Little Boy
Little Boy | |
---|---|
Highly enriched uranium | |
Filling weight | 64 kg (141 lb) |
Blast yield | 13 kilotons of TNT (54 TJ) to 16 kilotons of TNT (67 TJ) |
Little Boy was a type of
Little Boy was developed by
After the war, numerous components for additional Little Boy bombs were built. By 1950, at least five weapons were completed; all were retired by November 1950.
Naming the bomb
There are two primary accounts of how the first atomic bombs got their names.
In September 1945, another Project Alberta physicist,
Another explanation of the names, from a classified United States Air Force history of Project Silverplate from the 1950s, implies a possible reconciliation of the two versions: that the terms "Thin Man" and "Fat Man" were first developed by someone at or from Los Alamos (i.e., Serber), but were consciously adopted by the officers in Silverplate when they were adopting their own codenames for their own project (including "Silverplate"). As Silverplate involved modifying B-29s for a secret purpose, deliberately using codenames that would align with modifying vehicles for Roosevelt and Churchill would serve their needs well.[6]
Development
Early gun-type design work
Because of its perceived simplicity, the gun-type nuclear weapon design was the first approach pursued by the scientists working on bomb design during the Manhattan Project. In 1942, it was not yet known which of the two fissile materials pathways being simultaneously pursued—uranium-235 or plutonium-239—would be successful, or if there were significant differences between the two fuels that would impact the design work. Coordination with British scientists in May 1942 convinced the American scientists, led by J. Robert Oppenheimer, that the atomic bomb would not be difficult to design and that the difficulty would lie only in the production of fuel. Calculations in mid-1942 by theoretical physicists working on the project reinforced the idea that an ordinary artillery gun barrel would be able to impart sufficient velocity to the fissile material projectile.[7]
Several different weapon designs, including autocatalytic assembly, a nascent version of implosion, and alternative gun designs (e.g., using high explosives as a propellent, or creating a "double gun" with two projectiles) were pursued in the early years of the project, while the facilities to manufacture fissile material were being constructed. The belief that the gun design would be an easy engineering task once fuel was available led to a sense of optimism at Los Alamos, although Oppenheimer established a small research group to study implosion as a fallback in early 1943.

Concern that impurities in reactor-bred plutonium would make predetonation more likely meant that much of the gun-design work was focused on the plutonium gun. To achieve high projectile velocities, the plutonium gun was 17 feet (5.2 m) long with a narrow diameter (suggesting its codename as the Thin Man) which created considerable difficulty in its ballistics dropping from aircraft and fitting it into the bomb bay of a B-29.[10]

In early 1944,
From Thin Man to Little Boy
As a consequence of the discovery of the Pu-240 contamination problem, in July 1944 almost all research at Los Alamos was redirected to the
In contrast to the plutonium implosion-type nuclear weapon and the plutonium gun-type fission weapon, the uranium gun-type weapon was much simpler to design. As a high-velocity gun was no longer required, the overall length of the gun barrel could be dramatically decreased, and this allowed the weapon to fit into a B-29 bomb bay without difficulty. Though not an optimal use of fissile material compared to the implosion design, it was seen as a nearly guaranteed weapon.[2]
The design specifications were completed in February 1945, and contracts were let to build the components. Three different plants were used so that no one would have a copy of the complete design. The gun and
Although all of its components had been individually tested,
Though Little Boy incorporated various safety mechanisms, an accidental detonation of a fully-assembled weapon was very possible. Should the bomber carrying the device crash, the hollow "bullet" could be driven into the "target" cylinder, possibly detonating the bomb from gravity alone (though tests suggested this was unlikely), but easily creating a critical mass that would release dangerous amounts of radiation.[20] A crash of the B-29 and subsequent fire could trigger the explosives, causing the weapon to detonate.[21] If immersed in water, the uranium components were subject to a neutron moderator effect, which would not cause an explosion but would release radioactive contamination. For this reason, pilots were advised to crash on land rather than at sea.[20] Ultimately, Parsons opted to keep the explosives out of the Little Boy bomb until after the B-29 had taken off, to avoid the risk of a crash that could destroy or damage the military base from which the weapon was launched.[22]
Design


The Little Boy was 120 inches (300 cm) in length, 28 inches (71 cm) in diameter and weighed approximately 9,700 pounds (4,400 kg).
