Provisional Irish Republican Army
Provisional Irish Republican Army | |
---|---|
Irish: Óglaigh na hÉireann[1] | |
Leaders | IRA Army Council[2] |
Dates of operation | 1969–2005 (on ceasefire from 1997)[3] |
Allegiance | Irish Republic[n 1][4] |
Active regions | Ireland,[5] England,[6] Europe,[7] |
Ideology | |
Size | 10,000 est. throughout the Troubles[10] |
Allies | |
Opponents | United Kingdom |
Battles and wars | Irish Republican Army (IRA) |
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA), officially known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA; Irish: Óglaigh na hÉireann) and informally known as the Provos, was an Irish republican paramilitary force that sought to end British rule in Northern Ireland, facilitate Irish reunification and bring about an independent republic encompassing all of Ireland. It was the most active republican paramilitary group during the Troubles. It argued that the all-island Irish Republic continued to exist, and it saw itself as that state's army, the sole legitimate successor to the original IRA from the Irish War of Independence. It was designated a terrorist organisation in the United Kingdom and an unlawful organisation in the Republic of Ireland, both of whose authority it rejected.
The Provisional IRA emerged in December 1969, due to a split within
The Provisional IRA declared a final ceasefire in July 1997, after which its political wing
History
Origins
The
Following partition, Northern Ireland became a
Marches marking the Ulster Protestant celebration
1969 split
The IRA split into "Provisional" and
Following the convention the traditionalists canvassed support throughout Ireland, with IRA director of intelligence Mac Stíofáin meeting the disaffected members of the IRA in Belfast.[56] Shortly after, the traditionalists held a convention which elected a "Provisional" Army Council, composed of Mac Stíofáin, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, Paddy Mulcahy, Sean Tracey, Leo Martin, Ó Conaill, and Cahill.[48] The term provisional was chosen to mirror the 1916 Provisional Government of the Irish Republic,[51] and also to designate it as temporary pending ratification by a further IRA convention.[n 4][48][57] Nine out of thirteen IRA units in Belfast sided with the "Provisional" Army Council in December 1969, roughly 120 activists and 500 supporters.[58] The Provisional IRA issued their first public statement on 28 December 1969,[4] stating:
We declare our allegiance to the 32 county Irish republic, proclaimed at Easter 1916, established by the first Dáil Éireann in 1919, overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the existing British-imposed six-county and twenty-six-county partition states ... We call on the Irish people at home and in exile for increased support towards defending our people in the North and the eventual achievement of the full political, social, economic and cultural freedom of Ireland.[n 5][55]
The Irish republican political party
Initial phase
In January 1970, the Army Council decided to adopt a three-stage strategy; defence of nationalist areas, followed by a combination of defence and retaliation, and finally launching a guerrilla campaign against the British Army.
As a result of escalating violence,
On 22 June the IRA announced that a ceasefire would begin at midnight on 26 June, in anticipation of talks with the British government.
Following an IRA ceasefire over the Christmas period in 1974 and a further one in January 1975, on 8 February the IRA issued a statement suspending "offensive military action" from six o'clock the following day.[116][117] A series of meetings took place between the IRA's leadership and British government representatives throughout the year, with the IRA being led to believe this was the start of a process of British withdrawal.[118][119] Occasional IRA violence occurred during the ceasefire, with bombs in Belfast, Derry, and South Armagh.[120][121] The IRA was also involved in tit for tat sectarian killings of Protestant civilians, in retaliation for sectarian killings by loyalist paramilitaries.[122][123] By July the Army Council was concerned at the progress of the talks, concluding there was no prospect of a lasting peace without a public declaration by the British government of their intent to withdraw from Ireland.[124] In August there was a gradual return to the armed campaign, and the truce effectively ended on 22 September when the IRA set off 22 bombs across Northern Ireland.[122][125] The old guard leadership of Ó Brádaigh, Ó Conaill, and McKee were criticised by a younger generation of activists following the ceasefire, and their influence in the IRA slowly declined.[126][127] The younger generation viewed the ceasefire as being disastrous for the IRA, causing the organisation irreparable damage and taking it close to being defeated.[127] The Army Council was accused of falling into a trap that allowed the British breathing space and time to build up intelligence on the IRA, and McKee was criticised for allowing the IRA to become involved in sectarian killings, as well a feud with the Official IRA in October and November 1975 that left eleven people dead.[123]
The "Long War"
Following the end of the ceasefire, the British government introduced a new three-part strategy to deal with the Troubles; the parts became known as
In 1977 the IRA evolved a new strategy which they called the "Long War", which would remain their strategy for the rest of the Troubles.
