Palestinian nationalism

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Further information: History of Palestinian nationality
"Palestinian liberation" redirects here. For other uses of the term or organizations with that term in their name, see Palestinian liberation (disambiguation).

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Palestinian nationalism is the

region of Palestine.[1] Originally formed in the early 20th century in opposition to Zionism, Palestinian nationalism later internationalized and attached itself to other ideologies;[2] it has thus rejected the occupation of the Palestinian territories by the government of Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War.[3] Palestinian nationalists often draw upon broader political traditions in their ideology, such as Arab socialism and ethnic nationalism in the context of Muslim religious nationalism. Related beliefs have shaped the government of Palestine
and continue to do so.

In the broader context of the

right to travel. Divisions between nationalists frequently stir up tense standoffs over particular ideological goals, an example being the gulf between Islamist Palestinians favoring a more authoritarian state compared to centrist and secular peoples supporting democratic self-determination. Palestinians favoring nonviolent resistance also frequently clash with ultra-nationalists who advocate for and engage in political violence both inside and outside Israel
.

Origins and starting points

A 1930 protest in Jerusalem against the British Mandate by Palestinian women. The sign reads "No dialogue, no negotiations until termination [of the Mandate]".

Zachary J. Foster argued in a 2015 Foreign Affairs article that "based on hundreds of manuscripts, Islamic court records, books, magazines, and newspapers from the Ottoman period (1516–1918), it seems that the first Arab to use the term "Palestinian" was Farid Georges Kassab, a Beirut-based Orthodox Christian." He explained further that Kassab’s 1909 book Palestine, Hellenism, and Clericalism noted in passing that "the Orthodox Palestinian Ottomans call themselves Arabs, and are in fact Arabs", despite describing the Arabic speakers of Palestine as Palestinians throughout the rest of the book."[4] The Palestinian Arab Christian Falastin newspaper had addressed its readers as Palestinians since its inception in 1911 during the Ottoman period.[5][6]

Khalil Beidas's 1898 use of the word "Palestinians" in the preface to his translation of Akim Olesnitsky's A Description of the Holy Land[7]
Falastin newspaper addressed its readers as "Palestinians" since its establishment in 1911.[5][6]

Foster later revised his view in a 2016 piece published in Palestine Square, arguing that already in 1898

Lutheran missionary Johann Ludwig Schneller (1820–1896), founder of the Syrian Orphanage; and the American James Wells.[7]

In his 1997 book, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, historian

Greater Syria, an Arab national project, as well as to Islam.[11] He writes that, "local patriotism could not yet be described as nation-state nationalism."[12]

Israeli historian

al-Sham (Syria), Misr (Egypt), and diyar (country), in senses that appear to go beyond objective geography. Gerber describes this as "embryonic territorial awareness, though the reference is to social awareness rather than to a political one."[13]

Pan-Arab national movement.[15]

In his book The Israel–Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, James L. Gelvin states that "Palestinian nationalism emerged during the interwar period in response to Zionist immigration and settlement."[16] However, this does not make Palestinian identity any less legitimate: "The fact that Palestinian nationalism developed later than Zionism and indeed in response to it does not in any way diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it less valid than Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition to some "other." Why else would there be the need to specify who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose."[16]

Bernard Lewis argues it was not as a Palestinian nation that the Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman Empire objected to Zionists, since the very concept of such a nation was unknown to the Arabs of the area at the time and did not come into being until later. Even the concept of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I."[17]

Palestinian.[18]

Late Ottoman context

The collapse of the

al-Nahda ("awakening", sometimes called "the Arab renaissance"), which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature of Arabic.[19]

Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects. In the 1830s however, Palestine was occupied by the Egyptian vassal of the Ottomans,

Palestinian Arab revolt was precipitated by popular resistance against heavy demands for conscripts, as peasants were well aware that conscription was little more than a death sentence. Starting in May 1834 the rebels took many cities, among them Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. In response, Ibrahim Pasha sent in an army, finally defeating the last rebels on 4 August in Hebron.[14]

Arab states' flags
.

