Maji Maji Rebellion

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Maji Maji Rebellion
Part of
Friedrich Wilhelm Kuhnert, 1908.
DateJuly 1905 – August 1907
Location)
Result German victory
Belligerents

German Empire Germany

Qadiriyya Brotherhood

Matumbi Ngindo, Ngoni, Yao tribes

other
Tanganyikans
Commanders and leaders
Strength
c. 2,000 c. 90,000
Casualties and losses
15 Germans, 73 askari, and 316 ruga ruga[2] 75,000–300,000 total dead by famine, disease, and violence[3][4]

The Maji Maji Rebellion (German: Maji-Maji-Aufstand, Swahili: Vita vya Maji Maji), was an armed rebellion of Muslim and animist Africans against German colonial rule in German East Africa (modern-day Tanzania). The war was triggered by German colonial policies designed to force the indigenous population to grow cotton for export. The war lasted from 1905 to 1907, during which 75,000 to 300,000 died, overwhelmingly from famine.[5]

After the Scramble for Africa among the major European powers in the 1880s, Germany reinforced its hold on several formal African colonies. These were German East Africa (Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and part of Mozambique), German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia), Cameroon, and Togoland (today split between Ghana and Togo).

The Germans had a relatively weak hold on German East Africa. However, they maintained a system of forts throughout the interior of the territory and were able to exert some control over it. Since their hold on the colony was weak, they resorted to using violently repressive tactics to control the population.[6]

Germany levied head taxes in 1898 and relied heavily on forced labour to build roads and accomplish various other tasks. In 1902, governor of German East Africa, Gustav Adolf von Götzen ordered villages to grow cotton as a cash crop for export. Each village was charged with producing a quota of cotton. The headmen of the village were put in charge of overseeing the production, which set them against the rest of the population.[7]

The German policies were very unpopular, as they had serious effects on the lives of local peoples. The social fabric of society was rapidly changing: as the roles of men and women were being changed, they had to adapt for the communities. Since men were forced away from their homes to work, women had to take on some of the traditional male roles. Also, the men's absence strained the resources of the village, and the people's ability to deal with their environment and remain self-sufficient. In 1905, a drought threatened the region. All that, as well as opposition to the government's agricultural and labour policies, led to open rebellion against the Germans in July.[8]

The insurgents turned to magic to drive out the German colonizers and used it as a unifying force in the rebellion. A spirit medium named Kinjikitile Ngwale, who practiced folk Islam that incorporated animist beliefs, claimed to be possessed by a snake spirit called Hongo.[9] Ngwale began calling himself Bokero and developed a belief that the people of East Africa had been called upon to eliminate the Germans. German anthropologists recorded that he gave his followers war medicine that would turn German bullets into water. This "war medicine" was in fact water (maji in Kiswahili) mixed with castor oil and millet seeds.[9] Empowered with this new liquid, Bokero's followers began what would become known as the Maji Maji Rebellion.

The end of the war was followed by a period of

genocidal.[10][11]

Map of German East Africa with the areas affected by the rebellion highlighted in red.

Uprising

The followers of Bokero's movement were poorly armed with

Roman Catholic Bishop of Dar es Salaam) were speared to death.[9]

Soon the Yao tribes started participating and throughout August the rebels moved from the Matumbi Hills in the southern part of what is now Tanzania and attacked German garrisons throughout the colony. The attack on Ifakara, on 16 August, destroyed the small German garrison and opened the way to the key fortification at Mahenge. Though the southern garrison was quite small (there were but 458 European and 588 native soldiers in the entire area), their fortifications and modern weapons gave them an advantage. At Mahenge, several thousand Maji Maji warriors (led by another spirit medium; not Bokero) marched on the German cantonment, which was defended by Lieutenant Theodor von Hassel with sixty native soldiers, a few hundred loyal tribesmen, and two machine guns.[9] The two attacking tribes disagreed on when to attack and were unable to co-ordinate. The first attack was met with gunfire from 1000 m; the tribesmen stood firm for about fifteen minutes, then broke and retreated. After the first attack, a second column of 1,200 men advanced from the east. Some of these attackers were able to get within three paces of the firing line before they were killed.[9]

The Qadiriyya Brotherhood declared a jihad against the Germans,[13] with Sufi Muslims now playing a major role in the rebellion.