Assembly details
Inside the weapon, the uranium-235 material was divided into two parts, following the gun principle: the "projectile" and the "target". The projectile was a hollow cylinder with 60% of the total mass (38.5 kilograms [85 lb]). It consisted of a stack of nine uranium rings, each 6.25 inches (159 mm) in diameter with a 4-inch (100 mm) bore in the center, and a total length of 7 inches (180 mm), pressed together into the front end of a thin-walled projectile 16.25 inches (413 mm) long. Filling in the remainder of the space behind these rings in the projectile was a tungsten carbide disc with a steel back. At ignition, the projectile slug was pushed 42 inches (1,100 mm) along the 72-inch-long (1,800 mm), 6.5-inch-wide (170 mm) smooth-bore gun barrel. The slug "insert" was a 4-inch cylinder, 7 inches in length with a 1-inch (25 mm) axial hole. The slug comprised 40% of the total fissile mass (25.6 kilograms or 56 pounds). The insert was a stack of six washer-like uranium discs somewhat thicker than the projectile rings that were slid over a 1-inch rod. This rod then extended forward through the tungsten carbide plug, impact-absorbing anvil, and nose plug backstop, eventually protruding out of the front of the bomb casing. This entire target assembly was secured at both ends with locknuts.[27][28]
When the hollow-front projectile reached the target and slid over the target insert, the assembled super-critical mass of uranium would be completely surrounded by a tamper and neutron reflector of tungsten carbide and steel, both materials having a combined mass of 2,300 kilograms (5,100 lb).

Counter-intuitive design
The material was split almost in half, with at one end a group of rings of highly enriched uranium with 40% of the supercritical mass, and at the other end another group of slightly larger rings with 60% of the supercritical mass, which was fired onto the smaller group, with four polonium-beryllium neutron initiators to make the supercritical mass explode.[31][32]
A hole in the center of the larger piece dispersed the mass and increased the surface area, allowing more fission neutrons to escape, thus preventing a premature chain reaction.[33] But, for this larger, hollow piece to have minimal contact with the tungsten carbide tamper, it must be the projectile, since only the projectile's back end was in contact with the tamper prior to detonation. The rest of the tungsten carbide tamper surrounded the sub-critical mass target cylinder (called the "insert" by the designers) with air space between it and the insert. This arrangement packs the maximum amount of fissile material into a gun-assembly design.[33]
For the first fifty years after 1945, every published description and drawing of the Little Boy mechanism assumed that a small, solid projectile was fired into the center of a larger, stationary target.[34] However, critical mass considerations dictated that in Little Boy the more extensive, hollow piece would be the projectile. Hollow cylinders have higher critical masses than solid pieces of fissile material, because any neutrons encountered by or generated by the material are more likely to get scattered in the air than to continue a chain reaction. The larger piece would also avoid the effects of neutron reflection from the tungsten carbide tamper until it was fully joined with the rest of the fuel. Once joined and with its neutrons reflected, the assembled fissile core would comprise more than two critical masses of uranium-235.[35] In 2004, John Coster-Mullen, a truck driver and model maker from Illinois who had studied every photograph and document on the Hiroshima bomb to make an accurate model, corrected earlier published accounts.[31]
Fuze system
The fuzing system was designed to trigger at the most destructive altitude, which calculations suggested was 1,900 feet (580 m). It employed a three-stage interlock system:[36]
- A timer ensured that the bomb would not explode until at least fifteen seconds after release, one-quarter of the predicted fall time, to ensure the safety of the aircraft. The timer was activated when the electrical barometric stage.[36]
- The purpose of the barometric stage was to delay activating the radar altimeter firing command circuit until near detonation altitude. A thin metallic membrane enclosing a vacuum chamber (a similar design is still used today in old-fashioned wall barometers) gradually deformed as ambient air pressure increased during descent. The barometric fuze was not considered accurate enough to detonate the bomb at the precise ignition height, because air pressure varies with local conditions. When the bomb reached the design height for this stage (reportedly 6,600 feet or 2,000 meters), the membrane closed a circuit, activating the radar altimeters. The barometric stage was added because of a worry that external radar signals might detonate the bomb too early.[36]