While Arab nationalism, at least in an early form, and Syrian nationalism were the dominant tendencies along with continuing loyalty to the Ottoman state, Palestinian politics were marked by a reaction to foreign predominance and the growth of foreign immigration, particularly Zionist.[20]

The Egyptian occupation of Palestine in the 1830s resulted in the destruction of

Sahl Arraba region in northern Samaria, rose to prominence. Loyal allies of Jezzar Pasha and the Tuqans, they gained the governorship of Jabal Nablus and other sanjaqs.[21]

In 1887 the

Greater Syria into smaller administrative units. The administration of the mutasarrifate took on a distinctly local appearance.[22]

Michelle Compos records that "Later, after the founding of Tel Aviv in 1909, conflicts over land grew in the direction of explicit national rivalry."[23] Zionist ambitions were increasingly identified as a threat by Palestinian leaders, while cases of purchase of lands by Zionist settlers and the subsequent eviction of Palestinian peasants aggravated the issue.

The programmes of four Palestinian nationalist societies jamyyat al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf (Brotherhood and Purity), al-jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Charitable Society), Shirkat al-Iqtissad al-Falastini al-Arabi (lit. Arab Palestinian Economic Association) and Shirkat al-Tijara al-Wataniyya al-Iqtisadiyya (lit. National Economic Trade Association) were reported in the newspaper

Filastin in June 1914 by letter from R. Abu al-Sal’ud. The four societies has similarities in function and ideals; the promotion of patriotism, educational aspirations and support for national industries.[24]

British Mandate period

Nationalist groups built around notables

Palestinian Arab A’ayan ("Notables") were a group of urban elites at the apex of the Palestinian socio-economic pyramid where the combination of economic and political power dominated Palestinian Arab politics throughout the British Mandate period. The dominance of the A’ayan had been encouraged and utilised during the Ottoman period and later, by the British during the Mandate period, to act as intermediaries between the authority and the people to administer the local affairs of Palestine.

Al-Husseini

The

Qaisi family in an alliance with a rural lord of the Jerusalem area Mustafa Abu Ghosh, who clashed with the tribe frequently. The feuds gradually occurred in the city between the clan and the Khalidis that led the Qaisis however these conflicts dealt with city positions and not Qaisi-Yamani rivalry.[25]

The Husaynis later led resistance and propaganda movements against the

Hajj Amīn al-Husayni from the post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
and banned him from entering Jerusalem.

Nashashibi

The

National Defence Party in 1934.[30]
He also served as a minister in the Jordanian government, governor of the West Bank, member of the Jordanian Senate, and the first military governor in Palestine.

Tuqan

The

Tuqan family, originally from northern Syria, was led by Hajj Salih Pasha Tuqan in the early eighteenth century and were the competitors of the Nimr family in the Jabal Nablus (the sub-district of Nablus and Jenin). Members of the Tuqan family held the post of mutasallim (sub-district governor) longer than did any other family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.The rivalry between the Tuqans and Nimr family continued until the 1820s.[31]

Abd al-Hadi

Independence Party) as a branch of the pan-Arab party. Rushdi Abd al-Hadi joined the British administrative service in 1921. Amin Abd al-Hadi joined the SMC in 1929, and Tahsin Abd al-Hadi was mayor of Jenin. Some family members secretly sold their shares of Zirʿin village to the Jewish National Fund in July 1930 despite nationalist opposition to such land sales. Tarab ‘Abd al Hadi feminist and activist was the wife of Awni ‘Abd al Hadi, Abd al-Hadi Palace
built by Mahmud ‘Abd al Hadi in Nablus stands testament to the power and prestige of the family.

Khalidiy, al-Dajjani, al-Shanti

Other A’ayan were the Khalidi family, al-Dajjani family, and the al-Shanti family. The views of the A’ayan and their allies largely shaped the divergent political stances of Palestinian Arabs at the time. In 1918, as the Palestinian Arab national movements gained strength in Jerusalem,

Kamel Al Budeiri
, and Sheikh Hassan Abu Al-So’oud in establishing the Arab Club.

