North American XB-70 Valkyrie
XB-70 Valkyrie | |
---|---|
XB-70 Valkyrie in flight | |
Role | Strategic bomber Supersonic research aircraft |
National origin | United States |
Manufacturer | North American Aviation (NAA) |
First flight | 21 September 1964 |
Retired | 4 February 1969 |
Status | Retired |
Primary users | United States Air Force NASA |
Number built | 2 |
The North American Aviation XB-70 Valkyrie is a retired
At these speeds, it was expected that the B-70 would be practically immune to interceptor aircraft, the only effective weapon against bomber aircraft at the time. The bomber would spend only a brief time over a particular radar station, flying out of its range before the controllers could position their fighters in a suitable location for an interception. Its high speed made the aircraft difficult to see on radar displays and its high-altitude and high-speed capabilities could not be matched by any contemporaneous Soviet interceptor or fighter aircraft.
The introduction of the first Soviet surface-to-air missiles in the late 1950s put the near-invulnerability of the B-70 in doubt. In response, the Air Force began flying its missions at low level, where the missile radar's line of sight was limited by terrain. In this low-level penetration role, the B-70 offered little additional performance over the B-52 it was meant to replace, while being far more expensive with shorter range. Alternative missions were proposed, but these were of limited scope. With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) during the late 1950s, crewed nuclear bombers were increasingly seen as obsolete.
The USAF eventually gave up fighting for its production and the B-70 program was cancelled in 1961. Development was then turned over to a research program to study the effects of long-duration high-speed flight. As a result, two prototype aircraft, designated XB-70As, were built; these aircraft were used for supersonic test-flights during 1964–69. In 1966, one prototype crashed after colliding with a smaller aircraft while flying in close formation; the remaining Valkyrie bomber is in the National Museum of the United States Air Force near Dayton, Ohio.
Development
Background
In an offshoot of
The aviation industry had been studying this problem for some time. From the mid-1940s, there was interest in using nuclear-powered aircraft as bombers.[4][5][N 1] In a conventional jet engine, thrust is provided by heating air using jet fuel and accelerating it out a nozzle. In a nuclear engine, heat is supplied by a reactor, whose consumables last for months instead of hours. Most designs also carried a small amount of jet fuel for high-power portions of flight, such as takeoffs and high-speed dashes.[4]
Another possibility being explored at the time was the use of boron-enriched "zip fuels", which increase the energy density of jet fuel by about 40 percent,[6] and could be used in modified versions of existing jet engine designs.[6] Zip fuels appeared to offer sufficient performance improvement to produce a strategic bomber with supersonic speed.
WS-110A
The Air Force followed these developments closely, and in 1955 issued General Operational Requirement No. 38 for a new bomber, combining the payload and intercontinental range of the B-52 with the Mach 2 top speed of the Convair B-58 Hustler.[7][N 2] The new bomber was expected to enter service in 1963.[8] Nuclear and conventional designs were considered. The nuclear-powered bomber was organized as "Weapon System 125A" and pursued simultaneously with the jet-powered version, "Weapon System 110A".[9]
The USAF Air Research and Development Command's (ARDC) requirement for WS-110A asked for a chemical-fuel bomber with Mach 0.9 cruising speed and "maximum possible" speed during a 1,000-nautical-mile (1,200 mi; 1,900 km) entrance and exit from the target. The requirement also called for a 50,000-pound (23,000 kg) payload and a combat radius of 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 mi; 7,400 km).[11] The Air Force formed similar requirements for a WS-110L intercontinental reconnaissance system in 1955, but this was later canceled in 1958 due to better options.[12][13][14] In July 1955, six contractors were selected to bid on WS-110A studies.[9] Boeing and North American Aviation submitted proposals, and on 8 November 1955 were awarded contracts for Phase 1 development.[13]
In mid-1956, initial designs were presented by the two companies.
