Armoured warfare
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Armoured warfare or armored warfare (
Much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of
World War I
Modern armoured warfare began during the
Britain and France first developed tanks in 1915 as a way of navigating the
Despite the generally unpromising beginnings, the military and political leadership in both Britain and France during 1917 backed large investment into armoured-vehicle production. This led to a sharp increase in the number of available tanks for 1918. The German Empire, on the contrary, produced only a few tanks, late in the war. Twenty German A7V tanks were produced during the entire conflict, compared to over 4,400 French and over 2,500 British tanks of various kinds. Nonetheless, World War I saw the first tank-versus-tank battle, during the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when a group of three German A7V tanks engaged a group of three British Mark IV tanks which they met accidentally.
After the final German spring offensives of 21 March to 18 July 1918, the Entente deployed tanks en masse at the Battle of Soissons (18 to 22 July 1918) and Battle of Amiens (August 1918), which ended the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front, and thus effectively ended the war.
Tactically, deployment plans for armour during the war typically placed a strong emphasis on direct support for infantry. The tank's main tasks were seen as crushing barbed-wire and destroying machine-gun nests, facilitating the advance of foot soldiers. Theoretical debate largely focused on the question of whether to use a "swarm" of light tanks for this, or a limited number of potent heavy vehicles. Though in the Battle of Cambrai a large concentration of British heavy tanks effected a breakthrough, it was not exploited by armour. The manoeuvrability of the tank should at least in theory regain armies the ability to
Strategic use of tanks developed only slowly during and immediately after World War I, partly due to these technical limits but also due to the prestige role traditionally accorded to horse-mounted cavalry. An exception, on paper, was the Plan 1919 of the British Army's Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, who envisaged using the expected vast increase in armour production during 1919 to execute deep strategic penetrations by mechanised forces consisting of tanks and infantry carried by trucks, supported by aeroplanes, to paralyse the enemy command-structure.[6]
Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools of doctrinal thought.
Interwar period
1920s
During the 1920s, a very limited number of tanks were produced. There were however, important theoretical and technical developments. Various British and French commanders who had contributed to the origin of the tank, such as Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, theorised about a possible future use of independent armoured forces, containing a large concentration of tanks, to execute deep strategic penetrations. Especially Liddell Hart wrote many books about the subject, partly propagating Fuller's theories. Such doctrines were faced with the reality that during the 1920s the armoured vehicles, as early road transport in general, were extremely unreliable, and could not be used in sustained operations. Mainstream thought on the subject was more conservative and tried to integrate armoured vehicles into the existing infantry and cavalry organisation and tactics.
Technical development initially focussed on the improvement of the suspension system, transmission and engine, to create vehicles that were faster, more reliable and had a better range than their WW I predecessors.[7] To save weight, such designs had thin armour plating and this inspired fitting small-calibre high-velocity guns in turrets, giving tanks a good antitank capacity.[8] Both France and Britain eventually built specialised infantry tanks, more heavily armoured to provide infantry support, and cavalry tanks that were faster and could exploit a breakthrough, seeking to bring about defeat of the enemy by severing his lines of communication and supply, as cavalry had done during the previous century.
The British were the first to create a larger fully mechanised unit when the War Office sanctioned the creation of the Experimental Mechanized Force,[9] which was formed on 1 May 1927, under infantry Colonel R. J. Collins, after Fuller (was) refused the function. Its sub-units were entirely mobile and consisted of reconnaissance tankettes and armoured cars, a battalion of forty-eight Vickers Medium Mark I tanks, a motorised machine-gun battalion, a mechanised artillery regiment, which had one battery of fully tracked self-propelled Birch guns capable of acting as conventional or anti-aircraft artillery, and a motorised company of field engineers.[10] The unit carried out operations on Salisbury Plain and was observed by the other major nations, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Although its performance was recognised, it was disbanded in 1928.
In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, argued that the British army, under budget and over-stretched during the interwar period, pursued innovation recklessly by betting on the combat effectiveness of armoured units operating with little infantry or artillery support. Doing so led to its initial setbacks in North Africa during the Second World War.[11]
All major European states (with the exception of Germany that was forbidden to possess armoured vehicles under the Treaty of Versailles), the US, and Japan, would create their own experimental mechanised forces during the late 1920s, many using either French or British vehicle designs or even directly purchased vehicles, but largely borrowing from both to develop their own doctrines.