1918–1920 nationalist activity

Following the arrival of the British a number of Muslim-Christian Associations were established in all the major towns. In 1919 they joined together to hold the first Palestine Arab Congress in Jerusalem. Its main platforms were a call for representative government and opposition to the Balfour Declaration.

The

Faisal-Weizmann Agreement led the Palestinian Arab population to reject the Syrian-Arab-Nationalist movement led by Faisal (in which many previously placed their hopes) and instead to agitate for Palestine to become a separate state, with an Arab majority. To further that objective, they demanded an elected assembly.[32] In 1919, in response to Palestinian Arab fears of the inclusion of the Balfour declaration to process the secret society al-Kaff al-Sawada’ (the Black-hand, its name soon changed to al-Fida’iyya, The Self-Sacrificers) was founded, it later played an important role in clandestine anti-British and anti-Zionist activities. The society was run by the al-Dajjani and al-Shanti families, with Ibrahim Hammani in charge of training and ‘Isa al-Sifri developed a secret code for correspondence. The society was initially based in Jaffa but moved its headquarters to Nablus, the Jerusalem branch was run by Mahmud Aziz al-Khalidi.[33]

The Times report of the riots, 8 April 1920

After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional rivalry between the Husayni and Nashashibi clans into a serious rift,

Nabi Musa riots of the previous March. Colonel Storrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, removed him without further inquiry, replacing him with Raghib. This, according to the Palin report, 'had a profound effect on his co-religionists, definitely confirming the conviction they had already formed from other evidence that the Civil Administration was the mere puppet of the Zionist Organization.'[35]

Supreme Muslim Council under Hajj Amin (1921–1937)

The High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, as a counterbalance the Nashashibis gaining the position of Mayor of Jerusalem, pardoned Hajj Amīn and Aref al-Aref and established a Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), or Supreme Muslim Sharia Council, on 20 December 1921.[36] The SMC was to have authority over all the Muslim Waqfs (religious endowments) and Sharia (religious law) Courts in Palestine. The members of the Council were to be elected by an electoral college and appointed Hajj Amīn as president of the Council with the powers of employment over all Muslim officials throughout Palestine.[37] The Anglo American committee termed it a powerful political machine.[38]

The Hajj Amin rarely delegated authority, consequently most of the council's executive work was carried out by Hajj Amīn.[38] Nepotism and favoritism played a central part to Hajj Amīn's tenure as president of the SMC, Amīn al-Tamīmī was appointed as acting president when the Hajj Amīn was abroad, The secretaries appointed were ‘Abdallah Shafĩq and Muhammad al’Afĩfĩ and from 1928 to 1930 the secretary was Hajj Amīn's relative Jamāl al-Husaynī, Sa’d al Dīn al-Khaţīb and later another of the Hajj Amīn's relatives ‘Alī al-Husaynī and ‘Ajaj Nuwayhid, a Druze was an adviser.[38]

Politicisation of the Wailing Wall

It was during the British mandate period that politicisation of the Wailing Wall occurred.[39] The disturbances at the Wailing wall in 1928 were repeated in 1929, however the violence in the riots that followed, that left 116 Palestinian Arabs, 133 Jews dead and 339 wounded, were surprising in their intensity.[40]

Black Hand gang

Black Hand gang in 1935. Izz ad-Din died in a shootout against the British forces.[41][42] He has been popularised in Palestinian nationalist folklore for his fight against Zionism.[43]

1936–1939 Arab revolt

The Great revolt 1936–1939 was an uprising by Palestinian Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine in protest against mass Jewish immigration.

Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup
.

Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, who had started his career as a devoted follower of Hajj Amin, broke with the influential Husayni family in the early 1940s.[46] The British estimated the strength of the al-Najjada paramilitary scout movement, led by Al-Hawari, at 8,000 prior to 1947.[47]

1937 Peel Report and its aftermath

The Nashashibis broke with the

Arab High Committee and Hajj Amīn shortly after the contents of the Palestine Royal Commission report were released on 7 July 1937, announcing a territorial partition plan.[48]

The split in the ranks of the

Nashashibi clan and the Arab Palestinian Communist Party, accepted the plan.[49]

Results

The revolt of 1936–1939 led to an imbalance of power between the Jewish community and the Palestinian Arab community, as the latter had been substantially disarmed.[48]

1947–1948 war

Al-Qadir moved to

Qastal Hill on the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road, on 8 April 1948.[50] al-Qadir's death was a factor in the loss of morale among his forces, Ghuri, who had no experience of military command was appointed as commander of the AHW. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, at the head of the Arab Liberation Army remained as the only prominent military commander.[51]

1948–1964

Haj Amin al-Husseini meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the future Egyptian president, in 1948

In September 1948, the

Hajj Amin al-Husseini,[53] former chairman of the Arab Higher Committee
.

The All-Palestine Government however lacked any significant authority and was in fact seated in Cairo. In 1959 it was officially merged into the

better source needed][dubious – discuss
]

The

Palestinian diaspora—principally professionals working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in Cairo or Beirut. The founders included Yasser Arafat who was head of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) (1952–1956) in Cairo University, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Khaled Yashruti was head of the GUPS in Beirut (1958–1962).[57]

PLO until the First Intifada (1964–1988)

The

Palestine Liberation Organisation was founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964, following an earlier decision of the Arab League, its goal was the "liberation" of "Palestine" with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate.[58] The original PLO Charter (issued on 28 May 1964[59]) stated that "Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral regional unit" and sought to "prohibit... the existence and activity" of Zionism.[60] The charter also called for a right of return and self-determination
for Palestinians.

Defeat suffered by the Arab states in the June 1967 Six-Day War, brought the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip under Israeli military control.

Yasser Arafat, claimed the

Arabic, "karameh" means "dignity") and quickly became a Palestinian national hero; portrayed as one who dared to confront Israel. Masses of young Arabs joined the ranks of his group Fatah. Under pressure, Ahmad Shukeiri resigned from the PLO leadership and in July 1969, Fatah joined and soon controlled the PLO. The fierce Palestinian guerrilla fighting and the Jordanian Artillery bombardment forced the IDF withdrawal and gave the Palestinian Arabs an important morale boost. Israel was calling their army the indomitable army but this was the first chance for Arabs to claim victory after defeat in 1948, 1953, and 1967. After the battle, Fatah began to engage in communal projects to achieve popular affiliation.[61] After the Battle of Karameh there was a subsequent increase in the PLO's strength.[62][63]

In 1974 the PLO called for an independent state in the territory of

guerilla tactics to attack Israel from their bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as from within the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[65]

In 1988, the PLO officially endorsed a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side contingent on specific terms such as making East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians the right of return to land occupied by Palestinians prior to the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel.[66]

First Intifada (1987–1993)

Local leadership vs. the PLO

The First Intifada (1987–1993) would prove another watershed in Palestinian nationalism, as it brought the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to the forefront of the struggle. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU; Arabic al-Qiyada al Muwhhada) mobilised grassroots support for the uprising.[67]

In 1987 The Intifada caught the (PLO) by surprise, the leadership abroad could only indirectly influence the events.,[67] A new local leadership, the UNLU, emerged, comprising many leading Palestinian factions. The disturbances initially spontaneous soon came under local leadership from groups and organizations loyal to the PLO that operated within the Occupied Territories; Fatah, the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and the Palestine Communist Party.[68] The UNLU was the focus of the social cohesion that sustained the persistent disturbances.[69]

After

King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988,[70] the UNLU organised to fill the political vacuum.[71]

Emergence of Hamas

During the intifada Hamas breached the monopoly of the PLO as sole political representative of the Palestinian people.[72]

