Unified Task Force
Operation Restore Hope | |||||||||||
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Part of the Somali Civil War | |||||||||||
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Participants | |||||||||||
Somali National Alliance | |||||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||||
Mohamed Farrah Aidid | |||||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||||
82 killed
~300 wounded
| Several thousand both civilians and military insurgents (per Aidid) |
The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was a United States-led, United Nations-sanctioned multinational force which operated in Somalia from 5 December 1992 until 4 May 1993. A United States initiative (code-named Operation Restore Hope), UNITAF was charged with carrying out United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of the country.
Background
Faced with a
Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to worsen. Factions were splintering into smaller factions, and then splintered again. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless when the stores had to be shipped through the territory of another. Three hundred thousand Somalis had already starved to death, and 1.5 million were at risk of starvation.[5] Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, looting and extortion.[4] By November, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid had grown confident enough to defy the Security Council formally and demand the withdrawal of peacekeepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments.[6]
In the face of mounting public pressure and frustration,
However, Boutros-Ghali felt that such action would be difficult to apply under the mandate for UNOSOM. Moreover, he realised that solving Somalia's problems would require such a large deployment that the UN Secretariat did not have the skills to command and control it. Accordingly, he recommended that a large intervention force be constituted under the command of member states but authorised by the Security Council to carry out operations in Somalia. The goal of this deployment was "to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building".[4]
Following this recommendation, on 3 December 1992 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794, authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The Security Council urged the Secretary-General and member states to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved.[8]
UNITAF has been considered part of a larger state building initiative in Somalia, serving as the military arm to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid. However, UNITAF cannot be considered a state building initiative due to its specific, limited and palliative aims, which it nonetheless exercised forcefully. The primary objective of UNITAF was security rather than larger institution building initiatives.[9]
Composition
The vast bulk of UNITAF's total personnel strength was provided by the United States (some 25,000 out of a total of 37,000 personnel). Other countries that contributed to UNITAF were 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment from Australia (January-May 1993), Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt (one battalion), Ethiopia, France (brigade HQ and one battalion), Germany, Greece (medical company at Waajid), the Indian Army (brigade HQ at Baidoa and three battalions), Ireland (transport company), Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, elements of No. 40 Squadron RNZAF from New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.[10]
For UNITAF, "the task of organizing and subordinating the units became largely a negotiation between the supplying governments and the JTF staff."[11]
The
The national contingents were co-ordinated and overseen by
"The deck was stacked against UNOSOM II, to some extent, from the beginning. The US was anxious to leave, feeling they had accomplished their somewhat limited objectives, but the UN was far from ready to receive the baton. The US, which had planned for a five or six weeks mission when it agreed to head UNITAF, was ready to turn over the command by mid-January. As the UNITAF commander was able to assign humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) to non-US forces, he began—with the approval of CINCCENT and the JCS—to reduce US forces and redeploy them to their home bases. In his words,
United States
Prior to Resolution 794, the United States had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the U.S. as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned "the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment".[15] Resolution 794 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 3 December 1992, and they welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for humanitarian efforts in Somalia.[16] President George H. W. Bush responded to this by initiating Operation Restore Hope on 4 December 1992, under which the United States would assume command in accordance with Resolution 794.[17]
Larry Freedman, a
Critics of U.S. involvement argued that the U.S. government was intervening so as to gain control of oil concessions for American companies,[19] with a survey of Northeast Africa by the World Bank and UN ranking Somalia second only to Sudan as the top prospective producer.[20] However, no American and UN troops were deployed in proximity to the major oil exploration areas in the northeastern part of the country or the autonomous Somaliland region in the northwest. The intervention happened twenty-two months after the fall of Barre's regime.[21] Other critics explain the intervention as the administration's way to maintain the size and expenditures of the post-Cold War military establishment, to deflect criticism for the president's failure to act in Bosnia, or to leave office on a high note.[21] To many in the administration, the intervention seemed like an optimal case for the use of military force – the chances of success seemed high, while the political risks and the danger to U.S. troops appeared to be limited. Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger described the situation in Somalia as "a tragedy of massive proportions, and, underline this, one that we could do something about.”[22]
Operation
The operation began on 6 December 1992, when
The MEU's
Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia and it resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement signed on 27 March 1993.[29] The conference, however, had little result as the civil war continued afterwards.
Results
As UNITAF's mandate was to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid, the operation was regarded as a success.
Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Navy ships were involved, from the unit USS Peleliu
No disarmament of the rivalling factions within Somalia was undertaken.
Transition to UNOSOM II
UNITAF was only intended as a transitional body.[
One day prior to the signing of the
References
Footnotes
- ^ https://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm
- ^ "United Nations Operation in Somalia UNSOM 1992". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 31 May 2009.
- ^ "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics" (PDF). Fas.org. Retrieved 4 October 2018.
- ^ a b c d e "United Nations Operation In Somalia I – (Unosom I)". Un.org. Retrieved 29 January 2012.
- ISBN 9780813327938.
- ^ United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- ^ United Nations, 1992, Letter dated 92/11/29 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, page 6.
- ^ United Nations, Security Council resolution 794 (1992), 24 April 1992, para. 3
- ISBN 978-0199760121.
- ^ "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II) - Background (Summary)". peacekeeping.un.org. Retrieved 16 September 2021.; Ramsbothan and Woodhouse, 1999, 225.
- ^ Bullock 1995, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/SAASS-Theses/smdpage15021/6/
- ^ Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope, Center for Naval Analysis
- ^ Patman, R.G., 2001, ‘Beyond ‘the Mogadishu Line’: Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State Conflicts’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol, 12, No. 1, p. 69
- ^ Bullock 1995, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/SAASS-Theses/smdpage15021/6/
- ^ "Security Council resolutions – 1992". Un.org. Retrieved 29 January 2012.
- ^ Security Council Resolution 794
- ^ Bush, George H., Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, 4/12/92 On 23 December 1992,
- ISBN 1-56352-188-1.
- ^ Fineman, Mark (18 January 1993). "Column One; The Oil Factor In Somalia;Four American Petroleum Giants Had Agreements With The African Nation Before Its Civil War Began. They Could Reap Big Rewards If Peace Is Restored". Los Angeles Times: 1. Archived from the original on 24 February 2012.
- ^ Hassan, Abdiqani (21 May 2008). "Canada's Africa Oil starts Somalia seismic survey". Reuters. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-56902-288-7.
- ISSN 0360-4918.
- ^ Friedman, Herbert A. "United States PSYOP in Somalia". Psywarrior. Retrieved 2 December 2012.
- ^ Borchini, Charles P. (Lt. Col.); Borstelmann, Mari (October 1994). "PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope" (PDF). Special Warfare. United States Army. Retrieved 2 December 2012.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Buer, Eric F. (Maj.) (2002). "A Comparative Analysis of Offensive Air Support" (PDF). United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College. p. 23. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 August 2014.
- ^ Mroczkowski, Dennis P. (Col.) (2005). Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force 1992–1993 (PDF). United States Marines Corps. pp. 31–34. Retrieved 13 February 2020.
- ^ Joint Publication 3-0 (17 January 2017). Joint Operations (Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018 ed.). Joint Chiefs of Staff: US Government Printing Office. pp. V-17 to V-18, VIII-12 to VIII-13, GL-10.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - ^ Joint Publication 3-02 (4 January 2019). "Chapter II – Types of Amphibious Operations, Chapter IV – Planning Phase" (PDF). Amphibious Operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff: US Government Printing Office. pp. II-9 to II-13, IV-4 to IV-19.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - ^ "The General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993". United States Institute of Peace. Archived from the original on 29 December 2006. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
- ^ "Operation Restore Hope". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2 December 2007.
- ^ "United Nations Operation in Somalia I". Retrieved 2 December 2007.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-19-955105-7.
- ISBN 978-0-7432-2786-5.
- OCLC 1342130779.
- JSTOR 20047117.
- ^ Norrie MacQueen (2006). Peacekeeping and the International System. Routledge.[ISBN missing]
- ISBN 978-0941690904.
- ^ "United Nations Operation in Somalia 2". Un.org. Retrieved 2 December 2007.
- ^ ISSN 0039-6338.
- ^ ISSN 0882-7729. Retrieved 17 May 2023.
- ISBN 0-85598-271-3.
Bibliography
- Allard, Kenneth (1995). Somalia Operations : Lessons Learned (PDF). Washington, DC: OCLC 32155661. Archived from the original(PDF) on 8 August 2022.
- Harned, Glenn M. (2016). Stability Operations in Somalia 1992-1993 : A Case Study (PDF). ISBN 978-0-9861865-8-5. Archived from the original(PDF) on 17 April 2018. Retrieved 8 August 2022.
- Miller, Laura L.; Moskos, C. (1995). "Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope". S2CID 144654522.
- Poole, Walter S. (2005). "The Effort to Save Somalia August 1992-March 1994" (PDF). Joint History Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 May 2022. Retrieved 7 August 2022.
- Stevenson, Jonathan (1995). Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia. ISBN 978-1557507884.
- Stewart, Richard W. (2003). "The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994". United States Army Center of Military History. Archived from the original on 19 June 2022. Retrieved 6 August 2022.
- The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. The United Nations Blue Book Series. Vol. VIII. New York, NY: ISBN 978-92-1-100566-0. Archived from the originalon 8 August 2022. Retrieved 8 August 2022.
- "United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994" (PDF). United States Army Center of Military History. 2003. Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 August 2022. Retrieved 7 August 2022.
External links
- UN Department of Peacekeeping: UNOSOM 1 Archived
- UN Department of Peacekeeping: UNOSOM 2 Archived
- Global Security on Operation Restore Hope Archived
- Bibliography of Contingency Operations: Somalia (Restore Hope) compiled by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Archived