1930s
During the 1930s, political tensions between the world powers quickly increased. The
In France, the second largest tank producer, mechanisation was motivated by a need to compensate for severe manpower shortages due to a collapsed birth rate during World War I. This led to the development of a vast range of specialised armoured vehicles, not just tanks but also
Before the
World War II
Poland
In their Invasion of Poland during September 1939, German forces applied a narrow cooperation between large armoured units – of the Panzerwaffe and the Cavalry – and "active" infantry divisions to break the Polish defensive lines and pursue the defeated enemy forces. The more limited and dispersed Polish armoured units were quickly destroyed. The Red Army, invading the east of Poland, also deployed armoured divisions. At the time, the swift collapse of the Polish army was seen as the result of an armoured Blitzkrieg. However, later it has been argued that the campaign was largely an instance of the classical nineteenth century German concept of the "Annihilation Battle", in which the role of deep strategic armoured penetrations was limited.[20]
France
In the wake of the Polish campaign, during the
The spectacular and unexpected success not only caused a sudden change in the global
North African theatre
In the deserts of North Africa, the British developed the alternative approach of combining the armoured, infantry and artillery together to form a 'balanced, combined arms team'. The
The arrival of the German Afrika Korps under command of General der Panzertruppe Erwin Rommel highlighted the weaknesses of the British approach: the small number of infantry and artillery in each armoured division was sufficient when attacking the immobile and uncoordinated Italian troops, but against the highly mobile, well-coordinated German units, the undermanned Commonwealth formations were proving inadequate. [citation needed]
Between 1941 and 1942, the Allies struggled in armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions; however, they achieved some notable successes at Crusader, 1st Alamein and under Montgomery finally achieved decisive victories, in particular at the Second Battle of El Alamein.[citation needed]
In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote that due to factors emanating from the interwar period, the British army in North Africa initially operated their armoured units with little infantry or artillery support. Meanwhile, the Germans had integrated their armour with mechanised infantry and artillery. Only after undoing their misplaced emphasis on armour were the British able to restore their combat effectiveness.[11]
Soviet Union
Pre-war
Much of the Red Army development in tank use was based on the theoretical work carried out by such officers as
While the infantry based part of the doctrine demanded "powerful tanks" (heavy tanks armed with infantry guns and machineguns) and "tankettes" (light, often amphibious tanks with machineguns), the shock army demanded "manoeuvre tanks" (fast tanks with medium guns) used in conjunction with motorised forces and "mechanised cavalry" that would operate in depth as "strategic cavalry" combined with nascent airborne troops. These ideas culminated in the "PU-36" or the 1936 Field Service Regulations.
Wartime
At the start of the Second World War much of the Red Army, including its armoured forces, was in transition and recovering from the
One important development took place shortly before the war, which influenced Soviet armoured doctrine and tank design for a decade: the creation of the T-34. Developed on the Christie suspension chassis and using sloped armour for the first time, the T-34 proved a shock to the German forces in the first German encounter of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The T-34 had an excellent combination of mobility, protection and firepower. [citation needed] Using wide tracks, the T-34 was also able to negotiate terrain in difficult weather conditions, something that persistently dogged the German designs. [citation needed]
Assessing the success of the German
Germany
In Germany, in-depth research through theoretical approaches, wargaming and exercises developed a confidence within the
At the outbreak of World War II, the German armoured forces benefited from a much more profound and more flexible training than that of the Allies on the tactical and operational level. German tanks operated while directed by radio communication, which allowed tank commanders to take greater advantage of the manoeuvrability of their vehicles.[25]
Even after the conquest of Poland, "Blitzkrieg" was not defined on the strategic level. Guderian and von Manstein devised a strategy that entailed what later would be seen as the essence of Blitzkrieg: concentrated panzer divisions performing swift deep penetrations. This strategy was not initially accepted by German High Command. Nevertheless, the final plans for the invasion of France in 1940 hinged on the element of a Schwerpunkt at Sedan, and was assigned to such forces. The great success of this operation led to Blitzkrieg being integrated with strategic planning for the rest of the war.
German tanks could carry with them enough fuel and supplies to go almost two hundred kilometers, and enough food to last three to nine days.
The effect of German Panzer's speed, mobility, and communication shocked the French, and ultimately were the deciding factors in the battle. It overcame their inferiority in armour and armament relative to the main French materiel such as the Char B1 bis.[27] The superior tactical and operational praxis, combined with an appropriate strategic implementation, enabled the Germans to defeat forces superior in armour (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in the battles of 1940,[27] but just as Blitzkrieg became a deliberate military doctrine, in 1941,[citation needed] it ultimately failed on the eastern front, though initially attaining spectacular successes.