Peace process

Some Israelis had become tired of the constant violence of the First Intifada, and many were willing to take risks for peace.[73] Some wanted to realize the economic benefits in the new global economy. The Gulf War (1990–1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value of territory had been overstated, and that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait psychologically reduced their sense of security.[74]

Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat and Bill Clinton at the signing of the Oslo Accords, 13 September 1993

A renewal of the Israeli–Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of the Cold War as the United States took the lead in international affairs. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western observers were optimistic, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in an article, titled "The End of History". The hope was that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new international order. President George H. W. Bush, in a speech on 11 September 1990, spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a "New world order" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born".[75]

1993 Oslo Agreement

The demands of the local Palestinian and Israeli populations were somewhat differing from those of the Palestinian diaspora, which had constituted the main base of the PLO until then, in that they were primarily interested in

Oslo Agreement cemented the belief in a two-state solution in the mainstream Palestinian movement, as opposed to the PLO's original goal, a one-state solution which entailed the destruction of Israel and its replacement with a secular, democratic Palestinian state. The idea had first been seriously discussed in the 1970s, and gradually become the unofficial negotiating stance of the PLO leadership under Arafat, but it had still remained a taboo subject for most, until Arafat officially recognized Israel in 1988, under strong pressure from the United States. However, the belief in the ultimate necessity of Israel's destruction and/or its Zionist foundation (i.e., its existence as a specifically Jewish state) is still advocated by many, such as the religiously motivated Hamas movement, although no longer by the PLO leadership.[citation needed
]

Palestinian National Authority (1993)

In 1993, with the transfer of increased control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem from Israel to the Palestinians, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat appointed Sulaiman Ja'abari as Grand Mufti. When he died in 1994, Arafat appointed Ekrima Sa'id Sabri. Sabri was removed in 2006 by Palestinian National Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, who was concerned that Sabri was involved too heavily in political matters. Abbas appointed Muhammad Ahmad Hussein, who was perceived as a political moderate.

Goals

Demonstration in Amman, Jordan, during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis

Palestinian statehood

Main articles:
Greater Palestine

Proposals for a Palestinian state refer to the proposed establishment of an independent state for the Palestinian people in Palestine on land that was occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967 and prior to that year by Egypt (Gaza) and by Jordan (West Bank). The proposals include the Gaza Strip, which is controlled by the Hamas faction of the Palestinian National Authority, the West Bank, which is administered by the Fatah faction of the Palestinian National Authority, and East Jerusalem which is controlled by Israel under a claim of sovereignty.[76]

From the river to the sea

Main article: From the river to the sea

"From the river to the sea" is, and forms part of, a popular Palestinian political slogan. It references the land which lies between the

River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea and has been frequently used in statements by Arab leaders.[77][78] It is also chanted at pro-Palestinian protests and demonstrations,[79] where it is often followed or preceded by the phrase "Palestine will be free".[80][81]

"Palestine from the river to the sea" was claimed as

occupied between 1959 and 1967 by Egypt). In a slightly different fashion, "Palestine from the river to the sea" is still claimed by Hamas,[83][84] referring to all areas of former Mandatory Palestine
.

Competing national, political, and religious loyalties

Pan-Arabism

A PFLP patrol in Jordan, 1969

Some groups within the PLO hold a more

anti-imperialist struggle. This said, however, there seems to be a general consensus among the main Palestinian factions that national liberation takes precedence over other loyalties, including Pan-Arabism, Islamism and proletarian internationalism.[citation needed
]

Pan-Islamism

The Hamas flag

In a later repetition of these developments, the

Sunni Muslims, and while never absent from the rhetoric and thinking of the secularist PLO factions, Islamic political doctrines, or Islamism, did not become a large part of the Palestinian movement until the 1980s rise of Hamas.[citation needed
]

By early Islamic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "the

Islamists.[citation needed
]

See also

References

  1. Palestinian National Charter of 1968. The Avalon Project has a copy here [1]
  2. ^ Joffe, Alex. "Palestinians and Internationalization: Means and Ends." Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. 26 November 2017. 28 November 2017.
  3. ^ "No UN Vote Can Deny the Palestinian People Their Right to Self Determination". The Huffington Post UK. 2 January 2015.
  4. ^ Foster, Zachary J. (6 October 2015). "What's a Palestinian?". Foreign Affairs – via www.foreignaffairs.com.
  5. ^ a b Harold M. Cubert (3 June 2014). The PFLP's Changing Role in the Middle East. Routledge. p. 36. Retrieved 31 December 2023. That year, Al-Karmil was founded in Haifa 'with the purpose of opposing Zionist colonization...' and in 1911, Falastin began publication, referring to its readers, for the first time, as 'Palestinians'.
  6. ^ a b Neville J. Mandel (1976). The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I. University of California Press. p. 128. Retrieved 31 December 2023. As befitted its name, Falastin regularly discussed questions to do with Palestine as if it were a distinct entity and, in writing against the Zionists, addressed its readers as "Palestinians".
  7. ^ a b Zachary Foster, "Who Was The First Palestinian in Modern History" Archived 29 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine The Palestine Square 18 February 2016
  8. ^ Khalidi, 1997, p. 18.
  9. ^ Khalidi, 1997, p. 149.
  10. ^ a b c Khalidi, 1997, p. 19–21.
  11. ISBN 0-292-70680-4
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  15. ^ Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 40–42 in the French edition.
  16. ^ a b Gelvin, 2005, pp. 92–93.
  17. ISBN 978-0-393-31839-5
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  18. ^ "The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine", by Daniel Pipes, Jerusalem Post, 13 September 2000 [2]
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  20. ^ Foreign predominance and the rise of Palestinian nationalism
    • Google Book Search
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    • Palestine: a study of Jewish, Arab, and British policies By Esco Foundation for Palestine, inc
    Published by Yale university press, 1947 p 1058
  21. ^ Doumani, 1995, Chapter: Egyptian rule, 1831-1840.
  22. ISBN 0-7425-5842-8
    , p. 70
  23. ISBN 0-7425-4639-X
    , p. 48
  24. ISBN 0-85664-635-0
    p 33
  25. ^ a b Illan Pappe. "The Rise and Fall of the Husainis (Part 1)". jerusalemquarterly.org. Archived from the original on 28 September 2007.
  26. ^ Jerusalemites Archived 22 September 2008 at the Wayback Machine Families of Jerusalem and Palestine
  27. ISBN 0-275-94576-6
    p 290
  28. ISBN 0-521-55632-5
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  30. ISBN 0-7914-0708-X
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  32. ^ Porath, chapter 2
  33. ^ Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria, Routledge, London 1994 pp.105-109
  34. ^ Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria, Routledge, London 1994 p.102
  35. ^ Palin Report, pp. 29-33. Cited Huneidi p.37.
  36. ISBN 978-0-8133-3489-9
  37. ^ UN Doc Archived 20 December 2008 at the Wayback Machine
  38. ^
    ISBN 90-04-07929-7
    pp 66-67
  39. ^ Jerusalemite Institute of Jerusalem Studies: Heritage, Nationalism and the Shifting Symbolism of the Wailing Wall by Simone Ricca
  40. ^ 1929 Palestine riots
    • Sandra Marlene Sufian and Mark LeVine (2007) -Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict by Michelle Compos p 54
    • San Francisco Chronicle, 9 August 2005, "A Time of Change; Israelis, Palestinians and the Disengagement"
    • NA 59/8/353/84/867n, 404 Wailing Wall/279 and 280, Archdale Diary and Palestinian Police records.
  41. ISBN 0-275-97902-4
    p 11
  42. ^ Sylvain Cypel (2006) p 340
  43. ^ Abdullah Franji (1983) p 87
  44. ^ Levenberg, 1993, p. 6.
  45. ISBN 0-85303-672-1
    p. 71
  46. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9
    pp. 88–89.
  47. ^ Khalaf, 1991, p 143.
  48. ^ a b Ted Swedenburg. (1988)
  49. ^ Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, 2004), p. 588. qtd. by Susser.
  50. ^ al-Qadir dies at Qastal
    • Morris, (2003), pp. 234–235.
    • New York Times, "Arabs Win Kastel But Chief is Slain; Kader el-Husseini, a Cousin of Mufti, Falls as His Men Recapture Key Village", by Dana Adams Schmidt, 9 April 1948.
    • Benveniśtî, (2002), p.111.
  51. ^ Gelber, Yoav (2001) pp 89–90
  52. ISBN 9781845190750
    – via Google Books.
  53. ISBN 9781851098422
    .
  54. ISBN 0-231-10515-0
    p 178
  55. ^ Khalidi (1998) p 180
  56. Danny Rubenstein, Haaretz
    ; 6 June 2001
  57. ISBN 1-58234-049-8
    .
  58. ^ See articles 1, 2 and 3 in the Palestinian National Charter (1968) as published by The Avalon Project at Yale Law School
  59. ^ Helena Cobban,The Palestinian Liberation Organisation(Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.30
  60. ^ "Articles 2 and 23 of the Palestinian National Covenant".
  61. ^ Kurz (2006), p. 55
  62. ^ "1968: Karameh and the Palestinian revolt". Telegraph. 16 May 2002. Retrieved 3 September 2008.
  63. ^ Pollack (2002), p. 335
  64. ^ a b The PNC Program of 1974, 8 June 1974. On the site of MidEastWeb for Coexistence R.A. - Middle East Resources. Page includes commentary. Retrieved 5 December 2006.
  65. ^ Arab-Israeli Conflict Archived 28 October 2009 at the Wayback Machine, Encarta
  66. ISBN 0-8133-4048-9
    .
  67. ^ a b Yasser Arafat obituary Archived 11 January 2017 at the Wayback Machine, socialistworld.net (Committee for a Worker's International).
  68. ISBN 0-89608-363-2
    p 39
  69. ISBN 1-86064-098-2
    p 194
  70. ^ King Hussein, Address to the Nation, Amman, Jordan, 31 July 1988. The Royal Hashemit Court's tribute to King Hussein
  71. ISBN 0-253-33377-6
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  72. ISBN 0-231-11675-6
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  73. ^ The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin
  74. ^ The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh
  75. ^ President Bush's speech to Congress Archived 31 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine al-bab.com
  76. ^ "Olmert: Israel must quit East Jerusalem and Golan". Haaretz. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  77. ISBN 978-0-307-43281-0
    . Only two years ago he [Saddam Hussein] declared on Iraqi television: 'Palestine is Arab and must be liberated from the river to the sea and all the Zionists who emigrated to the land of Palestine must leave.'
  78. ISBN 978-0-7456-4243-7
    . One exception was Faysal al- Husayni, who stated in his 2001 Beirut speech: 'We may lose or win [tactically] but our eyes will continue to aspire to the strategic goal, namely, to Palestine from the river to the sea.'
  79. ISBN 978-0-230-10687-1
    . Thus, the MAB slogan 'Palestine must be free, from the river to the sea' is now ubiquitous in anti-Israeli demonstrations in the UK ...
  80. ^ "From the river to the sea, Jews and Arabs must forge a shared future". The Guardian. 23 May 2021.
  81. ^ "The Real Meaning of "From the River to the Sea"". The Jewish Journal. 16 June 2021.
  82. ^ "United Nations Maintenance Page". unispal.un.org. Archived from the original on 4 May 2015.
  83. ^ "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)". MidEast Web. 18 August 1988.
  84. ^ Nassar, Maha (3 December 2018). "'From The River To The Sea' Doesn't Mean What You Think It Means". The Forward. Retrieved 28 December 2020.

Bibliography

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