- A war of attrition against enemy personnel [British Army] which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their [the British] people at home for their withdrawal.
- A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's financial interests in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long-term investment in our country.
- To make the Six Counties ... ungovernable except by colonial military rule.
- To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by National and International propaganda and publicity campaigns.
- By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals,
The "Long War" saw the IRA's tactics move away from the large bombing campaigns of the early 1970s, in favour of more attacks on members of the security forces.
The prison protest against criminalisation culminated in the 1981 Irish hunger strike, when seven IRA and three Irish National Liberation Army members starved themselves to death in pursuit of political status.[143] The hunger strike leader Bobby Sands and Anti H-Block activist Owen Carron were successively elected to the British House of Commons, and two other protesting prisoners were elected to Dáil Éireann.[144] The electoral successes led to the IRA's armed campaign being pursued in parallel with increased electoral participation by Sinn Féin.[145] This strategy was known as the "Armalite and ballot box strategy", named after Danny Morrison's speech at the 1981 Sinn Féin ard fheis:
Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand we take power in Ireland?[146]
Attacks on high-profile political and military targets remained a priority for the IRA.[147][148] The Chelsea Barracks bombing in London in October 1981 killed two civilians and injured twenty-three soldiers; a week later the IRA struck again in London by an assassination attempt on Lieutenant General Steuart Pringle, the Commandant General Royal Marines.[148] Attacks on military targets in England continued with the Hyde Park and Regent's Park bombings in July 1982, which killed eleven soldiers and injured over fifty people including civilians.[149] In October 1984 they carried out the Brighton hotel bombing, an assassination attempt on British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, whom they blamed for the deaths of the ten hunger strikers.[142] The bombing killed five members of the Conservative Party attending a party conference including MP Anthony Berry, with Thatcher narrowly escaping death.[142][150] A planned escalation of the England bombing campaign in 1985 was prevented when six IRA volunteers, including Martina Anderson and the Brighton bomber Patrick Magee, were arrested in Glasgow.[151] Plans for a major escalation of the campaign in the late 1980s were cancelled after a ship carrying 150 tonnes of weapons donated by Libya was seized off the coast of France.[152] The plans, modelled on the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, relied on the element of surprise which was lost when the ship's captain informed French authorities of four earlier shipments of weapons, which allowed the British Army to deploy appropriate countermeasures.[153] In 1987 the IRA began attacking British military targets in mainland Europe, beginning with the Rheindahlen bombing, which was followed by approximately twenty other gun and bomb attacks aimed at British Armed Forces personnel and bases between 1988 and 1990.[7][154]
Peace process
By the late 1980s the Troubles were at a military and political stalemate, with the IRA able to prevent the British government imposing a settlement but unable to force their objective of Irish reunification.[155] Sinn Féin president Adams was in contact with Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader John Hume and a delegation representing the Irish government, in order to find political alternatives to the IRA's campaign.[156] As a result of the republican leadership appearing interested in peace, British policy shifted when Peter Brooke, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, began to engage with them hoping for a political settlement.[157] Backchannel diplomacy between the IRA and British government began in October 1990, with Sinn Féin being given an advance copy of a planned speech by Brooke.[158] The speech was given in London the following month, with Brooke stating that the British government would not give in to violence but offering significant political change if violence stopped, ending his statement by saying:
The British government has no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland: Our role is to help, enable and encourage ... Partition is an acknowledgement of reality, not an assertion of national self-interest.[n 15][162]
The IRA responded to Brooke's speech by declaring a three-day ceasefire over Christmas, the first in fifteen years.
On 31 August 1994 the IRA announced a "complete cessation of military operations" on the understanding that Sinn Féin would be included in political talks for a settlement.
On 9 February 1996 a statement from the Army Council was delivered to the Irish national broadcaster
Following the May 1997 UK general election Major was replaced as prime minister by Tony Blair of the Labour Party.[189] The new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, had announced prior to the election she would be willing to include Sinn Féin in multi-party talks without prior decommissioning of weapons within two months of an IRA ceasefire.[189] After the IRA declared a new ceasefire in July 1997, Sinn Féin was admitted into multi-party talks, which produced the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998.[190][191] One aim of the agreement was that all paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland fully disarm by May 2000.[192] The IRA began decommissioning in a process that was monitored by Canadian General John de Chastelain's Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD),[193] with some weapons being decommissioned on 23 October 2001 and 8 April 2002.[194] The October 2001 decommissioning was the first time an Irish republican paramilitary organisation had voluntarily disposed of its arms.[n 17][195] In October 2002 the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended by the British government and direct rule returned, in order to prevent a unionist walkout.[n 18][197] This was partly triggered by Stormontgate—allegations that republican spies were operating within the Parliament Buildings and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)[n 19][199]—and the IRA temporarily broke off contact with de Chastelain.[200] However, further decommissioning took place on 21 October 2003.[201] In the aftermath of the December 2004 Northern Bank robbery, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Michael McDowell stated there could be no place in government in either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland for a party that supported or threatened the use of violence, possessed explosives or firearms, and was involved in criminality.[202] At the beginning of February 2005, the IRA declared that it was withdrawing a decommissioning offer from late 2004.[202] This followed a demand from the Democratic Unionist Party, under Paisley, insisting on photographic evidence of decommissioning.[202]
End of the armed campaign
On 28 July 2005, the IRA, with a statement read to the media by
- 1,000 rifles
- 2 tonnes of the plastic explosive Semtex
- 20–30 heavy machine guns
- 7 surface-to-air missiles
- 7 flamethrowers
- 1,200 detonators
- 11 rocket-propelled grenade launchers
- 90 handguns
- 100+ hand grenades[211]
Having compared the weapons decommissioned with the British and Irish security forces' estimates of the IRA's arsenal, and because of the IRA's full involvement in the process of decommissioning the weapons, the IICD concluded that all IRA weaponry had been decommissioned.[n 20][213] The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Hain, said he accepted the conclusion of the IICD.[214] Since then, there have been occasional claims in the media that the IRA had not decommissioned all of its weaponry.[215] In response to such claims, the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) stated in its 10th report that the IRA had decommissioned all weaponry under its control.[215] The report stated that if any weapons had been kept they would have been kept by individuals and against IRA orders.[n 21][215]
In February 2015,
Weaponry and operations
In the early days of
The IRA was mainly active in Northern Ireland, although it also attacked targets in England and mainland Europe, and limited activity also took place in the Republic of Ireland.
Casualties
The IRA was responsible for more deaths than any other organisation during the Troubles.[251] Two detailed studies of deaths in the Troubles, the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), and the book Lost Lives, differ slightly on the numbers killed by the IRA and the total number of conflict deaths.[252] According to CAIN, the IRA was responsible for 1,705 deaths, about 48% of the total conflict deaths.[253] Of these, 1,009 (about 59%) were members or former members of the British security forces, while 508 (about 29%) were civilians.[254] According to Lost Lives, the IRA was responsible for 1,781 deaths, about 47% of the total conflict deaths.[255] Of these, 944 (about 53%) were members of the British security forces, while 644 (about 36%) were civilians (including 61 former members of the security forces).[255] The civilian figure also includes civilians employed by British security forces, politicians, members of the judiciary, and alleged criminals and informers.[255] Most of the remainder were loyalist or republican paramilitary members, including over 100 IRA members accidentally killed by their own bombs or shot for being security force agents or informers.[256][257] Overall, the IRA was responsible for 87–90% of the total British security force deaths, and 27–30% of the total civilian deaths.[254][255]
During the IRA's campaign in England it was responsible for at least 488 incidents causing 2,134 injuries and 115 deaths, including 56 civilians and 42 British soldiers.[n 25][260][261] Between 275 and 300 IRA members were killed during the Troubles,[262][263] with the IRA's biggest loss of life in a single incident being the Loughgall ambush in 1987, when eight volunteers attempting to bomb a police station were killed by the British Army's Special Air Service.[264]
Structure