Before the war,
United States
Though the U.S. had established the
The United States Army regarded the
Under this doctrine, U.S. tank crews of both armoured divisions and GHQ tank battalions were taught to fight tanks in tank on tank engagements. Armoured force personnel during and after the war criticised the infantry for using the GHQ tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions strictly as infantry support.
Tank destroyers
The U.S. combined arms team included air support, artillery, engineers, and a tank component supplemented by tank destroyers formed into independent tank destroyer battalions. The latter is most closely identified with the Chief of Army Ground Forces, Lesley J. McNair. Having studied the early German successes McNair came under the belief that U.S. forces would be faced with fast moving enemy forces who would seek to bypass, isolate and reduce U.S. forces in a replay of the Fall of France. [citation needed] To stem the flood of marauding panzers, fast moving powerfully armed tank destroyer battalions were created to be held back and used in the counter-attack.
It was also calculated that U.S. interests would be better served by large numbers of reliable (battle-worthiness) medium tanks rather than a smaller number of unreliable[33] heavy tanks.[citation needed] It was decided therefore to slow the production of the U.S. heavy tank designs such as the M26 Pershing and concentrate resources on mass-producing the M4 Sherman and tank destroyers such as the M18 Hellcat.[citation needed]
To be able get into position to counter-attack, the tank destroyers had to be fast. To achieve the desired mobility and agility from the engines available the armour protection was sacrificed, a measure of protection coming from being nimble and hopefully from being able to knock out the enemy before they could get a shot in. Although they usually had guns of either 75 mm or 76 mm calibre (the M36 used a 90mm calibre gun), the tank destroyer units were issued with the ancestor of the modern armour-piercing discarding sabot, rounds which made their guns much more powerful than a simple comparison of calibres would suggest.
Japan
The Japanese doctrine was mainly French in concept but with some purely Japanese elements. Due to Japan's naval priorities in
In 1939, the Japanese Army engaged
As with all armour, maintenance was a continuous challenge; especially in tropical environments. When IJA and SNLF (Imperial marines) tanks did clash with the enemy they were quickly destroyed by concealed anti-tank guns or overwhelming numbers of hostile tanks. Japan was a naval power, and concentrated its production on warships, thus placing a low priority on armoured vehicle development,[34] its tanks becoming quickly obsolete during the later years of the war. A number of designs that were equal to heavier foreign types were on the drawing board at the beginning of the war, but would only be built in small numbers towards the end, being placed in reserve, to be deployed for the defence of Japan itself.
China
The Republic of China's National Revolutionary Army's 200th Division was the country's only mechanised division during the war. The 200th used pre-war tanks acquired from Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union. [citation needed]
After 1945
Indo-Pakistani wars
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Arab–Israeli wars
The conflict between Arab nations in the East Mediterranean region and Israel in particular would serve to become a testing ground for development in armoured warfare during the decades of the Cold War. Both sides in the Arab–Israeli series of conflicts made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles due to the practicality of tanks in the desert environment these conflicts largely took place in.
During the
Conversely, the Yom Kippur War (1973) illustrated the problems that can arise if armoured and infantry units do not work closely together. Israeli tanks, operating independently in large numbers, were decimated by Egyptian anti-tank teams, well-distributed amongst regular infantry, and often equipped with new, first-generation portable anti-tank guided missiles. This is an extreme example but exemplifies what has been fairly thoroughly documented since the Second World War: tanks and infantry work best by taking advantage of each other's strengths and combining to minimise the weaknesses.
In many conflicts, it was usual to see infantry riding on the back of tanks, ready to jump off and provide support when necessary. Unfortunately, the design of many modern tanks makes this a dangerous practice. The turboshaft-powered M1 Abrams, for example, has such hot exhaust gas that nearby infantry have to be careful where they stand. Tanks can also be very vulnerable to well aimed artillery; well-coordinated air support and counter-battery artillery units can help overcome this.
Emergence of guided missiles
While attempts to defeat the tank were made before and during the Second World War, through the use of conventional high velocity
In response, the Soviet Union, the country with the largest armoured fleet in the world, strove to incorporate some anti-tank capability into almost every infantry weapon. By the 1960s, Soviet defense scientists were designing portable anti-tank guided missiles. These new weapons were to be either carried by infantry, or fired from the newly developed BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle. They were in use with Soviet forces before the end of the decade.
In 1973, the Israeli Army failed to anticipate the importance of these new weapon systems. Hundreds of
In the recent 2006 conflict with Hezbollah, while Israeli infantry were able to easily defeat opposing ATGM teams, tanks operating on their own suffered several hits from the latest advanced Russian tandem-warhead types (such as the Kornet). This highlighted that tanks operating solely, in the era of ATGMs, are extremely vulnerable.
Responding to the serious tank losses suffered against Hezbollah,
NATO
During the Cold War, NATO assumed armoured warfare to be a dominant aspect of conventional ground warfare in Europe. Although the use of light tanks was largely discontinued, and heavy tanks were also mostly abandoned, the medium tank design evolved into heavier models due to increase in armour and larger sized main weapon resulting in the main battle tank (MBT) which came into existence, combining most of the different types of tanks during World War II.
For the most part the NATO armoured doctrine remained defensive, and dominated by use of nuclear weapons as deterrence. Although most NATO nations began the Cold War period with a large number of U.S.-designed tanks in their fleets, there was a considerable degree of disagreement on the design of future MBTs among the NATO major nations. Both the U.S. and Germany experimented with, but abandoned the missile-armed
The
Warsaw Pact
The Warsaw Pact armoured doctrine was substantially influenced by the developments in the Soviet Army which sought to adopt its existing doctrine evolved during World War II to the nuclear battlefield. In the early 1960s this led to a number of important developments in the armoured forces and their supporting Arms. One important development was the transition of the Second World War use of Cavalry-Mechanised Group (CMG) into the Cold War Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) that was designed to exploit breakthroughs to penetrate NATO's defences in depth. This was a culmination of the Deep Battle theory dating to the 1930s.[42]
In 1964 a significant breakthrough in tank design was achieved in the Soviet Union when the
Infantry fighting vehicles were first developed in the 1960s with the Soviet Union's BMP-1, for the first time allowing supporting infantry to accompany tanks on a battlefield when nuclear weapon use was expected.
The T-64s and BMP-1s were also joined by the self-propelled guns and more importantly
The Soviet tank troops, as they were known in the USSR, included armoured units, armoured training regiments and other formations and units.
Vietnam War
M113 armoured personnel carriers proved effective in the terrain of Vietnam against enemy forces which, until 1968, rarely deployed their armour.[43] Though they were soon countered with mines and RPGs, M-113's continued service during the war, primarily evolving into infantry fighting vehicles, known as the ACAV[44] (Armoured Cavalry Assault Vehicle); and functioning as a "light tank."[45]
More heavily armed
By 1971, the larger
21st century
Tanks rarely work alone; the usual minimum unit size is a platoon (a platoon is the smallest U.S. Army/Marine unit led by an officer, and a component of a company or troop) of three to five tanks. The tanks of the platoon work together providing mutual support: two might advance while covered by the others then stop and provide cover for the remainder to move ahead.[47]
Normally, multiple platoons coordinate with
When on the defensive, they wait in prepared positions or use any natural
The disposition of armour around a tank is not uniform; the front is typically better armoured than the sides or rear. Accordingly, normal practice is to keep the front towards the enemy at all times; the tank retreats by reversing instead of turning around. Driving backwards away from an enemy is even safer than driving forwards towards them since driving forwards over a bump can throw the front of the tank up in the air, exposing the thin armour of the underside and taking the gun off the target due to its limited angle of depression.[48]
The tracks, wheels and suspension of a tank are outside the armoured hull and are some of the most vulnerable spots. The easiest way to disable a tank (other than a direct hit in a vulnerable area with a full-power anti-tank weapon) is to target the tracks for a "mobility kill" (m-kill), or target all external visual aids with rubbery cohesive substances such as melted rubber or blackened high viscosity epoxy resins. Once a tank is disabled it is easier to destroy. This is why side-skirts are an important feature; they can deflect heavy machine-gun bullets and trigger the detonation of high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds before they strike the running gear. Other vulnerable parts of a typical tank include the engine deck (with air intakes, radiators, etc.) and the turret ring, where the turret joins the hull.
When used defensively, tanks are often sunk into trenches or placed behind earth berms for increased protection. The tanks can fire off a few shots from their defensive position, then retreat (reversing) to another prepared position further back and drive behind the berms or into the trenches there. These positions can be constructed by the tank crews, but preparations are better and quicker if carried out by combat engineers with bulldozers. Overhead protection, even if it is fairly thin, can also be very useful since it can help pre-detonate artillery shells and avoid direct hits from above which can be deadly to tanks, by striking them at their thinnest armour. In short, tank crews find as many ways as possible to augment the armour on their vehicles.