The two designs had takeoff weights of about 750,000 pounds (340,000 kg) with large fuel loads. The Air Force evaluated the designs, and in September 1956 deemed them too large and complicated for operations.[18] General Curtis LeMay was dismissive, declaiming, "This is not an airplane, it's a three-ship formation."[19] The USAF ended Phase 1 development in October 1956 and instructed the two contractors to continue design studies.[16][18][20]
New designs
While the original proposals were being studied, advances in supersonic flight were proceeding rapidly. The narrow delta was establishing itself as a preferred planform for supersonic flight, replacing earlier designs like the swept-wing and trapezoidal layouts seen on designs like the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and the earlier WS-110 concepts. Engines able to cope with higher temperatures were also under development, allowing for sustained supersonic speeds.[18]
This work led to an interesting discovery: when an engine was optimized specifically for high speed, it burned perhaps twice as much fuel at that speed than when it was running at subsonic speeds. However, the aircraft would be flying as much as four times as fast. Thus its most economical cruise speed, in terms of fuel per mile, was its maximum speed. This was entirely unexpected and implied that there was no point in the dash concept; if the aircraft was able to reach Mach 3, it may as well fly its entire mission at that speed. The question remained whether such a concept was technically feasible, but by March 1957, engine development and wind tunnel testing had progressed enough to suggest that it was.[18]
WS-110 was redesigned to fly at Mach 3 for the entire mission. Zip fuel was retained for the engine's afterburner to increase range.[18][21] Both North American and Boeing returned new designs with very long fuselages and large delta wings. They differed primarily in engine layout; the NAA design arranged its six engines in a semi-circular duct under the rear fuselage, while the Boeing design used separate podded engines located individually on pylons below the wing,[17] like the Hustler.
North American scoured available literature to find any additional advantage. This led them to an obscure report by two
North American improved on the basic concept by adding a set of drooping wing-tip panels that were lowered at high speed. This helped trap the shock wave under the wing between the downturned wing tips. It also added more vertical surface to the aircraft to maintain directional stability at high speeds.
The buildup of heat due to
On 30 August 1957, the Air Force decided that enough data were available on the NAA and Boeing designs that a competition could begin. On 18 September, the Air Force issued operational requirements that called for a cruising speed of Mach 3.0 to 3.2, an over-target altitude of 70,000–75,000 ft (21,000–23,000 m), a range of up to 10,500 miles (16,900 km), and a gross weight not to exceed 490,000 pounds (220,000 kg). The aircraft would have to use the hangars, runways and handling procedures used by the B-52. On 23 December 1957, the North American proposal was declared the winner of the competition, and on 24 January 1958, a contract was issued for Phase 1 development.[14]
In February 1958, the proposed bomber was designated B-70,[14] with the prototypes receiving the "X" experimental prototype designation. The name "Valkyrie" was the winning submission in early 1958, selected from 20,000 entries in a USAF "Name the B-70" contest.[28] The Air Force approved an 18-month program acceleration in March 1958 that rescheduled the first flight to December 1961.[14] But in late 1958 the service announced that this acceleration would not be possible due to lack of funding.[29] In December 1958, a Phase II contract was issued. The mockup of the B-70 was reviewed by the Air Force in March 1959. Provisions for air-to-surface missiles and external fuel tanks were requested afterward.[30] At the same time, North American was developing the F-108 supersonic interceptor. To reduce program costs, the F-108 would share two of the engines, the escape capsule, and some smaller systems with the B-70.[31] In early 1960, North American and the USAF released the first drawing of the XB-70 to the public.[32]
The "missile problem"
The B-70 was planned to use a high-speed, high-altitude bombing approach that followed a trend of bombers flying progressively faster and higher since the start of crewed bomber use.
As early as 1942, German flak commanders had already concluded that AAA would be essentially useless against jet aircraft, and began development of guided missiles to fill this role.[34] Most forces reached the same conclusion soon afterwards, with both the US and UK starting missile development programs before the war ended.[35] The UK's Green Mace was one of the last attempts to develop a useful high-altitude AAA weapon, but its development ended in 1957.[36]
Interceptor aircraft with ever-improving performance remained the only effective anti-bomber weapons by the early 1950s, and even these were having problems keeping up with the latest designs; Soviet interceptors during the late 1950s could not intercept the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance aircraft,[37] despite its relatively low speeds. It was later discovered that flying faster also made radar detection much more difficult due to an effect known as the blip-to-scan ratio, and any reduction in tracking efficiency would further interfere with the operation and guidance of fighters.[38]
The introduction of the first effective anti-aircraft missiles by the late 1950s changed this picture dramatically.
