Orlov revolt
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Operations during the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774) and Orlov revolt (1770) | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
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Greeks Supported by: Russia | Ottoman Empire | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Panagiotis Benakis Daskalogiannis Konstantinos Kolokotronis † Lambros Katsonis Alexei Orlov | Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Greek revolutionaries Imperial Russian Navy |
Ottoman Muslim Albanian mercenaries Local Turks | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Unknown | Unknown | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Unknown | Unknown |
The Orlov revolt
Background
Rise of the Russo-Turkish conflict
The first attempts of the nascent
During the same period, Russian influence began to spread among the Christians living under Ottoman rule. Prophecies of a 'golden nation' or 'blonde nation' that would destroy the Ottoman Empire began circulating already in the 1690s, during the height of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686–1700.[3] At the same time, the Franco-Ottoman alliance resulted in advantages for the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, and particularly the Holy Land. This caused the Greek Orthodox patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem to turn to Russia for support in recovering their privileges.[4] The Austrian advance into the northwestern Balkans during the Great Turkish War also caused concern, with the Serbian patriarch and the ruler of Wallachia, Șerban Cantacuzino, seeking Russian support as early as 1688.[4] The presence of a Russian ambassador at the Ottoman court from 1700 on also allowed direct contacts of Russian officials with the Ottoman Christians, while an increasing number of the latter sought refuge and employment in Russia, where Greek colonies were established.[5]
Outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774
The Ottoman Empire had its longest period of peace between 1739 (Treaty of Belgrade) and 1768 - three decades when it did not engage any of its European rivals.[6] Europe was caught up in costly and bloody conflicts while the Ottomans stayed out and tended to economy and politics, and rebuilding social and administrative organization.[6]
This peaceful period came to an end on 23 October 1768, when the Porte declared war on Russia.[6] Causes included aggressive Russian foreign policy, Russian interference in Crimea (an Ottoman vassal), and the power struggle in Poland-Lithuania.[6] There were insignificant events in 1768–69, as both sides prepared for a long campaign.[7]
Meanwhile, Greek rebels were readied. Wishing to weaken the Ottoman Empire and establish a pro-Russian independent Greek state, Russian emissaries had been sent to Mani in the mid-1760s to make a pact with the strongest local military leaders, and at the same time notable Greeks approached various Russian agents, discussing plans for the liberation of Greece.[8] In preparation for war, Russian agents promoted Greek rebellion to support military actions in the north.[9] Russian artillery captain Grigorios Papadopoulos (or Georgios Papasoglu[10]), a Greek, was dispatched to Mani.[9] Georgios Papazolis, another Greek officer of the Russian army, cooperated with the brothers Grigory and Alexei Orlov in preparations for a Greek insurrection in the Morea during the Russian military operations against the Ottoman Empire in 1769.[11] The organization of the Greek rebellion was put under brothers Orlov,[9] with Alexei as the Russian fleet commander.[7]
Some Greek notables joined the Russian side, and promised them men and supplies, while in return they expected massive Russian aid (10,000 soldiers and military equipment).[9] Russia planned to incite Orthodox Christians to revolt, and sent agents to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Crete and the Morea.[7] Another Orlov brother, Fyodor Orlov , was sent to coordinate rebels in Morea, deemed the most important strategic area in mainland Greece (due to its ports).[12] Russia assembled a war fleet for deployment in the Mediterranean, described as "one of the most spectacular events of the 18th century", which caught the Ottomans off-guard.[7] The first fleet contingent (out of two) departed in August 1769 and arrived in the Aegean in December.[7] This expedition of four ships, a few hundred soldiers and inadequate arms supplies greatly disappointed the Greeks.[9] Nevertheless, combined Russian-Greek forces attempted a campaign.[9]
Progress of the revolt
Peloponnese
The arrival of the Russian fleet in Mani in February 1770 saw the establishment of local armed groups in Mani and Kalamata. However, the small Russian expeditionary force could not convince a part of the local Greeks to take arms. The Russian manpower was much fewer than expected and mutual distrust developed between the Greek and Russian leaders.[13] Among the Greek leaders that were approached were Panagiotis Benakis, a notable from Kalamata, the local metropolitan bishop Anthimos,[14] and Cretan shipping magnate John Vlachos "Daskalogiannis". Initially an army of 1,400 men was formed, but additional reinforcement of Cretans arrived the following days. The Greek forces were divided into major units (called legions) with the help of a small number of Russian officers and soldiers. The "Eastern Spartan Legion" in Laconia, with 1,200 men, was organized by P. P. Dolgorukov and led by Georgios "Yiorgakis"[10] Mavromichalis, while the "Western Spartan Legion" in Messenia was led by G. M. Barkov and Antonios Psarros.[15]
The Greek rebels were initially successful and managed to defeat Ottoman forces in Laconia and eastern Messenia in southern
The population of
In March 12 the western legion and the Russian fleet began to siege the fortress of Koroni. However, after six week the garrison couldn't be taken.[16]
Crete
Meanwhile, the Greek revolt in Crete was led by Daskalogiannis. Soon after Sfakians refused to pay taxes and revolted in great numbers.[17] However, the support promised by the Russian emissaries never arrived at Crete and Daskalogiannis was left to his own devices.[citation needed] He managed to organize a band of 2,000 well armed men who descended from the mountains onto the plains of western Crete.[18] There with messianic overtones they prepared for a week with feasting and in formations of small bands started to kill local Muslims in an unsuccessful effort to convince other Cretans to join them in their quest to overthrow the Ottomans.[18] The Cretan uprising was soon suppressed by numerically superior Ottoman units.[17]
Ottoman response
In April the revolutionaries managed to capture the fortress of Navarino however the uprising was already doomed and the Russian fleet abandoned the region in following June.[19]
As soon as the first news of the Russian-backed Greek revolt reached the Ottoman capital, the first anti-Greek pogroms broke out in various cities of the Ottoman Empire, including Smyrna.[20]
With the assistance of Greek islanders, the Russian fleet was able to score a major victory against the
Aftermath
The Muslim Albanian mercenaries hired by the Ottomans remained in the Peloponnese for several years after the suppression of the revolt, periodically launching reprisals against the Greeks,
The Ottoman government was unable to pay the wages the Albanian mercenaries demanded for their service, causing the latter to ravage the region.[28] In 1774 the Russo-Turkish War ended with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca which granted general amnesty to the population. Nevertheless, attacks by Muslim Albanian mercenaries in the region continued not only against the Greek population but also against Turks.[29] The extensive destruction and lack of control in the Peloponnese forced the central Ottoman government to send a regular Turkish military force to suppress those Albanian troops in 1779,[9] and eventually drive them out from Peloponnese.[23]
From the Russian point of view, Count Orlov's mission was mostly a success, damaging the Ottoman fleet, directing Ottoman troops south, and contributing to the victory that led to the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.
From the Greek point of view, the revolt had significant consequences. On the one hand, it cost a huge number of lives (both in battle, and in the Ottoman reprisals that followed). On the other hand, the Milet-i Rum, of which Greek were a part, did well out of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Greek ships, for example, gained the right to sail under the Russian flag and had open access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia gained the right to protect the Orthodox population and its churches and to build an Orthodox cathedral in Istanbul. Russia also obtained the right to appoint Consuls throughout the empire, and most of these were Greeks. The treaty ushered in major changes to the Greek world.[30]
Greek connections to Russia became even stronger because of the influence of prominent Greeks in Russia such as Count Demetrio Mocenigo, Count
In popular culture
The revolt was a crucial event for the further development of Philhellenism as an important literary movement in the Western world. As such, the protagonist in Friedrich Hölderlin's novel Hyperion participates in a 1770 revolt inspired by the Orlov Revolt.[32][33]
Gallery
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Battle of Chios (Chesma) by Ivan Aivazovsky (1848)
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Gravour showing the Battle of Chesma
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A bust of Daskalogiannis in Anopolis, Crete
Annotations
References
- ^ a b Vakalopoulos 1975, p. 52.
- ^ Vakalopoulos 1975, p. 53.
- ^ Vakalopoulos 1975, pp. 55–57.
- ^ a b Vakalopoulos 1975, p. 56.
- ^ Vakalopoulos 1975, pp. 56–57, 59.
- ^ a b c d Gallant 2015, p. 18.
- ^ a b c d e Gallant 2015, p. 19.
- SSRN 2436332.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Jelavich 1983, p. 78.
- ^ a b Gallant 2015, p. 21.
- ^ Dakin 1973, p. 78.
- ^ Gallant 2015, pp. 19–20.
- ^ Roessel 2001, p. 13.
- ^ ISBN 9781134536030.
- ^ a b Pappas 1982, p. 74.
- ^ a b Brewer, 2012, p. 189
- ^ a b Pappas 1982, p. 76.
- ^ ISBN 9781400844494.
- ISBN 9780786474707.
- ISBN 9783791714257.
Als in Istanbul bekannt wurde, daß auf russischer Seite zahlreiche griechische Mannschaften und Offiziere kämpften, kam es in Smyrna (Izmir) und anderen Städten des Reiches zu ersten antigriechischen Pogromen.
- ^ Dakin 1973, p. 26.
- ^ Gallant 2015, pp. 9–11.
- ^ a b Stavrianos 2000, p. 189.
- ISBN 978-960-7897-40-4.
- ISBN 9780857719478.
...when the Turks and Albanians reasserted themselves they were merciless; recapturing Patras, they left scarcely anyone alive.
- ISBN 9780857718105.
- ISBN 978-0-520-36359-5.
- ISBN 9780857718105.
- ISBN 9781134536030.
- ^ Gallant 2015, pp. 11–13.
- ^ Gallant 2015, pp. 14–23.
- ^ Roessel 2001, p. 16.
- ^ Hölderlin, Freidrich; trans. Willard R. Trask (1965). Hyperion. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. p. 106.
- ^ a b Gallant 2015, p. 20.
Sources
- Brewer, David (16 April 2012). Greece, the Hidden Centuries: Turkish Rule from the Fall of Constantinople to Greek Independence. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0-85772-167-9.
- ISBN 9780520023420.
- Gallant, Thomas (2015). "The winds of change". The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: The Long Nineteenth Century. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 17–. ISBN 978-0-7486-3607-5.
- ISBN 9780521252492.
- Pappas, Nicholas Charles (1982). Greeks in Russian military service in the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries. Stanford University.
- Papadopoulos, Stefanos (1975). "Η Ελληνική Επανάσταση του 1770 και ο αντίκτυπός της στις ελληνικές χώρες" [The Greek Revolution of 1770 and its impact on the Greek lands]. In Christopoulos, Georgios A. & Bastias, Ioannis K. (eds.). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους, Τόμος ΙΑ΄: Ο Ελληνισμός υπό ξένη κυριαρχία (περίοδος 1669 - 1821), Τουρκοκρατία - Λατινοκρατία [History of the Greek Nation, Volume XI: Hellenism under Foreign Rule (Period 1669 - 1821), Turkocracy – Latinocracy] (in Greek). Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon. pp. 58–85. ISBN 978-960-213-100-8.
- Roessel, David (2001). In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198032908.
- Stavrianos, Leften Stavros (2000). The Balkans Since 1453. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. pp. 187–190, 195. ISBN 978-1-85065-551-0.
- ISBN 978-960-213-100-8.