- Two or more redundant radar altimeters were used to reliably detect final altitude. When the altimeters sensed the correct height, the firing switch closed, igniting the three BuOrd Mk15, Mod 1 Navy gun primers in the breech plug, which set off the charge consisting of four silk powder bags each containing 2 pounds (910 g) of WM slotted-tube cordite. This launched the uranium projectile towards the opposite end of the gun barrel at an eventual muzzle velocity of 1,000 feet per second (300 m/s). Approximately 10 milliseconds later the chain reaction occurred, lasting less than 1 microsecond. The radar altimeters used were modified U.S. Army Air Corps APS-13 tail warning radars, nicknamed "Archie", normally used to warn a fighter pilot of another plane approaching from behind.[36]
Rehearsals
The Little Boy pre-assemblies were designated L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4, L-5, L-6, L-7, and L-11. Of these, L-1, L-2, L-5, and L-6 were expended in test drops. The first drop test was conducted with L-1 on 23 July 1945. It was dropped over the sea near Tinian in order to test the radar altimeter by the B-29 later known as
Bombing of Hiroshima

Parsons, the Enola Gay's weaponeer, was concerned about the possibility of an accidental detonation if the plane crashed on takeoff, so he decided not to load the four cordite powder bags into the gun breech until the aircraft was in flight. After takeoff, Parsons and his assistant,

The bomb was dropped at approximately 08:15 (JST) on 6 August 1945. After falling for 44.4 seconds, the time and barometric triggers started the firing mechanism. The detonation happened at an altitude of 1,968 ± 50 feet (600 ± 15 m). It was less powerful than the Fat Man, which was dropped on Nagasaki, but the damage and the number of victims at Hiroshima were much higher, as Hiroshima was on flat terrain, while the hypocenter of Nagasaki lay in a small valley. According to figures published in 1945, 66,000 people were killed as a direct result of the Hiroshima blast, and 69,000 were injured to varying degrees.[40] Later estimates put the deaths as high as 140,000 people.[41] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that out of 24,158 Imperial Japanese Army soldiers in Hiroshima at the time of the bombing, 6,789 were killed or missing as a result of the bombing.[42]
The exact measurement of the explosive yield of the bomb was problematic since the weapon had never been tested.
Physical effects
After being selected in April 1945, Hiroshima was spared conventional bombing to serve as a pristine target, where the effects of a nuclear bomb on an undamaged city could be observed.[45] While damage could be studied later, the energy yield of the untested Little Boy design could be determined only at the moment of detonation, using instruments dropped by parachute from a plane flying in formation with the one that dropped the bomb. Radio-transmitted data from these instruments indicated a yield of about 15 kilotons.[44]
Comparing this yield to the observed damage produced a rule of thumb called the 5 pounds per square inch (34 kPa) lethal area rule. Approximately all the people inside the area where the shock wave carried such an overpressure or greater would be killed.[46] At Hiroshima, that area was 2.2 miles (3.5 km) in diameter.[47]
The damage came from three main effects: blast, fire, and radiation.[48]
Blast
The blast from a nuclear bomb is the result of X-ray-heated air (the fireball) sending a shock wave or pressure wave in all directions, initially at a velocity greater than the speed of sound,[49] analogous to thunder generated by lightning. Knowledge about urban blast destruction is based largely on studies of Little Boy at Hiroshima. Nagasaki buildings suffered similar damage at similar distances, but the Nagasaki bomb detonated 2.0 miles (3.2 km) from the city center over hilly terrain that was partially bare of buildings.[50]

In Hiroshima, almost everything within 1.0 mile (1.6 km) of the point directly under the explosion was completely destroyed, except for about 50 heavily reinforced, earthquake-resistant concrete buildings, only the shells of which remained standing. Most were completely gutted, with their windows, doors, sashes, and frames ripped out.[51] The perimeter of severe blast damage approximately followed the 5 pounds per square inch (34 kPa) contour at 1.1 miles (1.8 km).
