Manned Orbiting Laboratory
Station statistics | |
---|---|
Crew | 2 |
Carrier rocket | Titan IIIM |
Mission status | Canceled |
Mass | 14,476 kg (31,914 lb) |
Length | 21.92 m (71.9 ft) |
Diameter | 3.05 m (10.0 ft) |
Pressurized volume | 11.3 m3 (400 cu ft) |
Orbital inclination | Polar orbit |
Configuration | |
The Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was part of the
The MOL program was announced to the public on 10 December 1963 as an inhabited platform to demonstrate the utility of putting people in space for military missions; its reconnaissance satellite mission was a secret
As the 1960s progressed, the Vietnam War competed with the MOL for funds, and resultant budget cuts repeatedly postponed its first operational flight. At the same time, automated systems rapidly improved, narrowing the benefits of a crewed space platform over an automated one. A single uncrewed test flight of the Gemini B spacecraft was conducted on 3 November 1966, but the MOL was canceled in June 1969 without any crewed missions being flown.
Seven of the astronauts transferred to NASA in August 1969 as
Background
At the height of the
The launch of Sputnik 1, the first satellite, by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957, came as a profound shock to the American public, which had assumed American technical superiority.[5][6] One benefit of the Sputnik crisis was that no government protested Sputnik's overflying their territory, thereby tacitly acknowledging the legality of satellites. While there was a big difference between Sputnik and a spy satellite, it made it much harder for the Soviets to object to overflights by satellites from another country.[7] In February 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the USAF to proceed as quickly as possible with Corona as a joint interim project with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[8][9]
In August 1958, Eisenhower decided to give responsibility for most forms of human space flight to the
The USAF
In its 26 April 1961 project plan,
The same 22 February 1962 memorandum gave tacit approval for the development of a space station. The USAF staff and the
On 9 November 1962, Zuckert submitted his proposals to McNamara. For fiscal year 1964, he requested US$75 million (equivalent to $579 million in 2023) in funding for MODS and US$102 million (equivalent to $796 million in 2023) for Blue Gemini.
McNamara called for a review of whether Dyna-Soar had military capabilities that could not be met by Gemini, on 18 January 1963. In his 14 November 1963 response, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), Harold Brown, examined options for a space station. He preferred a four-man station that would be launched separately and crewed by astronauts arriving in Gemini spacecraft. Crews would rotate every 30 days, with resupply of consumables arriving every 120 days.[24][25] On 10 December 1963, McNamara issued a press release that officially announced the cancellation of Dyna-Soar and the initiation of the MOL program.[26]
Soon after coming to office, the
Initiation
On 16 December 1963, USAF Headquarters ordered Schriever to submit a development plan for the MOL.
The
The USAF issued an RFP to twenty firms in January 1965. At the end of February 1965,
As a black project (i.e. one that was secret and publicly unacknowledged), but one impossible to completely conceal, MOL needed some "white" (i.e. unclassified and publicly acknowledged) experiments as cover. An MOL Experiments Working Group was created under Colonel William Brady. Some 400 experiments proposed by several agencies were examined. These were consolidated and reduced to 59, and twelve primary and eighteen secondary ones were selected. A 499-page report on the experiments was issued on 1 April 1964.[35] Although reconnaissance was its main purpose, "manned orbiting laboratory" was still an accurate description; the program hoped to prove that astronauts could perform militarily useful tasks in a shirt-sleeve environment in space for up to thirty days.[36]
The USAF recommended that the MOL use the Gemini B spacecraft with the Titan III booster. A program of six flights (one uncrewed and five crewed) was proposed, the first flight taking place in 1966.[37] The program was costed at US$1.653 billion (equivalent to $12 billion in 2023). The Science Advisor to the President, Donald Hornig, reviewed the USAF's submission. He noted that for the sophisticated reconnaissance missions proposed, a human-operated system was far superior to an automated one, but speculated that with sufficient effort, the gap between the two could be reduced. He also noted that while countries had not objected to satellites passing overhead, a crewed space station might be a different matter,[38] but the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, thought that this could be managed.[39]
There remained the question of whether the improved performance compared to the automated
In January 1965, Schriever had appointed
In the wake of Johnson's announcement of the program, MOL was given the designation Program 632A. The USAF announced the appointment of Schriever as MOL director and Evans as vice director, in charge of the MOL staff at