All levels of the organisation were entitled to send delegates to General Army Conventions.[2] The convention was the IRA's supreme decision-making authority, and was supposed to meet every two years,[2] or every four years following a change to the IRA's constitution in 1986.[n 26][1] Before 1969 conventions met regularly, but owing to the difficulty in organising such a large gathering of an illegal organisation in secret,[n 27][267] while the IRA's armed campaign was ongoing they were only held in September 1970,[267] October 1986,[267] and October or November 1996.[187][268] After the 1997 ceasefire they were held more frequently, and are known to have been held in October 1997,[269] May 1998,[270] December 1998 or early 1999,[271][272] and June 2002.[273] The convention elected a 12-member Executive, which selected seven members, usually from within the Executive, to form the Army Council.[n 28][2][276] Any vacancies on the Executive would then be filled by substitutes previously elected by the convention.[2] For day-to-day purposes, authority was vested in the Army Council which, as well as directing policy and taking major tactical decisions, appointed a chief-of-staff from one of its number or, less often, from outside its ranks.[277][278]
The chief-of-staff would be assisted by an
The IRA referred to its ordinary members as volunteers (or óglaigh in Irish), to reflect the IRA being an
Political ideology
Part of a series on |
Irish republicanism |
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The IRA's goal was an all-Ireland democratic socialist republic.[295] Richard English, a professor at Queen's University Belfast, writes that while the IRA's adherence to socialist goals has varied according to time and place, radical ideas, specifically socialist ones, were a key part of IRA thinking.[9] Former IRA volunteer Tommy McKearney states that while the IRA's goal was a socialist republic, there was no coherent analysis or understanding of socialism itself, other than an idea that the details would be worked out following an IRA victory.[296] This was in contrast to the Official IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army, both of which adopted clearly defined Marxist positions.[297] Similarly, the Northern Ireland left-wing politician Eamonn McCann has remarked that the Provisional IRA was considered a non-socialist IRA compared to the Official IRA.[298]
During the 1980s, the IRA's commitment to socialism became more solidified as IRA prisoners began to engage with works of political and
Categorisation
The IRA is a proscribed organisation in the United Kingdom under the Terrorism Act 2000,[300] and an unlawful organisation in the Republic of Ireland under the Offences Against the State Acts, where IRA volunteers are tried in the non-jury Special Criminal Court.[n 30][302] A similar system was introduced in Northern Ireland by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, with a Diplock court consisting of a single judge and no jury.[303] The IRA rejected the authority of the courts in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and its standing orders did not allow volunteers on trial in a criminal court to enter a plea or recognise the authority of the court, doing so could lead to expulsion from the IRA.[n 31][304][305] These orders were relaxed in 1976 due to sentences in the Republic of Ireland for IRA membership being increased from two years to seven years imprisonment.[304][306] IRA prisoners in the UK and the Republic of Ireland were granted conditional early release as part of the Good Friday Agreement.[307] IRA members were often refused travel visas to enter the United States, due to previous criminal convictions or because the Immigration and Nationality Act bars the entry of people who are members of an organisation which advocates the overthrow of a government by force.[n 32][310][311]
American TV news broadcasts used the terms "activists", "guerrillas", and "terrorists" to describe IRA members, while British TV news broadcasts commonly used the term "terrorists", particularly the
An internal British Army document written by General Sir Mike Jackson and two other senior officers was released in 2007 under the Freedom of Information Act.[252] It examined the British Army's 37 years of deployment in Northern Ireland, and described the IRA as "a professional, dedicated, highly skilled and resilient force", while loyalist paramilitaries and other republican groups were described as "little more than a collection of gangsters".[252]
Strength and support
Numerical strength
It is unclear how many people joined the IRA during the Troubles, as it did not keep detailed records of personnel.[10] Journalists Eamonn Mallie and Patrick Bishop state roughly 8,000 people passed through the ranks of the IRA in the first 20 years of its existence, many of them leaving after arrest, retirement or disillusionment.[321] McGuinness, who held a variety of leadership positions,[n 33] estimated a total membership of 10,000 over the course of the Troubles.[10] The British Army estimates the IRA had 500 volunteers in July 1971, 130 in Derry and 340 in Belfast,[n 34][325] journalist Ed Moloney states by the end of the year the IRA in Belfast had over 1,200 volunteers.[92] After the late 1970s restructure,[326] the British Army estimated the IRA had 500 full-time volunteers.[327] A 1978 British Army report by Brigadier James Glover stated that the restructured IRA did not require the same number of volunteers as the early 1970s, and that a small number of volunteers could "maintain a disproportionate level of violence".[137][328] Journalist Brendan O'Brien states by the late 1980s the IRA had roughly 300 active volunteers and 450 more in support roles,[329] while historian Richard English states in 1988 the IRA was believed to have no more than thirty experienced gunmen and bombers, with a further twenty volunteers with less experience and 500 more in support roles.[327] Moloney estimates in October 1996 the IRA had between 600 and 700 active volunteers.[266]
