Pax Americana
Pax Americana
In this sense, Pax Americana has come to describe the military and economic position of the United States relative to other nations. The U.S. Marshall Plan, which saw the country transfer $13.3 billion (equivalent of $173 billion in 2023) in economic recovery programs to Western European countries, has been described as "the launching of the Pax Americana".[5]
Early period
The first articulation of a Pax Americana occurred after the end of the
With the
After its victory in the Spanish–American War of 1898 and the subsequent acquisition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, the United States had gained a colonial empire. By ejecting Spain from the Americas, the United States shifted its position to an uncontested regional power, and extended its influence into Southeast Asia and Oceania. Although U.S. capital investments within the Philippines and Puerto Rico were relatively small, these colonies were strategic outposts for expanding trade with Latin America and Asia, particularly China. In the Caribbean area, the United States established a sphere of influence in line with the Monroe Doctrine, not explicitly defined as such, but recognized in effect by other governments and accepted by at least some of the republics in that area.[10] The events around the start of the 20th century demonstrated that the United States undertook an obligation, usual in such cases, of imposing a "Pax Americana".[10] As in similar instances elsewhere, this Pax Americana was not quite clearly marked in its geographical limit, nor was it guided by any theoretical consistency, but rather by the merits of the case and the test of immediate expediency in each instance.[10] Thus, whereas the United States enforced a peace in much of the lands southward from the Nation and undertook measures to maintain internal tranquility in such areas, the United States on the other hand withdrew from interposition in Mexico.[10]
European powers largely regarded these matters as the concern of the United States. Indeed, the nascent Pax Americana was, in essence, abetted by the policy of the United Kingdom, and the preponderance of global
The United States lost its Pacific and regionally bounded nature towards the end of the 19th century. The government adopted protectionism after the Spanish–American War and built up the navy, the "Great White Fleet", to expand the reach of U.S. power. When Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901, he accelerated a foreign policy shift away from isolationism towards foreign intervention which had begun under his predecessor, William McKinley. The Philippine–American War arose from the ongoing Philippine Revolution against imperialism.[12] Interventionism found its formal articulation in the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming the right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of weak states in the Americas in order to stabilize them, a moment that underlined the emergent U.S. regional hegemony. By 1900, the United States possessed the world's largest industrial capacity and national income, having surpassed both the United Kingdom and Germany.[13]
Interwar period
The United States had been criticized for not taking up the hegemonic mantle following the disintegration of Pax Britannica before the First World War and during the interwar period due to the absence of established political structures, such as the World Bank or United Nations which would be created after World War II, and various internal policies, such as protectionism.[2][14][15][16] Though, the United States participated in the Great War, according to Woodrow Wilson:
[...] to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.
[...] for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.[2]
The United States' entry into the Great War marked the abandonment of the traditional American policy of isolation and independence of world politics. Not at the close of the Civil War, not as the result of the Spanish War, but in the Interwar period did the United States become a part of the international system.[2] With this global reorganization from the Great War, there were those in the American populace that advocated an activist role in international politics and international affairs by the United States.[2] Activities that were initiated did not fall into political-military traps and, instead, focused on economic-ideological approaches that would increase the American Empire and general worldwide stability.[17] Following the prior path, a precursor to the United Nations and a league to enforce peace, the League of Nations, was proposed by Woodrow Wilson.[2] This was rejected by the American Government in favor of more economic-ideological approaches and the United States did not join the League. Additionally, there were even proposals of extending the Monroe Doctrine to Great Britain put forth to prevent a second conflagration on the European theater.[18] Ultimately, the United States' proposals and actions did not stop the factors of European nationalism spawned by the previous war, the repercussions of Germany's defeat, and the failures of the Treaty of Versailles from plunging the globe into a Second World War.[19]
Between World War I and World War II, America also sought to continue to preserve Pax America as a
The average American's sympathies, on the other hand, if the feelings of the vast majority of the nation had been correctly interpreted, was with the Allied (Entente) Powers.[18] The population of the United States was revolted at the ruthlessness of the Prussian doctrine of war, and German designs to shift the burden of aggression encountered skeptical derision.[18] The American populace saw themselves safeguarding liberal peace in the Western World. To this end, the American writer Roland Hugins stated:[20]
The truth is that the United States is the only high-minded Power left in the world. It is the only strong nation that has not entered on a career of imperial conquest, and does not want to enter on it. [...] There is in America little of that spirit of selfish aggression which lies at the heart of militarism. Here alone exists a broad basis for "a new passionate sense of brotherhood, and a new scale of human values." We have a deep abhorrence of war for war's sake; we are not enamored of glamour or glory. We have a strong faith in the principle of self-government. We do not care to dominate alien peoples, white or colored; we do not aspire to be the Romans of tomorrow or the "masters of the world." The idealism of Americans centers in the future of America, wherein we hope to work out those principles of liberty and democracy to which we are committed. This political idealism, this strain of pacifism, this abstinence from aggression and desire to be left alone to work out our own destiny, has been manifest from the birth of the republic. We have not always followed our light, but we have never been utterly faithless to it.[2]
