Mu'awiya I

Mu'awiya I (

Mu'awiya and his father

After Muhammad died in 632,

The successive promotions of Abu Sufyan's sons contradicted Umar's efforts to otherwise curtail the influence of the Qurayshite aristocracy in the Muslim state in favor of the earliest Muslim converts (i.e. the Muhajirun and Ansar groups).^[16] According to the historian Leone Caetani, this exceptional treatment stemmed from Umar's personal respect for the Umayyads, the branch of the Banu Abd Shams to which Mu'awiya belonged.^[17] This is doubted by the historian Wilferd Madelung, who surmises that Umar had little choice, due to the lack of a suitable alternative to Mu'awiya in Syria and the ongoing plague in the region, which precluded the deployment of commanders more preferable to Umar from Medina.^[17]

Upon the accession of Caliph Uthman (r. 644–656), Mu'awiya's governorship was enlarged to include Palestine, while a companion of Muhammad,

Mu'awiya initiated the Arab naval campaigns against the Byzantines in the eastern Mediterranean,[1] requisitioning the harbors of Tripoli, Beirut, Tyre, Acre, and Jaffa.^[37][44] Umar had rejected Mu'awiya's request to launch a naval invasion of Cyprus, citing concerns about the Muslim forces' safety at sea, but Uthman allowed him to commence the campaign in 647, after refusing an earlier entreaty.^[45] Mu'awiya's rationale was that the Byzantine-held island posed a threat to Arab positions along the Syrian coast, and that it could be easily neutralized.^[45] The exact year of the raid is unclear, with the early Arabic sources providing a range between 647 and 650, while two Greek inscriptions in the Cypriot village of Solois cite two raids launched between 648 and 650.^[45]

According to the 9th-century historians al-Baladhuri and

Mu'awiya's domain was generally immune to the growing discontent prevailing in Medina, Egypt and

Ali's victory in Basra left Mu'awiya vulnerable, his territory wedged between Ali's forces in Iraq and Egypt, while the war with the Byzantines was ongoing in the north.[66] In 657 or 658 Mu'awiya secured his northern frontier with Byzantium by making a truce with the emperor, enabling him to focus the bulk of his troops on the impending battle with the caliph.^[67] After failing to gain the defection of Egypt's governor, Qays ibn Sa'd, he resolved to end the Umayyad family's hostility to Amr ibn al-As, the conqueror and former governor of Egypt, whom they accused of involvement in Uthman's death.^[68] Mu'awiya and Amr, who was popular with the Arab troops of Egypt, made a pact whereby the latter joined the coalition against Ali and Mu'awiya publicly agreed to install Amr as Egypt's lifetime governor should they oust Ali's appointee.^[69]

Although he had the firm backing of the Kalb, to shore up the rest of his base in Syria, Mu'awiya was advised by his kinsman

In the first week of June 657, the armies of Mu'awiya and Ali

Mu'awiya rejected suggestions from his advisers to engage Ali in a duel and definitively end hostilities.

Following the breakdown of the arbitration talks, Amr and the Syrian delegates returned to Damascus, where they greeted Mu'awiya as amir al-mu'minin, signaling their recognition of him as caliph.^[93] In April or May 658, Mu'awiya received a general pledge of allegiance from the Syrians.^[56] In response, Ali broke off communications with Mu'awiya, mobilized for war and invoked a curse against Mu'awiya and his close retinue as a ritual in the morning prayers.^[93] Mu'awiya reciprocated in kind against Ali and his closest supporters in his own domain.^[94]

In July, Mu'awiya dispatched an army under Amr to Egypt after a request for intervention from pro-Uthman mutineers in the province who were being suppressed by the governor, Caliph Abu Bakr's son and Ali's stepson,

There is little information in the early Muslim sources about Mu'awiya's rule in Syria, the center of his caliphate.^[114][115] He established his court in Damascus and moved the caliphal treasury there from Kufa.^[116] He relied on his Syrian tribal soldiery,^[114] numbering about 100,000 men,^[117] increasing their pay at the expense of the Iraqi garrisons,^[114] also about 100,000 soldiers combined.^[117] The highest stipends were paid on an inheritable basis to 2,000 nobles of the Quda'a and Kinda tribes, the core components of his support base, who were further awarded the privilege of consultation for all major decisions and the rights to veto or propose measures.^[30][118] The respective leaders of the Quda'a and the Kinda, the Kalbite chief Ibn Bahdal and the Homs-based Shurahbil, formed part of his Syrian inner circle along with the Qurayshites Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid, son of the distinguished commander Khalid ibn al-Walid, and al-Dahhak ibn Qays.^[119]

