Landing at Nadzab
Landing at Nadzab | |||||||
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Part of World War II, Pacific War | |||||||
5 September 1943. Dwarfed by and silhouetted against clouds of smoke generated to provide concealment, C-47s from the US Army Air Forces drop a battalion of the 503rd Parachute Regiment at Nadzab, New Guinea. A battalion dropped minutes earlier is landing in the foreground. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States Australia | Japan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Douglas MacArthur George Kenney Thomas Blamey Edmund Herring George Alan Vasey |
Hitoshi Imamura Hatazō Adachi Kumaichi Teramoto Hidemitsu Nakano | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
6,000 | 2,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
119 killed 241 wounded or injured 166 evacuated sick. | Unknown |
The Landing at Nadzab was an airborne landing on 5 September 1943 during the New Guinea campaign of World War II in conjunction with the landing at Lae. The Nadzab action began with a parachute drop at Lae Nadzab Airport, combined with an overland force.
The parachute drop was carried out by the US Army's 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment and elements of the Australian Army's 2/4th Field Regiment into Nadzab, New Guinea in the Markham Valley, observed by General Douglas MacArthur, circling overhead in a B-17. The Australian 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, 2/6th Field Company, and B Company, Papuan Infantry Battalion reached Nadzab after an overland and river trek that same day and began preparing the airfield. The first transport aircraft landed the next morning, but bad weather delayed the Allied build up. Over the next days, the 25th Infantry Brigade of the Australian 7th Division gradually arrived. An air crash at Jackson's Field ultimately caused half the Allied casualties of the battle.
Once assembled at Nadzab, the 25th Infantry Brigade commenced its advance on Lae. On 11 September, it engaged the Japanese soldiers at Jensen's Plantation. After defeating them, it engaged and defeated a larger Japanese force at Heath's Plantation. During this skirmish, Private Richard Kelliher won the Victoria Cross, Australia's highest award for gallantry. Instead of fighting for Lae, the Japanese Army withdrew over the Saruwaged Range. This proved to be a gruelling test of endurance for the Japanese soldiers who had to struggle over the rugged mountains; in the end, the Japanese Army managed to withdraw its forces from Salamaua and Lae, though with extensive losses from exposure and starvation during the retreat. Troops of the 25th Infantry Brigade reached Lae shortly before those of the 9th Division that had been advancing on Lae from the opposite direction.
The development of Nadzab was delayed by the need to upgrade the Markham Valley Road. After strenuous efforts in the face of wet weather, the road was opened on 15 December 1943. Nadzab then became the major Allied air base in New Guinea.
Background
Strategy
Allied
In July 1942, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a series of operations against the Japanese bastion at Rabaul, which blocked any Allied advance along the northern coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines or north toward the main Japanese naval base at Truk. In keeping with the overall Allied grand strategy of defeating Nazi Germany first, the immediate aim of these operations was not the defeat of Japan but merely the reduction of the threat posed by Japanese aircraft and warships based at Rabaul to air and sea communications between the United States and Australia.[1]
By agreement among the Allied nations, in March 1942 the
Rabaul fell within MacArthur's area, but the initial operations in the southern
Following these victories, the initiative in the South West Pacific passed to the Allies and General Douglas MacArthur pressed ahead with his plans for Task Two. At the Pacific Military Conference in Washington, D.C. in March 1943, the plans were reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chiefs were unable to supply all the requested resources, so the plans had to be scaled back, with the capture of Rabaul postponed to 1944.[5] On 6 May 1943, MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Brisbane issued Warning Instruction No. 2, officially informing subordinate commands of the plan, which divided the Task Two operations on the New Guinea axis into three parts:
- Occupy Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands and establish air forces thereon.
- Seize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area and establish air forces therein.
- Occupy western New Britain, establishing air forces at Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Gasmata. Occupy or neutralise Talasea.
