Operation Chengiz Khan
Operation Chengiz Khan | |||||||
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Part of the Faridkot | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Indian Air Force | Pakistan Air Force | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Pratap Chandra Lal |
Abdul Rahim Khan | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Anti-aircraft guns missilesSAM |
36 aircraft in first two waves 15 aircraft in a third wave | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
No material damage to most of the IAF airfields, with only the runways at Amritsar getting cratered and a radar station destroyed.[4] Most airfields repaired within same night.[5] | 4 aircraft reportedly shot down in response.[4] |
Operation Chengiz Khan was the code name assigned to the preemptive strikes carried out by the
Not withstanding the multiplicity of targets, the Pakistani air strikes were ineffectual and failed to inflict any material damage to the IAF air fields, only cratering the runways at Amritsar and destroying a radar station.[4][6] The PAF reportedly lost four aircraft during the raid.[4]
In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the air strikes to be a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial air strikes the same night, which were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning. Statements released by both nations the next day confirmed the "existence of a state of war between the two countries", although neither government formally issued a declaration of war.
Background
In March 1971,
Pakistan came under increasing criticism[9] from India, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe as the plight of the refugees and their impact on the Indian economy were highlighted by Indira Gandhi in the UN and on a number of global tours.[10] However, the United States and China showed little interest in the situation and actively opposed aid, intervention or support to the Mukti Bahini[11][12] (possibly fearing advancement of Soviet influence deep into South Asia[9]). India's aid to the Mukti Bahini continued unabated, and fighting between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani forces grew increasingly vicious. On 9 August 1971, India signed a twenty-year cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union[13] in which each promised military support to the other in the event it was attacked. This provided India cover against any possible Chinese or American intervention in aid of Pakistan if it went to war with India. To the Pakistani leadership, it became clear that armed Indian intervention and secession of East Pakistan was becoming inevitable.[14]
The strategy of pre-emption
This section needs additional citations for verification. (January 2015) |
By October 1971, the Mukti Bahini had started launching massive raids deep into East Pakistan with "alleged" active support of the Indian Army troops.
This policy made the assumptions that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, General.
A second objective for the PAF was to conduct air interdiction against the supply routes for the Indian troops opposing Khan's proposed offensive, but these were accorded as secondary targets to be engaged after the operation started.[citation needed]
The PAF's strikes were based on the same strategy of pre-emptive neutralization of enemy air capability used by the Israeli Air Force against Egyptian and Arab air forces in Operation Focus during the Six-Day War of 1967.[20][21]
The decision to hit India with a pre-emptive air strike was taken on 30 November 1971 during a meeting among the Pakistani President, General
The objectives of the strike were:[citation needed]
- To surprise the IAF by attacking its forward airfieldswhen it was least expected.
- To neutralize these in order to obtain at least temporary battlefield air superiorityin the West.
- To counter-balance the Indian numerical advantage by hitting the forward operating bases of the Indian Air Force as a measure reducing the weight of expected counterattacks on PAF's own bases.
To achieve surprise, the decision was made to strike on a Friday, the day of the
The II Corps offensive into Punjab
Under Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's II Corps offensive plan involved driving east from the vicinity of Bahawalnagar to cross the international border and push towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana in India's "Foxtrot Sector" or "F Sector."[22]
While describing the situation in the "F sector" of India, John H. Gill writes:
With poor dispositions and inept leadership, India's 67 Brigade lost a significant parcel of land to Pakistan's 105 Brigade despite repeated and costly counterattacks. Fortunately for India, indecision on the part of Pakistan's high command kept its potentially powerful II Corps from executing a planned offensive against India's “Foxtrot Sector” (or simply “F Sector”).
The II Corps offensive plan called for 105 Brigade and 25 Brigade to come under II Corps, while IV Corps advanced from its positions along the Ravi.[22]
The PAF had also positioned mobile radar and pre-stocked forward airfields in the proposed battle area to support the planned attack.[23]
Army headquarters ordered II Corps to shift to its forward assembly areas on 14 December and major elements of 1 Armored Division began to move the following day, while the 7 Division was also concentrating south of the Sutlej. However, by now, a major part of II Corps, 33 Division, had been broken up to reinforce Pakistani units against Indian offensives elsewhere.[24]
Thus, the II Corps offensive was deprived of approximately one third of its striking power before it had even begun.
On 16 December, Army headquarters issued new orders “freezing all movements” until further notice. Trains carrying equipment of 1 Division were unloaded, and II Corps, with its units on both sides of the Sutlej, settled in to await orders. If the operation had proceeded as planned, the corps would likely have launched their attack in the early morning of December 17. However, due to the "freeze" order, they remained on the Pakistan side of the border and were unable to cross before the cease-fire came into effect at 2000 hours on the same day.[25]
Pakistan's failure to launch the offensive in a timely manner has generated great controversy among subsequent commentators.[22][verification needed]
The first strikes
The final orders for the strike were issued at 17:30 hrs on Friday 3 December 1971. The first formations were in flight and heading for their targets by 17:40 hrs. Officially, it was announced via government channels that the airstrikes were launched in response to attacks along the western border on
The first of the strikes were mounted against
At 17:45 hrs, four Mirages flying from
Within forty-five minutes of these strikes, Pakistani troops had shelled India's western frontier and were reported to have crossed the border at Punch in the state of Jammu.[10]
Followup counter-air strikes
The third wave of the PAF counter air strikes were directed to strike
Ambala Airbase was a hit by a two plane B-57 formation led by Wg. Cdr. Rais Rafi. The flight hit the runway with eight bombs, causing minor damage.
Like Ambala, Agra Airbase, which lay deepest among the PAF's targets that evening, was struck by a two-plane B-57 formation led by Wg. Cdr. Yunus and followed by Flight Lieutenant Mazhar Bukhari. The bombs dropped by Yunus did not explode. Rais Rafi explained the old age of the bombs as the reason for their ineffectiveness as these were supposed to be used in the Second World War.[28] The first Indian counter strikes launched that very night included the Canberras of No.5 Sqn[29] based at Agra.
Sirsa was hit by Sqn. Ldr. Alvi with bombs equipped with time-delayed fuses, damaging the runway heavily and forcing the runway to be closed for the rest of the night.[26]
Four
In the south, Sqn. Ldr. Ishtak Qureshi's bombs hit the underground power cable at Jaisalmer, cutting off the power supply and telephone connection for six hours. At the same time, Jodhpur was hit by two B-57s led by Sqn. Ldr. Sohail Mansur while Jamnagar was hit by Flt. Lt. Ejaz Azam.[5]
The Indian retaliation
As Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the nation on radio shortly after midnight The PAF units stationed on these airfields had to operate from taxiways for the following two days.
Through the night the Indian Air Force also
Analysis
Of its stated objectives, the PAF was unable to neutralize the Indian Air Force in the west,[10] which on its part had dispersed its aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters, suffering only minor damage to a few aircraft.[32]
As Newsweek magazine (1971) described the attack:
Trying to catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan, launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that one rapid attack would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert, Pakistani pilots were inept, and Yahya's strategy of scattering his thin air force over a dozen air fields was a bust![33]
See also
- Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation War
- Military plans of the Bangladesh Liberation War
- Mitro Bahini order of battle
- Pakistan Army order of battle, December 1971
- Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan
References
- ISBN 978-0300173789.
- ISBN 9780231507400.
- ISBN 978-0815722748.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-87474-680-8.
- ^ a b c d e "My years with the IAF" by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal
- ISBN 9781000317664.
- ^ "Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971". Gendercide watch. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ "Emerging Discontent, 1966–70". Country Studies Bangladesh. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ a b Donaldson 1972
- ^ a b c d e f "India and Pakistan: Over the Edge". TIMES magazine. 1971-12-13. Archived from the original on October 11, 2007. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ Sheren, Syeda Momtaz (2012). "War of Liberation, The". In Islam, Sirajul; Jamal, Ahmed A. (eds.). Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Second ed.). Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.
- ^ Remarks of President Richard M Nixon on 10 April 1971 at State Department signing of Biological Weapons Convention.
.Every Great Power must follow the principle that it should not directly or indirectly allow any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbors.
USIS Text, pp 1–2.
- ^ Kapur 1972
- ^ a b "Bangladesh: Out of War, a Nation Is Born". Time. Vol. 98, no. 25. 1971-12-20. Archived from the original on January 12, 2007. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ Ahmed, Helal Uddin (2012). "Mukti Bahini". In Islam, Sirajul; Jamal, Ahmed A. (eds.). Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Second ed.). Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.
- ^ Col. Anil Shorey. "The Unique Battle of Garibpur. Sainik Samachar Vol.49, No.8, 16–30 April 2002". Sainik Samachar, Indian Ministry of Defence. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ "Pakistan: Yahya Khan and Bangladesh". Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ Kyly R G. "The India-Pakistan War Of 1971: A Modern War". Global security. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ Faruqui 2001
- ^ a b c d e Tom Cooper, with Syed Shaiz Ali. "India – Pakistan War, 1971; Western Front, part I". Air Combat Information Group. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ "The War of December 1971". Indian Air Force. Archived from the original on 2009-04-10. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ a b c Gill, John H. (2003). An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh. National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.
- ISBN 978-0-19-579772-5.
- ISBN 978-0-19-577990-5.
- OCLC 45399558.
- ^ a b Lal 1986
- ISBN 978-0853687511.
- ^ Rais Ahmed Rafi. PAF Bomber Operations 1965 and 1971 Wars. PAF Book Club. pp. 105–106.
- ^ "Indian Air Force. Squadron 5, Tuskers". Global Security. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ "Pakistan intensifies air raids on India". BBC. 1971-12-03. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
- ISBN 0-8032-1344-1.
- ^ Singh, Mandeep (2020). Anti-Aircraft Artillery in Combat, 1950–1972: Air Defence in the Jet Age. Air World. p. 208.
Further reading
- Donaldson, Robert H. (June 1972), "India: The Soviet Stake in Stability", Asian Survey, 12 (6), University of California Press: 475–492, JSTOR 2643045.
- Kapur, Ashok (June 1972), "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance", Asian Survey, 12 (6), University of California Press: 463–474, JSTOR 2643044.
- Lal, Pratap Chandra (1986), My Years with the IAF, Casemate Pub & Book Dist Llc, ISBN 8170620082.
- Faruqui, A (2001), "Failure in Command: Lessons from Pakistan's Indian Wars, 1947–1999. Defense and Security Analysis, Volume 17, Number 1, 1 April 2001, pp. 31–40(10)", Defense & Security Analysis, Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1475-1798.