Mu'awiya is credited by the early Muslim sources for establishing

Mu'awiya's primary internal challenge was overseeing a Syria-based government that could reunite the politically and socially fractured Caliphate and assert authority over the tribes which formed its armies.[122] He applied indirect rule to the Caliphate's provinces, appointing governors with full civil and military authority.^[136] Although in principle governors were obliged to forward surplus tax revenues to the caliph,^[122] in practice most of the surplus was distributed among the provincial garrisons and Damascus received a negligible share.^[30][137] During Mu'awiya's caliphate, the governors relied on the ashraf (tribal chieftains), who served as intermediaries between the authorities and the tribesmen in the garrisons.^[122] Mu'awiya's statecraft was likely inspired by his father, who utilized his wealth to establish political alliances.^[137] The caliph generally preferred bribing his opponents over direct confrontation. In the summation of Kennedy, Mu'awiya ruled by "making agreements with those who held power in the provinces, by building up the power of those who were prepared to co-operate with him and by attaching as many important and influential figures to his cause as possible".^[137]

Iraq and the east

Challenges to central authority in general, and to Mu'awiya's rule in particular, were most acute in Iraq, where divisions were rife between the ashraf upstarts and the nascent Muslim elite, the latter of which was further divided between Ali's partisans and the Kharijites.

Despite his relocation to Damascus, Mu'awiya remained fond of his original homeland and made known his longing for "the spring in Juddah [sic], the summer in Ta'if, [and] the winter in Mecca".^[158] He purchased several large tracts throughout Arabia and invested considerable sums to develop the lands for agricultural use. According to the Muslim literary tradition, in the plain of Arafat and the barren valley of Mecca he dug numerous wells and canals, constructed dams and dikes to protect the soil from seasonal floods, and built fountains and reservoirs. His efforts saw extensive grain fields and date palm groves spring up across Mecca's suburbs, which remained in this state until deteriorating during the Abbasid era, which began in 750.^[158] In the Yamama region in central Arabia, Mu'awiya confiscated from the Banu Hanifa the lands of Hadarim, where he employed 4,000 slaves, likely to cultivate its fields.^[159] The caliph gained possession of estates in and near Ta'if which, together with the lands of his brothers Anbasa and Utba, formed a considerable cluster of properties.^[160]

One of the earliest known Arabic inscriptions from Mu'awiya's reign was found at a soil-conservation dam called Sayisad 32 kilometers (20 mi) east of Ta'if, which credits Mu'awiya for the dam's construction in 677 or 678 and asks God to give him victory and strength.

Mu'awiya possessed more personal experience than any other caliph fighting the Byzantines,

Based on the histories of al-Tabari (d. 923) and Agapius of Hierapolis (d. 941), the first raid of Mu'awiya's caliphate occurred in 662 or 663, during which his forces inflicted a heavy defeat on a Byzantine army with numerous patricians slain. In the next year a raid led by Busr reached Constantinople and in 664 or 665, Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid raided Koloneia in northeastern Anatolia. In the late 660s, Mu'awiya's forces attacked Antioch of Pisidia or Antioch of Isauria.^[166] Following the death of Constans II in July 668, Mu'awiya oversaw an increasingly aggressive policy of naval warfare against the Byzantines.^[56] According to the early Muslim sources, raids against the Byzantines peaked between 668 and 669.^[166] In each of those years there occurred six ground campaigns and a major naval campaign, the first by an Egyptian and Medinese fleet and the second by an Egyptian and Syrian fleet.^[169] The culmination of the campaigns was an assault on Constantinople, but the chronologies of the Arabic, Syriac, and Byzantine sources are contradictory. The traditional view by modern historians is of a great series of naval-borne assaults against Constantinople in c. 674–678, based on the history of the Byzantine chronicler Theophanes the Confessor (d. 818).^[170]

However, the dating and the very historicity of this view has been challenged; the Oxford scholar James Howard-Johnston considers that no siege of Constantinople took place, and that the story was inspired by the actual siege a generation later.^[171] The historian Marek Jankowiak on the other hand, in a revisionist reconstruction of the events reliant on the Arabic and Syriac sources, asserts that the assault came earlier than what is reported by Theophanes, and that the multitude of campaigns that were reported during 668–669 represented the coordinated efforts by Mu'awiya to conquer the Byzantine capital.^[172] Al-Tabari reports that Mu'awiya's son Yazid led a campaign against Constantinople in 669 and Ibn Abd al-Hakam reports that the Egyptian and Syrian navies joined the assault, led by Uqba ibn Amir and Fadala ibn Ubayd respectively.^[173] According to Jankowiak, Mu'awiya likely ordered the invasion during an opportunity presented by the rebellion of the Byzantine Armenian general Saborios, who formed a pact with the caliph, in spring 667. The caliph dispatched an army under Fadala, but before it could be joined by the Armenians, Saborios died. Mu'awiya then sent reinforcements led by Yazid who led the Arab army's invasion in the summer.^[170] An Arab fleet reached the Sea of Marmara by autumn, while Yazid and Fadala, having raided Chalcedon through the winter, besieged Constantinople in spring 668, but due to famine and disease, lifted the siege in late June. The Arabs continued their campaigns in Constantinople's vicinity before withdrawing to Syria most likely in late 669.^[174]

In 669, Mu'awiya's navy raided as far as Sicily. The following year, the wide-scale fortification of Alexandria was completed.^[56] While the histories of al-Tabari and al-Baladhuri report that Mu'awiya's forces captured Rhodes in 672–674 and colonized the island for seven years before withdrawing during the reign of Yazid I, the modern historian Clifford Edmund Bosworth casts doubt on these events and holds that the island was only raided by Mu'awiya's lieutenant Junada ibn Abi Umayya al-Azdi in 679 or 680.^[175] Under Emperor Constantine IV (r. 668–685), the Byzantines began a counteroffensive against the Caliphate, first raiding Egypt in 672 or 673,^[176] while in winter 673, Mu'awiya's admiral Abd Allah ibn Qays led a large fleet that raided Smyrna and the coasts of Cilicia and Lycia.^[177] The Byzantines landed a major victory against an Arab army and fleet led by Sufyan ibn Awf, possibly at Sillyon, in 673 or 674.^[178] The next year, Abd Allah ibn Qays and Fadala landed in Crete and in 675 or 676, a Byzantine fleet assaulted Maraclea, killing the governor of Homs.^[176]

In 677, 678 or 679, according to Theophanes, Mu'awiya sued for peace with Constantine IV, possibly as a result of the destruction of his fleet or the Byzantines' deployment of the Mardaites in the Syrian littoral during that time.^[179] A thirty-year treaty was concluded, obliging the Caliphate to pay an annual tribute of 3,000 gold coins, 50 horses and 30 slaves, and withdraw their troops from the forward bases they had occupied on the Byzantine coast.^[180] But other Byzantine and Islamic sources make no mention of this treaty.^[181] Although the Muslims did not achieve any permanent territorial gains in Anatolia during Mu'awiya's career, the frequent raids provided Mu'awiya's Syrian troops with war spoils and tribute, which helped ensure their continued allegiance, and sharpened their combat skills.^[182] Moreover, Mu'awiya's prestige was boosted and the Byzantines were precluded from any concerted campaigns against Syria.^[183]

Conquest of central North Africa

Although the Arabs had not advanced beyond

The struggle over the succession of Constantine IV drew Byzantine focus away from the African front.

Mu'awiya dismissed Uqba in 673, probably out of concern that he would form an independent power base in the lucrative regions that he had conquered. The new Arab province, Ifriqiya (modern-day Tunisia), remained subordinate to the governor of Egypt, who sent his mawla (non-Arab, Muslim freedman) Abu al-Muhajir Dinar to replace Uqba, who was arrested and transferred to Mu'awiya's custody in Damascus. Abu al-Muhajir continued the westward campaigns as far as Tlemcen and defeated the Awraba Berber chief Kasila, who subsequently embraced Islam and joined his forces.^[189] In 678, a treaty between the Arabs and the Byzantines ceded Byzacena to the Caliphate, while forcing the Arabs to withdraw from the northern parts of the province.^[187] After Mu'awiya's death, his successor Yazid reappointed Uqba, Kasila defected and a Byzantine–Berber alliance ended Arab control over Ifriqiya,^[189] which was not reestablished until the reign of Caliph Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan (r. 685–705).^[190]

Nomination of Yazid as successor

In a move unprecedented in Islamic politics, Mu'awiya nominated his own son, Yazid, as his successor.^[191] The caliph likely held ambitions for his son's succession over a considerable period.^[192] In 666, he allegedly had his governor in Homs, Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid, poisoned to remove him as a potential rival to Yazid.^[193] The Syrian Arabs, with whom Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid was popular, had viewed the governor as the caliph's most suitable successor by dint of his military record and descent from Khalid ibn al-Walid.^[194][i]

It was not until the latter half of his reign that Mu'awiya publicly declared Yazid heir apparent, though the early Muslim sources offer divergent details about the timing and location of the events relating to the decision.

According to Hinds, in addition to Yazid's nobility, age and sound judgement, "most important of all" was his connection to the Kalb. The Kalb-led Quda'a confederation was the foundation of Sufyanid rule and Yazid's succession signaled the continuation of this alliance.[30] In nominating Yazid, the son of the Kalbite Maysun, Mu'awiya bypassed his older son Abd Allah from his Qurayshite wife Fakhita.^[205] Although support from the Kalb and the Quda'a was guaranteed, Mu'awiya exhorted Yazid to widen his tribal support base in Syria. As the Qaysites were the predominant element in the northern frontier armies, Mu'awiya's appointment of Yazid to lead the war efforts with Byzantium may have served to foster Qaysite support for his nomination.^[206] Mu'awiya's efforts to that end were not entirely successful as reflected in a line by a Qaysite poet: "we will never pay allegiance to the son of a Kalbi woman [i.e. Yazid]".^[207][208]

In Medina, Mu'awiya's distant kinsmen Marwan ibn al-Hakam, Sa'id ibn al-As and Ibn Amir accepted Mu'awiya's succession order, albeit disapprovingly.^[209] Most opponents of Mu'awiya's order in Iraq and among the Umayyads and Quraysh of the Hejaz were ultimately threatened or bribed into acceptance.^[182] The remaining principle opposition emanated from Husayn ibn Ali, Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, Abd Allah ibn Umar and Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr, all prominent Medina-based sons of earlier caliphs or close companions of Muhammad.^[210] As they possessed the nearest claims to the caliphate, Mu'awiya was determined to obtain their recognition.^[211][212] According to the historian Awana ibn al-Hakam (d. 764), before his death, Mu'awiya ordered certain measures to be taken against them, entrusting these tasks to his loyalists al-Dahhak ibn Qays and Muslim ibn Uqba.^[213]

Death

Mu'awiya died from an illness in Damascus in Rajab 60

Mu'awiya's grave was a visitation site as late as the 10th century. Al-Mas'udi holds that a mausoleum was built over the grave and was open to visitors on Mondays and Thursdays. Ibn Taghribirdi asserts that Ahmad ibn Tulun, the autonomous 9th-century ruler of Egypt and Syria, erected a structure on the grave in 883 or 884 and employed members of the public to regularly recite the Qur'an and light candles around the tomb.^[220]

Assessment and legacy

Like Uthman, Mu'awiya adopted the title khalifat Allah ('deputy of God'), instead of khalifat rasul Allah ('deputy of the messenger of God'), the title used by the other caliphs who preceded him.^[221] The title may have implied political as well as religious authority and divine sanctioning.^[30] He is reported by al-Baladhuri to have said "The earth belongs to God and I am the deputy of God".^[222] Nevertheless, whatever the absolutist connotations the title may have had, Mu'awiya evidently did not impose this religious authority. Instead, he governed indirectly like a supra-tribal chief using alliances with provincial ashraf, his personal skills, persuasive power, and wit.^[30][223]

Apart from his war with Ali, he did not deploy his Syrian troops domestically, and often used monetary gifts as a tool to avoid conflict.^[137] In Julius Wellhausen's assessment, Mu'awiya was an accomplished diplomat "allowing matters to ripen of themselves, and only now and then assisting their progress".^[224] He further states that Mu'awiya had the ability to identify and employ the most talented men at his service and made even those whom he distrusted work for him.^[224]

