Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

At independence on 30 June 1960, the army suffered from a dramatic deficit of trained leaders, particularly in the officer corps. This was because the Force Publique had always only been officered by Belgian or other expatriate whites. The Belgian Government made no effort to train Congolese commissioned officers until the very end of the colonial period, and in 1958, only 23 African cadets had been admitted even to the military secondary school.[13] The highest rank available to Congolese was adjutant, which only four soldiers achieved before independence.^[14][a] Though 14 Congolese cadets were enrolled in the Royal Military Academy in Brussels in May, they were not scheduled to graduate as second lieutenants until 1963.^[16] Ill-advised actions by Belgian officers led to an enlisted ranks' rebellion on 5 July 1960, which helped spark the Congo Crisis. Lieutenant General Émile Janssens, the Force Publique commander, wrote during a meeting of soldiers that 'Before independence=After Independence', pouring cold water on the soldiers' desires for an immediate raise in their status.^[13]

Historian Louis-François Vanderstraeten says that on the morning of 8 July 1960, following a night during which all control had been lost over the soldiers, numerous ministers arrived at Camp Leopold with the aim of calming the situation.

• that the defence portfolio not be given to the Prime Minister
• that the name Force Publique be changed to Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC)
• and that the commander-in-chief and chief of staff should not necessarily be Belgians

The "laborious" discussions which then followed were later retrospectively given the label of an "extraordinary ministerial council."

On 8–9 July 1960, the soldiers were invited to appoint black officers, and "command of the army passed securely into the hands of former sergeants," as the soldiers in general chose the most-educated and highest-ranked Congolese army soldiers as their new officers.[20] Most of the Belgian officers were retained as advisors to the new Congolese hierarchy, and calm returned to the two main garrisons at Leopoldville and Thysville.^[21] The Force Publique was renamed the Armée nationale congolaise (ANC),^[22] or Congolese National Armed Forces. However, in Katanga Belgian officers resisted the Africanisation of the army.

There was a Force Publique mutiny at Camp Massart, in Elizabethville, on 9 July 1960;

On 14 July 1960, in response to requests by Prime Minister Lumumba, the UN Security Council adopted

A total of 3,500 troops for ONUC had arrived in the Congo by 20 July 1960.^[28] The first contingent of Belgian forces had left Leopoldville on 16 July upon the arrival of the United Nations troops. Following assurances that contingents of the Force would arrive in sufficient numbers, the Belgian authorities agreed to withdraw all their forces from the Leopoldville area by 23 July. The last Belgian troops left the country by 23 July, as United Nations forces continued to deploy throughout the Congo. The build of ONUC continued, its strength increasing to over 8,000 by 25 July and to over 11,000 by 31 July 1960. A basic agreement between the United Nations and the Congolese Government on the operation of the Force was agreed by 27 July. On 9 August, Albert Kalonji proclaimed the independence of South Kasai.

During the crucial period of July–August 1960, Mobutu built up "his" national army by channeling foreign aid to units loyal to him, by exiling unreliable units to remote areas, and by absorbing or dispersing rival armies. He tied individual officers to him by controlling their promotion and the flow of money for payrolls. Researchers working from the 1990s have concluded that money was directly funnelled to the army by the U.S.

In August 1960, due to the rejection of requests for UN assistance to suppress the South Kasai and Katanga revolts, Lumumba's government decided to request Soviet help. De Witte writes that "Leopoldville asked the Soviet Union for planes, lorries, arms, and equipment...Shortly afterwards, on 22 or 23 August, about 1,000 soldiers left for Kasai."^[32] On 26–27 August, the ANC seized Bakwanga, Albert Kalonji's capital in South Kasai, without serious resistance and, according to de Witte, "in the next two days it temporarily put an end to the secession of Kasai."^[32]

At this point, the Library of Congress Country Study for the Congo says, that on 5 September 1960:^[33] "Kasavubu also appointed Mobutu as head of the ANC.

