Operation Hurricane
Operation Hurricane | |
---|---|
UTC, 2 October 1952 | |
Number of tests | 1 |
Test type | Ship |
Max. yield | 25 kilotons of TNT (100 TJ) |
Test series chronology | |
→ |
Operation Hurricane was the first test of a British atomic device. A plutonium implosion device was detonated on 3 October 1952 in Main Bay, Trimouille Island, in the Montebello Islands in Western Australia. With the success of Operation Hurricane, Britain became the third nuclear power, after the United States and the Soviet Union.
During the
Implicit in the decision to develop
A small fleet was assembled for Operation Hurricane under the command of
Background
The December 1938 discovery of
At the
With the end of the war the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States "became very much less special".[12] The British government had trusted that America would share nuclear technology, which the British saw as a joint discovery,[13] but the terms of the Quebec Agreement remained secret. Senior members of the United States Congress were horrified when they discovered that it gave the British a veto over the use of nuclear weapons.[14] On 9 November 1945, the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Clement Attlee, and the Prime Minister of Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King, went to Washington, DC, to confer with Truman about future cooperation in nuclear weapons and nuclear power.[15][16] They signed a Memorandum of Intention that replaced the Quebec Agreement. It made Canada a full partner, and reduced the obligation to obtain consent for the use of nuclear weapons to merely requiring consultation.[17] The three leaders agreed that there would be full and effective cooperation on civil and military applications of atomic energy, but the British were soon disappointed;[18] the Americans made it clear that cooperation was restricted to basic scientific research.[19] The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) ended technical cooperation. Its control of "restricted data" prevented the United States' allies from receiving any information.[20]
Attlee set up a
In July 1946, the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended that Britain acquire nuclear weapons.[31] They estimated that 200 bombs would be required by 1957.[32] Despite this, and the research and construction of production facilities that had already been approved, there was still no official decision to proceed with making atomic bombs.[33] Portal submitted a proposal to do so at the 8 January 1947 meeting of the Gen 163 Committee, a subcommittee of the Gen 75 Committee, which agreed to proceed with the development of atomic bombs. It also endorsed his proposal to place Penney, now the Chief Superintendent Armament Research (CSAR) at Fort Halstead in Kent, in charge of the bomb development effort,[34] which was codenamed High Explosive Research.[35] Penney contended that "the discriminative test for a first-class power is whether it has made an atomic bomb and we have either got to pass the test or suffer a serious loss of prestige both inside this country and internationally."[36]
Although the British government had committed to the development of an
Site selection
Implicit in the decision to develop atomic bombs was the need to test them.
The study noted several requirements for a test area:
- an isolated area with no human habitation 160 kilometres (100 mi) downwind;
- large enough to accommodate a dozen detonations over a period of several years;
- with prevailing winds that would blow falloutout to sea but away from shipping lanes;
- a temporary camp site at least 16 kilometres (10 mi) upwind of the detonation area;
- a base camp site at least 40 kilometres (25 mi) upwind of the detonation area, with room for laboratories, workshops and signals equipment;
- ready for use by mid-1952.[41]
The first test would probably be a ground burst, but consideration was also given to an explosion in a ship to measure the effect of a ship-borne atomic bomb on a major port. Such data would complement that obtained about an underwater explosion by the American Operation Crossroads nuclear test in 1946, and would therefore be of value to the Americans. Seven Canadian sites were assessed, the most promising being Churchill, Manitoba, but the waters were too shallow to allow ships to approach close to shore.[41][42]
In September 1950, the
At the time Britain was still Australia's largest trading partner; it would be overtaken by Japan and the United States by the 1960s. Britain and Australia had strong cultural ties, and Menzies was strongly pro-British. Most Australians were of British descent, and Britain was still the largest source of immigrants to Australia, largely because British ex-servicemen and their families qualified for free passage, and other British migrants received subsidised passage. Australian and British troops were fighting communist forces together in the Korean War and the Malayan Emergency.[46] Australia still maintained close defence ties with Britain through the Australia New Zealand and Malaya (ANZAM) area, which was created in 1948. Australian war plans of this era continued to be closely integrated with those of Britain, and involved reinforcing the British forces in the Middle East and Far East.[47]
Australia was particularly interested in developing atomic energy as the country was then thought to have no oil and only limited supplies of coal.[48] Plans for atomic power were considered along with hydroelectricity as part of the post-war Snowy Mountains Scheme. There was also interest in the production of uranium-235 and plutonium for nuclear weapons.[49][50] The Australian government had hopes of collaboration with Britain on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons,[48] but the 1948 Modus Vivendi cut Australian scientists off from information they had formerly had access to.[51] Unlike Canada, Australia was not a party to the Quebec Agreement or the Modus Vivendi. Britain would not share technical information with Australia for fear that it might jeopardise its far more important relationship with the United States,[52] and the Americans were reluctant to share secret information with Australia after the Venona project revealed the extent of Soviet espionage activities in Australia.[53] The creation of NATO in 1949 excluded Australia from the Western Alliance.[54]
The three-man survey party, headed by
On 27 March 1951, Attlee sent Menzies a personal message saying that, while negotiations with the United States for use of the
Meanwhile, negotiations continued with the Americans.
