Operation Mars

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 Soviet Union

 Germany

Operation Mars (Russian: Операция «Марс»), also known as the Second Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive Operation (Russian: Вторая Ржевско-Сычёвская наступательная операция), was the codename for an offensive launched by

The Kalinin and Western Fronts were directed by Stalin and Zhukov "to crush the Rzhev-Sychovka-Olenino-Bely enemy grouping." The Western Front was to "take Sychovka no later than the 15th December." The Kalinin Front's 39th and 22nd armies were to take Olenino by 16 December and Bely by 20 December.^{[7]: 121–122, 129–130}

Operation Mars was to be followed soon afterward by Operation Jupiter, which was to commence two to three weeks later. The Western Front's powerful

The offensive was launched in the early hours of 25 November 1942. It got off to a bad start, as fog and snowy weather grounded the planned air support. It also greatly reduced the effect of the massive artillery barrages preceding the main attacks by making it impossible for the forward artillery observers to adjust fire and observe the results. The northern thrust made little progress. The eastern attack across the frozen Vazuza river slowly ground forward. The two western thrusts made deeper penetrations, especially around the key town of Belyi. Still, the progress was nowhere near what the Soviets expected.

The German defenders fought stubbornly, clinging to their strong-points, which were often centered on many of the small villages dotting the area. In some cases, the German strong points remained manned for a time after the Soviets advanced past them, creating more problems for the Red Army in their rear areas. Despite repeated, persistent Soviet attacks, German small-arms fire and pre-planned artillery concentrations cut down the attacking Soviet infantry. Soviet tanks were picked off by anti-tank guns and the few German tanks, as well as in close combat with infantry.

The relative lack of initial success compounded the Soviet problems. The minor penetrations and the resulting small bridgeheads made it difficult to bring forward reinforcements and follow-up forces, especially artillery so critical for reducing the German strong points. The Germans reacted by shifting units within the salient against the points of the Soviet advance and pinching off their spearheads. With limited reserves and reinforcement unlikely due to Soviet offensives elsewhere, the Ninth Army was placed under great pressure.

Eventually the shifting of German forces, coupled with Soviet losses and supply difficulties, allowed the German forces to gain the upper hand. Their lines held, and they retook much of the lost ground. The German counterattacks against the Belyi (western) and the Vazuza (eastern) Soviet thrusts resulted in several thousand Soviet soldiers being trapped behind German lines. A few of them managed to break through to Soviet lines, some after fighting in the German rear for weeks. The trapped Soviets had to leave almost all of their vehicles and heavy weapons behind. Though the Germans were not able to remove Soviet forces from the Luchesa valley in the northwest of the salient, that was of little significance because the Soviets there were unable to press their attack through the difficult terrain.

Outcome

"The Western Front failed to penetrate enemy defences," according to

Operation Mars was a military failure, and the Soviets were unable to accomplish any of their objectives. However, in the aftermath of Operation Mars the commander of Army Group Centre, Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge, recommended the Germans abandon the salient to economize on manpower and to assume more defensible positions. Adolf Hitler refused. His denial of a major withdrawal in the winter of 1941–1942 had ultimately stabilized the German Army when it was on the edge of a collapse. Subsequently, he was less willing to heed the advice of his commanders. In addition, he was unwilling to give up any ground he had won and saw usefulness in retaining the salient as a starting point for a future thrust upon Moscow. However, in the spring of 1943, his desire to move back onto the offensive made him more receptive to withdrawing forces from the salient to free up manpower for operations elsewhere. A staged withdrawal was begun at the beginning of March 1943. By 23 March, the withdrawal was complete.

Historian A. V. Isayev has pointed out that together with influences on other sectors during the winter of 1942–1943, Operation Mars had an effect upon the strategic situation in 1943. In the plan for the large offensive at Kursk in July 1943, the German Ninth Army was located in the southern area of the Orel salient. It delivered the assault upon the Kursk salient from the north. However, losses suffered at Rzhev during Operation Mars resulted in the Ninth Army being short of forces, particularly infantry formations, and it could not muster enough force to fulfill its task.^[9]

Assessment

In the final assessment, Operation Mars was a failure for the Soviet forces.

In order to confine the German forces in every sector of the front and prevent the large reinforcement to the critical sectors, and in order to strengthen their [i.e., the Soviet] position in the places which were suitable for future offensives in the following winter, the Russians renewed their offensives in the central sector. Their main efforts focused on Rzhev and

infantry divisions – which were planned to be used in the southern sectors – had to be kept here to close gaps in the front and to retake lost territories. This was the only method for us to stop the enemy breakthrough.

— Kurt von Tippelskirch^[11]

Zhukov concluded that the main reason Soviet forces were unable to destroy the Rzhev salient "was underestimation of the rugged terrain" and "the shortage of supporting armour, artillery, mortars, and aircraft to pierce the enemy defences." He also did not expect the Germans to bring "up considerable reinforcements to this sector from other Fronts."[7]

Casualties

• Soviet:
  • Isayev:
    70,373 killed
    145,301 wounded^[2]
  • Glantz:
    100,000 killed
    235,000 wounded
    1,600 tanks^[3]
• German: 40,000 casualties^[4]

Notes