Faced with this problem, military doctrine had already started shifting away from high-altitude supersonic bombing toward low-altitude penetration. Radar is line-of-sight, so aircraft could dramatically shorten detection distances by flying close to the Earth and hiding behind terrain.[41] Missile sites spaced to overlap in range when attacking bombers at high altitudes would leave large gaps between their coverage for bombers flying at lower levels. With an appropriate map of the missile sites, the bombers could fly between and around the defenses. Additionally, early missiles generally flew unguided for a period of time before the radar systems were able to track the missile and start sending it guidance signals. With the SA-2 missile, this minimum altitude was roughly 2,000 feet (600 m).[42]
Flying at low level provided protection against fighters as well. Radars of the era did not have the ability to look down (see look-down/shoot-down); if a higher altitude aircraft's radar was aimed down to detect targets at a lower altitude, the reflection of the ground would overwhelm the signal returned from a target. An interceptor flying at normal altitudes would be effectively blind to bombers far below it. The interceptor could descend to lower altitudes to increase the amount of visible sky, but doing so would limit its radar range in the same way as the missile sites, as well as greatly increasing fuel use and thus reducing mission time. The Soviet Union would not introduce an interceptor with look-down capability until 1972 with the High Lark radar in the MiG-23M, and even this model had very limited capability.[43]
Strategic Air Command found itself in an uncomfortable position; bombers had been tuned for efficiency at high speeds and altitudes, performance that had been purchased at great cost in both engineering and financial terms. Before the B-70 was to replace the B-52 in the long-range role, SAC had introduced the
The B-70, designed for even higher speeds, altitudes and range than the B-58, suffered even more in relative terms. At high altitudes, the B-70 was as much as four times as fast as the B-52, but at low altitudes it was limited to only Mach 0.95, only modestly faster than the B-52 at the same altitudes. It also had a smaller bomb load and shorter range.[10] Its only major advantage would be its ability to use high speed in areas without missile cover, especially on the long journey from the US to USSR. The value was limited; the USAF's doctrine stressed that the primary reason for maintaining the bomber force in an era of ICBMs was that the bombers could remain in the air at long ranges from their bases and were thus immune to sneak attack.[45] In this case, the higher speed would be used for only a short period of time between the staging areas and the Soviet coastline.
Adding to the problems, the zip fuel program was canceled in 1959.
Downsizing, upswing, cancellation
At two secret meetings on 16 and 18 November 1959, the
Then interest increased due to the politics of presidential campaign of 1960. A central plank of John F. Kennedy's campaign was that Eisenhower and the Republicans were weak on defense, and pointed to the B-70 as an example. He told a San Diego audience near NAA facilities, "I endorse wholeheartedly the B-70 manned aircraft."[50] Kennedy also made similar campaign claims regarding other aircraft: near the Seattle Boeing plant he affirmed the need for B-52s and in Fort Worth he praised the B-58.[51]
The Air Force changed the program to full weapon development and awarded a contract for an XB-70 prototype and 11 YB-70s in August 1960.[49][52] In November 1960, the B-70 program received a $265 million (equivalent to $2.6 billion today) appropriation from Congress for FY 1961.[53][54] Nixon, trailing in his home state of California, also publicly endorsed the B-70, and on 30 October Eisenhower helped the Republican campaign with a pledge of an additional $155 million ($1.5 billion today) for the B-70 development program.[55]
On taking office in January 1961, Kennedy was informed that the missile gap was an illusion.[56][N 4] On 28 March 1961,[57] after $800 million (equivalent to $7.8 billion today) had been spent on the B-70 program, Kennedy canceled the project as "unnecessary and economically unjustifiable"[55] because it "stood little chance of penetrating enemy defenses successfully."[58] Instead, Kennedy recommended "the B-70 program be carried forward essentially to explore the problem of flying at three times the speed of sound with an airframe potentially useful as a bomber."[55] After Congress approved $290 million ($2.8 billion today) of B-70 "add-on" funds to the President's 12 May 1960 modified FY 1961 budget, the Administration decided on a "Planned Usage" of only $100 million ($980 million today) of these funds. The Department of Defense subsequently presented data to Congress that the B-70 would add little performance for the high cost.[59]
However, after becoming the new Air Force Chief of Staff in July 1961,
Experimental aircraft
The XB-70s were intended to be used for the advanced study of
The data from the XB-70 test flights and aerospace materials development were used in the later
Design
The Valkyrie was designed to be a high-altitude Mach 3 bomber with six engines.
The XB-70 used compression lift, which resulted from a shock wave generated by the leading edge of the engine intake splitter below the apex of the wing.[77] At Mach 3 cruising speed, the shock wave is bent back about 65 degrees and the wing is superimposed on the shock system which has a pressure 40 pounds per square foot (1.9 kPa) higher under the aircraft than in front of the shock. The compression lift provided five percent of the total lift.[78] Camber was added to the wing leading edge inboard of the folding tips to improve subsonic handling and reduce supersonic drag. The outer portions of the wings were hinged to pivot downward by 65 degrees, acting as a type of variable-geometry wingtip device. This increased the aircraft's directional stability at supersonic speeds, shifted the center of pressure to a more favorable position at high speeds, and caused the shock originating at the intake splitter to reflect from the vertical tip surface giving additional compression lift.[79]
Like a number of other delta-wing aircraft designed for supersonic speeds (Concorde, Tu-144, FD2), the Valkyrie needed a feature to improve the pilot's view during nose-high low-speed flight and on the ground. An outer windshield and ramp, which could be lowered, was provided enabling viewing through the fixed cockpit windshield. With the ramp raised into its high-speed position, the forebody was more streamlined. Rain removal and windshield anti-ice was accomplished by utilizing 600 °F (320 °C) bleed air from the engines.[80] The lower forward section included a radar bay, and production machines were to be equipped with a refueling receptacle on the upper surface of the forward fuselage.[81]
The XB-70 was equipped with six
Operational history
The XB-70's maiden flight was on 21 September 1964.[85] In the first flight test, between Palmdale and Edwards AFB, one engine had to be shut down shortly after take-off, and an undercarriage malfunction warning meant that the flight was flown with the undercarriage down as a precaution, limiting speed to 390 mph (630 km/h) – about half that planned.[86] During landing, the rear wheels of the port side main gear locked, the tires ruptured, and a fire started.[87][88]
The Valkyrie first became supersonic (Mach 1.1) on the third test flight on 12 October 1964, and flew above Mach 1 for 40 minutes during the following flight on 24 October. The wing tips were also lowered partially in this flight. XB-70 No. 1 surpassed Mach 3 on 14 October 1965 by reaching Mach 3.02 at 70,000 ft (21,000 m).[89] The first aircraft was found to suffer from weaknesses in the honeycomb panels, primarily due to inexperience with fabrication and quality control of this new material.[7] On two occasions, honeycomb panels failed and were torn off during supersonic flight, necessitating a Mach 2.5 limit being placed on the aircraft.[90]
The deficiencies discovered on AV-1 were almost completely solved on the second XB-70, which first flew on 17 July 1965. On 3 January 1966, XB-70 No. 2 attained a speed of Mach 3.05 while flying at 72,000 ft (22,000 m). AV-2 reached a top speed of Mach 3.08 and maintained it for 20 minutes on 12 April 1966.[91] On 19 May 1966, AV-2 reached Mach 3.06 and flew at Mach 3 for 32 minutes, covering 2,400 mi (3,900 km) in 91 minutes of total flight.[92]
Longest flight | 3:40 hours | 6 January 1966 |
Fastest speed | 2,020 mph (3,250 km/h) | 12 January 1966 |
Highest altitude | 74,000 ft (23,000 m) | 19 March 1966 |
Highest Mach number | Mach 3.08 | 12 April 1966 |
Sustained Mach 3 | 32 minutes | 19 May 1966 |
Mach 3 total | 108 minutes/10 flights | – |
A joint NASA/USAF research program was conducted from 3 November 1966 to 31 January 1967 for measuring the intensity and signature of sonic booms for the National Sonic Boom Program. Testing was planned to cover a range of sonic boom overpressures on the ground similar to but higher than those anticipated from the proposed American
The second flight research program (NASA NAS4-1174) investigated "control of structural dynamics" from 25 April 1967 through the XB-70's last flight in 1969.[98][99] At high altitude and high speed, the XB-70A experienced unwanted changes in altitude.[100] NASA testing from June 1968 included two small vanes on the nose of AV-1 for measuring the response of the aircraft's stability augmentation system.[99][101] AV-1 flew a total of 83 flights.[102]
The XB-70's last supersonic flight took place on 17 December 1968. On 4 February 1969, AV-1 took its final flight to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for museum display (now the National Museum of the United States Air Force).[103] Flight data was collected on this subsonic trip.[104] North American Rockwell completed a four-volume report on the B-70 that was published by NASA in April 1972.[105]
Variants
- XB-70A
- Prototype of B-70. Two were built.
- XB-70B
- AV-3, NAA Model Number NA-274, USAF S/N 62-0208, was originally to be the first YB-70A in March 1961. This advanced prototype was canceled during early manufacture.[70][109]
- YB-70
- Planned preproduction version with improvements based on XB-70s.[49][52]
- B-70A
- Planned bomber production version of Valkyrie.[7] A fleet of up to 65 operational bombers was planned.[110]
- RS-70
- Proposed reconnaissance-strike version with a crew of four and in-flight refueling capability.[10]
Incidents and accidents
Incidents
On 7 May 1965, a 3-foot (1 m) piece of the apex of the wing broke off in flight and caused extensive damage to five of the six engines. They were sent to GE and repaired. The sixth engine was inspected and re-installed in the aircraft.[111]
On 14 October 1965, AV-1 surpassed Mach 3, but heat and stress damaged the honeycomb panels, leaving 2 ft (60 cm) of the leading edge of the left wing missing. The first aircraft was limited to Mach 2.5 afterwards.[90]
Mid-air collision
On 8 June 1966, XB-70A No. 2 was in close formation with four other aircraft (an F-4 Phantom, an F-5, a T-38 Talon, and an F-104 Starfighter) for a photoshoot at the behest of General Electric, manufacturer of the engines of all five aircraft. A sixth aircraft, a Learjet 23, had been contracted by General Electric to photograph the formation.[112]
After the photoshoot, the F-104 drifted into the XB-70's right wingtip, flipped and rolled inverted over the top of the Valkyrie, before striking the bomber's vertical stabilizers and left wing. The F-104 then exploded, destroying the Valkyrie's vertical stabilizers and damaging its left wing. Despite the loss of both vertical stabilizers and damage to the wings, the Valkyrie flew straight for 16 seconds before it entered an uncontrollable spin and crashed north of Barstow, California. NASA Chief Test Pilot Joe Walker (F-104 pilot) and Carl Cross (XB-70 co-pilot) were killed. Al White (XB-70 pilot) ejected, sustaining serious injuries, including the crushing of his arm by the closing clamshell-like escape crew capsule moments prior to ejection.[113][114]
The USAF summary report of the accident investigation stated that, given the position of the F-104 relative to the XB-70, Walker, the F-104 pilot, would not have been able to see the XB-70's wing, except by uncomfortably looking back over his left shoulder. The report said that it was likely that Walker maintained his position by looking at the fuselage of the XB-70, forward of his position. The F-104 was estimated to be 70 ft (21 m) to the side of the fuselage of the XB-70 and 10 ft (3.0 m) below. The report concluded that from that position, without appropriate sight cues, Walker was unable to properly perceive his motion relative to the Valkyrie, leading to his aircraft drifting into the XB-70's wing.[101][115] The accident investigation also pointed to the wake vortex from the XB-70's right wingtip as the reason for the F-104's sudden roll over and into the bomber.[115]
The General Electric photoshoot had not been authorized by the Air Force. Following the catastrophe, Col. Albert W. Cate was dismissed from his position, and Col. Joe Cotton, Col. James G. Smith and John S. McCollom were issued reprimands.[116][112][117]
Aircraft on display
Valkyrie AV-1 (AF Ser. No. 62-0001) is on display at the
Specifications (XB-70A)
Data from Pace,[122] USAF XB-70 Fact sheet[107] B-70 Aircraft Study,[123][124][83]
General characteristics
- Crew: 2
- Length: 185 ft 0 in (56.39 m)
- Wingspan: 105 ft 0 in (32.00 m)
- Height: 30 ft 0 in (9.14 m)
- Wing area: 6,297 sq ft (585.0 m2)
- Airfoil: Hexagonal; 0.30 Hex modified root, 0.70 Hex modified tip
- Empty weight: 253,600 lb (115,031 kg)
- Gross weight: 534,700 lb (242,536 kg)
- Max takeoff weight: 542,000 lb (245,847 kg)
- Fuel capacity: 300,000 pounds (140,000 kg) / 46,745 US gal (38,923 imp gal; 176,950 L)
- Powerplant: 6 × General Electric YJ93 afterburning turbojet, 19,900 lbf (89 kN) thrust each dry, 28,000 lbf (120 kN) with afterburner
Performance
- Maximum speed: 1,787 kn (2,056 mph, 3,310 km/h)
- Maximum speed: Mach 3.1
- Cruise speed: 1,738 kn (2,000 mph, 3,219 km/h)
- Combat range: 3,725 nmi (4,287 mi, 6,899 km)
- Service ceiling: 77,350 ft (23,580 m)
- Lift-to-drag: about 6 at Mach 2
- Wing loading: 84.93 lb/sq ft (414.7 kg/m2)
- Thrust/weight: 0.314
See also
- Pye Wacket, a program to develop a defensive missile to be carried by the B-70
- ArmaLite AR-5 survival rifle (originally developed for XB-70 aircrew survival kits)
Related development
Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era
Related lists
- List of bomber aircraft
- List of military aircraft of the United States
Notes
- ^ Quote by Theodore von Kármán (1945): "The size and performance of the craft driven by atomic power would depend mainly on ... reducing the engine weight to the limiting value which makes flight at a certain speed possible."[4]
- ^ The NB-58 Hustler was used for XB-70 engine testing, and the TB-58 was used for XB-70 chase and training.
- ^ Quote: "deleterious to metallic components".[46]
- ^ Wiesner ... a member of Eisenhower's permanent Science Advisory Committee, explained that the missile gap was a fiction. The new president greeted the news with a single expletive "delivered more in anger than in relief".... Herken 1961, p. 140. This quote taken from Herken's interview with Wiesner conducted 9 February 1982.
- ^ In response to the British/French treaty in 1962 that lead to the Concorde SST, President John F. Kennedy began the American SST project in June 1963.[58] North American entered a design with some elements from the B-70, but it was eliminated from the competition in June 1964.[58]
- ^ Following the 1963 formation of the National Supersonic Transport program, the 1964 Oklahoma City sonic boom tests "influenced the 1971 cancellation of the Boeing 2707 supersonic transport and led to the United States' complete withdrawal from SST design."
References
Citations
- ^ The World’s Fastest Bomber: The XB-70 Valkyrie, archived from the original on 22 January 2024, retrieved 23 January 2024
- ^ Jane's all the World's Aircraft 1963-1964, p. 254.
- ^ York 1978, p. 70.
- ^ a b c von Kármán, Theodore. "Where We Stand: First Report to General of the Army H. H. Arnold on Long Range Research Problems of the Air Forces with a Review of German Plans and Developments". Atomic Energy for Jet Propulsion. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 22 August 1945.
- ^ Bikowicz, Brian D. "Atomic Powered Aircraft – Politics" Archived 7 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Atomicengines.com. Retrieved: 24 May 2011.
- ^ a b c Schubert, Dave. "From Missiles to Medicine: The development of boron hydrides" Archived 23 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine. Pioneer Magazine, March 2001.
- ^ a b c Jenkins 1999, Ch. 1.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 9.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 9–10.
- ^ a b c B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol II. pp. II-2.
- ^ Knaack 1988, pp. 560–561.
- ^ Knaack 1988, pp. 561, 566.
- ^ a b Pace 1988, p. 14.
- ^ a b c d Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 17.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 13–14.
- ^ a b Knaack 1988, p. 563.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 15–16.
- ^ a b c d e f Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 14–15.
- ^ Rees 1960, pp. 125–126.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. I, pp. I-34–I-38.
- ^ Conway 2005, p. 33.
- ^ Rees 1960, p. 126.
- ^ a b Pace 1988, p. 16.
- ^ Winchester 2005, p. 187.
- ^ Talay, Theodore A., ed. "Dynamic Longitudinal, Directional, and Lateral Stability" Archived 20 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Centennial of Flight Commission, 2003. Retrieved: 24 May 2011.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. III., pp. III-10, III-31, III-141, III-210.
- ^ a b B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. III., pp. III-496 to III-498.
- ^ Pace 1988, p. 17.