Support from other countries and organisations
Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was a supplier of arms to the IRA, donating two shipments of arms in the early 1970s,[331] and another five in the mid-1980s.[332] The final shipment in 1987 was intercepted by French authorities,[332] but the prior four shipments included 1,200 AKM assault rifles, 26 DShK heavy machine guns, 40 general-purpose machine guns, 33 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 10 SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, 10 LPO-50 flamethrowers, and over two tonnes of plastic explosive Semtex.[330] He also gave $12 million in cash to the IRA.[333][334][335]
Irish Americans (both Irish immigrants and natives of Irish descent) also donated weapons and money.[11] The financial backbone of IRA support in the United States was the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), founded by Irish immigrant and IRA veteran Michael Flannery. NORAID officially raised money for the families of IRA prisoners but was strongly accused by opponents of being a front for the IRA and being involved in IRA gunrunning.[336][337] The key IRA transatlantic gunrunning network was run by Irish immigrant and IRA veteran George Harrison, who estimated to have smuggled 2,000–2,500 weapons and approximately 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ireland.[338] However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Harrison for IRA arms smuggling in June 1981, thereby blocking the IRA's arms supply from America.[339] This forced the IRA to focus on importing weaponry from its already-established networks in Europe and the Middle East.[340][341] In addition, Irish American support for the Republican cause began to weaken in the mid-1970s and gradually diminished in the 1980s due to bad publicity surrounding IRA atrocities and NORAID.[342][343] By 1998, only $3.6 million were raised in America for the Irish Republican cause,[344][345][346][347] in which many historians and scholars agreed such an amount was too small to make an actual difference in the conflict.[348][349][345]
Irish Canadians, Irish Australians, and Irish New Zealanders were also active in supporting the Republican cause.[350][351][352] More than A$20,000 were sent per year to the Provisionals from supporters in Australia by the 1990s.[353] Canadian supporters not just fundraised or import weapons,[354][355][356][357] but also smuggled IRA and Sinn Féin members into the United States, which, unlike Canada, enacted a visa ban on such members on the basis of advocating violence since the early 1970s. Gearóid Ó Faoleán wrote that "[i]n 1972, inclement weather forced a light aeroplane to reroute to Shannon Airport from Farranfore in County Kerry, where IRA volunteers had been awaiting its arrival. The plane, piloted by a Canadian [IRA supporter], had flown from Libya with at least one cargo of arms that included RPG-7 rocket launchers" where IRA smuggled these weapons into safe houses for its armed campaign.[358] In 1974, seven Canadian residents (six who were originally from Belfast) were arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for smuggling weapons to the IRA after "raids in St. Catharines, Tavistock and Toronto and at the U.S. border at Windsor". Philip Kent, one of those arrested, was discovered in his car for having "fifteen FN rifles and a .50 calibre machine gun".[359]
Former MI5 agent Willie Carlin said that one of the main reasons why the IRA Army Council did not attack Scotland during the conflict was because doing so would reduce support from Scots and have a negative impact on its fundraising and other activities there. Carlin explained that "[t]here were politicians in Scotland, a lot of whom were very sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and even the Sinn Fein cause". He also noted that while much of the money was donated by supporters in Glasgow, funds also came from all over the country, from "farmers up there who had family and relatives in Ireland".[360]
The IRA had links with the
In May 1996, the
Financing
While overseas financial support was generally appreciated, the vast majority of the IRA revenue came from activities in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee in its 26 June 2002 report stated that "the importance of overseas donations has been exaggerated and donations from the USA have formed only a small portion of IRA income." It identified extortion, fuel laundering, rum-running, tobacco smuggling, armed robbery, and counterfeiting in Ireland and Britain as the primary sources of funding for both Republican and Loyalist militants throughout and after the Troubles, while "the sums involved [from overseas] [were and] are comparatively small". The committee estimated that the Provisional IRA made £5-8 million a year while spending £1.5m annually to carry out its campaign.[349] One IRA interviewee stated that starting in the 1970s for example:
Belfast ran itself for years on its [social] clubs. You know the clubs? They formed the clubs, earlier on they formed it and ... the car parks, you know, not building them but taking over areas and running them as car parks. There was no one to say how much you took in and how much you took out and so, you know, if there was twenty-thousand coming in every week you could say there's twelve-thousand coming in and then there's eight-thousand going one way, and you paid your people and say there's so much going every week. And that financed the movement.[379]
Generally, the IRA was against drug dealing and prostitution, because it would be unpopular within Catholic communities and for moral reasons.[380] The chief of the RUC Drugs Squad, Kevin Sheehy, said the IRA tried to prevent volunteers being directly involved with drugs, and noted one occasion when an IRA member caught with a small amount of cannabis was "disowned and humiliated" in his local area.[381] The IRA targeted drug dealers with punishment shootings and ordered them to leave Ireland, and some were killed using the covername Direct Action Against Drugs.[382][383] However, there are claims the IRA "licensed" certain dealers to operate and forced them to pay protection money.[384] Following the murder of Robert McCartney in 2005, the IRA expelled three IRA volunteers.[385] Adams said at Sinn Féin's 2005 ard fheis "There is no place in republicanism for anyone involved in criminality", while adding "we refuse to criminalise those who break the law in pursuit of legitimate political objectives".[386] This was echoed shortly after by an IRA statement issued at Easter, saying that criminality within the ranks would not be tolerated.[387] In 2008, the IMC stated that the IRA was no longer involved in criminality, but that some members have engaged in criminality for their own ends, without the sanction or support of the IRA.[388]
Popular support
Support for the IRA within nationalist communities and within the Republic of Ireland has fluctuated over the course of the conflict. In September 1979 the Economic and Social Research Institute conducted a wide-ranging survey of attitudes to the IRA in the Republic. Its findings showed that 20.7% broadly supported IRA activities, while 60.5% opposed them. Meanwhile, when respondents were asked whether they sympathised or rejected their motives, 44.8% of respondents expressed some level of sympathy with their motives while 33.5% broadly rejected them.[389] A study in 1999 showed amongst Catholics in Northern Ireland, 42% of respondents expressed sympathy with republican violence while 52% said they had no sympathy. The same study found 39.7% of respondents in the Republic of Ireland sympathised with republican violence.[390]
According to a 2022 poll, 69% of Irish nationalists polled believe there was no option but "violent resistance to British rule during the Troubles".[391]
Other activities
Sectarian attacks
The IRA publicly condemned sectarianism and sectarian attacks, however some IRA members did carry out sectarian attacks.[392] Of those killed by the IRA, Malcolm Sutton classifies 130 (about 7%) of them as sectarian killings of Protestants, 88 of them committed between 1974 and 1976.[393] Unlike loyalists, the IRA denied responsibility for sectarian attacks and the members involved used cover names, such as "Republican Action Force", which was used to claim responsibility for the 1976 Kingsmill massacre where ten Protestant civilians were killed in a gun attack.[394][395] They stated that their attacks on Protestants were retaliation for attacks on Catholics.[392] Many in the IRA opposed these sectarian attacks, but others deemed them effective in preventing similar attacks on Catholics.[396] Robert White, a professor at the Indiana University, states the IRA was generally not a sectarian organisation,[397] and Rachel Kowalski from the Department of War Studies, King's College London states that the IRA acted in a way that was mostly blind to religious diversity.[398]
Protestants in the rural border areas of counties
Vigilantism
During the Troubles, the IRA took on the role of policing in some nationalist areas of Northern Ireland.[402] Many nationalists did not trust the official police force—the RUC—and saw it as biased against their community.[402][403] The RUC found it difficult to operate in certain nationalist neighbourhoods and only entered in armoured convoys due to the risk of attack, preventing community policing that could have occurred if officers patrolled on foot.[404] In these neighbourhoods, many residents expected the IRA to act as a policing force,[402][405] and such policing had propaganda value for the IRA.[406] The IRA also sought to minimise contact between residents and the RUC, because residents might pass on information or be forced to become a police informer.[402] The IRA set up arbitration panels that would adjudicate and investigate complaints from locals about criminal or 'anti-social' activities.[407] First time offenders may have been given a warning, or for more serious offences a curfew may have been imposed.[408] Those responsible for more serious and repeat offences could have been given a punishment beating, or banished from the community.[408] Kneecapping was also used by the IRA as a form of punishment.[409] No punishment attacks have been officially attributed to the IRA since February 2006.[410]
The vigilantism of the IRA and other paramilitary organisations has been condemned as "
Informers
Throughout the Troubles, some members of the IRA passed information to the security forces.