It was observed during this time that the initial defeat of Germany opened a moral recasting of the world.[18] The battles between Germans and Allies were seen as far less battles between different nations than they represent the contrast between Liberalism and reaction, between the aspirations of democracy and the Wilhelminism gospel of iron.[18][21]
Modern period
The modern Pax Americana era is cited by supporters and critics of U.S. foreign policy after World War II. From 1945 to 1991, it was a partial international order, as it applied only to the Western world, being preferable for some authors to speak about a Pax Americana et Sovietica.[22] Many commentators and critics focus on American policies from 1992 to the present, and as such, it carries different connotations depending on the context. For example, it appears three times in the 90-page document, Rebuilding America's Defenses,[23] by the Project for the New American Century, but is also used by critics to characterize American dominance and hyperpower status as imperialist in function and basis. From about the mid-1940s until 1991, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the Cold War, and characterized by its significant international military presence and greater diplomatic involvement. Seeking an alternative to the isolationist policies pursued after World War I, the United States defined a new policy called containment to oppose the spread of Soviet communism.
The modern Pax Americana may be seen as similar to the period of peace in Rome, Pax Romana. In both situations, the period of peace was 'relative peace'. During both Pax Romana and Pax Americana wars continued to occur, but it was still a prosperous time for both Western and Roman civilizations. It is important to note that during these periods, and most other times of relative tranquility, the peace that is referred to does not mean complete peace. Rather, it simply means that the civilization prospered in their military, agriculture, trade, and manufacturing.
Pax Britannica heritage
From the end of the
In this era of peace, though, there were several wars between the major powers: the
During the Pax Britannica, America developed close ties with Britain, evolving into what has become known as a "special relationship" between the two. The many commonalities shared with the two nations (such as language and history) drew them together as allies. Under the managed transition of the British Empire to the Commonwealth of Nations, members of the British government, such as Harold Macmillan, liked to think of Britain's relationship with America as similar to that of a progenitor Greece to America's Rome.[25] Throughout the years, both have been active in North American, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries.
Late 20th century
After the Second World War, no
In the second half of the 20th century, the
The term Pax Americana was explicitly used by John F. Kennedy in the 1960s, who advocated against the idea, arguing that the Soviet bloc was composed of human beings with the same individual goals as Americans and that such a peace based on "American weapons of war" was undesirable:
I have, therefore, chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth too rarely perceived. And that is the most important topic on earth: peace. What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of a peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, and the kind that enables men and nations to grow, and to hope, and build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.[28]
Beginning around the Vietnam War, the 'Pax Americana' term had started to be used by the critics of American Imperialism. Here in the late 20th-century conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the charge of Neocolonialism was often aimed at Western involvement in the affairs of the Third World and other developing nations.[29][30][31][32][33] NATO became regarded as a symbol of Pax Americana in West Europe:
The visible political symbol of the Pax Americana was NATO itself … The Supreme Allied Commander, always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors.[34]
Contemporary power
Currently, the Pax Americana is based on the military preponderance beyond challenge by any combination of powers and projection of power throughout the world's commons—neutral sea, air and space. This projection is coordinated by the
In contrast [to the earlier empires], the scope and pervasiveness of American global power today are unique. Not only does the United States control all the world's oceans, its military legions are firmly perched on the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia ... American vassals and tributaries, some yearning to be embraced by even more formal ties to Washington, dot the entire Eurasian continent ... American global supremacy is ... buttered by an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that literally span the globe.[36]
Besides the military foundation, there are significant non-military international institutions backed by American financing and diplomacy (like the United Nations and
Being in the best position to take advantage of
With
The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable, and durable. It has, over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time; even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself. [... What is required is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.[38]
This is reflected in the research of
In the post-communism world of the 21st-century, the French Socialist politician and former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine describes the US as a hegemonic hyperpower, while the US political scientists John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye counter that the US is not a "true" hegemony, because it does not have the resources to impose a proper, formal, global rule; despite its political and military strength, the US is economically equal to Europe, thus, cannot rule the international stage.[39] Several other countries are either emerging or re-emerging as powers, such as China, Russia, India, and the European Union.
