Structural history of the Roman military
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The structural history of the Roman military concerns the major transformations in the organization and constitution of ancient Rome's armed forces, "the most effective and long-lived military institution known to history."[1] At the highest level of structure, the forces were split into the Roman army and the Roman navy, although these two branches were less distinct than in many modern national defense forces. Within the top levels of both army and navy, structural changes occurred as a result of both positive military reform and organic structural evolution. These changes can be divided into four distinct phases.
- Phase I
- The army was derived from obligatory annual military service levied on the citizenry, as part of their duty to the state. During this period, the Roman army would wage seasonal campaigns against largely local adversaries.
- Phase II
- As the extent of the territories falling under Roman control expanded and the size of the forces increased, the soldiery gradually became salaried professionals. As a consequence, military service at the lower (non-salaried) levels became progressively longer-term. Roman military units of the period were largely homogeneous and highly regulated. The army consisted of units of citizen infantry known as legions (Latin: legiones) as well as non-legionary allied troops known as auxilia. The latter were most commonly called upon to provide light infantry, logistical, or cavalry support.
- Phase III
- At the height of the Roman Empire's power, forces were tasked with manning and securing the borders of the vast provinces which had been brought under Roman control. Serious strategic threats were less common in this period and emphasis was placed on preserving gained territory. The army underwent changes in response to these new needs and became more dependent on fixed garrisons than on march-camps and continuous field operations.
- Phase IV
- As Rome began to struggle to keep control over its sprawling territories, military service continued to be salaried and professional for Rome's regular troops. However, the trend of employing allied or mercenary elements was expanded to such an extent that these troops came to represent a substantial proportion of the armed forces. At the same time, the uniformity of structure found in Rome's earlier military disappeared. Soldiery of the era ranged from lightly armed mounted archers to heavy infantry, in regiments of varying size and quality. This was accompanied by a trend in the late empire of an increasing predominance of cavalry rather than infantry troops, as well as a requirement for more mobile operations. In this period there was more focus (on all frontiers but the east) on smaller units of independently-operating troops, engaging less in set-piece battles and more in low-intensity, guerilla actions.
Early Roman army
Tribal forces (c. 752 BC – c. 578 BC)
According to the historians Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing at a far later date, the earliest Roman army existed in the 8th century BC. During this period Rome itself was probably little more than a fortified hilltop settlement and its army a relatively small force, whose activities were limited "mainly [to] raiding and cattle rustling with the occasional skirmish-like battle".[2] Historian Theodor Mommsen referred to it as Rome's curiate army, named for its presumed subdivision along the boundaries of Rome's three founding tribes (Latin: curiae), the Ramnians, Tities and Luceres.[3] This army's exact structure is not known, but it is probable that it loosely resembled a warrior band or group of bodyguards led by a chieftain or king.[4] Mommsen believes that Roman military organization of this period was regimented by the "Laws of [the apocryphal] King [V]Italus"[5] but these laws, though referred to by Aristotle, have been lost.[citation needed]
The army (Latin: legio) consisted, according to Livy, of exactly 3,000 infantry and 300 horsemen, one third from each of Rome's three founding tribes.
By the beginning of the 7th century BC, the
Etruscan-model hoplites (578 BC – c. 315 BC)
Although several Roman sources including Livy and Polybius talk extensively about the Roman army of the Roman Kingdom period that followed the Etruscan capture of the city, no contemporary accounts survive. Polybius, for example, wrote some 300 years after the events in question, and Livy some 500 years later. Additionally, what records were kept by the Romans at this time were later destroyed when the city was sacked. The sources for this period cannot therefore be seen as reliable, as they can be for later military history, e.g. from the First Punic War onwards.[13]
According to our surviving narratives, the three kings of Rome during the
However, Rome's social classes were qualified rather than created by the census. It is perhaps more accurate to say therefore that the army's structure was slightly refined during this period rather than radically reformed. Prior to these reforms, the infantry was divided into the classis of rich citizens and the infra classem of poorer citizens. The latter were excluded from the regular line of battle on the basis that their equipment was of poor quality.