Tanks usually go into battle with a round in the gun, ready to fire, to minimise reaction time when encountering an enemy. The US doctrine calls for this round to be a
Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It is much easier for enemy infantry to sneak up behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is most vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the thin upper turret armour and even basic weapons like Molotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank. Because of these limits, tanks are difficult to use in city conflicts where civilians or friendly forces might be nearby, since their firepower can't be used effectively.
Airborne threats
Tanks and other armoured vehicles are vulnerable to attack from the air for several reasons. One is that they are easily detectable—the metal they are made of shows up well on radar, and is especially obvious if they are moving in formation. A moving tank also produces a lot of heat, noise and dust. The heat makes seeing them on a
The other major reason is that most armoured vehicles have thinner armour on the roof of the turret and on the engine deck, so an anti-tank guided missile (from an attack helicopter or ground-attack jet) hitting them from the top can be deadly even if it has a small warhead. Even a small automatic cannon is powerful enough to penetrate the rear and top sections of the engine compartment of a tank.
Certain aircraft have been developed to attack armoured vehicles. Most notable is the purpose-built Fairchild-Republic
Similarly, a number of
Airborne threats can be countered in several ways. One is
Engineering support
Armoured warfare is mechanically and logistically intensive and requires extensive support mechanisms. Armoured fighting vehicles require armoured vehicles capable of working in the same terrain to support them. These are operated by the appropriate branches of the army, e.g. recovery and maintenance vehicles by the REME and combat engineering vehicles by the RE in the British Army. These include:
- Armoured recovery vehicles (ARV)—many of these are based on the chassis for the vehicle they support. E.g. the ARV for the UK Challenger tank is a Challenger hull onto which a winch is added.
- Armoured supply vehicles
- Combat engineering vehicles (CEV), e.g. bulldozers
For transporting tracked AFVs over highways, heavy transporters are used, since AFVs are prone to malfunction and their tracks also ruin the highways.
Light tanks and tank destroyers
While tanks are integral to armoured warfare, when power projection is required, the inability to perform rapid deployment has always been a limit of heavy main battle tanks.
It takes a few weeks to transfer tanks and their supporting equipment by air or sea.[
The desire to create air-portable armoured vehicles that can still take on conventional MBTs has usually resulted in ATGM-armed light vehicles or in self-propelled gun style vehicles. The lack of armour protection is offset by the provision of a first-look/first-hit/first-kill capability through the mating of a powerful gun to superior targeting electronics, a concept similar to that of the US tank destroyers of World War II.
Vehicles which have put such considerations into practice include the
Though limited conflicts (such as the
See also
- Armoured corps
- Blitzkrieg
- Cold War Tanks
- Combined arms
- Comparison of early World War II tanks
- Comparison of World War I tanks
- History of the tank
- Light tanks of the United Kingdom
- Lists of armoured fighting vehicles
- Mobile Defence
- Mobile Warfare
- Modern warfare
- Tanks in World War I
- Tanks in World War II
- Tanks of the interwar period
- Tanks of the post–Cold War era
Theorists and practitioners
- Franks, Tommy
- Fuller, J. F. C.
- de Gaulle, Charles
- Guderian, Heinz
- Hobart, Percy
- Liddell Hart, B. H.
- von Manstein, Erich
- Montgomery, Bernard
- Patton, George Smith
- Rawlinson, Henry
- Rommel, Erwin
- Schwarzkopf, Norman
- Tal, Israel
- Tukhachevski, Mikhail
- Zhukov, Georgy
Notes
- ^ Nye, Logan (2018-12-14). "10 Tanks That Changed the History of Armored Warfare". Military.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28.
- ^ a b "tactics - The armoured offensive | Britannica". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28.
- ^ Nye, Logan (2018-12-14). "10 Tanks That Changed the History of Armored Warfare". Military.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28.
- ^ p.27, Design and development of fighting vehicles, R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Macdonald, London, 1968
- ISBN 978-0-7538-2605-8.
- ^ Perrett (1990), p. 12
- ^ Perrett (1990) p. 9
- ^ Perrett (1990) p. 7
- ^ An Experimental Mechanised Force For the 21st Century? Boyd, S.F. 1999 British Army Review, 121. 1999(Apr), pp 17-22
- ^ Perrett (1990) p. 14
- ^ S2CID 253225173.