The second part was assigned to General Sir Thomas Blamey's New Guinea Force.[6] As a result, "It became obvious that any military offensive in 1943 would have to be carried out mainly by the Australian Army, just as during the bitter campaigns of 1942."[7]
Japanese
The Japanese maintained separate army and navy headquarters at Rabaul which cooperated with each other but were responsible to different higher authorities. Naval forces came under the
Imamura ordered Adachi to capture the Allied bases at
Geography
The Markham River originates in the Finisterre Range and flows for 110 miles (180 km), emptying into the Huon Gulf near Lae. The Markham Valley, which rises to an elevation of 1,210 feet (370 m), runs between the Finisterre Range to the north and the Bismarck Range to the south and varies from 6 to 12 miles (10 to 19 km) wide. The valley floor is largely composed of gravel and is generally infertile. Half of its area was covered by dense kangaroo grass 4–5 feet (1.2–1.5 m) high, but in parts where there had been a build-up of silt, Kunai grass grew from 6 to 8 feet (1.8 to 2.5 m) high. Rainfall is around 39 inches (1,000 mm) per annum. The Markham Valley was traversable by motor vehicles in the dry season, which ran from December to April, and therefore formed part of a natural highway between the Japanese bases at Lae and Madang.[12]
Planning and preparation
At Blamey's Advanced Allied Land Forces Headquarters (Adv LHQ) in
Meanwhile, Major General
The POSTERN plan called for the 7th Division to move in transports to Port Moresby and in
Vasey pronounced the plan "a dog's breakfast".[19] There were a number of serious problems. It relied on the Bulldog Road being completed, which it was not, due to the rugged nature of the country to be traversed and shortages of equipment.[18] Even if it was, the 7th Division would have been unlikely to make the operation target date. It had taken heavy casualties in the Battle of Buna–Gona and was seriously under-strength, with many men on leave or suffering from malaria. It would take time to concentrate it at its camp at Ravenshoe, Queensland on the Atherton Tableland. To bring it up to strength, the 1st Motor Brigade was disbanded in July to provide reinforcements.[16] Reinforcements passed through the Jungle Warfare Training Centre at Canungra, Queensland, where they spent a month training under conditions closely resembling those in New Guinea.[18]
The delays in getting the overland supply route organised and the 7th Division itself ready meant that, in the initial stages of the operation at least, the 7th Division would have to be maintained by air. Vasey further proposed that the bulk of his forces avoid a tiring overland march by moving directly to Nadzab by air, which increased the importance of capturing Nadzab early.[19] MacArthur agreed to make the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment based at nearby Gordonvale, Queensland, available to New Guinea Force to capture Nadzab. He further authorised the regiment to conduct training with the 7th Division and a number of exercises were conducted. Colonel Kenneth H. Kinsler, the commander of the 503rd, eager to discuss the Battle of Crete with the 21st Infantry Brigade's Brigadier Ivan Dougherty, took the unusual step of parachuting into Ravenshoe.[16] On 31 July, Vasey raised the prospect of utilising the entire regiment with Kinsler.[20] Blamey took up the matter with MacArthur, who authorised it on 8 August. Blamey made the Australian Army transport MV Duntroon available to ship the regiment from Cairns to Port Moresby,[21] except for the 2nd Battalion and advance party, which moved by air as originally planned.[22]
The 7th Division was treated to a training film, "Loading the Douglas C-47", and the commander of the Advanced Echelon of Lieutenant General George Kenney's Fifth Air Force, Major General Ennis Whitehead, made five C-47 Dakota transports available to the 7th Division each day so they could practise loading and unloading.[23] Whitehead also made a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress available so Vasey could fly low over the target area on 7 August.[24] Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and 2/6th Field Company practiced crossing the Laloki River with folding boats. They flew to Tsili Tsili Airfield on 23 and 24 August.[23]