Joseph Nye discredited the United States as not a "true" hegemony in his 2002 article titled "The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians".[40] His book of the same year he opens: "Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others."[41] And his 1991 book he titled Bound to Lead.[42] Leadership, translated into Greek, renders hegemony; an alternative translation is archia – Greek common word for empire. Having defined the US hegemony as "not true", Nye looks for an analogy to the true empire: Decline, he writes, is not necessarily imminent. "Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power ...[43]
In fact, there are striking parallels with the early Pax Romana (especially between 189 BC when the supremacy over the Mediterranean was won and the first annexation in 168 BC). Under that Pax Romana other states remained formally independent and very seldom were called "clients". The latter term became widely used only in the late medieval period. Usually, other states were called "friends and allies"—a popular expression under the Pax Americana.
One of the first to use the term Pax Americana was the
Now [1918] the [American colonial] cutting had grown into a tree that bade fair to overshadow the globe with its foliage. Amazed and shaken, we Germans began to discuss the possibility of a Pax Anglosaxonica as a world-wide counterpart to the Pax Romana. Suddenly the tendency toward global unification towered up, ready to gather the separate national states of Europe together under one banner and blanket in a larger cohesion ...[46]
The United States, Dehio associates on the same page, withdrew to isolation on that occasion. "Rome, too, had taken a long time to understand the significance of her world role." Two years earlier, with the war still at its peak, the founder of the Paneuropean Union, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, invoked the example of the two-centuries long "Pax Romana" which, he suggested, could be repeated if based on the preponderant US air power:
During the third century BC the Mediterranean world was divided on five great powers—Roma and Carthage, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. The balance of power led to a series of wars until Rome emerged the queen of the Mediterranean and established an incomparable era of two centuries of peace and progress, the 'Pax Romana' ... It may be that America's air power could again assure our world, now much smaller than the Mediterranean at that period, two hundred years of peace ... This is the only realistic hope for a lasting peace.[47]
One of the first criticisms of "Pax Americana" was written by Nathaniel Peffer in 1943:
It is neither feasible nor desirable ... Pax Americana can be established and maintained only by force, only by means of a new, gigantic imperialism operating with the instrumentalities of militarism and the other concomitants of imperialism ... The way to dominion is through empire and the price of dominion is empire, and empire generates its own opposition.[48]
He did not know if it would happen: "It is conceivable that ... America might drift into empire, imperceptibly, stage by stage, in a kind of power-politics gravitation." He also noted that America was heading precisely in that direction: "That there are certain stirrings in this direction is apparent, though how deep they go is unclear."[48]
The depth soon became clarified. Two later critics of Pax Americana,
Last but not least, the Gulf War marks the dawning of the Pax Americana. True, that term was used immediately after World War II. But it was a misnomer then because the Soviet empire—a real competitor with American power—was born at the same moment. The result was not a "pax" of any kind, but a cold war and a bipolar world ... During the past two years, however, Soviet power has imploded and a bipolar world has become unipolar.[50]
The following year, in 1992, a US strategic draft for the post-Cold War period was leaked to the press. The person responsible for the confusion, former Assistant Secretary of State, Paul Wolfowitz, confessed seven years later: "In 1992 a draft memo prepared by my office at the Pentagon ... leaked to the press and sparked a major controversy." The draft's strategy aimed "to prevent any hostile power from dominating" a Eurasian region "whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power". He added: "Senator Joseph Biden ridiculed the proposed strategy as 'literally a Pax Americana ... It won't work ...' Just seven years later, many of these same critics seem quite comfortable with the idea of a Pax Americana."[51]
The post-Cold War period, concluded William Wohlforth, much less ambiguously deserves to be called Pax Americana. "Calling the current period the true Pax Americana may offend some, but it reflects reality".[24]
The ‘’Pax Americana’’ motif reached its peak in the context of the 2003 Iraq War. The phrase "American Empire" appeared in one thousand news stories over a single six-month period in 2003.[52] Jonathan Freedland observed:
Of course, enemies of the United States have shaken their fist at its "imperialism" for decades ... What is more surprising, and much newer, is that the notion of an American empire has suddenly become a live debate inside the United States Accelerated by the post-9/11 debate on America's role in the world, the idea of the United States as a 21st-century Rome is gaining a foothold in the country's consciousness.[53]
Peter Bender, in his 2003 article "America: The New Roman Empire",[60] summarized: "When politicians or professors are in need of a historical comparison in order to illustrate the United States' incredible might, they almost always think of the Roman Empire."[61] The article abounds with analogies:
- "When they later extended their power to overseas territories, they shied away from assuming direct control wherever possible." In the Hellenistic world, Rome withdrew its legions after three wars and instead settled for a role of all-powerful patron and arbitrator.[62]
- The factor for the overseas engagement is the same in both cases: the seas or oceans ceased to offer protection, or so it seemed.