Schriever and the Director of the NRO,
Johnson had announced two MOL contractors: Douglas and General Electric. While the former had considerable technical and managerial experience from the Thor, Genie and Nike projects, General Electric had experience with large optical systems, and, perhaps more importantly, had over a thousand personnel immediately cleared for Dorian, while Douglas had very few. A US$10.55 million (equivalent to $76 million in 2023) fixed-price contract was signed with Douglas on 17 October 1965. Contract negotiations with General Electric were also completed around this time, and the company was given US$4.922 million (equivalent to $35 million in 2023), all but US$0.975 million (equivalent to $7 million in 2023) of it in black budget funds.[48]
The Aerospace Corporation was given responsibility for general systems engineering and technical direction.[49] Douglas selected five major subcontractors: Hamilton-Standard for environmental control and life support; Collins Radio for communications; Honeywell for attitude control; Pratt & Whitney for electrical power; and IBM for data management. Aerospace and the MOL SPO concurred with all but the last, noting that while IBM had a technically superior bid to UNIVAC, its estimated cost was US$32 million (equivalent to $230 million in 2023) compared to UNIVAC's US$16.8 million (equivalent to $121 million in 2023). Douglas decided to let study contracts to both firms.[48]
Astronauts
Selection
To provide prospective astronauts for the
For the first three NASA astronaut groups in 1959, 1962 and 1963, the USAF had established a selection board to review candidates before forwarding their names to NASA. The Chief of Staff of the USAF, General John P. McConnell, informed Schriever that he expected the selection of MOL astronauts to follow the same procedure. A selection board was convened in September 1965, chaired by Major General Jerry D. Page. On 15 September 1965, the selection criteria for MOL was announced.[54] Candidates had to be:
- Qualified military pilots;
- Graduates of the ARPS;
- Serving officers, recommended by their commanding officers; and
- Holding U.S. citizenship from birth.[54]
In October 1965, the MOL Policy Committee decided that MOL crew members would be designated "MOL Aerospace Research Pilots" rather than astronauts.[55]
The names of the first group of eight MOL pilots were announced on 12 November 1965 as a
- Major Michael J. Adams, USAF
- Major Albert H. Crews Jr., USAF
- USN
- Captain Richard E. Lawyer, USAF
- Captain Lachlan Macleay, USAF
- Captain Francis G. Neubeck, USAF
- Major James M. Taylor, USAF
- Lieutenant Richard H. Truly, USN.[54]
To prevent their return to the Navy on graduation, Finley and Truly were retained as instructors until the announcement.[56]
In late 1965, the USAF began selecting a second group of MOL pilots. This time applications were accepted. Selection occurred at the same time as that for NASA Astronaut Group 5, many applying to both programs. Successful candidates were told that NASA or MOL had chosen them, with no explanation why they had been chosen by one and not the other.[57] Over 500 applications were received and 100 were forwarded to USAF Headquarters. The MOL Program Office selected 25, who were sent to Brooks Air Force Base for physical evaluation in January and February 1966. Five were selected, and their names were publicly announced on 17 June 1966:
- Captain Karol J. Bobko, USAF
- Lieutenant Robert L. Crippen, USN
- Captain C. Gordon Fullerton, USAF
- Captain Henry W. Hartsfield Jr., USAF
- Captain
Bobko was the first graduate of the United States Air Force Academy to be selected as an astronaut.[59]
Eight other finalists for the second class had not yet completed ARPS. One was already attending; the other seven were sent to Edwards Air Force Base to join Class 66-B. The MOL Astronaut Selection Board met again on 11 May 1967, and recommended that four of the eight be appointed. The MOL Program Office announced names of those selected for the third group of MOL astronauts on 30 June 1967:
- Major James A. Abrahamson, USAF
- Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Herres, USAF
- Major Robert H. Lawrence Jr., USAF
- Major Donald H. Peterson, USAF.[52][60]
Lawrence was the first
Training
Many MOL astronauts had hoped since childhood to travel into space.
Phase I of crew training was a two-month introduction to the MOL program in the form of a series of briefings from NASA and the contractors. Phase II lasted for five months, and was conducted at the ARPS, where the astronauts were given technical training on the MOL vehicles and their operation procedures. This training was conducted in classrooms, training flights, and sessions on the T-27 space flight simulator. Phase III was continuous training on the MOL systems and providing crew input to them. The pilots spent most of their time in this phase. Phase IV was training for specific missions.[65]
Simulators were developed for each of the different MOL systems: Laboratory Module Simulator, Mission Payload Simulator, and Gemini B Procedures Simulator.