To give the paratroops some artillery support, Lieutenant Colonel Alan Blyth of the 2/4th Field Regiment proposed dropping some of its eight short 25-pounders by parachute. A call went out for volunteers and four officers and 30 other ranks were selected. On 30 August, Vasey watched them carry out a practice jump at Rogers Airfield.[25] This turned out to be the easy part. Brand new guns were received from the 10th Advanced Ordnance Depot at Port Moresby on 23 August. Two were handed over for training while, as a precaution, the remaining six were sent the 2/117th Field Workshops for inspection and checking. All six were condemned, owing to a number of serious defects in assembly and manufacture. On 30 August, the gunners received orders to move out the next day, so the 2/51st Light Aid Detachment cannibalised six guns to produce two working guns, which were proofed by firing 20 rounds per gun. Only one was ready in time to leave with the gunners so the other followed on a special flight. Eight of the 2/4th Field Regiment's Mark II 25-pounders were also condemned owing to the presence of filings in the buffer system. Vasey was less than impressed.[26]
Vasey was concerned about the Japanese strength in the Lae area, which his staff estimated at 6,400, in addition to the 7,000 that Herring's I Corps staff estimated were in the Salamaua area.[23] However, a more immediate danger was posed by the Japanese Fourth Air Army at Wewak. Photographs taken by Allied reconnaissance planes showed 199 Japanese aircraft on the four fields there on 13 August. On 17 August, Whitehead's heavy and medium bombers and fighters, escorted by fighters, bombed Wewak. Taking the Japanese by surprise, they destroyed around 100 Japanese aircraft on the ground.[27] In September, the Japanese Army air forces had at their disposal only 60 or 70 operational aircraft to oppose the Allied air forces in New Guinea, although both the 6th and 7th Air Divisions were in the area.[28]
On the south bank of the Markham River lay Markham Point, where the Japanese maintained a force of about 200 men on commanding ground. Part of the 24th Infantry Battalion was ordered to capture the position. The attack on the morning of 4 September went wrong from the start, with two scouts being wounded by a land mine. The force fought its way into the Japanese position but took heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw. Twelve Australians were killed and six were wounded in the attack. It was then decided to merely contain the Japanese force at Markham Point, which was subjected to mortar fire and an airstrike.[29]
Battle
Assault
Transport aircraft were controlled by the 54th Troop Carrier Wing, which was commanded by
The actual date was chosen by General Kenney based on the advice of his two weather-forecasting teams, one Australian and one American. Ideally, Z-Day would be clear from Port Moresby to Nadzab but foggy over New Britain, thereby preventing the Japanese air forces at Rabaul from intervening. Forecasting the weather days in advance with such precision was difficult enough in peacetime, but more so in wartime, when many of the areas from which the weather patterns developed were occupied by the enemy and data from them was consequently denied to the forecasters. When the two teams differed over the best possible date, Kenney "split the difference between the two forecasts and told General MacArthur we would be ready to go on the morning of the 4th for the amphibious movement of the 9th Division to Hopoi Beach and about nine o'clock on the morning of the 5th we would be ready to fly the 503rd Parachute Regiment to Nadzab."[31]
Z-Day, 5 September 1943, dawned with inauspiciously bad weather. Fog and rain shrouded both the departure airfields, Jackson's and Ward's but, as the forecasters had predicted, by 0730 the fog began to dissipate. The first C-47 took off at 0820. The formation of 79 C-47s, each carrying 19 or 20 paratroops, was divided into three flights. The first, consisting of 24 C-47s from the 403rd Troop Carrier Group from Jackson's, carried 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. The second, of 31 C-47s from the 375th Troop Carrier Group from Ward's, carried the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. The third, consisting of 24 C-47s of 317th Troop Carrier Group, from Jackson's, carried the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. Each battalion had its own drop zone. The transports were escorted by 48
When Kenney informed MacArthur that he planned to observe the operation from a B-17, MacArthur reminded Kenney of his orders to keep out of combat, orders that
Three hundred and two aircraft from eight different airfields in the Moresby and Dobodura areas, made a rendezvous over Tsili Tsili at 10:07, flying through clouds, passes in the mountains, and over the top. "Not a single squadron," wrote General Kenney, "did any circling or stalling around but all slid into place like clockwork and proceeded on the final flight down the Watut Valley, turned to the right down the Markham, and went directly to the target."