The equestrians, the highest social class of all, served in mounted units known as equites. The first class of the richest citizens served as heavy infantry with swords and long spears (resembling hoplites), and provided the first line of the battle formation. The second class were armed similarly to the first class, but without a breastplate for protection, and with an oblong rather than a round shield. The second class stood immediately behind the first class when the army was drawn up in battle formation. The third and fourth classes were more lightly armed and carried a thrusting-spear and javelins. The third class stood behind the second class in battle formation, normally providing javelin support. The poorest of the propertied men of the city comprised the fifth class. They were generally too poor to afford much equipment at all and were armed as skirmishers with slings and stones. They were deployed in a screen in front of the main army, covering its approach and masking its manoeuvres.[21]
Men without property, who were thereby excluded from the qualifying social classes of the
The army is said to have increased from 3,000 to 4,000 men in the 5th century BC, and then again from 4,000 to 6,000 men sometime before 400 BC.[8] This later army of 6,000 men were then divided into 60 centuries of 100 men each.[23]
Professionalisation during the Republican period
Manipular legion (315–107 BC)
The army of the early Republic continued to evolve, and although there was a tendency among Romans to attribute such changes to great reformers, it is more likely that changes were the product of slow evolution rather than singular and deliberate policy of reform.
During this period, a military formation of around 5,000 men was known as a legion (Latin: legio). However, in contrast to later legionary formations of exclusively heavy infantry, the legions of the early and middle Republic consisted of both light and heavy infantry. The term manipular legion, a legion based on units called maniples, is therefore used to contrast the later cohortal legion of the Empire that was based around a system of cohort units. The manipular legion was based partially upon social class and partially upon age and military experience.[27] It therefore represents a theoretical compromise between the earlier class-based army and the class-free armies of later years. In practice, even slaves were at one time pressed into the army of the Republic out of necessity.[28] Normally a single legion was raised each year, but in 366 BC two legions were raised in a single year for the first time.[8]
Maniples were units of 120 men each drawn from a single infantry class. The maniples were small enough to permit tactical movement of individual infantry units on the battlefield within the framework of the greater army. The maniples were typically deployed into three discrete lines (Latin: triplex acies) based on the three heavy infantry types of
"the Romans ... habitually enroll four legions each year, each consisting of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great" |
Polybius, The Histories, 3.107 |
The second type, the principes, typically formed the second rank of soldiers back from the front of a battle line. They were heavy infantry soldiers armed and armoured as per the hastati. The triarii, who typically formed the third rank when the army was arrayed for battle, were the last remnant of hoplite-style troops in the Roman army. They were armed and armoured as per the principes, with the exception that they carried a pike rather than two pila.[30] A triarii maniple was divided into two formations each six men across by 10 men deep.[32] A manipular legion typically contained between 1,200 hastati, 1,200 principes and 600 triarii.[33] The three classes of unit may have retained some slight parallel to social divisions within Roman society, but at least officially the three lines were based upon age and experience rather than social class. Young, unproven men would serve as hastati, older men with some military experience as principes, and veteran troops of advanced age and experience as triarii.[34][35]
The heavy infantry of the maniples were supported by a number of light infantry (Latin:
The light infantry of 1,200 velites[29] consisted of unarmoured skirmishing troops drawn from the youngest and lower social classes.[35] They were armed with a sword and shield (90 cm (3 ft) diameter), as well as several light javelins, each with a 90 cm (3 ft) wooden shaft the diameter of a finger, with a c. 25 cm (10 in) narrow metal point.[30] Their numbers were swollen by the addition of allied light infantry and irregular rorarii.[citation needed]
The Roman levy of 403 BC was the first to be requested to campaign for longer than a single season,[36] and from this point on such a practice became gradually more common, if still not typical.[citation needed]
A small navy had operated at a fairly low level after the
Proletarianisation of the infantry (217–107 BC)
The extraordinary demands of the
During the 2nd century BC, Roman territory saw an overall decline in population,[40] partially due to the huge losses incurred during various wars. This was accompanied by severe social stresses and the greater collapse of the middle classes into lower classes of the census and the proletarii.[40] As a result, both the Roman society and its military became increasingly proletarianised. The Roman state was forced to arm its soldiers at the expense of the state, since many of the soldiers who made up its lower classes were now impoverished proletarii in all but name, and were too poor to afford their own equipment.[40]