Later test explosions of nuclear weapons with houses and other test structures nearby confirmed the 5 psi overpressure threshold. Ordinary urban buildings experiencing it were crushed, toppled, or gutted by the force of air pressure. The picture at right shows the effects of a nuclear bomb-generated 5 psi pressure wave on a test structure in Nevada in 1953.[52]
A major effect of this kind of structural damage was that it created fuel for fires that were started simultaneously throughout the severe destruction region.
Fire
The first effect of the explosion was blinding light, accompanied by radiant heat from the fireball. The Hiroshima fireball was 1,200 feet (370 m) in diameter, with a surface temperature of 6,000 °C (10,000 °F), about the same temperature as at the surface of the sun.[53] Near ground zero, everything flammable burst into flame. One famous, anonymous Hiroshima victim, sitting on stone steps 850 feet (260 m) from the hypocenter, left a permanent shadow, having absorbed the fireball heat that permanently bleached the surrounding stone.[54] Simultaneous fires were started throughout the blast-damaged area by fireball heat and by overturned stoves and furnaces, electrical shorts, etc. Twenty minutes after the detonation, these fires had merged into a firestorm, pulling in surface air from all directions to feed an inferno which consumed everything flammable.[55]

The Hiroshima firestorm was roughly 2.0 miles (3.2 km) in diameter, corresponding closely to the severe blast-damage zone. (See the USSBS[56] map, right.) Blast-damaged buildings provided fuel for the fire. Structural lumber and furniture were splintered and scattered about. Debris-choked roads obstructed firefighters. Broken gas pipes fueled the fire, and broken water pipes rendered hydrants useless.[55] At Nagasaki, the fires failed to merge into a single firestorm, and the fire-damaged area was only one-quarter as great as at Hiroshima, due in part to a southwest wind that pushed the fires away from the city.[57]
As the map shows, the Hiroshima firestorm jumped natural firebreaks (river channels), as well as prepared firebreaks. The spread of fire stopped only when it reached the edge of the blast-damaged area, encountering less available fuel.[58] The Manhattan Project report on Hiroshima estimated that 60% of immediate deaths were caused by fire, but with the caveat that "many persons near the center of explosion suffered fatal injuries from more than one of the bomb effects."[59]
Radiation
Local fallout is dust and ash from a bomb crater, contaminated with radioactive fission products. It falls to earth downwind of the crater and can produce, with radiation alone, a lethal area much larger than that from blast and fire. With an air burst, the fission products rise into the stratosphere, where they dissipate and become part of the global environment. Because Little Boy was an air burst 580 meters (1,900 ft) above the ground, there was no bomb crater and no local radioactive fallout.[60]
However, a burst of intense
After the surrender of Japan was finalized, Manhattan Project scientists began to immediately survey the city of Hiroshima to better understand the damage, and to communicate with Japanese physicians about radiation effects in particular. The collaboration became the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in 1946, a joint U.S.–Japanese project to track radiation injuries among survivors. In 1975 its work was superseded by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation.[69]
In 1962, scientists at Los Alamos created a mockup of Little Boy known as "Project Ichiban" in order to answer some of the unanswered questions about the exact radiation output of the bomb, which would be useful for setting benchmarks for interpreting the relationship between radiation exposure and later health outcomes. But it failed to clear up all the issues. In 1982, Los Alamos created a replica Little Boy from the original drawings and specifications. This was then tested with enriched uranium but in a safe configuration that would not cause a nuclear explosion. A hydraulic lift was used to move the projectile, and experiments were run to assess neutron emission.[70]
Conventional weapon equivalent
After hostilities ended, a survey team from the Manhattan Project that included
To put these numerical differences into context, it is necessary to know that the acute effects of nuclear detonations, especially the blast and thermal effects, do not scale linearly, but generally as a
Although Little Boy exploded with the energy equivalent of around 15 kilotons of TNT, in 1946 the