In early January 1961, ANC units loyal to Lumumba invaded northern Katanga to support a revolt of Baluba tribesmen against Tshombe's secessionist regime.[34] On 23 January 1961, Kasa-Vubu promoted Mobutu to major-general; De Witte argues that this was a political move, "aimed to strengthen the army, the president's sole support, and Mobutu's position within the army."^[35]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 161 of 21 February 1961, called for the withdrawal of Belgian officers from command positions in the ANC, and the training of new Congolese officers with UN help. ONUC made a number of attempts to retrain the ANC from August 1960 to June 1963, often been set back by political changes.^[36] By March 1963 however, after the visit of Colonel Michael Greene of the United States Army, and the resulting "Greene Plan", the pattern of bilaterally agreed military assistance to various Congolese military components, instead of a single unified effort, was already taking shape.^[37]

In early 1964, a new crisis broke out as Congolese rebels calling themselves "

As a general rule, since that time, the armed forces have not intervened in politics as a body, rather being tossed and turned as ambitious men have shaken the country. In reality, the larger problem has been the misuse and sometimes abuse of the military and police by political and ethnic leaders.[41]

On 16 May 1968 a parachute brigade of two regiments (each of three battalions) was formed which eventually was to grow in size to a full division.^[42]

Zaire 1971–1997

The country was renamed Zaire in 1971 and the army was consequently designated the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ). In 1971 the army's force consisted of the 1st Groupement at Kananga, with one guard battalion, two infantry battalions, and a gendarmerie battalion attached, and the 2nd Groupement (Kinshasa), the 3rd Groupement (Kisangani), the 4th Groupement (Lubumbashi), the 5th Groupement (Bukavu), the 6th Groupement (Mbandaka), and the 7th Groupement (Boma). Each was about the size of a brigade, and commanded by aging generals who have had no military training, and often not much positive experience, since they were NCOs in the Belgian Force Publique.'^[43] By the late 1970s the number of groupements reached nine, one per administrative region.^[44] The parachute division (Division des Troupes Aéroportées Renforcées de Choc, DITRAC) operated semi-independently from the rest of the army.

In July 1972 a number of the aging generals commanding the groupements were retired.

On 11 June 1975 several military officers were arrested in what became known as the coup monté et manqué. Amongst those arrested were Générals Daniel Katsuva wa Katsuvira, Land Forces Chief of Staff, Utshudi Wembolenga, Commandant of the 2nd Military Region at Kalemie; Fallu Sumbu, Military Attaché of Zaïre in Washington, Colonel Mudiayi wa Mudiayi, the military attaché of Zaïre in Paris, the military attache in Brussels, a paracommando battalion commander, and several others.^[48] The regime alleged these officers and others (including Mobutu's secrétaire particulier) had plotted the assassination of Mobutu, high treason, and disclosure of military secrets, among other offences. The alleged coup was investigated by a revolutionary commission headed by Boyenge Mosambay Singa, at that time head of the Gendarmerie. Writing in 1988, Michael Schatzberg said the full details of the coup had yet to emerge.^[49] Meitho, writing many years later, says the officers were accused of trying to raise Mobutu's secrétaire particulier, Colonel Omba Pene Djunga, from Kasai, to power.^[50]

In late 1975, Mobutu, in a bid to install a pro-

Mobutu's support for the FNLA policy backfired when the MPLA won in Angola. The MPLA, then, acting ostensibly at least as the

The poor performance of Zaire's military during Shaba I gave evidence of chronic weaknesses.^[33] One problem was that some of the Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for extended periods. Senior officers often kept the money intended for the soldiers, typifying a generally disreputable and inept senior leadership in the FAZ. As a result, many soldiers simply deserted rather than fight. Others stayed with their units but were ineffective. During the months following the Shaba invasion, Mobutu sought solutions to the military problems that had contributed to the army's dismal performance. He implemented sweeping reforms of the command structure, including wholesale firings of high-ranking officers. He merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff and appointed himself chief of staff again, in addition to the positions of minister of defence and supreme commander that he already held. He also redeployed his forces throughout the country instead of keeping them close to Kinshasa, as had previously been the case. The Kamanyola Division, at the time considered the army's best formation, and considered the president's own, was assigned permanently to Shaba. In addition to these changes, the army's strength was reduced by 25 percent. Also, Zaire's allies provided a large influx of military equipment, and Belgian, French, and American advisers assisted in rebuilding and retraining the force.

Despite these improvements, a second invasion by the former Katangan gendarmerie, known as

In January 1979 General de Division Mosambaye Singa Boyenge was named as both military region commander and Region Commissioner for Shaba.^[58]

In 1984, a militarised police force, the

Thomas Turner wrote in the mid-1990s that "[m]ajor acts of violence, such as the killings that followed the "Kasongo uprising" in Bandundu Region in 1978, the killings of diamond miners in Kasai-Oriental Region in 1979, and, more recently, the massacre of students in Lubumbashi in 1990, continued to intimidate the population."[60]

The authors of the

"The maintenance status of equipment in the inventory has traditionally varied, depending on a unit's priority and the presence or absence of foreign advisers and technicians.^[33] A considerable portion of military equipment is not operational, primarily as a result of shortages of spare parts, poor maintenance, and theft. For example, the tanks of the 1st Armoured Brigade often have a nonoperational rate approaching 70 to 80 percent. After a visit by a Chinese technical team in 1985, most of the tanks operated, but such an improved status generally has not lasted long beyond the departure of the visiting team. Several factors complicate maintenance in Zairian units. Maintenance personnel often lack the training necessary to maintain modern military equipment. Moreover, the wide variety of military equipment and the staggering array of spare parts necessary to maintain it not only clog the logistic network but also are expensive.