Next came the C-47s, flying at 400 to 500 feet (122 to 152 m) at 100 to 105 mph (161 to 169 km/h). Dropping commenced at 10:22. Each aircraft dropped all its men in ten seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in four and a half minutes.[36] Following the transports came five B-17s with their racks loaded with 300 lb (140 kg) packages with parachutes, to be dropped to the paratroopers on call by panel signals as they needed them. This mobile supply unit stayed for much of the day, eventually dropping 15 tons of supplies. A group of 24 B-24s and four B-17s, which left the column just before the junction of the Watut and the Markham attacked the Japanese defensive position at Heath's Plantation, about halfway between Nadzab and Lae. Five B-25 weather aircraft were used along the route and over the passes, to keep the units informed on weather to be encountered during their flights to the rendezvous.[37] Generals MacArthur, Kenney, and Vasey observed the operation, from separate B-17s.[38] Later, MacArthur received the Air Medal for having "personally led the American paratroopers" and "skillfully directed this historic operation".[39] During the operation, including the bombing of Heath's, a total of 92 long tons (93 t) of high-explosive bombs was dropped, 32 long tons (33 t) of fragmentation bombs were dropped and 42,580 rounds of .50 calibre and 5,180 rounds of .30 calibre ammunition were expended.[40]
No air opposition was encountered, and only one C-47 failed to make the drop. Its cargo door blew off during the flight, damaging its elevator. It safely returned to base.[32] Three paratroopers were killed in the drop; two fell to their deaths when their parachutes malfunctioned while another landed in a tree and then fell some 66 feet (20 m) to the ground. There were 33 minor injuries caused by rough landings.[41] The three battalions met no opposition on the ground and formed up in their assembly areas. This took some time due to the tropical heat and the high grass.[42]
Five C-47s of the 375th Troop Carrier Group carrying the gunners of the 2/4th Field Regiment took off from Ward's Airfield after the main force and landed at Tsili Tsili.[43] After an hour on the ground, they set out for Nadzab. Most jumped from the first two aircraft. The next three aircraft dropped equipment, including the dismantled guns. The "pushers out" followed when the aircraft made a second pass over the drop. One Australian injured his shoulder in the drop. The gunners then had to locate and assemble their guns in the tall grass. Enough parts were found to assemble one gun and have it ready for firing within two and a half hours of dropping, although to maintain surprise they did not carry out registration fire until morning. It took three days to find the missing parts and assemble the other gun. At 1515, two B-17s dropped 192 boxes of ammunition. Their dropping was accurate, but some boxes of ammunition tore away from their parachutes.[44][45]
Follow-up
Meanwhile, a force under Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Lang, consisting of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, 2/6th Field Company, and detachments from the 7th Division Signals, 2/5th Field Ambulance and
The next day they went to work on the airstrip with hand tools. Trees were felled, potholes filled in and a windsock erected. Fourteen gliders were supposed to fly in three light tractors, three mowers, a wheeled rake and other engineering equipment from Dobodura.[45] Because the lack of opposition made immediate resupply non-urgent, and because he had doubts about the proficiency of the glider pilots, whom he knew had undergone only minimal training, General Blamey decided that the glider operation was not worth the risk to the glider pilots or their passengers and cancelled it, substituting instead the afternoon supply run by specially modified B-17s.[48] Lacking mowers, the Kunai grass was cut by hand by the pioneers, sappers, paratroops and native civilians and burned, causing the destruction of some stores and equipment that had been lost in the long grass and "a swirl of black dust".[49] By 11:00 on 6 September, the 1,500 feet (460 m) strip – which had not been used for over a year – had been extended to 3,300 feet (1,000 m).[50]