Rome and America both expanded in order to achieve security. Like concentric circles, each circle in need of security demanded the occupation of the next larger circle. The Romans made their way around the Mediterranean, driven from one challenger to their security to the next. The struggles ... brought the Americans to Europe and East Asia; the Americans soon wound up all over the globe, driven from one attempt at containment to the next. The boundaries between security and power politics gradually blurred. The Romans and Americans both eventually found themselves in a geographical and political position that they had not originally desired, but which they then gladly accepted and firmly maintained.[63]
- "Both claimed the unlimited right to render their enemies permanently harmless." Postwar treatments of Carthage, Macedon, Germany and Japan are similar.[64]
- "They became protective lords after each act of assistance provided to other states; in effect, they offered protection and gained control. The protected were mistaken when they assumed that they could use Rome or America to their own ends without suffering a partial loss of their sovereignty."[64]
- "World powers without rivals are a class unto themselves. They ... are quick to call loyal followers friends, or amicus populi Romani. They no longer know any foes, just rebels, terrorists, and rogue states. They no longer fight, merely punish. They no longer wage wars but merely create peace. They are honestly outraged when vassals fail to act as vassals."[65] Zbigniew Brzezinski comments on the latter analogy: "One is tempted to add, they do not invade other countries, they only liberate."[66]
In 1998, American political author, Charles A. Kupchan, described the world order "After Pax Americana"[67] and the next year "The Life after Pax Americana".[68] In 2003, he announced "The End of the American Era".[69] In 2012, he projected: "America's military strength will remain as central to global stability in the years ahead as it has been in the past."[70]
The Russian analyst Leonid Grinin argues that at present and in the nearest future Pax Americana will remain an effective tool of supporting the world order since the US concentrates too many leadership functions which no other country is able to take to the full extent. Thus, he warns that the destruction of Pax Americana will bring critical transformations of the World-system with unclear consequences.[71]
American political analyst Ian Bremmer argued that with the election of Donald Trump and the subsequent rise in populism in the west,[72][73] as well as US withdrawal from international agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NAFTA, and the Paris Climate Accords, that the Pax Americana is over.[74]
American imperialism
History of U.S. expansion and influence |
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|
American imperialism is a term referring to the cultural and political outcomes or ideological elements of United States foreign policy. Since the start of the Cold War, the United States has economically and/or diplomatically supported friendly foreign governments, including many that overtly violated the civil and human rights of their own citizens and residents. American imperialism concepts were initially a product of capitalism critiques and, later, of theorists opposed to what they take to be aggressive United States policies and doctrines.[citation needed]
Although there are various views of the imperialist nature of the United States, which describe many of the same policies and institutions as evidence of imperialism, explanations for imperialism vary widely. In spite of such literature, the historians Archibald Paton Thorton and Stuart Creighton Miller argue against the very coherence of the concept. Miller argues that the overuse and abuse of the term "imperialism" makes it nearly meaningless as an analytical concept.[75]
See also
- Overseas interventions of the United States
- Timeline of United States military operations
- Truman Doctrine
- Reagan Doctrine
- Bush Doctrine
- Platt Amendment
- Bretton Woods system
- Cold War (1985–1991)
- Neoconservatism
- Anti-communism
- New world order
- War on Terror
- American Tianxia
- Pax Russica
- Pax Americana and the Weaponization of Space
References
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- ^ Abbott, Lyman, Hamilton Wright Mabie, Ernest Hamlin Abbott, and Francis Rufus Bellamy. The Outlook. New York: Outlook Co, 1898. "Expansion not Imperialism" p. 465. (cf. [...] Felix Adler [states ...] "if, instead of establishing the Pax Americana so far as our influence avails throughout this continent, we should enter into' the field of Old World strife, and seek the sort of glory that is written in human blood." Here it is assumed that we have failed in establishing self-government, and propose to substitute, at least in other lands, an Old World form of government. This sort of argument has no effect on the expansionist, because he believes that we have magnificently succeeded in our problem, in spite of failures, neglects, and violations of our own principles, and because what he wishes to do is, not to abandon the experiment, but, inspired by the successes of the past, extend the Pax Americana over lands not included in this continent.")
- ^ "Definition of PAX AMERICANA". merriam-webster.com. Archived from the original on February 24, 2022. Retrieved August 1, 2018.
- ISBN 978-0-671-42149-6.