Planned operations
Reconnaissance
From the MOL's regular 280-kilometer (150 nmi) orbit, the main camera had a circular field of view 2,700 meters (9,000 ft) across, although at top magnification it was more like 1,300 meters (4,200 ft). This was much smaller than many of the targets that the NRO was interested in, such as air bases, shipyards and missile ranges. The astronauts would search for targets using the tracking and acquisition telescopes, which had a circular view about 12.0 km (6.5 nmi) across, with a resolution of about 9.1 meters (30 ft). The main camera would focus on the most important targets, providing a very high resolution image. The aim was to have the most interesting part of the target in the center of the image; due to the optics used, the image would not be as sharp around the edges.[67]
While surveillance targets were pre-programmed and the camera could operate automatically, astronauts could decide target priority for photographing. By avoiding cloudy areas and identifying more interesting subjects (an open
The Air Force expected that an improved version of the MOL space station, known as Block II, expected to be available for the sixth crewed flight in July 1974, would add image transmission and
Flight schedule
Flight | Date | Details | Reference |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 15 April 1969 | First Titan IIIM qualification flight (simulated Orbiting Vehicle). | [71][72] |
2 | 1 July 1969 | Second uncrewed Gemini-B/Titan IIIM qualification flight (Gemini-B flown alone, without an active laboratory). | [71][72] |
3 | 15 December 1969 | A crew of two, commanded by Taylor (possibly with Crews) would have spent thirty days in orbit. | [71][72][73] |
4 | 15 April 1970 | Second crewed mission. | [71][72] |
5 | 15 July 1970 | Third crewed mission. | [71][72] |
6 | 15 October 1970 | Fourth crewed MOL mission, of 30 to 60 days duration. All-Navy crew composed of Truly and either Crippen or Overmyer. | [71][72][74][75] |
7 | 15 January 1971 | Fifth crewed MOL mission | [71][72] |
Spacecraft
The Gemini spacecraft originated at NASA in 1961 as a development of the
Like the NASA Gemini, the Gemini B spacecraft would
Externally Gemini B was quite similar to its NASA twin, but there were many differences. The most noticeable was that it featured a rear hatch for the crew to enter the MOL space station. Notches were cut into the ejection seat headrests to allow access to the hatch. The seats were therefore mirror images of each other instead of being the same. Gemini B also had a larger diameter heat shield to handle the higher energy of reentry from a
The Gemini B systems were designed for long-term orbital storage (40 days), but equipment for long duration flights was removed since the Gemini B capsule itself was intended to be used only for launch and reentry. It had a different cockpit layout and instruments. As a result of the Apollo 1 fire in January 1967, in which three NASA astronauts were killed in a ground test of their spacecraft, the MOL was switched to use a helium-oxygen atmosphere instead of a pure oxygen one. At takeoff, the astronauts would breathe pure oxygen in their spacesuits while the cabin was pressurized with helium. It would then be brought up to a helium-oxygen mix.[78][79] This was an option that had been provided for in the original design.[84]
Four Gemini B spacecraft were ordered from McDonnell, along with a
Gemini B specifications
- Crew: 2
- Maximum duration: 40 days
- Length: 3.35 m (11.0 ft)
- Diameter: 2.32 m (7 ft 7 in)
- Cabin volume: 2.55 m3 (90 cu ft)
- Gross mass: 1,983 kg (4,372 lb)
- RCS thrusters: 16 N × 98 N (3.6 lbf × 22.0 lbf)
- RCS impulse: 283 s (2.78 km/s)
- Electric system: 4 kWh (14 MJ)
- Battery: 180 A·h (648,000 C)
- Reference:[78]
Gemini B layout
-
FlownGemini B prototype
-
Heat shield with hatch
-
Display panel
-
Gemini B nose
-
Control panel
-
Spacecraft interior
Space station
The hatch in the Gemini B spacecraft's heat shield connected to a transfer tunnel that ran through the adaptor module. This contained the
The purpose-built laboratory module was divided into two sections, but there was no partition between the two, and the crew could move freely between them. It was 5.8 meters (19 ft) long and 3.05 meters (10.0 ft) in diameter. Both were octagonal in shape, with eight bays. In the "upper" half (as it would have been on the launch pad), Bays 1 and 8 contained storage compartments; Bay 2, the environmental control system; Bay 3, the hygiene/waste compartment; Bay 4, the biochemical test console and work station; Bays 5 and 6, the airlock; and Bay 7, a glovebox for handling liquids; below that, a secondary food console. In the "lower" half, Bay 1 contained a motion chair that measured the mass of the crew; Bay 2, two performance test panels; Bay 3, the environmental control system controls; Bay 4, a physiology test console; Bay 5, an exercise device; Bay 6, two emergency oxygen masks; Bay 7, a view port and instrument panel; and Bay 8, the main spacecraft control station.[87]
Space station specifications
- Crew: 2
- Maximum duration: 40 days
- Orbit: Polar
- Length: 21.92 m (71.9 ft)
- Diameter: 3.05 m (10.0 ft)
- Habitable volume: 11.3 m3 (400 cu ft)
- Gross mass: 14,476 kg (31,914 lb)
