided by other factions or political boundaries.[21] For example, during the Iran–Iraq War, from 1980 to 1988, Turkey supported one Iraqi Kurdish group over another in order to play the Iraqi Kurds off against Turkey's own rebellious Kurds.[21]
Technology and telecommunications have helped Kurds to establish an ethno-national group, or self-defined national identity. Though this has developed a sense of pride and definition across political boundaries, it reveals a less promising scenario of Kurdish statehood.[21] It has disclosed disparities across countries about which Kurdish populations are gaining international support and relief. For Iraqi Kurds, this international network was established after the Gulf War of 1991. They had new forms of financial and political support as well as the resources and the legal geographic space to advance their nationalist agenda. This access allowed Kurdish language publications, texts, educational programs, and cultural organizations to flourish—benefits that Kurds only were experiencing within the state of Iraq and in European academic institutions.[21] Transnational social and cultural networks for Kurds were still tied to characteristics of certain states.[21]
Autonomy
With a
Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, Kurds have limited their activism to fighting for cultural, social and educational rights within the state of Turkey.[21] Due to Turkey's pending EU application, Turkey has been moving to grant these rights. With this improved relationship, Turkish Kurds have accepted their place within the Turkish state. This is just one instance of how Kurds are focusing on improving their livelihood within already established state lines rather than pushing for a restructuring of political borders in the Middle East. Though Iraqi Kurds have the greatest opportunity to push for autonomy because of the Iraqi state's government restructuring, Kurds in neighboring countries do not have the leverage to push for the independence that would threaten pre-existing states.[21]
Even at a crossroads for the political future of Iraqi Kurds, Barzani and Talabani have both opted for establishing a federalist system within post-Saddam Iraq in order to ensure the future wellbeing of the Kurdish people.[21]
On 1 July 2014, Massud Barzani announced that "Iraq's Kurds will hold an independence referendum within months." After previously opposing the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey has later given signs that it could recognize an independent Kurdish state. On 11 July 2014 KRG forces seized control of the Bai Hassan and Kirkuk oilfields, prompting a condemnation from Baghdad and a threat of "dire consequences," if the oilfields were not relinquished back to Iraq's control.[32]
References
ISSN 1553-8133. Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 2 August 2015. A rough estimate in this edition gives populations of 14.3 million in Turkey, 8.2 million in Iran, about 5.6 to 7.4 million in Iraq, and less than 2 million in Syria, which adds up to approximately 28–30 million Kurds in Kurdistan or in adjacent regions. The CIA estimates are as of August 2015[update]
– Turkey: Kurdish 18%, of 81.6 million; Iran: Kurd 10%, of 81.82 million; Iraq: Kurdish 15–20%, of 37.01 million, Syria: Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%, of 17.01 million.
^"The Kurdish population". Kurdish Institute of Paris. 2016. Archived from the original on 25 May 2023. Retrieved 16 June 2023. For Iraqi Kurdistan more precise figures are available. By 2016 there were 5.4 million Kurds in the three governorates (Erbil, Duhok, Suleimanieh) in the Federated Kurdistan Region and about 3 million Kurds in the adjoining Kurdish territories not officially located in the Kurdistan region. The Kurdish population in Iraq thus amounts to 8.4 million, or 26.5% of the total population of Iraq.
Aḥmad, K. M. (1985). "ʿANNAZIDS". Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. II. Fasc. 1. pp. 97–98.
Vacca, Alison (2017). Non-Muslim Provinces under Early Islam: Islamic Rule and Iranian Legitimacy in Armenia and Caucasian Albania. Cambridge University Press.