The IRA regarded informers as traitors,
Splinter groups
Former IRA volunteers are involved in various dissident republican
Notes and references
Notes
- ^ The Provisional IRA rejected the legitimacy of the Republic of Ireland, instead claiming its Army Council to be the provisional government of the revolutionary Irish Republic.[4]
- ^ The Irish Free State subsequently changed its name to Ireland and in 1949 became a sovereign state fully independent of the United Kingdom.[19]
- ^ The vote was a show of hands and the result is disputed.[54] It has been variously reported as twenty-eight votes to twelve,[51] or thirty-nine votes to twelve.[55] The official minutes state out of the forty-six delegates scheduled to attend, thirty-nine were in attendance, and the result of the second vote was twenty-seven votes to twelve.[53]
- ^ Following a convention in September 1970 the "Provisional" Army Council announced that the provisional period had finished, but the name stuck.[48]
- ^ The Provisional IRA issued all its public statements under the pseudonym "P. O'Neill" of the "Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin".[59] Dáithí Ó Conaill, the IRA's director of publicity, came up with the name.[60] According to Danny Morrison, the pseudonym "S. O'Neill" was used during the 1940s.[59]
- ^ When the resolution failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority to change Sinn Féin policy the leadership announced a resolution recognising the "Official" Army Council, which would only require a simple majority vote to pass.[50] At this point Seán Mac Stíofáin led the walkout after declaring allegiance to the "Provisional" Army Council.[50]
- Official Sinn Féin.[63]
- ^ The IRA also used "forties men" for volunteers such as Joe Cahill who fought in the Northern campaign,[73] and "fifties men" for volunteers who fought in the Border campaign.[74]
- cover for damage caused by bombs in Northern Ireland, so the British government paid compensation.[85]
- ^ This was due to the difficulty in identifying members of the IRA, ease of targeting, and many loyalists believing ordinary Catholics were in league with the IRA.[87]
- extradited to Northern Ireland and numerous extradition requests were rejected before Dominic McGlinchey became the first republican paramilitary to be extradited in 1984.[5][96]
- ^ In 1974 Seamus Costello, an Official IRA member who led a faction opposed to its ceasefire, was expelled and formed the Irish National Liberation Army.[100] This organisation remained active until 1994 when it began a "no-first-strike" policy, before declaring a ceasefire in 1998.[101] Its armed campaign, which caused the deaths of 113 people, was formally ended in October 2009 and in February 2010 it decommissioned its weapons.[101]
- ^ After the Official IRA's ceasefire, the Provisional IRA were typically referred to as simply the IRA.[104]
- ^ The Army Council withdrew its support for Éire Nua in 1979.[108] It remained Sinn Féin policy until 1982.[109]
- ^ Brooke's speech is known as the Whitbread Speech as it was given at the Whitbread Restaurant in London, in front of the British Association of Canned Food Importers & Distributors.[157][159] It is regarded as a key moment in the Northern Ireland peace process.[160][161]
- fax machine, and would forward the messages to the IRA leadership.[170]
- Official IRA also retained its weapons following its 1972 ceasefire.[195]
- ^ The assembly remained suspended until May 2007, when Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin became First Minister and deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland.[196]
- Patten Report.[198]
- Colonel Gaddafi is understood to have given the British government a detailed inventory of weapons he'd supplied to the IRA.[212]
- Irish News, 10 January 2022.