In the view of the historian Patricia Crone, Mu'awiya's successful rule was facilitated by the tribal composition of Syria. There, the Arabs who formed his support base were distributed throughout the countryside and were dominated by a single confederation, the Quda'a. This was in contrast to Iraq and Egypt, where the diverse tribal composition of the garrison towns meant that the government had no cohesive support base and had to create a delicate balance between the opposing tribal groups. As evidenced by the disintegration of Ali's Iraqi alliance, maintaining this balance was untenable. In her view, Mu'awiya's taking advantage of the tribal circumstances in Syria prevented the dissolution of the Caliphate in the civil war.^[225] In the words of the orientalist Martin Hinds, the success of Mu'awiya's style of governance is "attested by the fact that he managed to hold his kingdom together without ever having to resort to using his Syrian troops".^[30]

In the long-term, Mu'awiya's system proved precarious and unviable.^[30] Reliance on personal relations meant his government was dependent on paying and pleasing its agents instead of commanding them. This created a "system of indulgence", according to Crone.^[226] The governors became increasingly unaccountable and amassed personal wealth. The tribal balance on which he relied was insecure and a slight fluctuation would lead to factionalism and infighting.^[226] When Yazid became caliph, he continued his father's model. Controversial as his nomination had been, he had to face the rebellions of Husayn and Ibn al-Zubayr. Although he was able to defeat them with the help of his governors and the Syrian army, the system fractured as soon as he died in November 683. The provincial ashraf defected to Ibn al-Zubayr, as did the Qaysite tribes, who had migrated to Syria during Mu'awiya's reign and were opposed to the Quda'a confederation on whom Sufyanid power rested. In a matter of months the authority of Yazid's successor, Mu'awiya II, was restricted to Damascus and its environs. Although the Umayyads, backed by the Quda'a, were able to reconquer the Caliphate after the decade-long second civil war, it was under the leadership of Marwan, founder of the new ruling Umayyad house, the Marwanids, and his son Abd al-Malik.^[227] Having realized the weakness of Mu'awiya's model and lacking in his political skill, the Marwanids abandoned his system in favor of a more traditional form of governance where the caliph was the central authority.^[228] Nonetheless, the hereditary succession introduced by Mu'awiya became a permanent feature of many of the Muslim governments that followed.^[229]

Kennedy views the preservation of the Caliphate's unity as Mu'awiya's greatest achievement.^[230] Expressing a similar viewpoint, Mu'awiya's biographer R. Stephen Humphreys states that although maintaining the integrity of the Caliphate would have been an achievement on its own, Mu'awiya was intent on vigorously continuing the conquests that had been initiated by Abu Bakr and Umar. By creating a formidable navy, he made the Caliphate the dominant force in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. Control of northeastern Iran was secured and the Caliphate's frontier was expanded in North Africa.^[231] Madelung deems Mu'awiya a corruptor of the caliphal office, under whom the precedence in Islam (sabiqa), which was the determining factor in the choice of earlier caliphs, gave way to the might of the sword, the people became his subjects and he became the "absolute lord over their life and death".^[232] He strangled the communal spirit of Islam and used the religion as a tool of "social control, exploitation and military terrorization".^[232]

Mu'awiya was the first caliph whose name appeared on coins, inscriptions, or documents of the nascent Islamic empire.

The surviving Muslim histories originated in Abbasid-era Iraq.[236] The compilers, the narrators from whom the stories were collected, and the overall public sentiment in Iraq were hostile to the Syria-based Umayyads,^[237] under whom Syria was a privileged province and Iraq was locally perceived as a Syrian colony.^[229] Moreover, the Abbasids, having overthrown the Umayyads in 750, saw them as illegitimate rulers and further tarnished their memory to enhance their own legitimacy. Abbasid caliphs like al-Saffah, al-Ma'mun, and al-Mu'tadid publicly condemned Mu'awiya and other Umayyad caliphs.^[238] As such, the Muslim historical tradition is by and large anti-Umayyad.^[236] Nonetheless, in the case of Mu'awiya it portrays him in a relatively balanced manner.^[239]

On the one hand, it portrays him as a successful ruler who implemented his will with persuasion instead of force.^[239] It stresses his quality of hilm, which in his case meant mildness, slowness to anger, subtlety, and management of people by perceiving their needs and desires.^[30][240] The historical tradition is rife with anecdotes of his political acumen and self-control. In one such anecdote, when inquired about allowing one of his courtiers to address him with arrogance, he remarked:^[241]

I do not insert myself between the people and their tongue, so long as they do not insert themselves between us and our sovereignty.^[241]

The tradition presents him operating in the way of a traditional tribal sheikh who lacks absolute authority; summoning delegations (wufud) of tribal chiefs, and persuading them with flattery, arguments, and presents. This is exemplified in a saying attributed to him: "I never use my voice if I can use my money, never my whip if I can use my voice, never my sword if I can use my whip; but, if I have to use my sword, I will."^[239]

On the other hand, the tradition also portrays him as a despot who perverted the caliphate into kingship. In the words of

[Mu'awiya] was the first to have a bodyguard, police-force and chamberlains ... He had somebody walk in front of him with a spear, took alms out of the stipends and sat on a throne with the people below him ... He used forced labour for his building projects ... He was the first to turn this matter [the caliphate] into mere kingship.[242]

Al-Baladhuri calls him the 'Khosrow of the Arabs' (Kisra al-Arab).^[243] 'Khosrow' was used by the Arabs as a reference to Sasanian Persian monarchs in general, who the Arabs associated with worldly splendor and authoritarianism, as opposed to the humility of Muhammad.^[244] Mu'awiya was compared to these monarchs mainly because he appointed his son Yazid as the next caliph, which was viewed as a violation of the Islamic principle of shura and an introduction of dynastic rule on par with the Byzantines and Sasanians.^[239][243] The civil war that erupted after Mu'awiya's death is asserted to have been the direct consequence of Yazid's nomination.^[239] In the Islamic tradition, Mu'awiya and the Umayyads are given the title of malik (king) instead of khalifa (caliph), though the succeeding Abbasids are recognized as caliphs.^[245]

The contemporary non-Muslim sources generally present a benign image of Mu'awiya.^[126][239] The Greek historian Theophanes calls him a protosymboulos, 'first among equals'.^[239] According to Kennedy, the Nestorian Christian chronicler John bar Penkaye writing in the 690s "has nothing but praise for the first Umayyad caliph ... of whose reign he says 'the peace throughout the world was such that we have never heard, either from our fathers or from our grandparents, or seen that there had ever been any like it'".^[246]

Muslim view

In contrast to the four earlier caliphs, who are considered as models of piety and having governed with justice, Mu'awiya is not recognized as a rightly-guided caliph (khalifa rashid) by the Sunnis.

Mu'awiya's war with Ali, whom the Shia hold as the true successor of Muhammad, has made him a reviled figure in Shia Islam. According to the Shia, based on this alone Mu'awiya qualifies as an unbeliever, if he was a believer to begin with.^[249] In addition, he is held responsible for the killing of a number of Muhammad's companions at Siffin, having ordered the cursing of Ali from the pulpit, appointing Yazid as his successor, who went on to kill Husayn at Karbala, executing the pro-Alid Kufan nobleman Hujr ibn Adi,^[251] and assassinating Hasan by poisoning.^[252] As such, he has been a particular target of Shia traditions. Some traditions hold him to have been born of an illegitimate relationship between Abu Sufyan's wife Hind and Muhammad's uncle Abbas.^[253] His conversion to Islam is held to be devoid of any conviction and to have been motivated by convenience after Muhammad conquered Mecca. On this basis he is given the title of taliq (freed slave of Muhammad). A number of hadiths are ascribed to Muhammad condemning Mu'awiya and his father Abu Sufyan in which he is called "an accursed man (la'in) son of an accursed man" and prophesying that he will die as an unbeliever.^[254] Unlike the Sunnis, the Shia deny him the status of a companion^[254] and also refute the Sunni claims that he was a scribe of the Qur'anic revelation.^[249] Like other opponents of Ali, Mu'awiya is cursed in a ritual called tabarra, which is held by many Shia to be an obligation.^[255]

