Moore v. City of East Cleveland
Moore v. City of East Cleveland | |
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Holding | |
An East Cleveland, Ohio zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with her grandchild was unconstitutional | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Plurality | Powell, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun |
Concurrence | Brennan, joined by Marshall |
Concurrence | Stevens |
Dissent | Burger |
Dissent | Stewart, joined by Rehnquist |
Dissent | White |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. XIV |
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), was a
Background
Zoning Ordinance East Cleveland
In 1966,
Initial lawsuit
In East Cleveland, Ohio, Inez Moore lived with her son, Dale Moore Sr., his son, Dale Moore Jr., as well as John Moore Jr., a grandson who was the child of one of Inez Moore's other children.
Opinion of the Court
Writing for a plurality of the Court,
Justice Powell cited a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court recognized that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."[17] Additionally, Justice Powell ruled that the ordinance did not advance the City's goals of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic, and not overburdening the City's school system because the ordinance would have allowed for Moore to live with "a dozen school-age children" from one son while John Moore Jr. would be forced to live elsewhere.[18] Although Justice Powell noted that that substantive due process "has at times been a treacherous field" for the Supreme Court, he ruled that the Court's precedent establishes "that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."[19]
Concurring opinions
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he emphasized that "the zoning power is not a license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply into private areas of protected family life."[20] He stated that he wrote "only to underscore the cultural myopia of the arbitrary boundary drawn by the East Cleveland ordinance in the light of the tradition of the American home," which he argued "displays a depressing insensitivity toward the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our society."[21] Justice Brennan argued that the Constitution cannot be interpreted "to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living."[22]
Justice
Dissenting opinions
Justice Potter Stewart and Justice Byron White also filed dissenting opinions. Justice Stewart argued that the court's earlier decision in Belle Terre should determine the outcome in this case and that Moore's claims regarding associational freedom and privacy should not invoke constitutional protections.[28] Justice White emphasized that the "substantive content of the [Due Process] Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by pre constitutional history" and concluded that "the interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren" is not "one that calls for any kind of heightened protection under the Due Process Clause."[29] Additionally, Justice White concluded that "the normal goals of zoning regulation are present here and that the ordinance serves these goals by limiting, in identifiable circumstances, the number of people who can occupy a single household."[30]
Analysis and commentary
Analysts have observed that Moore is one of several cases have established "a constitutional right to family integrity."[3] Some commentators have also noted that the Moore decision lies at the intersection between the competing goals of controlling population density and maintaining family integrity, but in their rush to overturn "traditional-family ordinances," the Court may have "burn[ed] the house to roast the pig."[31] Other commentators have observed that opinions like Moore have "a Trojan-Horse quality" because the Court's decision to recognize rights only for an extended biological family "is itself a potent form of state regulation of family life."[32]
See also
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 431
- List of United States Supreme Court cases
- Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume
- List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Burger Court
References
- ^ Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
- ^ a b c Moore, 431 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring).
- ^ a b Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Family Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 301, 311 (2007).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-96 (plurality opinion) (citing E. Cleveland, Ohio, Housing Ordinances, § 1341.08 (1966)).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Family Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 301, 313 (2007).
- ^ Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Family Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 301, 313 (2007); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 497 n.4 (plurality opinion) (noting that John's father, John Moore Sr., had apparently lived with the family since the time of the trial, but that his presence in the home also likely violated the ordinance).
- ^ a b Moore, 431 U.S. at 497 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 497 (plurality opinion) (noting that Moore filed a motion in the trial court challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 497-98 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 504 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 499, 503-04, 506 (plurality opinion).
- (1974)) (noting that Belle Terre was distinguishable because the ordinance in that case "only unrelated individuals").
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 507-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
- ^ a b Moore, 431 U.S. at 522 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 531 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 534-35 (Sewart, J., dissenting).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 543, 549 (White, J., dissenting).
- ^ Moore, 431 U.S. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting).
- ^ J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 Duke L.J. 761, 796 (1982) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
- ^ David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 527, 565-66 (2000).
External links
- Works related to Moore v. East Cleveland at Wikisource
- Text of Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)