Operation Cobra
Operation Cobra | |||||||
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Part of Operation Overlord | |||||||
M4 Sherman tanks and infantrymen of the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Coutances | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States United Kingdom | Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Bernard Montgomery Omar Bradley Lesley J. McNair † |
Günther von Kluge Paul Hausser | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
First Army :
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Strength | |||||||
8 infantry divisions[3] 3 armored divisions[3] 2,451 tanks and tank destroyers[4][5][6] |
2 infantry divisions[3] 1 parachute division[3] 4 understrength Panzer divisions[3] 1 Panzergrenadier division[3] 190 tanks and assault guns[5][6] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
1,800 casualties[nb 1] at least 109 medium tanks destroyed or damaged unknown number of light tanks and tank destroyers[9] |
1,250 killed and/or captured [10] 144 tanks & self-propelled guns destroyed/abandoned[11] 2,447 soft-skinned vehicles destroyed/abandoned 252 artillery pieces destroyed/abandoned[11] |
Operation Cobra was an
Having been delayed several times by poor weather, Operation Cobra commenced on 25 July 1944, with a concentrated aerial bombardment from thousands of Allied aircraft. Supporting offensives had drawn the bulk of German armored reserves toward the British and Canadian sector and, coupled with the general lack of men and materiel available to the Germans, it was impossible for them to form successive lines of defense. Units of the U.S. VII Corps led the initial two-division assault, while other First U.S. Army corps mounted supporting attacks designed to pin German units in place. Progress was slow on the first day but opposition started to crumble once the defensive crust had been broken. By 27 July, most organized resistance had been overcome and the VII and VIII Corps advanced rapidly, isolating the Cotentin Peninsula.
By 31 July,
Background
Following the successful
The initial attempt by I Corps to reach the city on D-Day was blocked by elements of the
The successive Anglo-Canadian offensives around Caen kept the best of the German forces in Normandy, including most of the armor, to the eastern end of the Allied lodgement but even so the First U.S. Army made slow progress against dogged German resistance.[20] In part, operations were slow due to the constraints of the bocage landscape of densely packed banked hedgerows, sunken lanes and small woods, for which U.S. units had not trained.[25] With no ports in Allied hands, all reinforcement and supply had to take place over the beaches via the two Mulberry harbors and were at the mercy of the weather.[26]
On 19 June, a severe storm descended on the English Channel, lasting for three days and causing significant delays to the Allied build-up and the cancellation of some operations.[27] The First U.S. Army advance in the western sector was eventually halted by Bradley before the town of Saint-Lô, to concentrate on the seizure of Cherbourg.[28][29] The defense of Cherbourg consisted largely of four German battlegroups formed from the remnants of units that had retreated up the Cotentin Peninsula, but the port defenses had been designed principally to meet an attack from the sea.[30] Organized German resistance finally ended on 27 June, when the U.S. 9th Infantry Division managed to reduce the defenses of Cap de la Hague, north-west of the port.[31] Within four days, VII Corps (Major General J. Lawton Collins) resumed the offensive toward Saint-Lô, alongside XIX Corps and VIII Corps, causing the Germans to move more armor into the U.S. sector.[32]
Planning
The originator of the idea for Operation Cobra is disputed. According to Montgomery's official biographer, the foundation of Operation Cobra was laid on 13 June.[33][34] Planning was immensely aided by detailed Ultra intelligence which supplied up-to-date decodes of communications between Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, the German armed forces high command) and Hitler's generals.[35] Montgomery's plan at that time called for the U.S. First Army to take Saint-Lô and Coutances and then make two southward thrusts; one from Caumont toward Vire and Mortain and the other from Saint-Lô toward Villedieu and Avranches. Although pressure was to be kept up along the Cotentin Peninsula towards La Haye-du-Puits and Valognes, the capture of Cherbourg was not the priority.[33] With the capture of Cherbourg by VII Corps on 27 June, Montgomery's initial timetable was overtaken by events and the thrust from Caumont was never adopted.[29][36]
Following the conclusion of Operation Charnwood and the cancellation of the First Army offensive towards Saint-Lô, Montgomery met with Bradley and Dempsey on 10 July to discuss plans for the 21st Army Group.[37][38][39] Bradley said that progress on the western flank was very slow but that plans had been laid for another breakout attempt, codenamed Operation Cobra, to be launched by the First Army on 18 July.[40][41][42][43][44][45][28][nb 4] Montgomery approved the plan and that the strategy would remain the diversion of German attention from the First Army to the British and Canadian sector.[46][28] Dempsey was instructed to "go on hitting, drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad".[39] To accomplish this, Operation Goodwood was planned and Eisenhower ensured that both operations would have the support of the Allied strategic bombers.[12][28]
On 12 July, Bradley briefed his commanders on the Cobra plan, which consisted of three phases. The main effort would be under the control of VII Corps. In the first phase, the breakthrough attack would be conducted by the 9th Infantry Division (Major General
Cobra was to be a concentrated attack on a 6,400 m (7,000 yd) front, unlike previous U.S. broad front offensives and would have a mass of air support.
To overcome the constraints of the bocage that had made attacks so difficult and costly for both sides,
Supporting operations
On 18 July, the British VIII and I Corps—to the east of Caen—launched Operation Goodwood. The offensive began with the largest air bombardment in support of ground forces yet, with more than 1,000 aircraft dropping 6,000 short tons (5,400 t) of high explosive and fragmentation bombs from low altitude.[62] German positions to the east of Caen were shelled by 400 artillery pieces and many villages were reduced to rubble[62] but German artillery further to the south, on the Bourguébus Ridge, was outside the range of the British artillery[63] and the defenders of Cagny and Émiéville were largely unscathed by the bombardment.[64] This contributed to the losses suffered by Second Army, which sustained over 4,800 casualties.[nb 5] Principally an armored offensive, between 250 and 400 British tanks were put out of action,[nb 6] although recent examination suggests that only 140 were completely destroyed with an additional 174 damaged.[68] The operation remains the largest tank battle ever fought by the British Army[69] and resulted in the expansion of the Orne bridgehead and the capture of Caen on the south bank of the Orne.[24]
Simultaneously, the
Logistics
Each division consumed 750 short tons (680 t) of supplies daily.[76]
Allied offensive
Preliminary attacks
To gain good terrain for Operation Cobra, Bradley and Collins conceived a plan to push forward to the Saint-Lô–Periers road, along which VII and VIII Corps were securing jumping-off positions.
Main attack and breakthrough 25–27 July
After the one-day postponement, Cobra got underway at 09:38 on 25 July, when around 600 Allied fighter-bombers attacked strongpoints and enemy artillery along a 270 m (300 yd)-wide strip of ground located in the
By 11:00, the infantry began to move forward, advancing from crater to crater beyond what had been the German outpost line.
On the morning of 26 July, the U.S. 2nd Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division joined the attack as planned,[83] reaching one of Cobra's first objectives—a road junction north of Le Mesnil-Herman—the following day.[85] Also on 26 July, VIII Corps (Major General Troy H. Middleton) entered the battle, led by the 8th U.S. Infantry Division and 90th U.S. Infantry Division.[86] Despite clear paths of advance through the floods and swamps across their front, both divisions initially disappointed the First Army by failing to gain significant ground[86] but first light the next morning revealed that the Germans had been compelled to retreat by their crumbling left flank, leaving only immense minefields to delay VIII Corps.[86] By noon on 27 July, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division was also clear of any organized German resistance and was advancing rapidly.[85]
Breakout and advance 28–30 July
By 28 July, the German defenses across the U.S. front had largely collapsed under the full weight of the VII and VIII Corps advance and resistance was disorganized and patchy.[86] The 4th Armored Division (VIII Corps)—entering combat for the first time—captured Coutances but met stiff opposition east of the town and U.S. units penetrating into the depth of the German positions were counter-attacked by elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division and the 353rd Infantry Division, seeking to escape entrapment.[87] Around Roncey, P-47 Thunderbolts of the 405th Fighter Group destroyed a German column of 122 tanks, 259 other vehicles and 11 artillery pieces. An attack by British Typhoons close to La Baleine destroyed 9 tanks, 8 other armored vehicles and 20 other vehicles.[88] A counter-attack was mounted against the U.S. 2nd Armored Division by German remnants but this was a disaster and the Germans abandoned their vehicles and fled on foot.[87] Two columns of the 2nd SS Panzer Division were mauled by the U.S. 2nd Armored Division. A column around La Chapelle was bombarded at point blank range by 2nd Armored Division artillery. In two hours, U.S. artillery fired over 700 rounds, into the column. The Germans suffered the loss of 50 dead, 60 wounded and 197 taken prisoner. Material losses were over 260 German combat vehicles destroyed.[89] Beyond the town another 1,150 German soldiers were killed and the Germans lost 96 armored combat vehicles and trucks.[89] The U.S. 2nd Armored Division destroyed 64 German tanks and 538 other German combat vehicles during Operation Cobra.[90] The U.S. 2nd Armored Division suffered 49 tank losses in the process.[90] The 2nd Armored Division also inflicted over 7,370 casualties on the Germans while suffering 914 casualties.[90] At the beginning of Operation Cobra the German Panzer Lehr Division had only 2,200 combat troops, 12 Panzer IV and 16 Panthers fit for action and 30 tanks in various states of repair behind the lines.[91] Panzer Lehr was in the path of Allied bombing that consisted of 1,500 bombers. The division suffered about 1,000 casualties during this bombardment.[92] An exhausted and demoralized Bayerlein reported that his Panzer Lehr Division was "finally annihilated", with its armor wiped out, its personnel either casualties or missing and all headquarters records lost.[53]
Field Marshal Günther von Kluge Oberbefehlshaber West (commander of German forces on the Western Front)—was mustering reinforcements, and elements of the 2nd Panzer Division and the 116th Panzer Division were approaching the battlefield. The U.S. XIX Corps (Major General Charles H. Corlett) entered the battle on 28 July on the left of VII Corps and between 28 and 31 July became embroiled with these reinforcements in the fiercest fighting since Cobra began.[93] During the night of 29/30 July near Saint-Denis-le-Gast, to the east of Coutances, elements of the 2nd Armored Division found themselves fighting for their lives against a German column from the 2nd SS Panzer Division and 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, which passed through the U.S. lines in the darkness.[87] Other elements of the 2nd Armored Division were attacked near Cambry and fought for six hours; Bradley and his commanders knew that they were dominating the battlefield and such desperate assaults were no threat to the U.S. position.[87] When ordered to concentrate his division, Colonel Heinz Günther Guderian the senior staff officer of the 116th Panzer Division was frustrated by the high level of Allied fighter-bomber activity.[94] Without receiving direct support from the 2nd Panzer Division as promised, Guderian stated that his panzergrenadiers could not succeed in a counterattack against the Americans.[95] Advancing southward along the coast, later that day, the U.S. VIII Corps seized the town of Avranches—described by historian Andrew Williams as "the gateway to Brittany and southern Normandy"[53]—and by 31 July XIX Corps had thrown back the last German counterattacks after fierce fighting, inflicting heavy losses in men and tanks.[94] The U.S. advance was now relentless, and the First Army was finally free of the bocage.[53]
Operation Bluecoat, 30 July – 7 August
On 30 July, to protect Cobra's flank and prevent the disengagement and relocation of further German forces, VIII Corps and XXX Corps of the Second Army began Operation Bluecoat southwards from Caumont toward Vire and Mont Pinçon.[96] Bluecoat kept German armored units fixed on the British eastern front and continued the wearing down of the strength of German armored formations in the area. The breakthrough in the center of the Allied front surprised the Germans, when they were distracted by the Allied attacks at both ends of the Normandy bridgehead.[97] By the time of the U.S. breakout at Avranches, there was little to no reserve strength left for Unternehmen Lüttich, which had been defeated by 12 August, leaving the 7th Army with no choice but to retire rapidly east of the Orne river, with a rearguard of the remaining armored and motorized units, to allow time for the surviving infantry to reach the Seine. After the first stage of the withdrawal beyond the Orne, the maneuver collapsed for a lack of fuel, Allied air attacks and the constant pressure of the Allied armies, culminating in the encirclement of German forces in the Falaise pocket.[98]
Aftermath
At noon on 1 August, the
So let us do real fighting, boring in and gouging, biting.
Let's take a chance now that we have the ball.
Let's forget those fine firm bases in the dreary shell raked spaces,
Let's shoot the works and win! Yes, win it all![100]
The U.S. advance following Cobra was extraordinarily rapid. Between 1 and 4 August, seven divisions of Patton's Third Army had swept through Avranches and over the bridge at
By 8 August, the city of Le Mans—the former headquarters of the German 7th Army—had fallen to the Americans.[109] With von Kluge's few remaining battleworthy formations destroyed by the First Army, the Allied commanders realized that the entire German position in Normandy was collapsing.[110] Bradley declared:
This is an opportunity that comes to a commander not more than once in a century. We're about to destroy an entire hostile army and go all the way from here to the German border.[110]
On 14 August, in conjunction with U.S. movements northward to
Footnotes
- ^ Of which 700 were from VIII Corps,[7] and 600 from VII Corps, while the rest are from unknown specific other units.[8]
- ^ "The quick capture of that key city [Caen] and the neighborhood of Carpiquet was the most ambitious, the most difficult and the most important task of Lieutenant-General J. T. Crocker's I Corps".[21] Wilmot wrote "The objectives given to Crocker's seaborne divisions were decidedly ambitious, since his troops were to land last, on the most exposed beaches, with the farthest to go, against what was potentially the greatest opposition".[22]
- Panzer-Lehr-Division.[20]
- ^ By 10 July, Bradley had become concerned enough to write that the Allies faced the possibility of a World War I-type stalemate in the campaign.[46][47]
- ^ I Corps suffered 3,817 casualties and VIII Corps suffered 1,020 casualties.[65]
- ^ Reynolds claims that a careful study of the relevant documents indicate a maximum tank loss of 253 tanks during Goodwood, most of which were repairable[66] but Buckley claims 21st Army Group lost around 400 tanks during the operation, although he too notes that most were eventually recovered.[67]
Citations
- ^ a b c Williams, p. 204
- ^ a b Bercuson, p. 232
- ^ a b c d e f Pugsley, p. 47
- ^ a b Zaloga, p. 30
- ^ a b c d e f Hastings, p. 236
- ^ a b c Jackson, p. 113
- ^ Green, p. 62
- ^ Pugsley, p. 53
- ^ Stephen Napier, Armoured Campaign
- ^ "Operation Cobra". 24 February 2016.
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 313
- ^ a b Trew, p. 64
- ^ Van der Vat, p. 110
- ^ Bradley, p. 261
- ^ Williams, p. 24
- ^ Williams, p. 38
- ^ Ellis, p. 78
- ^ Greiss, p. 308
- ^ Ellis, p. 81
- ^ a b c d Keegan, p. 135
- ^ Ellis, p. 171
- ^ Wilmot, p. 272
- ^ Bercuson, p. 215
- ^ a b Williams, p. 131
- ^ Greiss, p. 317
- ^ Greiss, pp. 308–310
- ^ Williams, p. 114
- ^ a b c d Williams, p. 163
- ^ a b Greiss, p. 312
- ^ Hastings, p. 163
- ^ Hastings, p. 165
- ^ Greiss, p. 316
- ^ a b c d e Hastings, p. 249
- ^ Williams, p. 126
- ^ Lewin, p. 336
- ^ Esposito, pp. 78–80.
- ^ Wilmot, p. 351
- ^ Greiss, p. 311
- ^ a b Trew, p. 49
- ^ Blumenson, p. 187
- ^ Zaloga, p. 32
- ^ D'Este, p. 338
- ^ Weigley, p. 136
- ^ Pogue, p. 197
- ^ Williams, p. 175
- ^ a b Bradley, p. 272
- ^ Zaloga, p. 7
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 252
- ^ ISBN 978-1-4391-8263-5.
- ISBN 0-275-98263-7.
- ^ Hastings, p. 250
- ^ Esposito, pp. 76–77
- ^ a b c d Williams, p. 185
- ^ a b Hastings, pp. 249–250
- ^ a b Williams, p. 181
- ^ a b Weigley, p. 151
- ^ Griess, p. 324
- ^ Blumenson, p. 219
- ^ Zaloga, p. 3
- ^ Weigley, p. 149
- ^ Blumenson, p. 207
- ^ a b Williams, p. 161
- ^ Williams, p. 165
- ^ Williams, p. 167
- ^ Wilmot, p. 362
- ^ Reynolds, p. 186
- ^ Buckley, p. 36
- ^ Trew, pp. 97–98
- ^ Van-Der-Vat, p. 158
- ^ a b Copp, Approach to Verrières Ridge
- ^ Zuehlke, p. 166
- ^ Stacey, pp. 195–196
- ^ Bercuson, p. 225
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 256
- ^ Wilmot, p. 389
- ^ Clymer, Samuel (August 2011). "Operation Pluto: The Red Ball Express" (PDF). The Intercom. 34 (8): 8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 December 2011.
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 253
- ^ Williams, p. 174
- ^ Williams, p. 180
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 254
- ^ Sullivan, p. 107
- ^ a b c Williams, p. 182
- ^ a b c d Williams, p. 183
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 255
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 257
- ^ a b c d Hastings, p. 258
- ^ a b c d Hastings, p. 260
- ^ Zaloga p. 65
- ^ a b Zaloga p. 67
- ^ a b c Zaloga p. 75
- ^ Zaloga 2015 p. 36
- ^ Blumenson p. 240
- ^ Hastings p. 261
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 262
- ^ Hastings, p. 263
- ^ Hastings, p. 265
- ^ Daglish 2009, p. 301.
- ^ Ellis 1962, pp. 419–433.
- ^ Hastings, p. 266
- ^ Williams, p. 186
- ^ Wilmot, p. 399
- ^ Hastings, p. 277
- ^ D'Este, p. 414
- ^ a b Williams, p. 196
- ^ Wilmot, p. 401
- ^ Hastings, p. 283
- ^ Hastings, p. 285
- ^ Hastings, p. 286
- ^ Williams, p. 194
- ^ a b Williams, p. 197
- ^ Hastings, p. 301
- ^ Williams, p. 203
- ^ Hastings, p. 306
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- Reynolds, Michael (2002). Sons of the Reich: The History of II SS Panzer Corps in Normandy, Arnhem, the Ardennes and on the Eastern Front. Casemate Publishers and Book Distributors. ISBN 0-9711709-3-2.
- OCLC 155106767. Archived from the original(PDF) on 12 September 2008. Retrieved 20 August 2008.
- Sullivan, John J. (1988). "The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra" (PDF). Parameters, the U.S. Army's Senior Professional Journal. 18 (March): 97–110. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
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- Zuehlke, Mark (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas. Stoddart. ISBN 0-7737-3289-6.
- Panzer IV vs Sherman: France 1944 by Steven Zaloga
External links
- Normandiememoire.com. "Operation Cobra: the break-out". Archived from the original on 21 August 2003.
- Wiacek, Jacques. "Operation Cobra and final stages of the battle in normandy".