- ^ Knaack 1988, p. 566.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 24.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 18, 26.
- ^ "Here's A Peek At Tomorrow's Huge Planes" Archived 9 July 2023 at the Wayback Machine. Popular Mechanics, April 1960, p. 86.
- ^ Spick 1986, pp. 4–5.
- ^ ISBN 0700614206.
- ^ Cagle, Mary (30 June 1959). Nike Ajax Historical Monograph. U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command. p. I. Archived from the original on 9 July 2013. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
- ISBN 978-0851772257.
- ISBN 0-316-74300-3.
- ^ Pedlow and Welzenbach 1992, p. 9.
- ^ Jenkins 1999, p. 21.
- ^ Pedlow and Welzenbach 1992, p. 2.
- ^ Spick 1986, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Hannah 2002, p. 68.
- ^ Koenig and Scofield 1983, p. 132.
- ^ Miller 1985, p. 69.
- ^ Barry, John. "Bye-Bye Bomber?" Archived 14 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine. Newsweek, 11 December 2009.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 98.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 25–26.
- Eisenhower Presidential Library. Archived from the originalon 16 August 2011.
- Goodpaster (24 June 1959). Memorandum of Conference with the President: June 23, 1959 – 11:40 am. Box 1: Joint Chiefs of Staff (6) (Report).
DECLASSIFIED ... 4/10/79
- Goodpaster (December 1959). Memorandum of Conference with the President: November 16, 1959. [probably box 3] (Report). The memo for the 18 November meeting took two months to write, e.g., due to the transcription time.
- Goodpaster (20 January 1960). Memorandum of Conference with the President: November 18, 1959 – Augusta. Box 4: Joint Chiefs of Staff (8) (Report).
DECLASSIFIED ... 18 January 1981
Note: 18 November meeting quotations in this article are Goodpaster's paraphrasing of White & Eisenhower (e.g., "said he [Eisenhower] thought we [White, Goodpaster, et al]") – possibly from an audio recording if one was made at Augusta.
- Goodpaster (24 June 1959). Memorandum of Conference with the President: June 23, 1959 – 11:40 am. Box 1: Joint Chiefs of Staff (6) (Report).
- ^ a b c Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 26.
- ^ Zuckert, Eugene M. "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?". Foreign Affairs, April 1966. Retrieved: 8 December 2008.
- ^ Kennedy, John F. "Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Civic Auditorium, Seattle, WA" Archived 2 October 2012 at the Wayback Machine. The American Presidency Project at ucsb.edu. Retrieved: 30 May 2011.
- ^ a b Taube, Vol I, pp. I-29, I-31, I-37, I-38, I-47.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 26–27.
- ^ York 1978, p. 56.
- ^ a b c Kennedy, John F. "Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, Horton Plaza, San Diego, CA, 2 November 1960" Archived 14 September 2012 at the Wayback Machine. The American Presidency Project at ucsb.edu. Retrieved: 6 April 2009.
"1961 Budget Message" Archived 19 September 2020 at the Wayback Machine. Kennedy Archives, 28 March 1961, pp. I-38. - ^ Preble, Christopher A. "Who Ever Believed in the 'Missile Gap'?: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security". Presidential Studies Quarterly, December 2003, pp. 816, 819.
- ^ Knaack 1988, p. 569.
- ^ a b c Greenwood 1995, p. 289.
- ISBN 978-0-7658-0993-3. Retrieved: 31 May 2011.
- ^ "House Unit 'Directs' Production of B-70." The New York Times, 1 March 1962.
- ^ Pace 1988, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 28, 73.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. I, p. I-39.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 27–28.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. I, pp. I-39–I-44.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. I. pp. I-41, I-88.
- ^ "XB70A triggers burst of applause". Eugene Register-Guard. (Oregon). Associated Press. 11 May 1964. p. 5A. Archived from the original on 31 January 2023. Retrieved 31 December 2020.
- ^ "First look at new plane". Spokane Daily Chronicle. (Washington). AP photo. 11 May 1964. p. 2. Archived from the original on 15 September 2023. Retrieved 31 December 2020.
- ^ Boyne, Walter J. "The Ride of the Valkyrie" Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. Air Force Magazine, June 2006. Retrieved: 29 October 2008.
- ^ a b c Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 39.
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- ^ Moon 1989, p. 92.