The first plane to land was an
While engineers and anti-aircraft gunners arrived from Tsili Tsili, no infantry arrived from Port Moresby on 6 September because of bad flying weather over the
Due to the unpredictable weather, aircraft continued to arrive at Nadzab sporadically. Only the 2/25th Infantry Battalion and part of the 2/33rd had reached Nadzab by the morning of 8 September when Vasey ordered the commander of the 25th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier
On 13 September, a platoon of the 2/25th Infantry Battalion came under very heavy fire from a concealed Japanese machine gun near Heath's Plantation that wounded a number of Australians, including Corporal W. H. (Billy) Richards, and halted the platoon's advance. Private
North of the main advance, a patrol from Lieutenant Colonel John J. Tolson's 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, encountered a force of 200 Japanese crossing the Bumbu River on 15 September. The Americans engaged the Japanese force and reported inflicting heavy losses. The arrival of that day of the first units of Brigadier Ivan Dougherty's 21st Infantry Brigade at Nadzab at last allowed the paratroopers to be relieved.[56]
By this time, the 9th Division was about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) East of Lae, while the 7th Division was 7 miles (11 km) away and "it appeared an odds-on bet that the 9th would reach Lae first". The 7th Division resumed its advance at dawn on 16 September. The last ten Japanese troops facing the 2/33rd Infantry Battalion were killed and the 2/25th Infantry Battalion passed through its position and headed for Lae. As they moved down the Markham Valley Road, they occasionally encountered sick Japanese soldiers who held the column momentarily. Brigadier Eather came up in his
Japanese withdrawal
Colonel Watanabe, commander of 14th Field Artillery Regiment, thought that if there were artillery troops, no matter what the situation, it was unjustifiable if they could not fire a shot on the battlefield. And since the fighting strength was small and the men were tired, one cannon would be enough. He decided that they must also carry some shells, and encouraging his own troops he set out for Sarawaged. Soldiers who were carrying insufficient food for themselves should not have had to carry 50 kilograms of mountain gun bits and pieces. Officers and men took it in turns and several at time carried these as they climbed the steep slopes. Naturally, the officers and men sympathised with the Regimental Commander and clung on to the rocks with truly formidable spirit. However, the Division Commander came to know about it. He was deeply stirred by their sense of responsibility but could not overlook their suffering, and he finally issued a divisional order that they should cease this. On the Sarawaged Mountain the Regiment Commander and his subordinates, with tears in their eyes, bade a formal farewell to this, the last of the Regiment's guns.
Lieutenant General Kane Yoshihara[60]
On 8 September, Adachi ordered Nakano to abandon Salamaua and fall back on Lae. Nakano had already evacuated his hospital patients and artillery to Lae. On 11 September, his main body began to withdraw. By this time, it was clear that Blamey intended to cut off and destroy the 51st Division. After discussing the matter with
