Lê Văn Kim
Lieutenant General Lê Văn Kim (1918 – 28 March 1987)
Career
Kim began his career in the
In the early years of the Diem regime, Kim was directing the Land Development Program in the
Kim was then promoted brigadier general, but it was believed that Diem did to allow for Kim to become head of the Vietnamese National Military Academy, which was regarded as 'dead-end job' with no troops to command.[3]
1960 coup attempt
On November 11, 1960,
Junta
Kim was one of the leading figures in Minh's junta, and as the chief of general staff.[11]
During the latter part of Diệm's rule, a centerpiece of the rural pacification campaign was the large-scale construction of strategic hamlets, fortified camps that were designed to lock out insurgents. However this failed as many were able to infiltrate the settlements, as political affiliation could not be distinguished. It also angered the peasants, who were forced to abandon their ancestral lands and homes, and build new dwellings in the new villages. Many of these hamlets were subsequently overrun in communist attacks.[12][13][14][15] Kim oversaw the future of the program for Minh and they decided to liberalize the system to try to win over the peasants. They forecast that they could reduce the insurgency's support by 30% alone through these less restrictive arrangements, citing more cooperative attitudes in Mekong Delta regions heavily populated with Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài.[16] However this upset and aroused suspicions among the Americans.[16]
Overthrow
A group of officers, led by Generals
On January 30, Khánh launched a coup, arresting Minh, Dinh, Đôn and Kim, claiming that they were part of a neutralist plot with the
On May 28, 1964, Khanh put his rivals on trial. The generals were secretly interrogated for five and a half hours, mostly about details of their coup against Diệm, rather than the original charge of promoting neutralism. As all of the officers were involved in the plot against Diệm, this did not reveal any information new to them. The court deliberated for over nine hours, and when it reconvened for the verdict on May 29,[24] Khánh stated, "We ask that once you begin to serve again in the army, you do not take revenge on anybody".[22] The tribunal then "congratulated" the generals, but found that they were of "lax morality" and unqualified to command due to a "lack of a clear political concept".[22][25] They were chastised for being "inadequately aware of their heavy responsibility" and of letting "their subordinates take advantage of their positions".[26] The four imprisoned generals were allowed to remain in Da Lat under surveillance with their families.[22][26] However, there were reports that the trial ended in a festive manner akin to a party, as the officers shook hands and made up with one another,[27] with Minh reported to have commended Khanh for his "fairness" before organising a celebratory dinner for the generals.[24] All four generals were barred from commanding troops for a period; Kim was banned for six years. Offices were prepared for the quartet so that they could participate in "research and planning".[22] Worried that the group of idle officers would plot against him, Khánh made some preliminary arrangements to send them to the United States for military study, but this fell through.[26][28] When Khánh was himself deposed in 1965, he handed over dossiers proving that the four generals were innocent;[29] the original documents that Khánh claimed proved his accusations of neutralism were neither presented to nor found by anyone.[25]
During the period of house arrest, Khánh briefly released Đính and Kim when the
Notes
- ISBN 978-0-9852-1820-1. (pg 155-158)
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ^ a b c d e f g Miller, p. 208.
- ^ Hickey, p. 56.
- ^ Hickey, p. 67.
- ^ Miller, p. 185.
- ^ Miller, pp. 202—208.
- ^ Dommen, pp. 418—419.
- ^ Kahin, p. 473.
- ^ Miller, p. 210.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 231–232.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 272–276.
- ^ Tang, pp. 45–50.
- ^ Langguth, pp. 168–170.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 125–130.
- ^ a b Kahin, p. 187.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 232.
- ^ Kahin, p. 197.
- ^ Logevall, p. 162.
- ^ a b c Kahin, p. 198.
- ^ Blair, p. 113.
- ^ a b c d e Langguth, pp. 289–291.
- ^ a b MacGregor, Greg (1964-01-30). "Plot is laid to 2 seized in Saigon". The New York Times. p. 3.
- ^ New York Times. 1964-05-31. p. 2.
- ^ a b Blair, p. 115.
- ^ a b c Shaplen, pp. 244–245.
- ^ "Khanh releases 4 rival generals". The New York Times. 1964-05-31. p. 2.
- ^ Karnow, p. 355.
- ^ Langguth, p. 347.
- ^ Hickey, pp. 154–60.
References
- Blair, Anne E. (1995). Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-06226-5.
- Dommen, Arthur J. (2001). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-33854-9.
- Hickey, Gerald Cannon (2002). Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press. ISBN 0-89672-490-5.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- ISBN 0-394-54367-X.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- ISBN 978-0-674-07298-5.
- Logevall, Fredrik (2006). "The French Recognition of China and its Implications for the Vietnam War". In Roberts, Priscilla (ed.). Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 153–171. ISBN 0-8047-5502-7.
- ISBN 0-521-86911-0.
- Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. London: André Deutsch. OCLC 3574531.
- ISBN 0224028197.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.