Neurophenomenology

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Neurophenomenology refers to a scientific research program aimed to address the hard problem of consciousness in a pragmatic way.[1] It combines neuroscience with phenomenology in order to study experience, mind, and consciousness with an emphasis on the embodied condition of the human mind.[2] The field is very much linked to fields such as neuropsychology, neuroanthropology and behavioral neuroscience (also known as biopsychology) and the study of phenomenology in psychology.

Overview

The label was coined by C. Laughlin, J. McManus and E. d'Aquili in 1990.[3] However, the term was appropriated and given a distinctive understanding by the cognitive neuroscientist Francisco Varela in the mid-1990s,[4] whose work has inspired many philosophers and neuroscientists to continue with this new direction of research.

Phenomenology is a philosophical method of inquiry of everyday experience. The focus in phenomenology is on the examination of different phenomena (from Greek, phainomenon, "that which shows itself") as they appear to consciousness, i.e. in a first-person perspective. Thus, phenomenology is a discipline particularly useful for understanding how it is that appearances present themselves to us and how it is that we attribute meaning to them.[5][6]

Neuroscience is the scientific study of the brain, and deals with the third-person aspects of consciousness.[7] Some scientists studying consciousness believe that the exclusive utilization of either first- or third-person methods will not provide answers to the difficult questions of consciousness.[8]

Historically,

epoche. Husserl, who was a former student of Franz Brentano, thought that in the study of mind it was extremely important to acknowledge that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, a concept often explained as "aboutness"; consciousness is always consciousness of something. A particular emphasis on the phenomenology of embodiment was developed by philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty
in the mid-20th century.

Naturally, phenomenology and neuroscience find a convergence of common interests. However, primarily because of ontological disagreements between phenomenology and

neurodynamical analysis has a marked Merleau-Pontyian approach.[12]

See also

References

  1. PMID 12795206
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  2. .
  3. .
  4. ^ Varela, F.J. (1 April 1996). "Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 3 (4): 330–349.
  5. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Phenomenology
  6. ^ Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. 2008. The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge, Chapter 2.
  7. ^ "Neuroscience". c.merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 21 July 2021.
  8. ^ Engel, Andreas K.; Friston, Karl J.; Kragic, Danica, eds. (2016). The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
  9. ^ Debate Between D. Chalmers and D. Dennett: The Fantasy of First-Person Science
  10. ^ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Edmund Husserl
  11. .
  12. ^ "Hubert Dreyfus 'Intelligence Without Representation: Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation'". Archived from the original on 2008-12-01. Retrieved 2008-11-06.

Further reading

External links