- ^ The number of people injured has been variously reported as 70,[240] 130,[241] and 136.[242]
- ^ IRA bomb warnings included a code word known to the authorities, so it could be determined if a bomb warning was authentic.[243] They were also used when issuing public statements to media organisations.[244]
- bomb threats to disrupt the transport infrastructure.[258] A hoax bomb threat also forced the evacuation of Aintree Racecourse, postponing the 1997 Grand National.[259]
- majority vote of its 12 members, had the power to order an Extraordinary General Army Convention, which would be attended by the delegates of the previous General Army Convention, where possible.[265]
- ^ Delegates might spend over a day travelling to the General Army Convention, due to the elaborate security and countersurveillance arrangements.[266] Delegates for the 1996 convention had to stop at four locations in order to change vehicles and be scanned for covert listening devices, and they were not permitted to bring mobile telephones or other electronic devices.[266] The convention was guarded by the IRA's Internal Security Unit, who also monitored the local Garda Síochána station.[266] Pre-arranged escape plans were in place in case of a police raid.[266]
- ^ The Executive and Army Council elected in September 1970 remained in place until 1986, filling vacancies by co-option when necessary.[274][275]
- South Armagh Brigade did not have similar security problems as other brigades for a variety of reasons.[291] The locals were familiar with the terrain, in particular potential locations for covert observation posts used by soldiers.[292] Local farmers frequently searched using dogs, and were known to pass on the locations of soldiers to the IRA.[292] The small, close-knit communities also made it difficult for undercover soldiers to operate, as unfamiliar people and vehicles were immediately noticed by the locals.[292] The brigade also introduced new recruits slowly, training them over a period of several years with more experienced volunteers which built up mutual trust.[293] This, combined with the brigade's willingness to halt an operation if they feared it was compromised or conditions were not ideal, resulted in few arrests in the area.[293] The lack of arrests, as well as IRA volunteers living across the border in the Republic of Ireland, meant it was difficult for the security forces to recruit informers.[291]
- ^ Prior to May 1972 IRA volunteers in the Republic of Ireland were tried in normal courts. The three judge Special Criminal Court was re-introduced following a series of regional court cases where IRA volunteers were acquitted or received light sentences from sympathetic juries and judges, and also to prevent jury tampering.[301]
- ^ There were occasional exceptions to this, there are several instances of female IRA volunteers being permitted to ask for bail and/or present a defence. This generally happened where the volunteer had children whose father was dead or imprisoned. There are some other cases where male IRA volunteers were permitted to present a defence.[304]
- Irish American supporters about the impending IRA ceasefire at a critical point in the Northern Ireland peace process.[308][310]
- Derry Brigade (1970–1971), director of operations (1972), OC of Northern Command (1976), member of the Army Council (1977 onwards), and chief-of-staff (late 1970s–1982).[322][323]
- ^ At the same time there were 14,000 regular army soldiers deployed in Northern Ireland, in addition to 8,000 Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers and 6,000 Royal Ulster Constabulary officers.[324]
- immunity from prosecution.[417]
- ^ One of the Disappeared, Seamus Ruddy, was killed by the Irish National Liberation Army.[436]
- ^ The Mitchell Principles were ground rules written by US senator George J. Mitchell governing the entry of political parties to all-party talks, which included a commitment to non-violence and the decommissioning of weapons.[445]
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- Sanders, Andrew (2019). The Long Peace Process: The United States of America and Northern Ireland, 1960-2008. ISBN 978-1-78694-044-5.
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- Sinclair, Samuel Justin; Antonius, Daniel (2013). The Political Psychology of Terrorism. ISBN 978-0199925926.
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- White, Robert (2006). Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary. ISBN 978-0253347084.
- White, Robert (2017). Out of the Ashes: An Oral History of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement. ISBN 9781785370939.
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External links
Media related to Provisional Irish Republican Army at Wikimedia Commons
- CAIN (Conflict Archive Internet) Archive of IRA statements
- Behind The Mask: The IRA & Sinn Fein PBS Frontline documentary on the subject
- The IRA and American funding from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
- Bell, J. Bowyer. "Dragonworld (II): Deception, Tradecraft, and the Provisional IRA." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. Volume 8, No. 1., Spring 1995. p. 21–50. Published online 9 January 2008. Available at ResearchGate
- "Operation Banner: An analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland"