Luigi Cadorna
Luigi Cadorna | |
---|---|
Chief of Staff of the Italian Army | |
In office 27 July 1914 – 9 November 1917 | |
Preceded by | Alberto Pollio |
Succeeded by | Armando Diaz |
Personal details | |
Born | General | 4 September 1850
Battles/wars | Capture of Rome World War I |
Early career
Luigi Cadorna was born to General Raffaele Cadorna in Verbania Pallanza, Piedmont in 1850. In 1860 Cadorna became a student at the "Teuliè" Military School in Milan. At fifteen he entered the Turin Military Academy. Upon graduation, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant of artillery in 1868. In 1870, as an officer in the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, Cadorna participated in the occupation of Rome as part of a force commanded by his father. As major he was appointed to the staff of General Pianell, afterwards taking the post of Chief of Staff of the Verona Divisional Command. As Colonel commanding the 10th Regiment of Bersaglieri from 1892 Cadorna acquired a reputation for strict discipline and harsh punishment. He wrote a manual of infantry tactics, which laid stress on the doctrine of the offensive. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1898 Cadorna subsequently held a number of senior staff and divisional/corps command positions. On the eve of Italy's entry into World War (1915), he was close to peace-time retirement age and had a history of differences with his political and military superiors.
Cadorna had been offered the post of Chief of Staff for the first time in 1908, which he had rejected over the issue of political control during wartime. He was again offered the position in July 1914, as the Triple Entente and Central Powers girded for war. When Italy entered the war in May 1915 on the side of the Entente, Cadorna fielded thirty-six infantry divisions composed of 875,000 men, but with only 120 modern artillery pieces.[2]
First World War
Cadorna inherited a difficult political and military situation. The government of Premier Antonio Salandra favoured initial neutrality over Italy's treaty commitments under the Triple Alliance. Cadorna was accordingly obliged to reverse long-established strategic plans while discovering that the army was ill-prepared for war against Austria-Hungary and Germany.[3] In particular large numbers of men and quantities of equipment had been deployed to Tripolitania leaving the home army disorganized.[4]
Cadorna launched four offensives in 1915, all along the
On 24 October 1917, a combined Austro-Hungarian/German army struck across the Isonzo at
The Italian Army retreated in disarray and seemed on the verge of total collapse; 275,000 soldiers were captured. Italy's allies Britain and France insisted on the dismissal of Cadorna
The king appointed the respected General
The restored Italian defensive line was held during the subsequent
Post-war
After the war, the Italian government held an inquiry to investigate the defeat at Caporetto. It was published in 1919 and was highly critical of Cadorna, at that time a bitter man busy with writing his own memoirs. Cadorna claimed that he had no responsibility for the defeat, despite fleeing to Padua during the battle and abandoning the entire Italian Second Army to its fate. Nevertheless, he was made a Field Marshal (Maresciallo d'Italia) in 1924 after Benito Mussolini seized power.
Cadorna died in Bordighera in 1928.
Personal reputation
Several historians record Cadorna as an unimaginative martinet who was ruthless with his troops and dismissive of his country's political authorities. David Stevenson, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, describes him as earning "opprobrium as one of the most callous and incompetent of First World War commanders."[10] In manner he appeared a reserved and aristocratic officer of the old-fashioned Piedmontese school.[11] During the course of the war, Cadorna dismissed 217 officers, and during the
Other historians have a more balanced view of Cadorna.[
Family
He was the father of
Notes
- ^ In May 1916, one specific instance of actual decimation occurred in the Italian Army, involving the execution of one in ten soldiers of a 120 strong company of the 141º Catanzaro Infantry Brigade which had mutinied, killing officers, carabinieri and other soldiers. Two days later Cadorna endorsed the shooting of the 12 mutineers in a telegram sent to senior officers, but it is not clear whether he had been responsible for initiating this draconian measure.
References
- ^ "Scheda senatore CADORNA Luigi".
- ^ Marshall & Josephy 1982, p. 108 Keegan claims 25 divisions. See Keegan, 227.
- ISBN 9780957689275.
- ISBN 9780957689275.
- ^ Marshall & Josephy 1982, pp. 108–110
- ^ Keegan, 347.
- ISBN 978-0-713-99840-5.
- ^
- ^ Marshall & Josephy 1982, p. 215
- ^ ISBN 978-0-713-99840-5.
- ISBN 978-0-713-99709-5.
- ^ Keegan, 227.
- ^ Hew Strachan (2003) The First World War
- ISBN 9780141043418.
- ISBN 0-09-1801788.
- ^ Weber, Matthew (27 April 2017). "This Inept Italian General Killed More of his Own Men Than his Enemies". History Collection. Retrieved 30 November 2020.
In fact, his record was so horrid, that he is considered by many historians as one of the worst generals ever to lead an army. That is a distinction that no one wants to have.
- ^ Luigi Cadorna
Other Sources
- ISBN 0-375-40052-4.
- Marshall, S. L. A.; Josephy, Alvin M. (1982). The American heritage history of World War I. American Heritage Pub. Co. : Bonanza Books : Distributed by Crown Publishers. OCLC 1028047398.