The distinction between the heavy infantry types of hastati, principes and triarii began to blur, perhaps because the state was now assuming the responsibility of providing standard-issue equipment to all but the first class of troops, who alone were able to afford their own equipment.[40] By the time of Polybius, the triarii or their successors still represented a distinct heavy infantry type armed with a unique style of cuirass, but the hastati and principes had become indistinguishable.[40]
In addition, the shortage of available manpower led to a greater burden being placed upon its allies (socii) for the provision of allied troops.[41] Where accepted allies could not provide the required force types, the Romans were not averse during this period to hiring mercenaries to fight alongside the legions.[42]
Marian legion (107–27 BC)
Modern historiography has regularly cast Marius as abolishing the propertied militia and replacing it with landless soldiers motivated largely by pay. This belief emerges from the ancient literary sources, but rests on a relatively weak basis.[43]
Despite enrolling some three to five thousand volunteers during the
For much of the 20th century, historians held that the property qualification separating the five classes and the capite censi was reduced over the course of the second century to a nugatory level due to a shortage of manpower. The basis for that belief, however, was merely three undated Roman figures for the amount of property required to serve which would serve as evidence for reductions only if forced into a descending order.[48][49] Many scholars have also now abandoned the notion that Italy suffered in the second century BC any deficit of manpower which would have driven such putative reductions.[50][51][52]
Modern historians have also sometimes credited to Marius the abolition of Roman cavalry and light infantry and their replacement with auxilia. There is no direct evidence for this contention, which is driven largely by literary sources' silence on those branches after the 2nd century; continued inscriptional evidence attests both citizen cavalry and light infantry into the end of the republic.[53] The decline of Roman light infantry has been connected not to reform but cost. Because the logistical cost of supporting light infantry and heavy infantry was relatively similar, the Romans chose to deploy heavy infantry in extended and distant campaigns due to their greater combat effectiveness, especially when local levies could substitute for light infantry brought from Rome and Italy.[54]
The changes to the Roman army during the 1st century BC are now more attributed to the Social War and the civil wars from 49 to 31 BC.[55][56] The large-scale downsizing of Roman cavalry detachments likely emerged from the extension of citizenship to all of Italy. Because Italy's enfranchisement meant that Rome was now directly liable for the cavalry's upkeep rather than their local communities, Rome instead levied auxilia from allies who, by treaty, were responsible for their contingents' upkeep.[57]
Pay remained extremely low – only five asses per day – and irregular.[58] Moreover, although the surviving sources frequently characterise soldiers as "poor", these sources largely reflect the perspectives of the elite, by whom the vast majority of the population were considered "poor" and for whom poverty needed not entail actual landlessness. Many of the soldiers of the 1st century BC possessed modest lands.[47] Nor did the legions meaningfully professionalise: as, in general, both soldiers and commanders served only for short periods intending, respectively, to secure plunder or political advancement from military victory.[59]
After the Social War, the state also started to keep men under arms for longer periods to maintain available experienced manpower, and coupled this with longer terms for commanders, particularly Caesar and Pompey. Client armies emerged but not in the 100s BC but rather in the decades before Caesar's civil war, which broke out in 49 BC.[60]
The legions of the late Republic were, structurally, almost entirely heavy infantry. The legion's main sub-unit was called a
Each legion was normally partnered with an approximately equal number of allied (non-Roman) auxiliae troops.
However, "the most obvious deficiency" of the Roman army remained its shortage of cavalry, especially heavy cavalry;[66] even auxiliary troops were predominantly infantry. Luttwak argues that auxiliary forces largely consisted of Cretan archers, Balearic slingers and Numidian infantry, all of whom fought on foot.[67] As Rome's borders expanded and its adversaries changed from largely infantry-based to largely cavalry-based troops, the infantry-based Roman army began to find itself at a tactical disadvantage, particularly in the East.[citation needed]
After having declined in size following the subjugation of the Mediterranean, the Roman navy underwent short-term upgrading and revitalisation in the late Republic to meet several new demands. Under Caesar, an invasion fleet was assembled in the English Channel to allow the invasion of Britain; under Pompey, a large fleet was raised in the Mediterranean Sea to clear the sea of Cilician pirates. During the civil war that followed, as many as a thousand ships were either constructed or pressed into service from Greek cities.[37]
Non-citizen recruitment (49–27 BC)
By the time of
The army at the height of the Empire
Imperial legions and reformation of the auxilia (27 BC – 117 AD)
By the turn of the millennium, Emperor
The legions, which had been a mix of life professionals and civilian campaigners, was altered into a standing army of professionals only.[75] The actual structure of the cohort army remained much the same as in the late Republic, although around the 1st century AD the first cohort of each legion was increased in size to a total of 800 soldiers.[76][77] However, while the structure of the legions remained much the same, their make-up gradually changed. Whereas early Republican legions had been raised by a draft from eligible Roman citizens, imperial legions were recruited solely on a voluntary basis and from a much wider base of manpower. Likewise, whereas Republican legions had been recruited almost exclusively in Italy, early Imperial legions drew most of their recruits from Roman colonies in the provinces from 68 AD onwards. One estimate places the proportion of Italian troops at 65% under Augustus in c. 1 AD, falling to around 49% by the end of Nero's reign.[78]
Since the legions were officially open only to Roman citizens, Max Cary and Howard Hayes Scullard argue that at least in some provinces at this time "many provincials must have been recruited who lacked any genuine claim to Roman citizenship but received it unofficially on enlistment,"[79] a practice that was to increase in the 2nd century.[80] This is most likely in those provinces where the pool of Roman citizens was not large enough to fulfill the provincial army's recruitment needs. One possible example is Britain, where one estimate puts the citizen pool in the 1st century at only 50,000 out of a total provincial population of around two million.[81]
At the same time as the legions underwent these transformations, the auxilia were reorganized and a number of allied troops were formalised into standing units similar to legions. Rather than being raised re-actively when required, the process of raising auxiliary troops was carried out in advance of conflicts according to annual targets.[82] Whereas the internal organisation of the auxilia had previously been left up to their commanders, in the early empire they were organised into standardised units known as turmae (for cavalry alae) and centuriae (for infantry cohortes).[65] Although never becoming as standardised in their equipment as the legions,[83] and often retaining some national flavour, the size of the units at least was standardised to some degree. Cavalry were formed into either an ala quingenaria of 512 horsemen, or an ala millaria of 1,000 horsemen. Likewise, infantry auxilia could be formed into a cohors quingenaria of 500 men or a cohors millaria of 1,000 men. Mixed cavalry/infantry auxiliaries were typically formed with a larger proportion of foot than horse troops: the cohors equitata quingenaria consisted of 380 foot and 120 horsemen, and the cohors equitata millaria consisted of 760 foot and 240 horsemen.[63]
The vitality of the empire at this point was such that the use of native auxilia in the Roman army did not apparently barbarise the military as some scholars claim was to happen in the late empire.[84] On the contrary, those serving in the auxilia during this period frequently strove to Romanise themselves. They were granted Roman citizenship on retirement, granting them several social advantages, and their sons became eligible for service in the legions.[85]
As with the army, many non-Italians were recruited into the Roman Navy, partly because the Romans had never readily taken to the sea. It appears that the navy was considered to be slightly less prestigious than the auxilia but, like the auxilia, troops could gain citizenship on discharge upon retirement. In terms of structure, each ship was staffed by a group of men approximately equivalent to a century, with ten ships forming a naval squadron.[86]
Introduction of vexillationes (76–117 AD)
Through the final years of the 1st century AD, the legions remained the backbone of the Roman army, although the auxilia in fact outnumbered them by up to half as much again.
The army during the decline of the Empire
Barbarisation of the army (117–253 AD)
By the time of the emperor Hadrian the proportion of Italians in the legions had fallen to just ten percent[78] and provincial citizens now dominated. This low figure is probably a direct result of the changing needs of military staffing: a system of fixed border defences (Latin: limes) were established around the Empire's periphery under Hadrian, consolidating Trajan's territorial gains. These called for troops to be stationed permanently in the provinces, a prospect more attractive to locally raised rather than Italian troops.[78] The higher prestige and pay to be found in the Italian dominated Praetorian Guard must also have played a role. The majority of the troops in the legions at the start of the 3rd century AD were from the more Romanised (though non-Italian) provinces, especially Illyria.[93] As the century progressed, more and more barbarians (Latin: barbari) were permitted to settle inside of, and tasked with aiding in the defence of, Rome's borders.[94] As a result, greater numbers of barbarous and semi-barbarous peoples were gradually admitted to the army.[93]
However, whether this regionalisation of the legions was partnered by a drop in the professionalism of the troops is contested. Antonio Santosuosso argues that the strict discipline and high motivation of the days of Marius had lapsed,[95] but Andrew Alfoldi states that the Illyrian troops were both valiant and warlike,[93] and Tacitus described German recruits as being natural mercenaries (Latin: vivi ad arma nati).[96] It seems that discipline in the legions did slacken, with soldiers granted permission to live with wives outside of military lodgings and permitted to adopt a more lavish and comfortable lifestyle, in contrast to the strict military regimen of earlier years.[95] However, it is by no means certain that this led to any reduction in the effectiveness of the legions, due to the greater ferocity and stature of the barbari recruits. The flavour of the Roman military, however, was now dictated by the increasing number of regional recruits, leading to a partial barbarisation of Rome's military forces beginning in this period.[97] The barbarisation of the lower ranks was paralleled by a concurrent barbarisation of its command structure, with the Roman senators who had traditionally provided its commanders becoming entirely excluded from the army. By 235 AD the Emperor himself, the figurehead of the entire military, was a man born outside of Italy to non-Italian parents.[98]
"A young nobleman, strong of hand and quick of mind and far more intelligent than your average barbarian ... the ardour of his face and eyes showed the burning spirit within. He had fought on our side in previous campaigns and earned the right to become a Roman citizen; indeed, he was even elevated to the rank of Equestrian." |
Velleius Paterculus, Roman History, 2.108 |
The gradual inclusion of greater numbers of non-citizen troops into the military was taken a further step by the creation under Hadrian of a new type of force in addition to the legions and auxilia, known as
Successive crises (238–359 AD)
By the late Empire, enemy forces in both the East and West were "sufficiently mobile and sufficiently strong to pierce [the Roman] defensive perimeter on any selected axis of penetration";
Larger groups of barbari began to settle in Rome's territories around this time, and the troops they were contracted to provide to the Roman army were no longer organised as numeri but rather were the forerunners of the later rented native armies known as federated troops (Latin: foederati).[106][c] Though they served under Roman officers, the troops of these units were far more barbarised than the numeri, lacked Romanisation of either military structure or personal ideology, and were ineligible for Roman citizenship upon discharge.[106] These native troops were not permitted to fight in native war bands under their own leaders, unlike the later foederati; instead, these troops were split into small groups attached to other Roman units.[107] They existed therefore as a halfway house between numeri, who were encouraged to be Romanised, and the foederati, who raised officers from their own ranks and were almost entirely self-dependent.[citation needed]
Comitatenses and limitanei (284–395 AD)
A distinction between frontier guard troops and more mobile reserve forces had emerged with the use of certain troops to permanently man frontiers such as Hadrian's Wall in Britannia in the 2nd century AD. The competing demands of manned frontiers and strategic reserve forces had led to the division of the military into four types of troops by the early 4th century:
- The Constantine I, the cunei of cavalry, and auxilia of infantry, both usually around 500 men strong, were local provincial units under sector commanders.[114] According to Pat Southern and Karen Dixon, the legiones, auxilia, and cunei of the border armies were part of the limitanei, but higher-status than the older cohortes and alae which they had replaced.[115][113]
- The comitatenses and the palatini were central field armies, usually stationed in the interior or rear areas of the empire as a strategic reserve.[116] The permanent field armies of the palatini and comitatenses were expansions of the field escort of the emperors, which were larger than bodyguard units, becoming temporary field armies known as the sacer comitatus.[117] The palatini were "praesental" armies, central field armies under the direct command of the emperors, while the comitatenses, were usually the regional field armies, although units could be moved between the two forces.[118] The initial expansion of the emperor's escort units, although substantial, still did not form a large enough force to campaign independently until further expanded by Diocletian and Constantine I.[117]
- The emperor praetorian guard. The scholae were his personal guard, and were mainly equipped as cavalry. Vogt suggests that the scholae formed two small central reserves (Latin: scholae) held to the strategic rear even of the comitatenses, one each in the presence of the emperors of West and East respectively.[115]
Of the four troop types, the limitanei (border guards) were once considered to have been of the lowest quality,[119] consisting largely of peasant-soldiers that were both "grossly inferior" to the earlier legions and inferior also to their counterparts in the mobile field armies.[120] However, more recent work establishes that the limitanei were regular soldiers.[109][110][111]
While the limitanei were supposed to deal with policing actions and low-intensity incursions, the duty of responding to more serious incidents fell upon the regional or provincial troops of the reduced field reserves of the comitatenses. The countering of the very largest scale incursions on a strategic scale was the task of the mobile field troops, the palatini and comitatenses diverted to strengthen the field armies, and possibly accompanied by the emperor's scholae.[121] Both border and field armies consisted of a mix of infantry and cavalry units[122] although the weight of cavalry was, according to some authorities, greater in the mobile field armies.[115] Overall, approximately one quarter of the army consisted of cavalry troops[123] but their importance is uncertain. Older works such as the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica (1911) state that the Roman military of the late Empire was "marked by that predominance of the horseman which characterised the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages,"[1] but many more recent authors believe that the infantry remained predominant.[124]
There is some dispute about whether this new military structure was put into place under the Emperor Diocletian or Constantine since both reorganised the Roman Army in the late 3rd and early 4th centuries to some degree.[125] Both Diocletian and even his predecessor of thirty years Gallienus may already have controlled mobile strategic reserves to assist the empire's border forces;[126] either Diocletian or Constantine expanded this nascent force into permanent field armies.[127]
Recruitment from amongst Roman citizens had become greatly curtailed as a consequence of a declining population,
Although units described as legiones existed as late as the 5th century in both the border and field armies,[134] the legionary system was very different from that of the principate and early empire. Since the term legion continued to be used, it is unclear exactly when the structure and role of the legions changed. In the 3rd or 4th century, however, the legions' role as elite heavy infantry was substantially reduced[131][135] and may have evaporated entirely.[136] Instead, those "legions" that remained were no longer drawn exclusively (and perhaps hardly at all) from Roman citizens.[122] Either Diocletian[137] or Constantine reorganised the legions into smaller infantry units[122] who, according to some sources, were more lightly armoured than their forebears.[135] Their lighter armament may have been either because they "would not consent to wear the same weight of body armour as the legionaries of old"[138] or, as in at least one documented instance, because they were prohibited from wearing heavy armour by their general in order to increase their mobility.[139] 4th-century legions were at times only one sixth the size of early imperial legions, and they were armed with some combination of spears, bows, slings, darts and swords, reflecting a greater contemporary emphasis on ranged fighting.[139][136] The auxilia and numeri had also largely disappeared.[140] Constantine further increased the proportion of German troops in the regular army;[141] their cultural impact was so great that even legionaries began wearing German dress.[131] At the start of Diocletian's reign, the Roman army numbered about 390,000 men, but by the end of his reign he successfully increased the number to 581,000 men.[142]
Adoption of barbarian allies (358–395 AD)
By the late 4th century, the Empire had become chronically deficient in raising sufficient troops from amongst its own population.
In 376, a large band of
The size and composition of these allied forces remains in dispute. Santosuosso argues that foederati regiments consisted mostly of cavalry[145] that were raised both as a temporary levy for a specific campaign need and, in some cases, as a permanent addition to the army. Hugh Elton believes that the importance of foederati has been overstated in traditional accounts by historians such as A.H.M. Jones. Elton argues that the majority of soldiers were probably non-Italian Roman citizens,[e][146] while Santosuosso believes that the majority of troops were almost certainly non-citizen barbari.[147]
Collapse in the West and survival in the East (395–476 AD)
The non-federated mobile field army, known as the comitatenses, was eventually split into a number of smaller field armies: a central field army under the emperor's direct control, known as the comitatensis palatina or praesentalis, and several regional field armies.[29] Historians Santosuosso and Vogt agree that the latter gradually degraded into low-quality garrison units similar to the limitanei that they either supplemented or replaced.[108] By the 5th century, a significant portion of Western Rome's main military strength lay in rented barbarian mercenaries known as foederati.[148]
As the 5th century progressed, many of the Empire's original borders had been either wholly or partially denuded of troops to support the central field army.
"We received a terrible rumour about events in the West. They told us that Rome was under siege, and the only safety for its citizens was that which they could buy with gold, and when that had been stripped from them, they were besieged again, so that they lost not only their possessions, but also their lives. Our messenger gave the news in a faltering voice, and could hardly speak for sobbing. The city which had captured the world was now itself captured" |
Jerome, Letters, 127 |
As Roman troops were spread increasingly thin over its long border, the Empire's territory continued to dwindle in size as the population of the empire declined.
Simultaneously, barbarian troops in Rome's pay came to be "in a condition of almost perpetual turbulence and revolt"[152] from 409 onwards. In 476 these troops finally unseated the last emperor of the Western Roman Empire.[153] The Eastern Roman forces continued to defend the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire until its fall in 1453.[154]
The former Oxford University historian
Notes
- ^ The eleventh edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica calls Livy's numbers "clearly artificial and invented
- ^ This viewpoint is echoed in the Encyclopædia Britannica, eleventh edition, which argues that "Much of its strength lay in the same qualities which made the Puritan soldiers of Cromwell terrible—the excellent character of the common soldiers, the rigid discipline, the high training."
- ^ The word can mean both a federated people, and also the units of allied troops later supplied by those people.
- ^ Gibbon writes that due to "the abuse of Christianity ... the active virtues of society were discouraged; and the last remains of military spirit were buried in the cloister."
- ^ Elton argues from the proportion of Roman names to non-Roman names from 350 to 476.
Citations
- ^ a b Encyclopædia Britannica, Eleventh Edition (1911), The Roman Army
- ^ Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome, p. 18
- ^ Mommsen, The History of Rome, Volume 1, p. 40
- ^ Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, p. 14
- ^ Mommsen, The History of Rome, Volume 1, p. 22
- ^ Grant, The History of Rome, p. 22
* Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD, p. 69 - ^ Mommsen, The History of Rome, Volume 1, p. 20
- ^ a b c d Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD, p. 69
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD, p. 86
- ^ Mommsen, The History of Rome, Volume 1, p. 65
- ^ Livy 1998, Book 5, Ch. 33.
- ^ Pallottino, The Etruscans, p. 68
- ^ a b Connolly, Peter. Greece and Rome at War. p. 87.
- ^ a b c Livy 1998, Book 1, Ch. 42.
- ^ a b Livy 1998, Book 1, Ch. 43.
- ^ Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, p. 10
- ^ Gabba, Republican Rome, The Army And the Allies, p. 2
- ^ Grant, The History of Rome, p. 334
* Boak, A History of Rome, p. 454 - ^ Campbell, The Crisis of Empire, p. 126
* Boak, A History of Rome, p. 454 - ^ Vogt 1993, p. 158.
- ^ Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, p. 96.
- ^ a b Gabba, Republican Rome, The Army And the Allies, p. 5
- ^ Grant, The History of Rome, p. 24
- ^ Grant, The History of Rome, Faber and Faber, 1979 p. 54
- ^ "Rome, The Samnite Wars". Archived from the original on 2011-10-14. Retrieved 2009-05-06.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link) - ^ Sekunda, Early Roman Armies, p. 40
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 A.D., p. 87
- ^ a b c Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 10
- ^ a b c d Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 18
- ^ a b c Polybius, History, Book 6
- ^ Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army pp. 29-30.
- ^ From Maniple to Cohort, Strategy Page
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 40.
- ^ Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, pp. 126-127, 128, 129.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 27.
- ^ Livy 1998, Book 5, Ch. 1.
- ^ a b Webster 1969, p. 156.
- ^ Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, p. 2
- ^ a b Gabba, Republican Rome, The Army and The Allies, p. 7
- ^ a b c d e Gabba, Republican Rome, The Army and The Allies, p. 9
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 11
- ^ Webster 1969, p. 143.
- ^ Taylor 2023, p. 161.
- ^ Evans 1995, p. 92.
- ^ Taylor 2023, p. 160 ; Taylor 2019, p. 79 .
- ^ Rich 1983, p. 329 ; Gruen 1995, pp. xvii, 367 ; Evans 1995, p. 91 .
- ^ a b Rafferty 2021.
- ^ Cadiou 2018, pp. 52–53.
- ISBN 978-0-8078-2839-7. The figures of 11,000, 4,000, and 1,500 asses are reported in the sources; "nothing warrants the presumption that the figures are to be arranged in a descending sequence" however.
- ^ Cadiou 2018, pp. 42 n. 24, 49–50.
- ^ Cadiou 2018, p. 48 n. 64, also mentioning an alterative theory – given in Shochat 1980, pp. 62–64 – that reductions in property qualifications, if they happened, were driven not by a quantitative shortage of assidui but rather a shortage of assidui willing to serve.
- ^ Rich 1983, p. 316. "The view that the property qualification... was progressively reduced derives much of its plausibility from the fact that it fits well with received doctrine on Roman manpower... It would thus smack of circularity to use the supposed second century reduction in the property qualification as evidence for the shortage of assidui."
- S2CID 230543924.
- ^ Taylor 2019, p. 86.
- ^ Taylor 2023, p. 162 ; Gauthier 2020, p. 284. "I... instead look at the Social War, as well as the civil wars, as the periods of pivotal change".
- ^ Probst 2008. "The first act that revolutionised the Roman army was Sulla’s march on Rome in 88".
- ^ Gauthier 2020, p. 286.
- ^ Gruen 1995, p. 369. "Bare subsistence"..
- ^ Gruen 1995, p. xvii.
- ^ Taylor 2023, p. 162.
- ^ a b Luttwak 1976, p. 14.
- ^ Webster 1969, p. 116.
- ^ a b c d Luttwak 1976, p. 15.
- ^ Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, p. 27
- ^ a b Webster 1969, p. 146.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 43.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 44.
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 67
- ^ Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, p. 57
- ^ Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, p. 217.
- ^ Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, p. 71
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 A.D., p. 270
* Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army, p. 71 - ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 17.
- ^ Grant, A History of Rome, p. 209
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 91
- ^ Hassall 2000, p. 325.
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 91
- ^ a b c d Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 98
- ^ Cary & Scullard, A History of Rome, p. 338
- ^ Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chapter I, p. 36
- ^ Mattingly, An Imperial Possession – Britain in the Roman Empire, pp. 166–168
- ^ Webster 1969, p. 144.
- ^ Webster 1969, p. 152.
- ^ a b Webster 1969, p. 150.
- ^ Webster 1969, p. 147.
- ^ Webster 1969, p. 165.
- ^ Hassall 2000, p. 320.
- ^ a b Hassall 2000, p. 331.
- ^ Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chapter I, p. 36
- ^ a b c d Alfoldi 1956, p. 211.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 124.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, pp. 153–154.
- ^ a b c d e f Alfoldi 1956, p. 208.
- ^ Vogt 1993, p. 58.
- ^ a b Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 173
- ^ Tacitus, History, 4, 64
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 174
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 175
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 122.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 123.
- ^ a b c d Alfoldi 1956, p. 216.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 176.
- ^ Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 94
Santosuosso, Storming The Heavens, p. 190 - ^ Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, pp. 11–12
- ^ Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, 284–1081, p. 56.
- ^ a b Alfoldi 1956, p. 212.
- ^ Alfoldi 1956, p. 219.
- ^ a b c Vogt 1993, p. 178.
- ^ a b Treadgold 1995, p. 161.
- ^ a b Strobel 2011, p. 268.
- ^ a b Southern & Dixon, 1996, p. 57.
- ^ Treadgold 1995, pp. 97–98.
- ^ a b Southern & Dixon, 1996, p. 36.
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 173.
- ^ a b c Vogt 1993, p. 177.
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. p. 452
- ^ a b Luttwak, 1976, p. 187.
- ^ Luttwak, 1976, p. 191
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. p. 452
* Grant, A History of Rome, p. 333
* Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 188 - ^ Luttwak 1976, pp. 154 & 173.
- ^ Luttwak, 1976, pp. 187-188, 190.
- ^ a b c Cary & Scullard, A History of Rome, p. 534
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. p. 451
- ^ Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, A.D. 350–425, pp. 103, 105–106
* Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 44–59. - ^ Southern & Dixon, The Late Roman Army, pp. 15–38.
- ^ Campbell, The Army, p. 121
* Southern & Dixon, The Late Roman Army, pp. 11–17 - ^ Southern & Dixon, The Late Roman Army, pp. 15–20 & 37–38
- ^ Vogt 1993, p. 25.
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. p. 451
* Cary & Scullard, A History of Rome, p. 537 - ^ Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chapter XXXVIII, p. 622
* Grant, A History of Rome, p. 333
* Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 229 - ^ a b c Vogt 1993, p. 59.
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD, p. 451
- ^ Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Chapter VI, p. 188
- ^ Luttwak 1976, p. 171.
- ^ a b Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. p. 453
- ^ a b Luttwak 1976, p. 175.
- ^ Brian Campbell, The Crisis of Empire, p. 123
- ^ Cary & Scullard, A History of Rome, p. 535
- ^ a b Alfoldi 1956, p. 209.
- ^ Alfoldi 1956, p. 213.
- ^ Grant, A History of Rome, p. 310
- ^ Treadgold, A History of Byzantine State and Society, 19
- ^ a b Grant, The History of Rome, p. 334
- ^ Ammianus Marcellinus, Historiae, book 31, chapters 3–16.
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 189
- ^ Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, pp. 145–152.
- ^ Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 192
- ^ a b c Luttwak 1976, p. 188.
- ^ a b Salway. Roman Britain, 1981, p. 437
- ^ Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, 284–1081, pp. 43–59.
- ^ Boak, A History of Rome to 525 AD, p. 521
- ^ Grant, A History of Rome, p. 344
- ^ Vogt 1993, p. 250.
- ^ Runciman 1965.
- ^ Adrian Goldsworthy The Fall of the West: The Slow Death of the Roman Superpower, Great Britain, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, paperback edition by Orion Books Ltd, London, 2010. Published in the US as How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower.
Bibliography
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Further reading
- Boak, AER (1915). "The Roman Magistri in the Civil and Military Service of the Empire". JSTOR 310606.