Logical determinism
Logical determinism is the view that a proposition about the future is either necessarily true, or its negation is necessarily true. The argument for this is as follows. By
The term ‘logical determinism’ (Logischer Determinismus) was introduced by Moritz Schlick.[2]
Logical determinism seems to present a problem for the conception of free will which requires that different courses of action are possible, for the sea-battle argument suggests that only one course is possible, because necessary. In trying to resolve the problem, the 13th century philosopher Duns Scotus argued in an early work that a future proposition can be understood in two ways: either as signifying something in reality that makes something be true in the future, or simply as signifying that something will be the case. The second sense is weaker in that it does not commit us to any present state of affairs that makes the future proposition true, only a future state of affairs.[3]
See also
References
- Schlick, M. ‘Die Kausalität in der gegenwärtigen Physik’, Naturwissenschaften 19 (1931),145-162; Eng. tr. (by P. Heath, 1979), in Philosophical Papers (Volume II). H. L. Mulder and B. F. van de Velde-Schlick (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 176-209
- Woleński, J. 'An Analysis of Logical Determinism', 1996.
Notes
- ^ Buckner and Zupko, Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotle's 'De interpretatione', translated with Introduction and Commentary by Edward Buckner and Jack Zupko, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014, p. 318
- ^ (Schlick 1979 p. 202), cited in Woleński 1996
- ^ Buckner and Zupko, p. 318