Amid rising

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81. ^ Hinds 1972, pp. 93–94.
82. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 238.
83. ^ Hinds 1972, p. 98.
84. ^ Hinds 1972, p. 100.
85. ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 79.
86. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 245.
87. ^ Donner 2012, p. 162.
88. ^ Hinds 1972, p. 101.
89. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 254–255.
90. ^ Hinds 1972, p. 99.
91. ^ Donner 2012, pp. 162–163.
92. ^ Donner 2012, p. 165.
93. ^ ^{a b} Madelung 1997, p. 257.
94. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 258.
95. ^ ^{a b c d} Kennedy 1998, p. 69.
96. ^ ^{a b c} Wellhausen 1927, p. 99.
97. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 262–263, 287.
98. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 100.
99. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 289.
100. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 290–292.
101. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 299–300.
102. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 301–303.
103. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 304–305.
104. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 307.
105. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 102–103.
106. ^ Donner 2012, p. 166.
107. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 317.
108. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 320, 322.
109. ^ Marsham 2013, p. 93.
110. ^ Marsham 2013, p. 96.
111. ^ Marsham 2013, pp. 97, 100.
112. ^ Marsham 2013, pp. 87, 89, 101.
113. ^ Marsham 2013, pp. 94, 106.
114. ^ ^{a b c} Wellhausen 1927, p. 131.
115. ^ ^{a b} Kennedy 2004, p. 86.
116. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 59–60, 131.
117. ^ ^{a b} Kennedy 2001, p. 20.
118. ^ Crone 1994, p. 44.
119. ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 86–87.
120. ^ Hawting 1996, p. 223.
121. ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 13.
122. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h} Hinds 1993, p. 266.
123. ^ Crone 1994, p. 45, note 239.
124. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Kennedy 2004, p. 87.
125. ^ Sprengling 1939, p. 182.
126. ^ ^{a b} Humphreys 2006, pp. 102–103.
127. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 134.
128. ^ Hawting 2000, p. 842.
129. ^ Foss 2016, p. 83.
130. ^ Hirschfeld 1987, p. 107.
131. ^ Hasson 1982, p. 99.
132. ^ Hoyland 1999, p. 159.
133. ^ Elad 1999, p. 23.
134. ^ Elad 1999, p. 33.
135. ^ Elad 1999, pp. 23–24, 33.
136. ^ ^{a b} Hinds 1993, pp. 266–267.
137. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Kennedy 2004, p. 83.
138. ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 83–84.
139. ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 84.
140. ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 84–85.
141. ^ ^{a b c} Kennedy 2004, p. 85.
142. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 120.
143. ^ ^{a b} Wellhausen 1927, p. 121.
144. ^ ^{a b} Hasson 2002, p. 520.
145. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 124.
146. ^ Hawting 2000, p. 41.
147. ^ ^{a b c} Foss 2009, p. 268.
148. ^ Foss 2009, p. 269.
149. ^ Foss 2009, p. 272.
150. ^ Foss 2009, pp. 269–270.
151. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 135.
152. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 135–136.
153. ^ Bosworth 1991, pp. 621–622.
154. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 136.
155. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 345, note 90.
156. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 346.
157. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 136–137.
158. ^ ^{a b} Miles 1948, p. 236.
159. ^ Dixon 1971, p. 170.
160. ^ Miles 1948, p. 238.
161. ^ Miles 1948, p. 237.
162. ^ Al-Rashid 2008, p. 270.
163. ^ Al-Rashid 2008, pp. 271, 273.
164. ^ Kaegi 1995, p. 247.
165. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 115.