Post-WWII


When the war ended, it was not expected that the inefficient Little Boy design would ever again be required, and many plans and diagrams were destroyed. However, by mid-1946 the Hanford Site reactors were suffering badly from the
At Sandia Base, three Army officers, Captains Albert Bethel, Richard Meyer, and Bobbie Griffin attempted to re-create the Little Boy. They were supervised by Harlow W. Russ, an expert on Little Boy who served with Project Alberta on Tinian, and was now leader of the Z-11 Group of the Los Alamos Laboratory's Z Division at Sandia. Gradually, they managed to locate the correct drawings and parts, and figured out how they went together. Eventually, they built six Little Boy assemblies. Although the casings, barrels, and components were tested, no enriched uranium was supplied for the bombs. By early 1947, the problem caused by the Wigner effect was on its way to solution, and the three officers were reassigned.[77][78]
The Navy
The Smithsonian Institution displayed a Little Boy (complete, except for enriched uranium), until 1986. The Department of Energy took the weapon from the museum to remove its inner components, so the bomb could not be stolen and detonated with fissile material. The government returned the emptied casing to the Smithsonian in 1993. Three other disarmed bombs are on display in the United States; another is at the Imperial War Museum in London.[34]
Notes
- ^ Serber & Crease 1998, p. 104.
- ^ a b Rhodes 1986, p. 541.
- ^ The "Mark" nomenclature did not become standardized until the postwar period. Some wartime documents refer to "Mark I" and "Mark II" as different gun-type weapons, or "Mark II" and "Mark III" as referring to non-lens implosion concepts that were pursued until the spring of 1945 (with "Mark IV" being the lensed Fat Man design). Eventually the "Mark I" was used exclusively for Little Boy, and "Mark III" for Fat Man. See e.g., Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 251–252, Hansen 1995a, p. 65, and discussion of nonlens program in Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 300, 312
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 419.
- OCLC 298514167.
- ^ Bowen, Lee (1959). A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943–1953, Volume I (Project Silverplate, 1943–1946). United States Air Force Historical Division. p. 96.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 42–44.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 67, 75.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 82–84.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 87, 114.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 228.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 245–249.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 257.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 262.
- ^ Nichols 1987, pp. 166, 175–176.
- ^ a b c Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 265.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 30.
- ^ Hansen 1995, pp. 111–112.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 293.
- ^ a b Hansen 1995, p. 113.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 333.
- ^ Lewis & Tolzer 1957, p. 72.
- ^ Gosling 1999, p. 51.
- ^ a b Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 18.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 27.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. 12.
- ^ Sublette, Carey. "Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions, Section 8.0: The First Nuclear Weapons". Retrieved 29 August 2013.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, pp. 18–19, 27.
- ^ Bernstein 2007, p. 133.
- ^ Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 263–265.
- ^ a b Monk 2012, pp. 409–410.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 28.
- ^ a b Coster-Mullen 2012, pp. 23–24.
- ^ a b Samuels 2008.
- . So while the 38.53 kilograms (84.9 lb), 80%-enriched, cylindrical "projectile" was an insufficient amount of enriched uranium to be a "bare sphere" critical mass, inside of a neutron-reflecting system it could potentially be dangerously close to criticality even prior to weapon assembly, or just prior to full assembly. After weapon assembly, the 64.2 kilograms (142 lb) 80%-enriched material, in a solid cylinder and encased in a neutron-reflecting tungsten tamper, would have composed more than one critical mass.
- ^ a b c d Hansen 1995a, pp. 2–5.
- ^ Campbell 2005, pp. 46, 80.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, pp. 100–101.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, pp. 34–35.