Crossing the Saruwaged Range proved to be a gruelling test of endurance for the Japanese soldiers. They started out with ten days' rations but this was exhausted by the time they reached Mount Salawaket. The 51st Division had already abandoned most of its heavy equipment; now, many soldiers threw away their rifles.[62] "The Sarawaged crossing", wrote Lieutenant General Kane Yoshihara, "took far longer than had been expected, and its difficulties were beyond discussion. Near the mountain summits the cold was intense and sleep was quite impossible all the cold night; they could only doze beside the fire. Squalls came, the ice spread and they advanced through snow under this tropical sky. Gradually the road they were climbing became a descending slope, but the inclination was so steep that if they missed their footing they would fall thousands and thousands of feet – and how many men lost their lives like that!"[60]
In the end, the Japanese Army could take pride in conducting a creditable defence in the face of an impossible tactical situation. "Fortune and Nature, however, favoured a valiant defender despite the equally valiant striving of the attackers."[14]
Aftermath
Casualties
The 503rd Parachute Infantry lost three men killed and 33 injured in the jump. Another eight were killed and 12 wounded in action against the Japanese, and 26 were evacuated sick.[63] The 2/5th Field Ambulance treated 55 jump casualties on 7 September.[64] Between 5 and 19 September, the 7th Division reported 38 killed and 104 wounded, while another 138 were evacuated sick.[65] To this must be added the 11 Americans and 59 Australians killed and 92 Australians injured in the air crash at Jackson's Airfield.[52] Thus, 119 Allied servicemen were killed, 241 wounded or injured, and 166 evacuated sick. Japanese casualties were estimated at 2,200, but it is impossible to apportion them between the 7th and 9th Divisions.[14]
Base development
The development of Nadzab depended on heavy construction equipment which had to be landed at Lae and moved over the Markham Valley Road. The job of improving the road was assigned to the 842nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, which arrived at Lae on 20 September but after a few days' work it was ordered to relieve the 871st Airborne Aviation Battalion at Nadzab. The 842nd reached Nadzab on 4 October but a combination of unseasonable rainfall and heavy military traffic destroyed the road surface and closed the road, forcing Nadzab to be supplied from Lae by air. The 842nd then had to resume work on the road, this time from the Nadzab end. Heavy rain was experienced on 46 of the next 60 days. The road was reopened on 15 December, allowing the 836th, 839th, 868th and 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalions and No. 62 Works Wing RAAF to move to Nadzab to work on the development of the airbase.[66]
The airbase would eventually consist of four all-weather airfields. No 1 had a 6,000 feet (1,800 m) by 100-foot (30 m) runway surfaced with
Outcome
General Blamey declared the capture of Lae and Salamaua to be "a signal step on the road to Victory".[68] Tolson described the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment's operation at Nadzab as "probably the classic text-book airborne operation of World War II". Coming after the impressive but flawed performance of the airborne arm in the Allied invasion of Sicily, Nadzab influenced thinking about the value of airborne operations.[69]
However, the impact was far greater than anyone on the Allied side realised, and the ramifications went far beyond New Guinea. Imperial General Headquarters had regarded the defeats in the
Notes
- ^ Morton 1962, pp. 301–304
- ^ Morton 1962, pp. 249–251
- ^ Miller 1959, pp. 1–2
- ^ Miller 1959, pp. 5–6
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 8–9
- ^ GHQ Warning Instruction No. 2, AWM54 589/5/3
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 12
- ^ Miller 1959, pp. 32–34
- ^ Miller 1959, pp. 41–42
- ^ a b c Miller 1959, p. 46
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 231
- ^ Notes of the "Markham Valley", War Diary, 7th Division GS, AWM52 1/5/14-0402 (PDF), Australian War Memorial, retrieved 4 April 2009
- ^ Horner 1998, pp. 407–409
- ^ a b c Dexter 1961, p. 392
- ^ Horner 1998, p. 408
- ^ a b c Dexter 1961, p. 268
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 73
