Metaphysical necessity
In
The concept of a metaphysically necessary being plays an important role in certain arguments for the existence of God, especially the ontological argument, but metaphysical necessity is also one of the central concepts in late 20th century analytic philosophy. Metaphysical necessity has proved a controversial concept, and criticized by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Richard Swinburne, among others.
Types of necessity
Metaphysical necessity is contrasted with other types of necessity. For example, the philosophers of religion John Hick[2] and William L. Rowe[3] distinguished the following three:
- factual necessity (existential necessity): a factually necessary being is not causally dependent on any other being, while any other being is causally dependent on it.
- causal necessity (subsumed by Hick under the former type): a causally necessary being is such that it is logically impossible for it to be causally dependent on any other being, and it is logically impossible for any other being to be causally independent of it.
- logical necessity: a logically necessary being is a being whose non-existence is a logical impossibility, and which therefore exists either timeless or eternally in all possible worlds.
Hume's dictum
Hume's dictum is a thesis about necessary connections between distinct entities. Its original formulation can be found in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature: "There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves".[4] Hume's intuition motivating this thesis is that while experience presents us with certain ideas of various objects, it might as well have presented us with very different ideas. So when I perceive a bird on a tree, I might as well have perceived a bird without a tree or a tree without a bird. This is so because their essences do not depend upon another.[4] David Lewis follows this line of thought in formulating his principle of recombination: "anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else".[5]
Hume's dictum has been employed in various arguments in contemporary
A posteriori and necessary truths
In
Necessity in theology
While many theologians (e.g.
See also
References
- ISBN 0191654876, 9780191654879
- ^ John Hick (1961): Necessary Being. - Scottish Journal of Theology, 1961: 353-369.
- ^ William L. Rowe (1998): The Cosmological Argument. Fordham Univ Press, 273 pp.
- ^ a b Hume, David (1739). "Book I, Part III, Section VI". A Treatise of Human Nature. The Project Gutenberg.
- ^ Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 88.
- ^ Gibbs, Cameron (2019). "6. THE ARGUMENT FROM PLENITUDE". A Defense of Hume's Dictum.
- ^ Swartz, Norman. Laws of Nature. Retrieved 28 November 2020.
- .
- ^ Gibbs, Cameron (2019). "2. CONSTRAINTS ON FORMULATING HUME'S DICTUM". A Defense of Hume's Dictum.
- ^ Menzel, Christopher (2017). Possible Worlds. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 28 November 2020.
- ^ Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press: 22.
- ^ Ronald H. Nash (1983): The Concept of God. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, p. 108
- ^ Richard Swinburne (2004): The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 96
External links
- Metaphysical necessity at PhilPapers
- Modal Metaphysics article in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Modal Illusions article in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy