Mu'izz al-Dawla
Mu'izz al-Dawla | |||||
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Emir of Iraq Amir al-umara | |||||
Reign | 945–967 | ||||
Successor | Izz al-Dawla | ||||
Born | 915 Daylam | ||||
Died | April 8, 967 (aged 52) Iraq | ||||
Issue |
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House | Buyid | ||||
Father | Buya | ||||
Religion | Shia Islam |
Ahmad ibn Buya (
, ruling from 945 until his death.The son of a
Throughout his rule, Mu'izz al-Dawla was devoted to conflicts with other dynasties for control over Iraq—in 946, an important battle took place in Baghdad between Mu'izz al-Dawla and the
Family and early career
Ahmad was the son of Buya, a
Around 928, Ahmad's brother Ali joined the service of
In 935 or 936, 'Ali sent Ahmad to
Ahmad's next opportunity to expand the possessions of the Buyids came when the Baridis requested help from 'Ali. The Baridis, who ruled in
Invasion and conquest of Iraq
From Khuzestan he launched several campaigns into Iraq, where the Caliphate was in serious internal disarray. These expeditions were on his own initiative; Ali had not ordered them and did not send support for them. In 944, Ahmad captured Wasit, but was met by an Abbasid army near Al-Mada'in under the de facto ruler of the Caliphate, Tuzun. Ahmad eventually emerged victorious during the battle, and then marched towards Baghdad, but was forced to retreat back to Ahvaz on July 28 after Tuzun destroyed the bridge to Baghdad.[5] In 945, an Abbasid officer, Yanal Kushah, joined Ahmad, who shortly invaded Iraq again.[6]
Ahmad then gained control of Baghdad on December 19, 945 without a struggle. He took charge of the administration of the Caliphate by taking the position of
Despite the fact that Mu'izz al-Dawla had taken control of Iraq by himself, he remained subordinate to 'Imad al-Dawla, who ruled in
First war with the Hamdanids
Background
News of this event was received negatively by the
Nasir al-Dawla had reason to be confident that he could defeat Mu'izz al-Dawla if he made an attempt to capture Baghdad. His army had been bolstered by the arrival of numerous
Initial hostilities
It quickly became clear that the two amirs would be unable to work out an agreement with each other. In February 946, Mu'izz al-Dawla sent an army under the command of Musa Fayadhah and Yanal Kushah to Ukbara, in preparation for a campaign to conquer Mosul. The expedition was terminated, however, when Yanal Kushah suddenly attacked Musa and deserted to the Hamdanids. Nasir al-Dawla responded to this act of aggression by leading his army, which included a number of Turks, to Samarra the following month. Mu'izz al-Dawla similarly gathered his forces and departed from Baghdad with the caliph al-Muti' for Ukbara.[14]
While stationed at Samarra, Nasir al-Dawla sent his brother Jubayr to sneak around the Buyid army and head south to Baghdad. When Jubayr arrived at the city, he was welcomed by the citizens and by Mu'izz al-Dawla's former secretary
When Mu'izz al-Dawla learned that he had lost Baghdad, he gathered his Daylamite soldiers, who had been busy plundering Tikrit and Samarra, and headed back to the city. When he arrived, he found that Nasir al-Dawla had crossed the Tigris and set up camp outside the Shammasiyyah quarter of eastern Baghdad; he therefore dug in on the western side of the city, and the two sides prepared for fighting.[16]
Stalemate
For the next three months, control of Baghdad was divided between the Hamdanids and Buyids, with the Tigris dividing the two. On the Hamdanid side, Nasir al-Dawla promoted Ibn Shirzad to serve as one of his chief commanders, while on the western side, Abu Ja'far Saymari, the chief secretary of Mu'izz al-Dawla, managed the Buyid war effort.[17]
Both sides were clearly determined to take permanent control of the city, and the battle quickly turned into a stalemate. Combat took place in multiple locations throughout Baghdad, with both the Hamdanid and Buyid forces launching offensive sorties against each other. Neither side, however was able to generate a victory large enough to win control of both halves of the city. Getting troops across the Tigris successfully was a challenge, and even if an army managed to make it to the opposite shore, they were usually forced to retreat in short order.[18]
Control of the Tigris was a major objective for both sides. The Hamdanid and Buyid armies both built zabzabs or small riverboats and used these to launch attacks on each other. Each day, Ibn Shirzad led a number of zabzabs filled with Turks up and down the Tigris, and they shot arrows at the Daylamites stationed on the western side of the city. Mu'izz al-Dawla also constructed a fleet of zabzabs, and his troops used these to battle the Hamdanid forces patrolling the river.[19]
On the eastern side, Nasir al-Dawla attempted to legitimize his seizure of the city by re-issuing the coinage of 942–943, from when he had last been in control of Baghdad. At least part of the population accepted his claims and supported him throughout the fighting. Ibn Shirzad was also able to augment the ranks of the Hamdanid forces by enlisting local citizens and criminals, and they participated in attacks on Mu'izz al-Dawla's Daylamite troops.[20]
The economy of Baghdad suffered greatly throughout the fighting. Both sides seized the produce of local cultivators to feed their troops. Eastern Baghdad was able to avoid any serious shortages thanks to shipments flowing down from Mosul, but the western side was subjected to a blockade for the duration of the conflict. Nasir al-Dawla's forces prevented civilians on the western side from crossing to the eastern, while a number of allied
Buyid victory
By July 945, with no end to the battle in sight and with the blockade making supplies increasingly scarce, Mu'izz al-Dawla was giving serious thought to abandoning western Baghdad and retreating to al-Ahwaz.[23] He eventually decided to make one final attempt to take the eastern side, and if the effort failed he would give the order to withdraw. He gave orders to his chief secretary Saymari to cross to the eastern bank with a number of handpicked Daylamites, while he himself would attempt to distract the Hamdanid forces with a ruse.
The plan was carried out on the night of August 1.[24] Mu'izz al-Dawla led a number of men north, instructing them to light torches and blast trumpets along the way. The Hamdanid army, seeing his movements, moved north as well to prevent him from crossing the river. Saymari and his soldiers were therefore free to cross to the eastern side and began to do so. When the Hamdanid army realized what was happening, they sent a number of men in zabzabs to stop him, and a fierce fight broke out. Eventually the Daylamites were victorious and the Hamdanid forces were pushed back to the Shammasiyyah gate at the northeastern corner of the city.
As the Daylamites spread throughout eastern Baghdad, the Hamdanid army began to fall apart in disorder. Nasir al-Dawla, realizing that he was in danger of losing the city, ordered Ibn Shirzad to take command of the troops and push the Daylamites back across the river. Ibn Shirzad set out, but when he attempted to convince the panicking soldiers to regroup he was unable to do so and therefore decided to flee. Nasir al-Dawla then realized that the fight was lost and joined the retreat; the Hamdanid forces withdrew from Baghdad and allowed the Buyids to take control of the city.
Eastern Baghdad, meanwhile, remained in a state of turmoil. The Daylamite army occupied the eastern quarters of the city and began retaliating against the population for their support of the Hamdanids during the fighting. Ignoring an order by Mu'izz al-Dawla to refrain from pillaging, they began looting, set fire to houses and killed a number of civilians. Many of the residents fled in fear and attempted to head north to Ukbara, but died along the way in the summer heat. The chaos ceased only when Saymari executed several pillagers and sent out patrols to reestablish order.[25]
Aftermath and war against minor rulers
Following their expulsion from Baghdad, Nasir al-Dawla, Ibn Shirzad and the Hamdanid army proceeded up the Tigris to Ukbara to regroup.[25] After they arrived, Nasir al-Dawla sent an envoy to Mu'izz al-Dawla to sue for peace. Mu'izz al-Dawla agreed to the terms, and the war between the two sides came to an end. Mu'izz al-Dawla agreed to recognize the Hamdanid as ruler of the territory from Tikrit northwards, and to release him from the obligation of transmitting tax revenues from Mosul and the Diyar Bakr district. In exchange, Nasir al-Dawla was made responsible for forwarding the tax proceeds of Ikhshidid Egypt and Syria on to Baghdad, and promised to regularly send supplies to the city which were to be exempt from any taxes;[26] in addition, he agreed to recognize al-Muti' as the legitimate caliph.[13]
The Turkish mercenaries in the Hamdanid army, who were vehemently opposed to Mu'izz al-Dawla's continued occupation of Baghdad, were not informed that Nasir al-Dawla was seeking peace with the Buyids. When they learned that the two amirs had agreed to a treaty, they rebelled against Nasir al-Dawla and compelled him to flee. Nasir al-Dawla was forced to call on Mu'izz al-Dawla for assistance, and a Buyid army under the command of Saymari was sent to quell the Turks and enforce the treaty. Saymari defeated the rebels and confirmed Nasir al-Dawla in his position, but also confiscated a number of supplies and took a son of Nasir al-Dawla as a hostage to ensure that he would abide by the terms of the peace; he then returned to Baghdad.[27]
Mu'izz al-Dawla now focused on the Baridis, who still controlled Basra and Wasit. He managed to defeat them and annex their lands in 947. Their defeat marked the end of major fighting.
Conflict between the Buyids and Hamdanids was renewed in 948, when Mu'izz al-Dawla again marched against Mosul, but was forced to cut off his campaign to assist his brother
War against the Batihah amirate and death of Imad al-Dawla
Mu'izz al-Dawla, having assisted his brother, then sent
'Imad al-Dawla shortly died in 949, and Rukn al-Dawla then took the title of senior amir. Mu'izz al-Dawla accepted the change of rulers, and then sent al-Saymari to Shiraz to ensure that Fana-Khusrau, who was the son of Rukn al-Dawla and 'Imad al-Dawla's successor, would take power there. Still, he raised objections when Fana-Khusrau requested the title of "Taj al-Dawla". The title of "Taj" ("crown") implied that Fana-Khusrau was superior to his father and uncle, provoking a reaction from Mu'izz al-Dawla. A more suitable title ("'Adud al-Dawla") was instead chosen.[29] Shortly afterwards, Mu'izz al-Dawla sent another expedition against the Batihah. This campaign, led by a Daylamite officer named Ruzbahan, ended badly. Ruzbahan discovered 'Imran's location and attacked him, but was heavily defeated and forced to withdraw.
'Imran then became even more bold, with his subjects demanding protection money from anyone, including government officials, that crossed their path, and the path to Basra by water was effectively closed off. Mu'izz al-Dawla's chief secretary, Abu Ja'far al-Saymari, died in 650/651, and Abu Muhammad al-Hasan al-Muhallabi succeeded him. Mu'izz al-Dawla, after receiving numerous complaints from his officers about 'Imran, sent another army in 950 or 951, under the joint command of al-Muhallabi and Ruzbahan.
Ruzbahan, who disliked the vizier, convinced him to directly attack 'Imran. He kept his forces in the rear and fled as soon as fighting between the two sides began. 'Imran used the terrain effectively, laying ambushes and confusing al-Muhallabi's army. Many of the vizier's soldiers died in the fighting and he himself only narrowly escaped capture, swimming to safety. Mu'izz al-Dawla then came to terms with 'Imran, acceding to his terms. Prisoners were exchanged and 'Imran was made a vassal of the Buyids, being instated as governor of the Batihah.
Peace lasted for approximately five years between the two sides. A false rumor of Mu'izz al-Dawla's death in 955, however, prompted 'Imran to seize a Buyid convoy traveling from Ahvaz to Baghdad. Mu'izz al-Dawla demanded that the items confiscated be returned, at which point 'Imran returned the money, but kept the goods. Mu'izz al-Dawla sent Ruzbahan a third time to the swamp, but the latter revolted and 'Imran was spared a new attack. Ruzbahan was further joined by the Daylamite soldiers of al-Muhallabi.
Rebellion of Ruzbahan
While Mu'izz was preoccupied with the rebellion of his Daylamite troops under Ruzbahan in southern Iraq, Nasir al-Dawla used the opportunity to advance south and capture Baghdad. In 957, Mu'izz al-Dawla fought a final battle against Ruzbahan. Ruzbahan almost managed to win the battle, but was defeated by Mu'izz al-Dawla's
Abu'l-Abbas Musafir, an officer of Mu'izz al-Dawla, who managed to discover the Daylamites' plan, urged Mu'izz al-Dawla to have Ruzbahan killed. Mu'izz al-Dawla, initially demurred, but was convinced of the threat of the plot by a number of his other officers. At nightfall, Mu'izz al-Dawla's guards drowned Ruzbahan in the
Mu'izz al-Dawla then began removing the Daylamites who had followed Ruzbahan from their offices, and arrested a number of them, while installing his Turkic ghulams to higher offices and giving them more land.
Second war with the Hamdanids
Mu'izz al-Dawla then began counter-attacking Nasir al-Dawla, who was not able to maintain his position, and abandoned Baghdad.
In 964, Nasir al-Dawla tried to renegotiate the terms of the arrangement he had made with Mu'izz al-Dawla, and secure Buyid recognition for his eldest son, Fadl Allah Abu Taghlib al-Ghadanfar, as his successor. Mu'izz al-Dawla refused Nasir al-Dawla's offer, and again invaded Hamdanid territory. Once again Mosul and Nasibin were captured, while the Hamdanids fled to the mountain fortresses. As in 958, the Buyids were unable to maintain themselves for long in the Jazira, and soon an agreement was reached which allowed the Hamdanids to return to Mosul. This time, however, Abu Taghlib emerged as the effective leader in his father's place: it was with him, rather than the aged Nasir al-Dawla, that Mu'izz al-Dawla concluded a treaty.[32][28][33]
Later life and death
Rukn al-Dawla's struggles in northern Persia against various enemies caused Mu'izz al-Dawla to send military aid for several years. This, combined with continually having to deal with the Hamdanids, prevented Mu'izz al-Dawla from expanding the borders of his state for several years. Despite this, he managed to annex
Impact and assessment
Mu'izz al-Dawla's entrance into Baghdad in 945 began over a century of Buyid rule in Iraq, and also of
Finally, the hostility between the Turks and Daylamites in Baghdad continued to pose a problem. The Sunni Turks, who found their privileges eroded by the Daylamite troops that had entered Baghdad with their master in 945, constantly threatened to upset the internal stability of the state. Mu'izz al-Dawla at first favored the Daylamite troops but later attempted to compromise between the two groups, making a Turk named Sebük-Tegin his chief commander. 'Izz al-Dawla's ascension would soon upset this balance, however, resulting in internal disunity.
References
- ^ Wolfgang Felix & Wilferd Madelung, pp. 342–347
- ^ Iran Under The Buyids, Heribert Busse, The Cambridge History of Iran, 274.
- ^ Kennedy (2004), p. 244
- ^ Iran Under The Buyids, Heribert Busse, The Cambridge History of Iran, 257.
- ^ Miskwaihi, p. 80
- ^ Miskwaihi, p. 87
- ^ Kennedy (2004), p. 220
- ^ Kabir, p. 7
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 88
- ^ Donahue, p. 34
- ^ Canard, "Histoire," p. 513; Miskawaihi, pp. 89-90
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 86, notes that Nasir al-Dawla had effectively stopped paying the required tribute even before the Buyid takeover of Baghdad
- ^ a b Bacharach, p. 58
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 92-3; Canard, "Histoire," p. 513
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 93; Canard, "Histoire," pp. 513-4
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 93; Canard, "Histoire," p. 514
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 93-4
- ^ Miskwaihi, pp. 93-5
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 93, 95; Canard, "Histoire," p. 514
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 95; Canard, "Histoire," pp. 514-5
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 94-5; Canard, "Histoire," p. 514; Donahue, p. 34
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 99
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 95-6; Canard, "Histoire," p. 515; Donahue, p. 34
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 96-7. August 1 was the last day of 334 A.H.
- ^ a b Miskawaihi, p. 97
- ^ Miskawaihi, p. 111
- ^ Miskawaihi, pp. 112-4; Donahue; p. 35; Canard, "Hamdanids," p. 127
- ^ a b c d Bowen (1993), p. 995
- ^ Iran Under The Buyids, Heribert Busse, The Cambridge History of Iran, 263.
- ^ Kennedy (2004), p. 217
- ^ Kennedy (2004), pp. 221, 271
- ^ a b Kennedy (2004), p. 271
- ^ Canard (1986), p. 127
- ^ Iran Under The Buyids, Heribert Busse, The Cambridge History of Iran, 264.
- ^ Zettersteen and Busse, p. 484
- ^ Gil, pp. 350, 945
- ^ Iran Under The Buyids, Heribert Busse, The Cambridge History of Iran, 261.
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- Bacharach, Jere L. Islamic History through Coins: An Analysis and Catalogue of Tenth-Century Ikhshidid Coinage. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006. ISBN 977-424-930-5
- ISBN 0-521-20093-8.
- Busse, Heribert (1975). "Iran Under the Buyids". In ISBN 0-521-20093-8.
- Busse, Heribert (2004) [1969]. Chalif und Grosskönig - Die Buyiden im Irak (945-1055) [Caliph and Great King - The Buyids in Iraq (945-1055)] (in German). Würzburg: Ergon Verlag. ISBN 3-89913-005-7.
- Donohue, John J. (2003). The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334 H./945 to 403 H./1012: Shaping Institutions for the Future. Leiden and Boston: Brill. ISBN 90-04-12860-3.
- Felix, Wolfgang; Madelung, Wilferd (1995). "DEYLAMITES". In ISBN 978-1-56859-022-6.
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- Miskawaihi. The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate: the Concluding Portion of the Experiences of the Nations, Vol. II. Trans. & ed. H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth. London, 1921.
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