- ^ The Manhattan Engineer District (29 June 1946). "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". p. 3 – via Project Gutenberg.
- ^ Wellerstein, Alex (4 August 2020). "Counting the Dead at Hiroshima and Nagasaki". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
- ^ Craven & Cate 1983, p. 723.
- ^ a b Hoddeson et al. 1993, p. 393.
- ^ a b c Malik 1985, p. 1.
- ^ Glasstone 1962, p. 629.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. 1.
- ^ Diacon 1984, p. 18.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, pp. 300, 301.
- ^ The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1946, p. 14.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. 179.
- ^ Nuclear Weapon Thermal Effects 1998.
- ^ Human Shadow Etched in Stone.
- ^ a b Glasstone & Dolan 1977, pp. 300–304.
- ^ D'Olier 1946, pp. 22–25.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. 304.
- ^ The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1946, pp. 21–23.
- ^ a b The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1946, p. 21.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. 409 "An air burst, by definition, is one taking place at such a height above the earth that no appreciable quantities of surface material are taken up into the fireball. ... the deposition of early fallout from an air burst will generally not be significant. An air burst, however, may produce some induced radioactive contamination in the general vicinity of ground zero as a result of neutron capture by elements in the soil." p. 36, "at Hiroshima ... injuries due to fallout were completely absent.".
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, pp. Chapter VIII and the 'Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer'.
- ^ Wellerstein, Alex. "NUKEMAP". nuclearsecrecy.com. Alex Wellerstein. Retrieved 28 July 2021.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, pp. 545, 546.
- ^ Richardson RR 2009.
- ^ "The ongoing research into the effects of radiation". Radio Netherlands Archives. 31 July 2005. Retrieved 16 December 2018.
- ^ Genetic Effects.
- ^ Izumi BJC 2003.
- ^ Izumi IJC 2003.
- PMID 9576898.
- ^ Coster-Mullen 2012, pp. 86–87.
- ^ Malik 1985, pp. 18–20.
- ^ Malik 1985, p. 21.
- ^ Malik 1985, p. 16.
- ^ Glasstone & Dolan 1977, p. 101.
- NUKEMAP website, which uses the data and calculations from Glasstone & Dolan 1977, pp. 80–122.
- ^ a b D'Olier 1946, p. 24.
- ^ a b Coster-Mullen 2012, p. 85.
- ^ a b Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Hansen 1995, pp. 116–118.
- ^ Hansen 1995, p. 115.
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- The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (PDF) (Report). The Manhattan Engineer District. 29 June 1946. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 April 2012. Retrieved 6 November 2013. This report can also be found here and here.
- ISBN 978-0-521-88408-2.
- Campbell, Richard H. (2005). The Silverplate Bombers: A History and Registry of the Enola Gay and Other B-29s Configured to Carry Atomic Bombs. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company. OCLC 58554961.
- Coster-Mullen, John (2012). Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man. Waukesha, Wisconsin: J. Coster-Mullen. OCLC 298514167.
- Craven, W. F.; Cate, J. L., eds. (1983). The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 5. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History. OCLC 9828710. Retrieved 28 March 2023.
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- OCLC 637004643. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
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- Lewis, Robert A.; Tolzer, Eliot (August 1957). "How We Dropped the A-Bomb". Popular Science. pp. 71–75, 209–210.
- Malik, John S. (1985). The yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear explosions (PDF) (Report). Los Alamos National Laboratory report. LA-8819. Retrieved 6 November 2013.
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External links
- Little Boy description at Carey Sublette's NuclearWeaponArchive.org
- Nuclear Files.org Archived 3 March 2007 at the Wayback Machine Definition and explanation of 'Little Boy'
- The Nuclear Weapon Archive
- Simulation of "Little Boy" an interactive simulation of "Little Boy"
- Little Boy 3D Model
- Hiroshima & Nagasaki Remembered information about preparation and dropping the Little Boy bomb
- Little boy Nuclear Bomb at Imperial War museum London UK (jpg)