- Payload: 2,700 kg (6,000 lb)
- Power: fuel cells or solar cells
- Reaction control system: N2O4 / MMH
- Reference:[74]
Space station layout
-
MOL main features
-
Gemini B layout
-
Integral launch dual compartment laboratory
-
MOL variations
Spacesuits
The MOL program's requirements for a spacesuit were a product of the spacecraft design. The Gemini B capsule had little room inside, and the MOL astronauts gained access to the laboratory through a hatch in the heat shield. This required a more flexible suit than those of NASA astronauts. The NASA astronauts had custom-made sets of flight, training and backup suits, but for the MOL the intention was that spacesuits would be provided in standard sizes with adjustable elements. The USAF sounded out the
A competition was held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in January 1967, and a production contract awarded to Hamilton Standard. At least 17 blue MOL MH-7 training suits were delivered between May 1968 and July 1969. A single MH-8 flight configuration suit was delivered in October 1968 for certification testing. The flight suit was intended to be worn during launch and reentry.[89]
The contract for the launch/reentry suit was followed by a second competition in September 1967 for a suit for extravehicular activity (EVA).[90] This too was won by Hamilton Standard. The design was complicated by USAF concerns that a crew member might slip their tethers and float away. As a result, an astronaut maneuvering unit (AMU) was developed and integrated with the life support system as an integrated maneuvering and life support system (IMLSS). The design was completed by October 1968, and a prototype without cover garments was delivered in March 1969. The cover garments were never completed.[90]
Facilities
Launch complex
The military director of the NRO, Brigadier General
The announcement that the MOL would be launched from the
The USAF attempted to purchase the land to the south of
By this time, the design of the launch complex had progressed to the point at which it was possible to call for bids for its construction. Major items included a launch pad, umbilical tower, mobile services tower, aerospace ground equipment building, propellant loading and storage systems, launch control center, segment receipt inspection building, ready building, protective clothing building, and complex service building.[95] Seven bids for the construction contract were received, and it was awarded to the lowest bidder, Santa Fe and Stolte of Lancaster, California. The contract was valued at US$20.2 million (equivalent to $145 million in 2023).[96][97] Construction work was overseen by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The launch control center, segment receipt inspection building and ready building were accepted by the USAF in August 1968.[98]
Easter Island
In the event of an abort, the Gemini B spacecraft could have come down in the eastern Pacific Ocean. To prepare for this contingency, an agreement was reached with Chile on 26 July 1968 for the use of Easter Island as a staging area for search and rescue aircraft and helicopters.[80] Works included resurfacing the 2,000-meter (6,600 ft) runway, taxiways and parking areas with asphalt, and establishing communications, aircraft maintenance and storage facilities, and accommodation for 100 personnel.[99]
Rochester
A Camera Optical Assembly (COA) facility was constructed at Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York. It included a new steel frame building and a masonry building with 13,120 square meters (141,200 sq ft) of test chambers, built at a cost of US$32,500,000 (equivalent to $240 million in 2023).[100] The laboratory was dug into the ground so observers would not realize how large it was.[55]
Test flight
An MOL test flight was launched from Cape Canaveral Space Launch Complex 40 on 3 November 1966 at 13:50:42 UTC, on a Titan IIIC, vehicle C-9.[101] The flight consisted of an MOL mockup built from a Titan II propellant tank, and Gemini spacecraft No. 2, which had been refurbished as a prototype Gemini B spacecraft.[86] This was the first time an American spacecraft intended for human spaceflight had flown in space twice, albeit without a crew.[102] The adapter connecting the Gemini spacecraft to the laboratory mockup contained three other spacecraft: two OV4-1 satellites and an OV1-6 satellite. The Gemini B spacecraft separated for a suborbital reentry, while the MOL mockup continued into low Earth orbit, where it released the three satellites.[101]
The simulated laboratory contained eleven experiments. The Manifold experimental package consisted of two
The hatch installed in the Gemini's
Public response
With the 1966 Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament approaching, there were concerns about how the MOL was viewed by the international community. The United States insisted that the MOL was in line with the 17 October 1963 United Nations General Assembly resolution that the exploration and use of outer space should be used only "for the betterment of mankind". To allay Soviet fears that the MOL would carry nuclear weapons, the State Department suggested that Soviet officials be permitted to inspect it for them before launch, but Brown opposed this on security grounds.[105]
Public debate of the merits of the MOL program was hobbled by its semi-secret nature. Writing about the MOL as an outsider in 1967, Leonard E. Schwartz, a consultant to the Directorate for Scientific Affairs of the OECD, noted that the United States already had SAMOS satellites for reconnaissance and Vela satellites for surveillance of nuclear explosions, but without knowing their capabilities or those of MOL, could not evaluate the actual costs or benefits of the program.[106]
Publicly, the Air Force vaguely described the MOL as "an effective space building block of very substantial potential, a space resource capable of growth to follow-on tasks".[107] "On completion", Brady declared in 1965, "we will have configured, acquired, and most important, conducted a manned military space operation thereby acquiring the crews, experience and equipment that will, if required, allow the Air Force to move into the near-earth space environment in an orderly and effective manner".[108]
The Soviet Union commissioned the development of its own military space station,
Delays and cost increases
Within weeks of Johnson's announcement of the MOL program, it was facing budget cuts. In November 1965, Flax arbitrarily cut US$20 million (equivalent to $148 million in 2023) from the MOL program's fiscal year 1967 budget, bringing it down to US$374 million (equivalent to $2760 million in 2023). Brown learned that McNamara intended to limit the program to US$150 million (equivalent to $1076 million in 2023) in fiscal year 1967, the same allocation as in fiscal year 1966, in response to the rising cost of the Vietnam War.[112] In August 1965, the first uncrewed qualification flight had been expected to take place in late 1968, with the first crewed mission in early 1970,[113][114] on the assumption that engineering development would commence in January 1966. Since this was now unlikely, McNamara saw no reason to continue with the original budget. Brown examined the schedules, advising McNamara that a crewed mission in April 1969 would require a minimum of US$294 million (equivalent to $2110 million in 2023) in fiscal year 1967, and that the minimum budget that the MOL program required was US$230 million (equivalent to $1650 million in 2023), which would impose a delay of the first flight of three to eighteen months. McNamara was unmoved, and US$150 million (equivalent to $956 million in 2023) was the sum requested in the budget submitted to Congress in January 1966.[112]
When the MOL engineering development phase commenced in September 1966, it became clear that the USAF estimates of project costs and those of the major contractors were a long way apart. McDonnell requested US$205.5 million (equivalent to $1475 million in 2023) for a fixed price plus incentive fee (FPIF) contract to design and build Gemini B, which the USAF budgeted at US$147.9 million (equivalent to $1061 million in 2023); Douglas wanted US$815.8 million (equivalent to $5854 million in 2023) for the laboratory vehicles which the USAF budgeted at US$611.3 million (equivalent to $4386 million in 2023); and General Electric sought US$198 million (equivalent to $1421 million in 2023) for work budgeted at US$147.3 million (equivalent to $1057 million in 2023). In response the MOL SPO reopened negotiations for systems not under contract, and halted the issuance of Dorian clearances to contractor personnel. This had the desired effect, and by December 1966, the major contractors had reduced their prices, bringing them closer to the USAF estimates. However, on 7 January 1967, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) informed the MOL SPO that it intended to limit contracts in fiscal year 1968 to US$430 million (equivalent to $3085 million in 2023), which was US$157 million (equivalent to $1127 million in 2023) short of what the MOL SPO wanted, and US$381 million (equivalent to $2734 million in 2023) below what the contractors wanted. This meant that the prime contracts had to be renegotiated.[47]
Budget cuts were not the only reason for the project's schedule slipping. On 9 December 1966, Eastman Kodak advised that it would not be able to deliver the optical sensors by the original target date of January 1969 for a crewed mission in April 1969, and asked for a ten-month extension to October 1969, which pushed the date of the first crewed mission back to January 1970.[100] Eventually, US$480 million (equivalent to $3444 million in 2023) was found for fiscal year 1968, with US$50 million (equivalent to $359 million in 2023) obtained by reprogramming funds from other programs, and US$661 million (equivalent to $4743 million in 2023) agreed upon for fiscal year 1969.[115] To accommodate this, the date of the first qualification flight was pushed back still further, to December 1970, with the first crewed mission in August 1971.[113][114]
On 17 May 1967, a US$674,703,744 FPIF contract (equivalent to $4.71 billion in 2023) was signed with Douglas, which also received US$13 million (equivalent to $91 million in 2023) in black budget funds. A US$180,469,000 FPIF contract (equivalent to $1.26 billion in 2023) was signed with McDonnell the following day, and a US$110,020,000 (equivalent to $789 million in 2023) to General Electric, which was expected to receive another US$60 million in black budget funds (equivalent to $418 million in 2023).[115][116] The delays increased the projected costs of the MOL program to US$2.35 billion (equivalent to $17 billion in 2023).[115]
As MOL deputy director, Bleymaier in early 1968 asked his astronauts for advice. Aware of the program's budgetary and political difficulties, they asked him to promise that the first launch would be fully operational. This would cancel two uncrewed qualification missions, the first in December 1970; the August 1971 crewed flight would be the first MOL launch and first operational mission.[113][117] In March 1968, Congress appropriated US$515 million (equivalent to $3445 million in 2023) for fiscal year 1969, and the MOL SPO was directed to plan on the basis of a US$600 million appropriation (equivalent to $3825 million in 2023) for fiscal year 1970. This entailed yet another schedule slippage. On 15 July 1968, the MOL SPO convened a conference with major contractors in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, and it was agreed to defer the first crewed mission from August to December 1971.[118]
Usefulness of humans
A few months after MOL development began, the program began developing an automated MOL that replaced the crew compartment with film reentry vehicles.
In February 1966, Schriever commissioned a report examining humans' usefulness on the station. The report, which was submitted on 25 May 1966, concluded that they would be useful in several ways, but implied that the program would always need to justify the cost and difficulty of the MOL versus a robotic version. Although it did not fly until July 1966, the authors were aware of the capabilities and limitations of the KH-8 Gambit 3. It could not achieve the same resolution as the Dorian camera on MOL,[119][117] and the automation necessitated a longer development time and added weight,[124] but the Dorian camera had a resolution of 33 to 38 centimetres (13 to 15 in), could remain in orbit longer, and carry more film than earlier spy satellites.[125]
The report's authors concluded that the justification for manned MOL was stronger than they had believed.[117] Crewed systems had many advantages over automated ones, which lost up to half their images to cloud cover on a typical mission. A human could select the best angle for a photograph, and could switch between color and infrared, or some other special film, depending on the target. This was especially useful for dealing with camouflaged targets. The MOL also had the ability to change orbits, and could shift from its regular 280 km (150 nmi) orbit to a 370-to-560 km (200-to-300 nmi) one, giving it a view of the entire Soviet Union.[126]
The authors believed that an uncrewed MOL would more likely fail early missions and slowly improve, while a crewed MOL would be "self-healing" and crews would not repeat mistakes. Experience on Projects Mercury, Gemini and the X-15 had demonstrated that crew initiative, innovation and improvisation were often the difference between the success and failure of the mission. Because of the early failures, they predicted that uncrewed MOL would always be less successful overall than crewed MOL regardless of the number of missions. After crewed MOL perfected the system, the program could fly both uncrewed and crewed missions, the report stated.[119][117]
Debate also persisted about the value of the very high resolution (VHR) imaging being developed for MOL and
Cancellation
On 20 January 1969,
Stewart briefed the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, on MOL, which Stewart described as the best path to VHR at the earliest date. Laird, who as a congressman had criticized McNamara for inadequately funding the MOL program, was favorably disposed towards the MOL program, as was Seamans, who was now the Secretary of the Air Force. On 6 March, Packard directed Foster to proceed on the basis of $556 million for fiscal year 1970 (equivalent to $3544 million in 2023). This entailed postponement of the first crewed mission to February 1972.[131]
The Bureau of the Budget did not accept Laird's decision. Mayo argued that the resolution provided by Gambit 3 was adequate, and proposed canceling both the MOL and Hexagon. An MOL mission was expected to cost $150 million (equivalent to $956 million in 2023), but a Gambit 3 launch cost only $23 million (equivalent to $147 million in 2023). The value of VHR, Mayo argued, was not worth the extra cost. On 9 April, Nixon reduced the MOL's funding to $360 million (equivalent to $2295 million in 2023), and canceled Hexagon.[132]
Packard and CIA's Helms asked the President to reverse the decision, arguing that Hexagon's ability to photograph large areas was more important for
On 7 June 1969, Stewart ordered Bleymaier to cease all work on Gemini B, the Titan IIIM and the MOL spacesuit, and to cancel or curtail all other contracts. The official announcement that the MOL had been canceled was made on 10 June.[133][134] One MOL astronaut heard the news on the radio while driving to work. Thousands of workers lost their jobs, including 500 at Kodak alone.[117]
Had it flown as scheduled, MOL would have been the world's first space station.
... because we couldn't find where having men in that satellite was beneficial. In fact, it was harmful. You had to put a life support system in it. The cameras—that now we can talk about—that were on the satellite, people moving around in the satellite created 'noise.' You didn't want anybody around. So you look at the cost and the complexity, so the program was terminated.[138]
Legacy
McLucas wrote that canceling MOL saved the government $1.5 billion over the following three years. NRO received some of the savings, and an official with the non-NRO Defense Support Program said that "MOL saved our ass".[117]
Following the cancellation, a committee was formed to handle the disposal of its assets, valued at US$12.5 million (equivalent to $80 million in 2023). The Acquisition and Tracking System, Mission Development Simulator, Laboratory Module Simulator, and Mission Simulator were transferred to NASA by the end of 1973. The MOL Program Office at the Pentagon closed on 15 February 1970, and the office in Los Angeles on 30 September 1970. The Director of Space Systems, Brigadier General Allen, became the point of contact for contracts that were terminated, but those with
At the time the MOL was canceled, 192 service and 100 civilian personnel were employed on MOL activities. Within weeks, 80 percent of the service personnel were given new duty assignments. The civilians were reassigned to the
The Titan III booster became a mainstay of the military satellite program. The Titan IIIC version was capable of lifting 9,100 kilograms (20,000 lb) into low Earth orbit;
Gambit 3's resolution did eventually become comparable to Dorian's, in part using optics technology developed for Dorian. The
At the time of cancellation, work on Space Launch Complex 6 was 92 percent complete. The main task remaining was conducting
Some items of MOL equipment made their way to museums. The Gemini B spacecraft used in the only flight of the MOL program is on display at the
In July 2015, the NRO declassified over eight hundred files and photos related to the MOL program.[163] A book by the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance oral historian Courtney V.K. Homer about the MOL program, Spies in Space (2019), was based on documents released by the NRO and interviews she conducted with Abrahamson, Bobko, Crippen, Crews, Macleay, and Truly.[135][164]
Notes
- ^ David 2017, p. 768.
- ^ Homer 2019, pp. 2–3.
- ^ Berger 2015, p. 2.
- ^ Divine 1993, p. 11.
- ^ Swenson, Grimwood & Alexander 1966, pp. 28–29, 37.
- ^ Homer 2019, p. 1.
- ^ Divine 1993, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Wheeldon 1998, p. 33.
- ^ Day 1998, p. 48.
- ^ Swenson, Grimwood & Alexander 1966, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Berger 2015, p. 4.
- ^ Swenson, Grimwood & Alexander 1966, p. 71.
- ^ a b Berger 2015, p. 5.
- ^ a b c Berger 2015, pp. 6–8.
- ^ Houchin 1995, p. 273.
- ^ Houchin 1995, p. 279.
- ^ Erickson 2005, p. 353.
- ^ Houchin 1995, p. 311.
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External links
- Declassified MOL files Archived 1 January 2019 at the Wayback Machine by the National Reconnaissance Office
- The Story of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory part 1, part2, part 3 by the National Reconnaissance Office