The Nevada Test Site would be cheaper than Montebello, although the cost would be paid in scarce dollars. Information gathered would have to be shared with the Americans, who would not share their own data. It would not be possible to test from a ship, and the political advantages in demonstrating that Britain could develop and test nuclear weapons without American assistance would be foregone.
A final decision was deferred until after the
Preparations
To coordinate the test, codenamed "Operation Hurricane", the British government established a Hurricane Executive Committee chaired by the
Penney was anxious to secure the services of Titterton, who had recently emigrated to Australia, as he had worked on the American
An advance party of
The next stage of work began in February 1952, in the wake of the December decision to proceed with the test. A detachment of No. 5 Airfield Construction Squadron was flown to Onslow from
The British assembled a small fleet for Operation Hurricane that included the
The Montebello Islands were reached on 8 August.
The British fleet was joined by eleven RAN ships, including the
Operation
The main site, known as H1, was established on the south-east corner of Hermite Island. This was the location of the control room from which the bomb would be detonated, along with the equipment to monitor the firing circuits and telemetry. It was also the location of the generators that provided electric power and recharged the batteries of portable devices, and ultra-high-speed cameras operating at up to 8,000 frames per second. Other camera equipment was set up on Alpha Island and Northwest Island. Most of the monitoring equipment was positioned on Trimouille Island, closer to the explosion. Here, there were a plethora of blast, pressure and seismographic gauges. There were also some 200 empty fuel containers for measuring the blast, a technique that Penney had employed on Operation Crossroads. There were thermometers and calorimeters for measuring the flash, and samples of paints and fabrics for determining the effect on them. Plants would be studied to measure their uptake of
The original intention was that the scientists would stay on Campania, commuting to the islands each day, but the survey party had misjudged the tides; Campania could not enter the lagoon, and had to anchor in the Parting Pool. The pinnaces could not tie up alongside Campania at night, and had to be moored several miles away. Transferring to the boats in choppy waters was hazardous.[86] One scientist fell in the sea and was rescued by Commander Douglas Bromley, Campania's executive officer.[88][89] Rough seas prevented much work being done between 10 and 14 August.[87] It took about an hour and a half to get from Campania to H2, and travelling between Plym and Campania took between two and three hours. Even when a boat was on call it could take 45 minutes to respond. Boat availability soon became a problem with only five LCMs, leaving personnel waiting for one to arrive.[86][90] The twelve smaller LCAs were also employed; although they could operate when the tides made waters too shallow for the pinnaces, their wooden bottoms were easily holed by coral outcrops.[90][91] On 15 August, some men were transferred from Campania by one of its three Dragonfly helicopters, but the weather closed in and they could not be picked up again, having to find shelter on Tracker and Zeebrugge, which were moored in the lagoon.[87][92] To get around these problems, tented camps were established for the scientists at H1 on Hermite Island and Cocoa Beach (also known as T2) on Trimouille Island.[91]
Scientific rehearsals were held on 12 and 13 September. This was followed by an operational rehearsal on 19 September, which included fully assembling the bomb,
Two Dragonfly helicopters flew in to gather a sample of contaminated seawater from the lagoon. Scientists in gas masks and protective gear visited points in pinnaces to collect samples and retrieve recordings. Tracker controlled this aspect, as it had the decontamination facilities. Air samples were collected by RAAF
Penney and some of his staff returned by air on 9 October.
Outcome
Two more nuclear tests were conducted in the Montebello Islands as part of Operation Mosaic in 1956, the detonations taking place on Alpha and Trimouille Islands.[108] By the 1980s the radioactivity had decayed to the point where it was no longer hazardous to the casual visitor, but there were still radioactive metal fragments containing cobalt-60, the remains of Plym.[109] The island remained a prohibited area until 1992.[110] A 2006 zoological survey found that the wildlife had recovered, and that the Aprasia rostrata, the legless lizard discovered by Hill, was not extinct.[65] As part of the Gorgon gas project, rats and feral cats were eradicated from the Montebello Islands in 2009, and birds and marsupials were transplanted from nearby Barrow Island to Hermite Island.[110] Today, the Montebello Islands are a park. Visitors are advised not to spend more than an hour per day at the test sites, or to take relics of the tests as souvenirs.[110] A pyramid-shaped obelisk marks the site of the explosion on Alpha Island.[111]
In 1992, Australian scientists Keith Wise and John Moroney of the
With the success of Operation Hurricane, Britain became the third nuclear power after the United States and the Soviet Union.