- ISBN 0-07-134271-0.
- ISBN 1-904687-84-9.
- ^ Heppenheimer 2006, pp. 96, 112, 116.
- ^ von Braun 1975, p. 122.
- ^ Jenkins & Landis 2002, p. 49
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 76.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. III. p. III–162.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 75–76.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 81.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. III. pp. III–476, III–479.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 83–84.
- USAF, Series 25 June 65 (original publication: 31 August 1964), pp. 1-40B, 1–49.
- ^ "Troubles plague bomber's flight". Spokesman-Review. (Spokane, Washington). Associated Press. 21 September 1964. p. 2. Archived from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved 1 January 2017.
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- ^ "Impressive video of an XB-70 Valkyrie Mach 3 bomber's emergency landing". 9 December 2015. Archived from the original on 8 July 2017. Retrieved 5 June 2017.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 50.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 54.
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- ^ Pace 1990, pp. 76–82.
- ^ Jenkins and Landis 2002, pp. 62–63.
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- ^ Pace 1988, pp. 62–69.
- ^ B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. I. pp. I–32, I-43.
- ^ a b B-70 Aircraft Study, Vol. II. pp. II–5 to II-6.
- ^ Jenkins 1997, p. 45.
- ^ a b Jenkins and Landis 2002, p. 60.
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- ^ a b "Colonel loses post over XB-70 crash." Archived 2 November 2023 at the Wayback Machine Tuscaloosa News, August 16, 1966, p. 1.
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- Jenkins, Dennis R. and Tony R. Landis. North American XB-70A Valkyrie WarbirdTech Volume 34. North Branch, Minnesota: Specialty Press, 2002. ISBN 1-580-07056-6.
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- Knaack, Marcelle Size. Post-World War II bombers, 1945–1973. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988. ISBN 0-16-002260-6.
- Koenig, William and Peter Scofield. Soviet Military Power. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983. ISBN 978-0-85368-592-0.
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Further reading
- Eisenhower Presidential Library.
- Goodpaster (24 June 1959). Memorandum of Conference with the President: June 23, 1959 – 11:40 am (Technical report). Subject Series, Dept. of Defense Subseries, Box 1: Joint Chiefs of Staff (6).
DECLASSIFIED ... 4/10/79
{{cite tech report}}
: CS1 maint: location (link) - Goodpaster (2 December 1959). Memorandum of Conference with the President: Monday, 16 November 1959, Augusta, Georgia, 8:30 am (Technical report). Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961 [Ann Whitman File]; DDE Diary Series Box No 46; Staff Notes—Nov 1959 (3). pp. 6–7 (B–70).
DECLASSIFIED ... 23 August 1979
{{cite tech report}}
: CS1 maint: location (link) - Goodpaster (20 January 1960). Memorandum of Conference with the President: November 18, 1959 – Augusta (Technical report). Subject Series, Dept. of Defense Subseries, Box 4; Joint Chiefs of Staff (8) [September 1959 – May 1960] & Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961 [Ann Whitman File]; DDE Diary Series Box No 46. pp. 6–8 (B–70).
DECLASSIFIED ... 18 January 1981
{{cite tech report}}
: CS1 maint: location (link) - Goodpaster (21 November 1960). Memorandum for the Record: Meeting ... Augusta, November 19, 1959 – from 8:30 am to approximately 10:20 am (Technical report). Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961 [Ann Whitman File]; DDE Diary Series Box No 45; Staff Notes—Nov. 1959 (6).
DECLASSIFIED ... 1/6/78
{{cite tech report}}
: CS1 maint: location (link)
External links
- Pike, Iain (25 June 1964). "B-70 The State of the Art Improver Part 1". Flight International: 1055–1062. Archived from the original on 1 March 2014.
- Pike, Iain (2 July 1964). "B-70 The State of the Art Improver Part 2". Flight International: 18–24. Archived from the original on 1 March 2014.
- Summary of preliminary data derived from the XB-70 airplanes at the Internet Archive
- "XB-70 Valkyrie Supersonic Bomber Flight Test Program Restored Color -1966" on YouTube
- Landis, Tony R., ed. (23 November 2020). A Look Back... NAA B-70 Valkyrie Variants, A Future That Never Was... (PDF). Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) History & Heritage Program. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 January 2021.