Kyūjō incident
Kyūjō incident | |||
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Part of the Surrender of Japan | |||
Date | 14–15 August 1945 | ||
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Resulted in | Coup failed | ||
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The Kyūjō incident (宮城事件, Kyūjō Jiken) was an attempted military
The officers murdered
Background
Decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration
On 26 July, 1945 (Berlin time), the Potsdam Conference issued a declaration on the terms for the surrender of Japan. When the Potsdam Declaration was received in Japan over shortwave, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Shigenori Tōgō brought a copy to the Emperor of Japan, Hirohito. After going over the declaration point by point, the emperor asked Tōgō if those terms "were the most reasonable to be expected in the circumstances". Tōgō said that they were. The emperor said, "I agree. In principle they are acceptable."[1] In late July, however, the other ministers were not ready to accept the declaration.[2]
On 9 August, 1945, the Japanese government, responding to the
After the closure of the
Agitation in the Army
The
Late on the night of 12 August, 1945, Major
Shortly after the Imperial Conference on the night of 13-14 August at which the surrender finally was decided, Anami had two conversations in which he expressed opposition to the surrender. He asked Yoshijirō Umezu, the Chief of the Army General Staff, if "the war should be continued even at the risk of launching a coup d'état", to which Umezu concluded, "There is nothing we can do now but to comply with the Emperor's decision."[5] Anami then confronted a Colonel Saburo Hayashi in a washroom and asked about "the possibility of attacking a large American convoy rumored to be outside of Tokyo." Hayashi dashed Anami's suggestion by reaffirming the Imperial decision while noting the presence of the convoy was only a rumor.[5] Finally, his brother-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Masahiko Takeshita confronted Anami, first suggesting Anami resign, which would topple the government; then suggesting he support the coup. To the first, Anami noted that the fall of the government would not stop the Imperial edict, while to the second, he replied that he wished to go to the Army Ministry first.[5]
At the Army Ministry, Anami announced compliance with the Imperial edict.[5] Then a group of senior army officers including Anami gathered in a nearby room. All those present were concerned about the possibility of a coup d'état to prevent the surrender—some of those present may have even been considering launching one. After a silence, General Torashirō Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, proposed that all senior officers present sign an agreement to carry out the emperor's order of surrender—"The Army will act in accordance with the Imperial Decision to the last." Vice Minister of War Tadaichi Wakamatsu was also present and helped draft the document. It was signed by all the most important officers present. The signatories were Minister of War Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, commander of the 1st General Army Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama, commander of the 2nd General Army Field Marshal Shunroku Hata and Inspector-General of Military Training Kenji Doihara. When Umezu voiced concern about air units causing trouble, Wakamatsu went next door to the HQ of the Air General Army, where its commander, Masakazu Kawabe (the brother of Torashirō), also signed. This written accord by the most senior officers in the Army, in addition to Anami's announcement, acted as a formidable firebreak against any attempt to incite a coup d'état in Tokyo.[8]
Coup attempt
Around 21:30 on 14 August, Hatanaka's rebels set their plan into motion. The Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards had entered the palace grounds, doubling the strength of the battalion already stationed there, presumably to provide extra protection against Hatanaka's rebellion. But Hatanaka, along with Lt. Col. Jirō Shiizaki, convinced the commander of the Second Regiment, Colonel Toyojirō Haga, of their cause, by telling him (untruthfully) that Anami, Umezu, and the commanders of the Eastern District Army and Imperial Guards Divisions were all in on the plan. Hatanaka also went to the office of General Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of the Eastern region of the army, to try to persuade him to join the coup. Tanaka refused, and ordered Hatanaka to go home. Hatanaka ignored the order.[9]
Originally, Hatanaka hoped that simply occupying the palace and showing the beginnings of a rebellion would inspire the rest of the Army to rise up against the move to surrender. This notion guided him through much of the last days and hours and gave him the blind optimism to move ahead with the plan, despite having little support from his superiors. Having set all the pieces into position, Hatanaka and his co-conspirators decided that the Guard would take over the palace at 02:00. The hours until then were spent in continued attempts to convince their superiors in the Army to join the coup. At about the same time, General Anami killed himself, leaving a message that read, "I—with my death—humbly apologize to the Emperor for the great crime."[10] Whether the crime involved losing the war, the coup, or both, remains unclear.[11]
At some time after 01:00, Hatanaka and his men surrounded the palace. Hatanaka, Shiizaki, Ida, and Captain Shigetarō Uehara (of the Air Force Academy) went to the office of Lt. General
The palace police were disarmed and all the entrances blocked.[15] Over the course of the night, Hatanaka's rebels captured and detained eighteen people, including Ministry staff and NHK workers sent to record the surrender speech.[15]
The rebels, led by Hatanaka, spent the next several hours fruitlessly searching for Imperial Household Minister
At about the same time, in
Around 03:00, Hatanaka was informed by Lieutenant Colonel Masataka Ida that the Eastern District Army was on its way to the palace to stop him, and that he should give up.[20][21] Finally, seeing his plan collapsing around him, Hatanaka pleaded with Tatsuhiko Takashima , Chief of Staff of the Eastern District Army, to be given at least ten minutes on the air on NHK radio, to explain to the people of Japan what he was trying to accomplish and why. He was refused.[22] Colonel Haga, commander of the Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, discovered that the Army did not support this rebellion, and he ordered Hatanaka to leave the palace grounds.
Just before 05:00, as his rebels continued their search, Major Hatanaka went to NHK studios, and, brandishing a pistol, tried desperately to get some airtime to explain his actions.[23] A little over an hour later, after receiving a telephone call from the Eastern District Army, Hatanaka finally gave up. He gathered his officers and walked out of the NHK studio.[24]
At dawn, Tanaka learned that the palace had been invaded. He went there and confronted the rebellious officers, berating them for acting contrary to the spirit of the Japanese army. He convinced them to return to their barracks.[13][25] By 08:00, the rebellion was entirely dismantled, having succeeded in holding the palace grounds for much of the night but failing to find the recordings.[26]
Hatanaka, on a motorcycle, and Shiizaki, on horseback, rode through the streets, tossing leaflets that explained their motives and their actions. Within an hour before the emperor's surrender broadcast, sometime around 11:00, on 15 August, Hatanaka placed his pistol to his forehead, and shot himself. Shiizaki stabbed himself with a dagger, and then shot himself. In Hatanaka's pocket was his death poem: "I have nothing to regret now that the dark clouds have disappeared from the reign of the Emperor."[19]
See also
- Matsue incident — about forty dissidents attacked facilities in Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture on August 24, 1945
- Films depicting the Kyūjō incident:
- 1945, an alternate history novel which depicts the coup succeeding.
- Gekokujō, or the low overcomes the high
References
Citations
- ^ Kase, Toshikazu (1950). Journey To The Missouri. Yale University Press. p. 210. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
- ISBN 0-671-81499-0.
- ^ a b Hoyt 1986, p. 404.
- ^ Toland 1970, p. 814–815.
- ^ a b c d e Frank 1999, p. 316.
- ^ Frank 1999, p. 318.
- ^ Hoyt 1986, pp. 407–408.
- ^ Frank 1999, p. 317.
- ^ Hoyt 1986, p. 409.
- ^ Frank 1999, p. 319.
- ^ Butow 1954, p. 220.
- ^ Hoyt 1986, pp. 409–410.
- ^ a b c d Hoyt 1986, p. 410.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 227.
- ^ a b Hasegawa 2005, p. 244.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 309.
- ^ Butow 1954, p. 216.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 279.
- ^ a b Wainstock 1996, p. 115.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 246.
- ^ Hasegawa 2005, p. 247.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 283.
- ^ Hoyt 1986, p. 411.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 303.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 290.
- ^ The Pacific War Research Society 1968, p. 311.
Bibliography
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0460-1.
- ISBN 978-0-14-100146-3.
- ISBN 978-0-674-01693-4.
- ISBN 978-0-07-030612-7.
- The Pacific War Research Society (1968) [1965]. Japan's Longest Day (English language ed.). Palo Alto, California: Kodansha International.
- ISBN 978-0-394-44311-9.
- Wainstock, Dennis (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-95475-8.