The most important factor that negatively affects maintenance is the low and irregular pay that soldiers receive, resulting in the theft and sale of spare parts and even basic equipment to supplement their meager salaries. When not stealing spare parts and equipment, maintenance personnel often spend the better part of their duty day looking for other ways to profit. American maintenance teams working in Zaire found that providing a free lunch to the work force was a good, sometimes the only, technique to motivate personnel to work at least half of the duty day.

The army's logistics corps [was tasked].. to provide logistic support and conduct direct, indirect, and depot-level maintenance for the FAZ. But because of Zaire's lack of emphasis on maintenance and logistics, a lack of funding, and inadequate training, the corps is understaffed, underequipped, and generally unable to accomplish its mission. It is organised into three battalions assigned to Mbandaka, Kisangani, and Kamina, but only the battalion at Kamina is adequately staffed; the others are little more than skeleton" units.

The poor state of discipline of the Congolese forces became apparent again in 1990. Foreign military assistance to Zaire ceased following the end of the Cold War and Mobutu deliberately allowed the military's condition to deteriorate so that it did not threaten his hold on power.^[63] Protesting low wages and lack of pay, paratroopers began looting Kinshasa in September 1991 and were only stopped after intervention by French ('Operation Baumier') and Belgian ('Operation Blue Beam')^[64] forces.

In 1993, according to the

This superficially impressive list of units overstates the actual capability of the armed forces at the time. Apart from privileged formations such as the Presidential Division and the 31st Airborne Brigade, most units were poorly trained, divided and so badly paid that they regularly resorted to looting. What operational abilities the armed forces had were gradually destroyed by politicisation of the forces, tribalisation, and division of the forces, included purges of suspectedly disloyal groups, intended to allow Mobutu to divide and rule.[65] All this occurred against the background of increasing deterioration of state structures under the kleptocratic Mobutu regime.

Mobutu's overthrow and after

Much of the origins of the recent conflict in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo stems from the turmoil following the

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was not successful in ending the war, and fighting resumed in September 1999. The FAC's performance continued to be poor and both the major offensives the Government launched in 2000 ended in costly defeats.[81] President Kabila's mismanagement was an important factor behind the FAC's poor performance, with soldiers frequently going unpaid and unfed while the Government purchased advanced weaponry which could not be operated or maintained. The defeats in 2000 are believed to have been the cause of President Kabila's assassination in January 2001.^[80] Following the assassination, Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency and was eventually successful in negotiating an end to the war in 2002–2003.

The December 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement devoted Chapter VII to the armed forces.^[82] It stipulated that the armed forces chief of staff, and the chiefs of the army, air force, and navy were not to come from the same warring faction. The new "national, restructured and integrated" army would be made up from Kabila's government forces (the FAC), the RCD, and the MLC. Also stipulated in VII(b) was that the RCD-N, RCD-ML, and the Mai-Mai would become part of the new armed forces. An intermediate mechanism for physical identification of the soldiers, and their origin, date of enrolment, and unit was also called for (VII(c)). It also provided for the creation of a Conseil Superieur de la Defense (Superior Defence Council) which would declare states of siege or war and give advice on security sector reform, disarmament/demobilization, and national defence policy.

A decision on which factions were to name chiefs of staff and military regional commanders was announced on 19 August 2003 as the first move in military reform, superimposed on top of the various groups of fighters, government and former rebels.

On 24 January 2004, a decree created the Structure Militaire d'Intégration (SMI, Military Integration Structure). Together with the SMI, CONADER also was designated to manage the combined tronc commun DDR element and military reform programme. The first post-Sun City military law appears to have been passed on 12 November 2004, which formally created the new national Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Included in this law was article 45, which recognised the incorporation of a number of armed groups into the FARDC, including the former government army Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), ex-FAZ personnel also known as former President Mobutu's 'les tigres', the RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RCD-N, MLC, the Mai-Mai, as well as other government-determined military and paramilitary groups.

Turner writes that the two most prominent opponents of military integration (brassage) were Colonel

There was another major personnel reshuffle on 12 June 2007. FARDC chief General Kisempia Sungilanga Lombe was replaced with General Dieudonne Kayembe Mbandankulu.[87] General Gabriel Amisi Kumba retained his post as Land Forces commander. John Numbi, a trusted member of Kabila's inner circle, was shifted from air force commander to Police Inspector General. U.S. diplomats reported that the former Naval Forces Commander Maj. General Amuli Bahigua (ex-MLC) became the FARDC's Chief of Operations; former FARDC Intelligence Chief General Didier Etumba (ex-FAC) was promoted to vice admiral and appointed Commander of Naval Forces; Maj. General Rigobert Massamba (ex-FAC), a former commander of the Kitona air base, was appointed as Air Forces Commander; and Brig. General Jean-Claude Kifwa, commander of the Republican Guard, was appointed as a regional military commander.^[88]

Due to significant delays in the DDR and integration process, of the eighteen brigades, only seventeen have been declared operational, over two and a half years after the initial target date. Responding to the situation, the Congolese Minister of Defence presented a new defence reform master plan to the international community in February 2008. Essentially the three force tiers all had their readiness dates pushed back: the first, territorial forces, to 2008–12, the mobile force to 2008–10, and the main defence force to 2015.

Much of the east of the country remains insecure, however. In the far northeast this is due primarily to the Ituri conflict. In the area around Lake Kivu, primarily in North Kivu, fighting continues among the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and between the government FARDC and Laurent Nkunda's troops, with all groups greatly exacerbating the issues of internal refugees in the area of Goma, the consequent food shortages, and loss of infrastructure from the years of conflict.^[89] In 2009, several United Nations officials stated that the army is a major problem, largely due to corruption that results in food and pay meant for soldiers being diverted and a military structure top-heavy with colonels, many of whom are former warlords.^[90] In a 2009 report itemizing FARDC abuses, Human Rights Watch urged the UN to stop supporting government offensives against eastern rebels until the abuses ceased.^[91]

Caty Clement wrote in 2009:^[92]

"One of the most notable [FARDC corruption] schemes was known as 'Opération Retour' (Operation Return). Senior officers ordered the soldiers' pay to be sent from Kinshasa to the commanders in the field, who took their cut and returned the remainder to their commander in Kinshasa instead of paying the soldiers. To ensure that foot soldiers would be paid their due, in late 2005, EUSEC suggested separating the chain of command from the chain of payment. The former remained within Congolese hands, while the EU mission delivered salaries directly to the newly 'integrated' brigades. Although efficient in the short term, this solution raises the question of sustainability and ownership in the long term. Once soldiers' pay could no longer be siphoned off via 'Opération Retour', however, two other budgetary lines, the 'fonds de ménage' and logistical support to the brigades, were soon diverted."

In 2010, thirty FARDC officers were given scholarships to study in Russian military academies. This is part of a greater effort by Russia to help improve the FARDC. A new military attaché and other advisers from Russia visited the DRC.^[93]

On 22 November 2012, Gabriel Amisi Kumba was suspended from his position in the Forces Terrestres by president Joseph Kabila due to an inquiry into his alleged role in the sale of arms to various rebel groups in the eastern part of the country, which may have implicated the rebel group M23.^[94] In December 2012 it was reported that members of Army units in the north east of the country are often not paid due to corruption, and these units rarely counter attacks made against villages by the Lord's Resistance Army.^[95]

The FARDC deployed 850 soldiers and 150 PNC police officers as part of an international force in the

In July 2014, the Congolese army carried out a joint operation with UN troops in the Masisi and Walikale territories of the North Kivu province. In the process, they liberated over 20 villages and a mine from the control of two rebel groups, the Mai Mai Cheka and the Alliance for the Sovereign and Patriotic Congo.^[97]

The UN published a report in October 2017 announcing that the FARDC no longer employed child soldiers but was still listed under militaries that committed sexual violations against children.^[98]

Troops operating with MONUSCO in North Kivu were attacked by likely rebels from the Allied Democratic Forces on 8 December 2017. After a protracted firefight the troops suffered 5 dead along with 14 dead among the UN force.^[99]

Structure

The President Félix Tshisekedi is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Minister of Defence, formally Ministers of Defence and Veterans (Ancien Combattants) is Crispin Atama Tabe, who succeeded former minister Aimé Ngoy Mukena.

The Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp in the Kinshasa suburb of Ngaliema hosts the defence department and the Chiefs of Staff central command headquarters of the FARDC. Jane's data from 2002 appears inaccurate; there is at least one ammunition plant in Katanga.^[100]

Below the Chief of Staff, the current organisation of the FARDC is not fully clear. There is known to be a Military Intelligence branch – Service du Renseignement militaire (SRM), the former

The available information on armed forces' Chiefs of Staff is incomplete and sometimes contradictory. In addition to armed forces chiefs of staff, in 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Malila was listed as Army Chief of Staff.^[105]

Command structure in January 2005

Virtually all officers have now changed positions, but this list gives an outline of the structure in January 2005.^[106] Despite the planned subdivision of the country into more numerous provinces, the actual splitting of the former provinces has not taken place.

• FARDC chief of staff: Major General Sungilanga Kisempia (PPRD)
• FARDC land forces chief of staff: General Sylvain Buki (RCD-G).^[107] Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba appears to have been appointed to the position in August 2006, and retained this position during the personnel reshuffle of 12 June 2007. In November 2012 he was succeeded by François Olenga.^[108]
• FARDC navy chief of staff: General Major Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa (MLC) (Commander of the Kimia II operation in 2009)^[109]
• FARDC air force chief of staff: Brigadier General Jean Bitanihirwa Kamara (MLC). Military training at the Ecole de formation d'officiers (EFO), Kananga, and other courses while in the FAZ. Brigade commander in the MLC, then named in August 2003 "chef d'etat-major en second" of the FARDC air force.^[110]
• 1st Military Region/
  Bandundu: Brigadier General Moustapha Mukiza (MLC)^[111]
• 2nd Military Region/
  Bas-Congo
  : Unknown. General Jean Mankoma 2009.
• 3rd Military Region/
  Equateur
  : Brigadier-General Mulubi Bin Muhemedi (PPRD)
• 4th Military Region/Kasai-Occidental: Brigadier-General Sindani Kasereka (RCD-K/ML)
• 5th Military Region/
  Kasai Oriental
  : General Rwabisira Obeid (RCD)
• 6th Military Region/Katanga: Brigadier-General Nzambe Alengbia (MLC) – 62nd, 63rd, and 67th Brigades in Katanga have committed numerous acts of sexual violence against women.^[112]
• 7th Military Region/Maniema: Brigadier-General Widi Mbulu Divioka (RCD-N)
• 8th Military Region/North Kivu: General Gabriel Amisi Kumba (RCD). General Amisi, a.k.a. "Tango Fort" now appears to be Chief of Staff of the Land Forces. Brig. Gen. Vainqueur Mayala was Commander 8th MR in September 2008^[113]
• 9th Military Region/
  Province Orientale
  : Major-General Bulenda Padiri (Mayi–Mayi)
• 10th Military Region/South Kivu: Major Mbuja Mabe (PPRD). General Pacifique Masunzu, in 2010. Region included 112th Brigade on Minembwe plateuxes. This grouping was "an almost exclusively Banyamulenge brigade under the direct command of the 10th Military Region, [which] consider[ed] General Masunzu as its leader."^[114]

Updates to command structure in 2014

In September 2014, President Kabila reshuffled the command structure and in addition to military regions created three new 'defence zones' which would be subordinated directly to the general staff. The defence zones essentially created a new layer between the general staff and the provincial commanders. The military regions themselves were reorganised and do not correspond with the ones that existed prior to the reshuffle.^[115][116] New commanders of branches were also appointed:^[117] A Congolese military analyst based in Brussels, Jean-Jacques Wondo, provided an outline of the updated command structure of the FARDC following the shake up of the high command:^{[118][119][120]}

• Chief of General Staff: Army Gen. Didier Etumba
• Deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Lt. Gen. Bayiba Dieudonné Amuli
• Deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen.
  Celestin Mbala Munsense
• Chief of operations: Maj. Gen. Prosper Nabiola
• Chief of intelligence: Brig. Gen. Tage Tage
• Chief of administration: Constantin Claude Ilunga Kabangu
• Chief of logistics: Brig. Gen. Lutuna Charles Shabani
• Land Forces Chief of Staff: Gen. Dieudonné Banze
• Land Forces deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Maj. Gen. Kiama Vainqueur Mayala
• Land Forces deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. Muyumb Obed Wibatira
• Navy Chief of Staff: Vice Adm. Rombault Mbuayama
• Navy deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Rear Adm. Jean-Marie Valentin Linguma Mata Linguma (Vice Adm. from 2018)^[121]
• Navy deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Rear Adm. Bruno Mayanga Muena
• Air Force Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen.
  Numbi Ngoie (Maj. Gen. from 2018)^[121]
• Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Brig. Gen. Maurice René Diasuka Diakiyana (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[121]
• Air Force deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Brig. Gen. Jean-Paul Nganguele Mutali (Maj. Gen. from 2018)^[121]

Regional commanders:

• 1st Defence Zone (Bas Congo, Bandundu, Equatuer, and Kinshasa): Brig. Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba
  • 11th Military Region (Bandundu Province): Brig Gen. Dieudonné Kiamata Mutupeke
  • 12th Military Region (Bas-Congo Province): Brig Gen. Jonas Padiri Muhizi (Maj. Gen. from 2018)^[121]
  • 13th Military Region (Equatuer Province): Brig. Gen. Luboya Kashama Johnny (Maj. Gen. from 2018)^[121]
  • 14th Military Region (Kinshasa): Brig. Gen. Camille Bombele Luwala
• 2nd Defence Zone (Kasai and Katanga): Maj. Gen. Jean Claude Kifwa
  • 21st Military Region (Kasai-Oriental and Kasai Occidental Provinces): Brig. Gen. Fall Jikabwe
  • 22nd Military Region (Katanga Province): Brig. Gen. Philémon Yav (Maj. Gen. from 2018)^[121]
• 3rd Defence Zone (Kivu, Maneima, and Katanga): Maj. Gen. Leon Mush ale Tsipamba
  • 31st Military Region (
    Bas-Uele and Tshopo
    Districts): Brig. Gen. Bertin Baseka Kamangala
  • 32nd Military Region (
    Haut-Uele and Ituri
    Districts): Brig. Gen. Jean-Pierre Bongwangela
  • 33rd Military Region (Maneima and South Kivu Provinces): Brig. Gen. Gaetan Kakudji Bobo
  • 34th Military Region (North Kivu Province): Maj. Gen. Emmanuel Lombe

The following changes were announced in July 2018.[121]

• Chief of the General Staff: Lt. Gen.
  Celestin Mbala Munsense (Army Gen. from 2019)^[122]
• Deputy Chief of Staff for operations and intelligence: Lt. Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba
• Deputy Chief of Staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. Jean-Pierre Bongwangela
• Chief of operations: Maj. Gen. Daniel Kashale
• Chief of intelligence: Maj. Gen. Delphin Kahimbi Kasabwe
• Chief of administration: Maj. Gen. Jean-Luc Yav
• Chief of logistics: Brig. Gen. Kalala Kilumba

Land forces

Circa 2008–09, the land forces were made up of about 14 integrated

It appears that about the same time that Presidential Decree 03/042 of 18 December 2003 established the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), "..all ex-combatants were officially declared as FARDC soldiers and the then FARDC brigades [were to] rest deployed until the order to leave for brassage" [the military integration process].[124]

The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the military integration process as its first of three stages.

In February 2008, then Defence Minister Chikez Diemu described the reform plan at the time as:[126]

"The short term, 2008–2010, will see the setting in place of a Rapid Reaction Force; the medium term, 2008–2015, with a Covering Force; and finally the long term, 2015–2020, with a Principal Defence Force." Diemu added that the reform plan rests on a programme of synergy based on the four pillars of dissuasion, production, reconstruction and excellence. "The Rapid Reaction Force is expected to focus on dissuasion, through a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions, capable of aiding MONUC to secure the east of the country and to realise constitutional missions."

Amid the other difficulties in building new armed forces for the DRC, in early 2007 the integration and training process was distorted as the DRC government under Kabila attempted to use it to gain more control over the dissident general

Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimes[129] and these human rights violations are "regularly" committed by both officers and members of the rank and file. Members of the Army also often strike deals to gain access to resources with the militias they are meant to be fighting.^[130]

The various brigades and other formations and units number at least 100,000 troops.^[131] The status of these brigades has been described as "pretty chaotic."^[132] A 2007 disarmament and repatriation study said "army units that have not yet gone through the process of brassage are usually much smaller than what they ought to be. Some non-integrated brigades have only 500 men (and are thus nothing more than a small battalion) whereas some battalions may not even have the size of a normal company (over a 100 men)."^[133]

A number of outside donor countries are also carrying out separate training programmes for various parts of the Forces Terrestres (Land Forces). The People's Republic of China has trained Congolese troops at

Attempting to list the equipment available to the DRC's land forces is difficult; most figures are unreliable estimates based on known items delivered in the past.^[137] The figures below are from the IISS Military Balance 2014.^[138] Much of the Army's equipment is non-operational due to insufficient maintenance—in 2002 only 20 percent of the Army's armoured vehicles were estimated as being serviceable.^[139]

• T 72
  . Thirty T-55s and 100 T-72 were listed in 2007, thus little new information has reached the IISS in the intervening seven years. In 2022 the IISS listed the 12-17 Type 59s, marking them as often unserviceable; the 32 T-55s; 100 T-72s, but marking them as T-72AVs, and, in addition, 25 T-64BV-1s (page 465).
• Light tanks: 10
  Type 62
  (serviceability in doubt). "40+" Type 62s were listed by the Military Balance in 2007. In 2022 the IISS listed 10 PT-76s and 30 Type 62s (page 465).
• Reconnaissance vehicles: Up to 17
  AML-90
  armoured cars, 19 EE-9 Cascavel; 2 RAM-V-2. In 2022 the IISS listed "up to 52" reconnaissance vehicles, including the "up to 17" AML-60s; and unchanged numbers of AML-90s, the EE-9s, and the two RAM-V-2s (page 465).
• Infantry Fighting Vehicles: 20 BMP-1
  (number reported unchanged since 2007). The same figure of BMP-1s was listed in 2022 (page 465).
• Armoured Personnel Carriers: IISS reports tracked vehicles include 3 BTR-50, 6 MT-LB, wheeled vehicles including 30-70 BTR-60; 58 Panhard M3 (serviceability in doubt), 7 TH 390 Fahd
  . Same unchanged figures were listed in 2022 (page 465)
• Type 81
  ; 528+ mortars, 81 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm, 120 mm.

In addition to these 2014 figures, in March 2010, it was reported that the DRC's land forces had ordered US$80 million worth of military equipment from Ukraine which included 20 T-72 main battle tanks, 100 trucks and various small arms.^[140] Tanks have been used in the Kivus in the 2005–09 period.

In February 2014, Ukraine revealed that it had achieved the first export order for the T-64 tank to the DRC Land Forces for 50 T-64BV-1s.^[141]

In June 2015 it was reported that Georgia had sold 12 of its Didgori-2 to the DRC for $4 million. The vehicles were specifically designed for reconnaissance and special operations. Two of the vehicles are a recently developed conversion to serve for medical field evacuation.^[142][143]

The United Nations confirmed in 2011, both from sources in the Congolese military and from officials of the Commission nationale de contrôle des armes légères et de petit calibre et de réduction de la violence armée, that the ammunition plant called Afridex in Likasi, Katanga Province, manufactures ammunition for small arms and light weapons.^[5]

Republican Guard

In addition to the other land forces, President Joseph Kabila also has a Republican Guard presidential force (Garde Républicaine or GR), formerly known as the Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). FARDC military officials state that the Garde Républicaine is not the responsibility of FARDC, but of the Head of State.^[144] Apart from Article 140 of the Law on the Army and Defence, no legal stipulation on the DRC's Armed Forces makes provision for the GR as a distinct unit within the national army. In February 2005 President Joseph Kabila passed a decree which appointed the GR's commanding officer and "repealed any previous provisions contrary" to that decree. The GR, more than 10,000 strong (the ICG said 10,000 to 15,000 in January 2007), has better working conditions and is paid regularly, but still commits rapes and robberies in the vicinity of its bases.

In an effort to extend his personal control across the country, Joseph Kabila has deployed the GR at key airports, ostensibly in preparation for an impending presidential visit.

The GR is also supposed to undergo the integration process, but in January 2007, only one battalion had been announced as having been integrated. Formed at a brassage centre in the Kinshasa suburb of Kibomango, the battalion included 800 men, half from the former GSSP and half from the MLC and RCD Goma.[144]

Up until June 2016, the GR comprised three brigades, the 10th Brigade at Camp Tshatshi and the 11th at Camp Kimbembe, both in Kinshasa, and the 13th Brigade at Camp Simi Simi in Kisangani.^[146] It was reorganised on the basis of eight fighting regiments, the 14th Security and Honor Regiment, an artillery regiment, and a command brigade/regiment from that time.

Other forces active in the country

There are currently large numbers of United Nations troops stationed in the DRC. The

Finally there is a government paramilitary force, created in 1997 under President Laurent Kabila. The National Service is tasked with providing the army with food and with training the youth in a range of reconstruction and developmental activities.[151] There is not much further information available, and no internet-accessible source details the relationship of the National Service to other armed forces bodies; it is not listed in the constitution. President Kabila, in one of the few comments available, says National Service will provide a gainful activity for street children. Obligatory civil service administered through the armed forces was also proposed under the Mobutu regime during the "radicalisation" programme of December 1974 – January 1975; the FAZ was opposed to the measure and the plan "took several months to die."^[152]

Air Force

All military aircraft in the DRC are operated by the Air Force. In 2007, Jane's World Air Forces stated that the Air Force had an estimated strength of 1,800 personnel and is organised into two

Like the other services, the Congolese Air Force is not capable of carrying out its responsibilities. Few of the Air Force's aircraft are currently flyable or capable of being restored to service and it is unclear whether the Air Force is capable of maintaining even unsophisticated aircraft. Moreover, Jane's stated that the Air Force's Ecole de Pilotage is 'in near total disarray' though Belgium has offered to restart the Air Force's pilot training program.[154]

In 2018 the IISS estimated that the Air Force numbered 2250 (p457); the 2020 edition carried the same number, unchanged.

The IISS Military Balance 2021 said the Air Force had four Su-25s; four transport aircraft, including 2 B727s; 7 Mil Mi-24s; and three transport helicopters, with a strength of 2,550 (p.461).

Navy

Before the downfall of Mobutu, a small navy operated on the Congo River. One of its installations was at the village of N'dangi near the presidential residence in Gbadolite. The port at N'dangi was the base for several patrol boats, helicopters and the presidential yacht.^[155] The 2002 edition of Jane's Sentinel described the Navy as being "in a state of near total disarray" and stated that it did not conduct any training or have operating procedures.^[156] The Navy shares the same discipline problems as the other services. It was initially placed under command of the MLC when the transition began, so the current situation is uncertain.

The 2007 edition of

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Further reading

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• Baaz, Maria E. and Stern, Maria (2013), "Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives: Negotiating Identity among Women Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)", Armed Forces & Society, 39, no. 4.
• Charlier, Thierry, "Défilé militaire à Kinshasa", in Raids magazine, no. 294, November 2010, pp. 46–47 (
  ISSN 0769-4814
  )
• Emizet, K. M. F., "Explaining the rise and fall of military regimes: civil-military relations in the Congo," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 2000
• Human Rights Watch, 'Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone: Sexual violence and military reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,' 16 July 2009
• Lefever, Ernest W. Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
• Lemarchand, René,The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 226–228. Concise general description of the FAZ in the 1990s.
• Lemarchand, René, "Forecasting the Future of the Military in Former Belgian Africa," in Catherine M. Kelleher, ed., Political Military Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills, California: 1974), pp. 87–104
• Malan, Mark, 'U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement,' Refugees International, 2008
• McDonald, Gordon C. et al., Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa), Washington. Supt. of Docs., U.S. Government Print. Off. 1971. DA Pam 550–67.
• Meitho, Kisukula Abeli, 'La desintegration de l'armée congolaise de Mobutu a Kabila', L'Harmattan, Paris/Montreal, 2001,
  ISBN 2-7384-8693-2
• Meitho, Kisukula Abeli "Les armées du Congo-Zaire, un frein au developpement"
• Mockler, Anthony, The New Mercenaries, Corgi Books, 1985,
  ISBN 0-552-12558-X
  – covers mercenary units titularly part of the Armée National Congolaise in the 1960s
• Stephen Rookes, "Ripe for Rebellion: Political and Military Insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964," Africa@War #51, Helion & Co., c2021.
• Rouvez, Alain; Coco, Michael; Paddack, Jean-Paul (1994). Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. pp. 310–313.
  OCLC 624665994
  .
• Spittaels, Steven and Hilgert, Filip, Mapping Conflict Motives in the Eastern DRC, IPIS, Antwerp, 4 March 2008
• Tshiyembe, Mwayila, 'Le défi de l'armée républicaine en République Démocratique du Congo,' Editions L'Harmattan, 2005
• Turner, John W. A Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1998,
  ISBN 1-85409-128-X
  , further details of FAZ operations in the 1980s and onwards can be found in pages 221–225.
• This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Country Studies. Federal Research Division.

External links

• Thom, William G. (September 1999). "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence". Journal of Conflict Studies. 19 (2).
  ISSN 1715-5673
  .
• Loi Organique FARDC 2013 Archived 10 December 2014 at the Wayback Machine
• German Foreign Ministry. "Pooling assistance for the Congo". Archived from the original on 20 February 2009. Retrieved 17 October 2020.