Summary
Name | Date and time | Location
|
Elevation + height | Delivery, purpose | Device | Yield | Fallout | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hurricane | 23:59:24 2 October ( UTC) )
07:59:24 3 October (AWST |
Trimouille Island, Montebello Islands, Western Australia 20°24′19″S 115°33′59″E / 20.40528°S 115.56639°E | 0–2.7 metres (0.0–8.9 ft) | Barge, weapon effect |
British levitated pit
|
25 kt | Unknown | Exploded in the hull of HMS Plym |
Notes
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 23–29.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 39–41.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 108–111.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 277.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 250–256.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 226–227, 256–258.
- ^ Jones 1985, pp. 246–247.
- ^ Szasz 1992, pp. 148–151.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 260–268.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 236–239.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 242.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 93.
- ^ Goldberg 1964, p. 410.
- ^ Farmelo 2013, p. 326.
- ^ Gott 1963, p. 240.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 73–77.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 468.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 92.
- ^ Paul 2000, pp. 80–83.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 106–108.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 21.
- ^ Baylis & Stoddart 2015, p. 32.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 26–27.
- ^ Goldberg 1964, p. 417.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 40–43.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 96.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 194–196.
- ^ a b Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 41.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 370–371.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 400–407.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 16–18.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 216.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 18.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 181–184.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 24, 48, 57.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 500.
- ^ a b Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 500–501.
- ^ a b Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 476–478.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 17.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 307–308.
- ^ a b Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 477–478.
- ^ Clearwater & O'Brien 2003, pp. 60–65.
- ^ a b c d Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 476–479.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 497.
- ^ Symonds 1985, p. 6.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Reynolds 2000, pp. 82–85.
- ^ a b Arnold & Smith 2006, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 147.
- ^ Reynolds 2000, pp. 54, 122–128.
- ^ Reynolds 2000, pp. 109–111.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 21.
- ^ Reynolds 2000, pp. 92–93.
- ^ Reynolds 2000, p. 166.
- ^ a b Symonds 1985, pp. 11–17.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 7–8.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 17–21.
- ^ Botti 1987, pp. 74–75.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 19.
- ^ Symonds 1985, p. 29.
- ^ "Hansard, 26 February 1952". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). 26 February 1952. Archived from the original on 13 February 2017. Retrieved 4 February 2017.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 180–181.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 478.
- ^ Hill 1955, pp. 113–124.
- ^ a b Maryan & Bush 2007, pp. 247–251.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 161.
- ^ Symonds 1985, p. 33.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 53–55.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 55–60.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 25–26.
- ^ a b Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 480–485.
- ^ "Britain's Atomic Weapon – The Planning Behind the Explosion" (PDF). Pathe. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 March 2017. Retrieved 14 March 2017.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 471–473.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 185.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 487.
- ^ a b c "Scientific Data Obtained from Operation Hurricane". Ministry of Defence. 27 August 1954. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015. Retrieved 16 October 2015.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 210–211.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 50–56.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 138–140.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 241.
- ^ Djokovic 2016, p. 1.
- ^ a b Symonds 1985, pp. 75–76.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 77–79.
- ^ a b c Arnold & Smith 2006, pp. 39–40.
- ^ a b c Symonds 1985, pp. 80–82.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 491.
- ^ "Captain Douglas Bromley". The Daily Telegraph. 9 July 2001. Archived from the original on 22 February 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2017.
- ^ a b Cathcart 1995, pp. 218–219.
- ^ a b Symonds 1985, p. 84.
- ^ a b "Operation Hurricane". Imperial War Museum. Archived from the original on 15 March 2017. Retrieved 14 March 2017.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 85–86.
- ^ a b c Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 492.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 253.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 270.
- ^ a b Cathcart 1995, p. 261.
- ^ Boniface, Susie (November 2018). "The Damned: Chapter 1, Operation Hurricane". The Mirror. Archived from the original on 18 November 2018. Retrieved 18 November 2018.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 44.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 258.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 262–265.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 45.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, p. 494.
- ^ a b Paul 2000, pp. 196–197.
- ^ "No. 39684". The London Gazette. 31 October 1952. p. 5733.
- ^ Symonds 1985, p. 106.
- ^ Symonds 1985, pp. 106–108.
- ^ Djokovic 2016, pp. 2–3.
- ^ Cooper, Lokan & Williams 1983, p. 6.
- ^ a b c "Montebello Islands". Department of Parks and Wildlife. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. Retrieved 25 February 2017.
- ^ "One man's island". The Sydney Morning Herald. 22 September 2012. Archived from the original on 16 July 2017. Retrieved 2 July 2017.
- ^ Wise & Moroney 1992, p. 59.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 46.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, pp. 256–264.
- ^ Gun et al. 2006, pp. v–vi, xxi.
- ^ Arnold & Smith 2006, p. 47.
- ^ a b "Britain's Nuclear Weapons-From MAUD to Hurricane". Nuclear Weapons Archive. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. Retrieved 16 February 2017.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 92.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Young 2007, pp. 130–133.
References
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- Baylis, John; Stoddart, Kristan (2015). The British Nuclear Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OCLC 900506637.
- Botti, Timothy J. (1987). The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–58. Contributions in Military Studies. New York: Greenwood Press. OCLC 464084495.
- OCLC 31241690.
- Clearwater, John; O'Brien, David (July–August 2003). "O Lucky Canada – Britain considered testing nuclear weapons in northern Manitoba but found the climate in Australia much more agreeable" (PDF). ISSN 0096-3402. Retrieved 16 February 2017.
- Cooper, Malcolm B.; Lokan, Keith H.; Williams, Geoffrey A. (1 November 1983). The Radiological Status of the Monte Bello Islands: May 1983 (PDF) (Technical report). Yallambie, Victoria, Australia: Australian Radiation Laboratory. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 March 2016. Retrieved 18 December 2013.
- Djokovic, Petar (2016). "Operations Hurricane and Mosaic" (PDF). Semaphore (2). (PDF) from the original on 7 June 2016. Retrieved 20 February 2017.
- ISBN 978-0-465-02195-6.
- Goldberg, Alfred (July 1964). "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent". International Affairs. 40 (3): 409–429. JSTOR 2610825.
- Gott, Richard (April 1963). "The Evolution of the Independent British Deterrent". International Affairs. 39 (2): 238–252. JSTOR 2611300.
- OCLC 3195209.
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- Gun, Richard; Parsons, Jacqueline; Ryan, Phillip; Crouch, Phillip; Hiller, Janet (May 2006). Australian Participants in British Nuclear Test in Australia, Volume 2: Mortality and Cancer Incidence (PDF) (Technical report). Canberra: Department of Veterans' Affairs. ISBN 1-920720-39-1. Archived(PDF) from the original on 14 June 2016. Retrieved 25 April 2019.
- (PDF) from the original on 26 September 2019. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
- Hill, Frank L. (June 1955). "Notes on the Natural History of the Monte Bello Islands". Proceedings of the Linnean Society of London. 165 (2): 113–124. .
- Jones, Vincent (1985). Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (PDF). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 10913875. Archived from the original(PDF) on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 8 June 2013.
- Maryan, Brad; Bush, Brian (28 February 2007). "Rediscovery of Aprasia rostrata on the Montebello Islands". The Western Australian Naturalist. 25 (4): 247–251. Retrieved 20 February 2017.
- Paul, Septimus H. (2000). Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. OCLC 43615254.
- Reynolds, Wayne (2000). Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press. OCLC 46880369.
- Symonds, J. L. (1985). A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. OCLC 18084438.
- Szasz, Ferenc Morton (1992). British Scientists and the Manhattan Project: The Los Alamos Years. New York: St. Martin's Press. OCLC 23901666.
- Wise, Keith N.; Moroney, John R. (May 1992). Public Health Impact of Fallout from British Nuclear Weapons Tests in Australia, 1952–1957 (PDF) (Report). Australian Radiation Laboratory. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 August 2017. Retrieved 2 July 2017.
- Wynn, Humphrey (1997). RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces, Their Origins, Roles and Deployment, 1946–1969. A Documentary History. London: The Stationery Office. ISBN 978-0-11-772833-2.
- Young, Ken (Spring 2007). "A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning". Journal of Cold War Studies. 9 (2): 5–31. S2CID 57563082.
Further reading
- Bird, Peter (1953). Operation Hurricane. Worcester: Square One Publications. ISBN 978-1-872017-10-5.
External links
- AWE history
- Original AWE page available from archive.org
- British nuclear weapons testing in Australia
- Operation Hurricane – Ministry of Supply made documentary
- Better quality extract from the same video of the Hurricane Nuclear Test
- Operation Hurricane by National Archives of Australia – Vimeo
- Declassified AWRE reports and National Archives files on Operation Hurricane's scientific and civil defence implications
- Nuclear Weapons Archive: British Nuclear Weapons – From MAUD to Hurricane