- ^ a b c d Dexter 1961, p. 269
- ^ a b c Horner 1992, p. 258
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 270
- ^ GHQ Operational Instruction No. 34/5, 8 August 1943, AWM54 589/5/3
- ^ Lowe 2004, p. 42
- ^ a b c Dexter 1961, p. 276
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 275
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 338–339
- ^ "Defects in 25 pdr light guns", 3 September 1943, NAA (Vic): MP742/1 94/1/450
- ^ Miller 1959, pp. 198–199
- ^ Shindo 2001
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 342–343
- ^ Kelly 2006, pp. 496–497
- ^ Kenney 1949, p. 288
- ^ a b c Kelly 2006, p. 505
- ^ Kenney 1949, pp. 288–289
- ^ Kenney 1949, p. 293
- ^ Kleber & Birdsell 1966, pp. 412–414
- ^ Kelly 2006, p. 506
- ^ Kenney 1949, pp. 293–294
- ^ Horner 1992, p. 263
- ^ Lowe 2004, pp. 83–84
- ^ Kenney 1949, p. 294
- ^ Lowe 2004, p. 54
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 344
- ^ Kelly 2006, p. 508
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 345
- ^ a b c Report on Operation OUTLOOK, War Diary 7th Division GS, AWM52 1/5/14-0446 (PDF), Australian War Memorial, retrieved 4 April 2009
- ^ Hoehn 2011, p. 56
- ^ Reconquest, pp. 29–30
- ^ Lowe 2004, pp. 55–56
- ^ a b Dexter 1961, p. 357
- ^ Kelly 2006, p. 509
- ^ Casey 1951, pp. 168–170
- ^ a b Dexter 1961, p. 358
- ^ Bradley 2004, pp. 1–6
- ^ Bradley 2003, pp. 31–33
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 359
- ^ a b Dexter 1961, p. 365
- ^ Bradley 2004, pp. 7–8
- ^ a b Dexter 1961, pp. 387–391
- ^ Kenney 1949, p. 296
- ^ a b Yoshihara, Kane, Southern Cross, Australian War Memorial, retrieved 16 September 2010
- ^ Miller 1959, p. 211
- ^ Miller 1959, p. 212
- ^ Miller 1959, p. 210
- ^ Walker 1957, p. 175
- ^ War Diary, 7th Division AQ Branch, AWM52 1/5/15-0177 (PDF), Australian War Memorial, retrieved 4 April 2009
- ^ Casey 1951, pp. 174–176
- ^ Casey 1951, p. 170
- ^ Reconquest, p. 12
- ^ Lowe 2004, pp. 75–76
- ^ Miller 1959, pp. 212–213
References
- Bradley, Phillip (2003). "Tragedy at Jackson's Strip". Wartime (23). Canberra: ISSN 0729-6274.
- Bradley, Phillip (2004). On Shaggy Ridge. The Australian 7th Division in the Ramu Valley: From Kaiapit to the Finisterre Ranges. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press. OCLC 223952146.
- OCLC 220327037.
- OCLC 2028994.
- Hoehn, John (2011). Commando Kayak: The Role of the Folboat in the Pacific War. Zurich, Switzerland: Hirsch Publishing. OCLC 747879654.
- OCLC 26195398.
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- Kelly, Robert H. (2006). Volume II: 1943 – Year of Expansion and Consolidation. Allied Air Transport Operations in the South West Pacific Area in WWII. Buderim, Queensland: Robert H. Kelly. OCLC 224699549.
- OCLC 1227801. Archived from the original(PDF) on 26 February 2009. Retrieved 20 February 2009.
- Kleber, Brooks E.; Birdsell, Dale (1966). The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat (PDF). Washington, D.C.: OCLC 62058889. Retrieved 6 October 2017.
- Lowe, James P. (2004). Nadzab (1943): The First Successful Airborne Operation (Master of Arts thesis). Louisiana State University. Retrieved 25 February 2009.
- Miller, John Jr (1959). The War in the Pacific: CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul. Washington, D.C.: OCLC 1355535.
- Morton, Louis (1962). The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. Washington, D.C.: OCLC 1355622.
- Shindo, Hiroyuki (June 2001). "Japanese air operations over New Guinea during the Second World War". Journal of the Australian War Memorial (34). Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 1 December 2008. Retrieved 5 March 2009.
- OCLC 1293257.
- Reconquest: An Official Record of the Australian Army's Successes in the Offensives against Lae, Finschhafen, Markham and Ramu Valleys, September 1943 – June 1944. Melbourne: Director General of Public Relations, Australian Military Forces. 1944. OCLC 221284976.
External links
- 503rd Jump at Nadzab, 1943 on YouTube