While this was the apex of the uprising, the

Kaiser Wilhelm immediately ordered two cruisers with their Marine complements to the troubled colony.[9] Reinforcements also arrived from as far away as New Guinea. When 1,000 regular soldiers from Germany arrived in October, Götzen felt he could go on the offensive and restore order in the south.[15]

Maji Maji warriors before hanging in February 1906

Three columns moved into the rebellious South. They destroyed villages, crops, and other food sources used by the rebels. They made effective use of their firepower to break up rebel attacks. A successful ambush of a German column crossing the Rufiji River by the Bena kept the rebellion alive in the southwest, but the Germans were not denied for long. By April 1906, the southwest had been pacified. However, elsewhere the fighting was bitter. A column under Lieutenant Gustav von Blumenthal (1879–1913, buried at Lindi) consisting of himself, one other European and 46 Askaris fell under continuous attack as it marched in early May 1906, from Songea to Mahenge. The Germans decided to concentrate at Kitanda, where Major Kurt Johannes, Lieutenants von Blumenthal and Friedrich Wilhelm von Lindeiner-Wildau eventually gathered. Von Blumenthal was then sent along the Luwegu River, partly by boat. The southeast campaign degenerated into a guerrilla war that brought with it a devastating famine.[9]

The German scorched earth policy deliberately caused famine among the population. Von Götzen was willing to pardon the common soldiers who gave up their weapons, leaders and traditional healers. However, he also needed to flush out the remaining rebels and so chose famine. In 1905, one of the leaders of German troops in the colony, Captain Wangenheim, wrote to von Götzen, "Only hunger and want can bring about a final submission. Military actions alone will remain more or less a drop in the ocean."[16] Germany's tactics have been described as genocidal by scholars such as A. Dirk Moses and Klaus Bachmann.[10][11]

Not until August 1907 were the last embers of rebellion extinguished. In its wake, the rebellion had left 15 Germans, 73 askaris, 316 ruga ruga,[2] and tens or even hundreds of thousands of insurgents and local civilians dead.[17][18]

Aftermath and interpretation

The

Tanganyika, the 'Cinderella Province,' has not fully recovered from the German terror half a century ago. The economy of the region has never been successfully rebuilt."[19] Later Tanzanian nationalists
used it as an example of the first stirrings of Tanzanian nationalism, a unifying experience that brought together all the different peoples of Tanzania under one leader, in an attempt to establish a nation free from foreign domination.

Later historians have challenged that view and claimed that the rebellion cannot be seen as a unified movement but rather a series of revolts conducted for a wide range of reasons, including religion. The Muslim Ngoni chiefs were offered Christian baptism before execution. Many people in the area itself saw the revolt as one part of a longer series of wars continuing since long before the arrival of Germans in the region. They cite the alliance of some groups with the Germans to further their own agendas.

John Iliffe interprets the rebellion as a "mass movement [which] originated in peasant grievances, was then sanctified and extended by prophetic religion, and finally crumbled as crisis compelled reliance on fundamental loyalties to kin and tribe".[20] Patrick Redmond describes the rebellion as "Tanzania's most spectacular manifestation of the rejection of colonial rule" but which had only a "slight chance of success".[21]

See also

References

  1. ^ Islam in Africa, p. 221
  2. ^ .
  3. .
  4. ^ Michelle Moyd “Genocide and War,” in Genocide: Key Themes, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp 242.
  5. JSTOR 179833
    .
  6. .
  7. ^ Iliffe, John (1969). Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 23.
  8. OCLC 903052545
    .
  9. ^ .
  10. ^ . [I]t is doubtlessly appropriate—probably even important—to understand the German suppression of the Maji-Maji Revolt as genocidal.
  11. ^ . If the German command's strategy was to destroy entire settlements (crops, harvests, and food), kill civilians along with combatants, coerce the surrender of entire groups through deliberate starvation, and to intentionally deprive ethnic groups of the leadership that was crucial to their survival — then Germany's conduct in East Africa deserves the label of genocide.
  12. ^ Petraitis, Richard (August 1998). "Bullets into Water: The Sorcerers of Africa". Retrieved 2008-11-30.
  13. ^ "Christian-Muslim relations in Eastern Africa" p. 45
  14. ^ "Maji Maji revolt | the Polynational War Memorial". www.war-memorial.net. Retrieved 2019-12-13.
  15. ^ "The Maji Maji Rebellion | Violence in Twentieth Century Africa". Scholar Blogs. Retrieved 2019-12-14.
  16. ^ Pakenham, 622 quoting from Götzen, Gustav Adolf (1909). Deutsch Ostafrika im Aufstand 1905–6. Berlin. p. 149.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  17. .
  18. Hull, Isabel V.
    (2004). Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p. 157.
  19. .
  20. .
  21. .

External links