- ^ p.32, Design and development of fighting vehicles, R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Macdonald, London, 1968
- ^ Goldman p. 123
- ^ Gérard Saint-Martin, 1998, L'Arme Blindée Française. Tome 1. Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente, Economica, Paris
- ^ Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, 1984, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two, Arms and Armour Press, London, p. 106
- ^ ISBN 1591142946
- ^ Zaloga & Grandsen (1984) p. 109
- ^ Goldman p. 123, 124
- ^ Zaloga & Grandsen (1984) p. 110
- ^ Harris, John Paul, 1995, "The Myth of Blitzkrieg", War in History II November 1995: 335–352
- ^ Perrett (1990), p. 18
- ^ p.38, Race to the swift: Thoughts on the Twenty-first century warfare, Brig. Richard E. Simpkin, Brassey's, London, 1985
- ^ Goldman p. 123, 167
- David Glantzed., Centre for land warfare, US Army war college, March 1984
- ^ a b "Blitzkrieg". Spartacus Educational. Retrieved 2019-12-02.
- S2CID 151367404.
- ^ a b Koster, John (2017). "When France Defied Hitler's Panzers". Military History. 34: 30–37 – via EBSCOhost.
{{cite journal}}
: Check|url=
value (help) - JSTOR 26304190.
- doi:10.21236/ada235149. Archived from the original on June 3, 2018.)
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help - ^ Zaloga (Armored Thunderbolt) p. 1-4
- ^ a b Zaloga (Armored Thunderbolt) p. 13
- ^ "U.S. Army Armor Center & School".
- ^ Zaloga (Armored Thunderbolt) p. 46
- ^ incomplete short citation]
- ^ Zaloga (Armored Thunderbolt) p. 45
- ^ Zaloga (Armored Thunderbolt) p. 15
- ^ Zaloga (M3/M5 Stuart) p. 13, 14, 33
- ^ "Israel unveils defense shield for Merkavas". UPI.com. 2010-04-06. Archived from the original on 2011-06-05. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
- ^ "Trophy Active Protection System". Defense-update.com. Archived from the original on 2011-12-30. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
- ^ Maital, Shlomo (30 May 2011). "Anti-tank missile defense system stops attack ... JPost - Defense". Jpost.com. Archived from the original on 2011-08-30. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
- ^ Hunnicutt/1984/p. 6, 149, 408
- ^ p.37 Race to the swift, Thoughts on Twenty-first century warfare, Brig. Richard E. Simpkin
- ^ Stockwell, p. 10
- ^ Starry, p. 73
- ^ Starry, p. 24/Zumbro, p. 470
- ^ Starry
- ^ Nye, Logan (2018-12-14). "10 Tanks That Changed the History of Armored Warfare". Military.com. Retrieved 2022-01-28.
- ^ .
- ^ "125mm APERS And Special Rounds". Fofanov.armor.kiev.ua. Archived from the original on 2010-12-04. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
References
- Goldman, Stuart D. Nomonhan, 1939; The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II. 2012, ISBN 978-1-61251-098-9.
- ISBN 0-306-81101-4.
- Hofmann, George F. and Starry, Donn A., eds. "Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces." 1999; University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-2130-2.
- ISBN 0-89141-230-1.
- Hunnicutt, R. P. Firepower: A History of the American Heavy Tank. 1988; Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-304-9.
- ISBN 0-345-24440-0.
- Perrett, Bryan, 1990, Tank Warfare: Combat Development in World War Two, Arms and Armour Press, London. ISBN 0-85368-993-8
- Department of the Army; First printing 1978.
- Pöhlmann, Markus 1990, Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis 1945, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn. ISBN 978-3-506-78355-4
- Stockwell, David B. Tanks In The Wire. 1990. ISBN 0-515-10333-0.
- ISBN 978-1-84603-091-8.
- Zaloga, Steven. Armored Thunderbolt, The US Army Sherman in World War II. 2008. Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-0424-3.
- Zumbro, Ralph. The Iron Cavalry. 1998, Pocket Books. ISBN 0-671-01390-4.
External links
- Tanks Encyclopedia
- Japanese Tanks and Tank Tactics Chapter II: Tactics
- Historic films showing tank warfare during the First World War at europeanfilmgateway.eu
- Educational video of how armored vehicles are used on the battlefield.