166. ^ ^{a b c} Jankowiak 2013, p. 273.
167. ^ Kaegi 1995, pp. 244–245, 247.
168. ^ Kaegi 1995, pp. 245, 247.
169. ^ Jankowiak 2013, pp. 273–274.
170. ^ ^{a b} Jankowiak 2013, pp. 303–304.
171. ^ Howard-Johnston 2010, pp. 303–304.
172. ^ Jankowiak 2013, p. 290.
173. ^ Jankowiak 2013, pp. 267, 274.
174. ^ Jankowiak 2013, pp. 304, 316.
175. ^ Bosworth 1996, pp. 159–160.
176. ^ ^{a b} Jankowiak 2013, p. 316.
177. ^ Jankowiak 2013, p. 318.
178. ^ Jankowiak 2013, pp. 278–279, 316.
179. ^ Stratos 1978, p. 46.
180. ^ Lilie 1976, pp. 81–82.
181. ^ Jankowiak 2013, p. 254.
182. ^ ^{a b} Kennedy 2004, p. 88.
183. ^ Kaegi 1995, pp. 247–248.
184. ^ Kennedy 2007, pp. 207–208.
185. ^ Kaegi 2010, p. 12.
186. ^ ^{a b c} Christides 2000, p. 789.
187. ^ ^{a b} Kaegi 2010, p. 13.
188. ^ ^{a b} Kennedy 2007, p. 209.
189. ^ ^{a b c} Christides 2000, p. 790.
190. ^ Kennedy 2007, p. 217.
191. ^ Lewis 2002, p. 67.
192. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 146.
193. ^ Hinds 1991, pp. 139–140.
194. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 339–340.
195. ^ ^{a b} Madelung 1997, pp. 340–342.
196. ^ ^{a b} Hinds 1991, p. 139.
197. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 137.
198. ^ ^{a b} de Goeje 1911, p. 28.
199. ^ Gibb 1960, p. 85.
200. ^ Marsham 2013, p. 90.
201. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 141, 143.
202. ^ Morony 1987, p. 183.
203. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 142.
204. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 143–144.
205. ^ Hawting 2002, p. 309.
206. ^ Marsham 2013, pp. 90–91.
207. ^ Marsham 2013, p. 91.
208. ^ Crone 1994, p. 45.
209. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 342–343.
210. ^ Donner 2012, p. 177.
211. ^ Wellhausen 1927, pp. 145–146.
212. ^ Hawting 2000, p. 43.
213. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 144–145.
214. ^ Morony 1987, p. 210, 212–213.
215. ^ Morony 1987, p. 210.
216. ^ Morony 1987, pp. 209, 213–214.
217. ^ Wellhausen 1927, p. 139.
218. ^ Morony 1987, p. 213.
219. ^ Morony 1987, pp. 213–214.
220. ^ Grabar 1966, p. 18.
221. ^ Crone & Hinds 2003, pp. 6–7.
222. ^ Crone & Hinds 2003, p. 6.
223. ^ Humphreys 2006, p. 93.
224. ^ ^{a b} Wellhausen 1927, pp. 137–138.
225. ^ Crone 2003, p. 30.
226. ^ ^{a b} Crone 2003, p. 33.
227. ^ Hawting 2002, p. 310.
228. ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 98.
229. ^ ^{a b} Kennedy 2016, p. 34.
230. ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 82.
231. ^ Humphreys 2006, pp. 112–113.
232. ^ ^{a b} Madelung 1997, pp. 326–327.
233. ^ Hoyland 2015, p. 98.
234. ^ Hoyland 2015, p. 266 n. 30.
235. ^ Hoyland 2015, pp. 135–136, 266 n. 30.
236. ^ ^{a b} Hoyland 2015, p. 233.
237. ^ Hawting 2000, pp. 16–17.
238. ^ Humphreys 2006, pp. 3–6.
239. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h} Hawting 2000, p. 42.
240. ^ Humphreys 2006, p. 119.
241. ^ ^{a b} Humphreys 2006, p. 121.
242. ^ ^{a b c} Hoyland 2015, p. 134.
243. ^ ^{a b} Crone & Hinds 2003, p. 115.
244. ^ Morony 1986, pp. 184–185.
245. ^ Lewis 2002, p. 65.
246. ^ Kennedy 2007, p. 349.
247. ^ Humphreys 2006, p. 115.
248. ^ Ende 1977, p. 14.
249. ^ ^{a b c} Kohlberg 2020, p. 105.
250. ^ Kohlberg 2020, p. 105, note 136.
251. ^ Kohlberg 2020, pp. 105–106.
252. ^ Pierce 2016, pp. 83–85.
253. ^ Kohlberg 2020, p. 103.
254. ^ ^{a b} Kohlberg 2020, p. 104.
255. ^ Hyder 2006, p. 82.
256. ^ Kraemer 1992, pp. 64–65.
257. ^ Halm 2003, pp. 90, 192.

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Further reading

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Muawiyah I.

• Shahin, Aram A. (2012). "In Defense of Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān: Treatises and Monographs on Muʿāwiya from the Eighth to the Nineteenth Centuries". In
  ISBN 978-90-04-21885-7
  .

Mu'awiya I Umayyad Dynasty Born: 602 Died: 26 April 680
Preceded by Hasan ibn Ali	Umayyad Caliph 661–680	Succeeded by Yazid I