- ^ "sagehistory.net". sagehistory.net. Archived from the original on June 29, 2009. Retrieved July 29, 2014.
- ^ a b "American Exceptionalism" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on February 25, 2009.
- ^ Lalor, John J., Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States. Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1884. "The Union Archived 2017-03-30 at the Wayback Machine", p. 959.
- ^ "Help". Oxford English Dictionary. Archived from the original on April 7, 2020. Retrieved April 2, 2021.
- ^ a b c d Kirkpatrick, F. A. South America and the War: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures Delivered in the University of London, King's College Under the Tooke Trust in the Lent Term, 1918. Cambridge [England]: University Press.
- ^ Porter, Bernard. Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
- PMID 11635503. Archived from the originalon August 5, 2010.
- ^ Kennedy, Paul. "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers." Vintage, January 1989. United States is listed as possessing 23.6% of world industrial capacity compared to 18.5% for the British.
- ^ James, Harold. The Interwar Depression in an International Context. München: R. Oldenbourg, 2002. p. 96[permanent dead link].
- ^ Richard Little, Michael Smith, Perspectives on World Politics. Routledge, 2006. Page 365.
- ^ Northrup, Cynthia Clark. The American Economy: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Great Depression pp. 135–36.
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- ^ a b c d e f g h i Einstein, Lewis. A Prophecy of the War (1913–1914). New York: Columbia University Press, 1918.
- ISBN 0-09-180178-8
- ^ Roland Hugins, The Possible Peace, New York, 1916.
- ^ Bismarck introduced this in the era of force.
- ^ Ibañez Muñoz, Josep, "El desafío a la Pax americana: del 11 de septiembre a la guerra de Irak" in C. García and A. J. Rodrigo (eds) "El imperio inviable. El orden internacional tras el conflicto de Irak", Madrid: Tecnos, 2004.
- ^ "Rebuilding America's Defenses Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century" (PDF). Newamericancentury.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 23, 2002. Retrieved July 29, 2014.
- ^ S2CID 57568539. p. 39.
- Daily TelegraphSeptember 6, 2002
- ^ Futrell, Robert Frank, "Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960". DIANE Publishing, 1989. p. 239.
- ^ Cronin, Patrick P. From Globalism to Regionalism: New Perspectives on US Foreign and Defense Policies. [Washington, D.C.]: [National Defense Univ. Press], 1993. p. 213 Archived March 30, 2017, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ Michael E. Eidenmuller (June 10, 1963). "Commencement Address American University". Americanrhetoric.com. Archived from the original on May 2, 2021. Retrieved July 29, 2014.
- ISBN 9780521413657. See especially pp. 149–50 of the internal definitions of neocolonialism in soviet bloc academia.
- ISBN 0-7425-4643-8p. 138: "Neocolonialism means that European powers and the United States no longer rule dependent territories directly through their occupying troops and imperial bureaucracy. Rather, they control the area's resources indirectly through business corporations and the financial lending institutions they dominate..."
- ISBN 0-231-13808-3pp. 123–24 giving the classical definition limited to US and European colonial powers.
- ISBN 0-8133-2452-1pp. 94–95 classicially defined as a capitalist phenomenon.
- ISBN 0-313-30013-5pp. 3–12, definition p. 7.
- JSTOR 24911288. p. 115.
- JSTOR 2539339. p. 102.
- The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (Perseus Books, New York, 1997, p. 23).
- ^ Westerfield, H. Bradford. The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy. New York: Crowell, 1963. p. 138. (cf. "the traditional American aversion to foreign wars, but also related to some recent disillusionment with the fruits of total wars ...")
- ^ "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century" (PDF). September 2000. Archived from the original (PDF) on January 4, 2009. Retrieved May 30, 2007.
- ^ Joseph S. Nye Sr., Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to Theory and History, pp. 276–77
- ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the originalon September 15, 2019.
- ^ The Paradox of American Power, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002).
- ^ Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power (Basic Books, 1991).
- ^ "The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective Archived December 20, 2016, at the Wayback Machine", Foreign Affairs (November–December 2010).
- ^ Cited in Michio Kaku and David Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans, Boston: South End Press, 1987, p. 64.
- . p. 314.
- ^ Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1945 (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 244.
- ^ Crusade for Pan-Europe (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), pp. 299–304.
- ^ JSTOR 2144425. pp. 12, 14–15.
- ^ To Win a Nuclear War, op. cit., p. 64.
- ^ Joshua Muravchick, "At Last, Pax Americana Archived 2018-07-16 at the Wayback Machine", The New York Times (January 24, 1991)
- from the original on April 22, 2021. Retrieved October 3, 2020. p. 36.
- ^ Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 2.
- ^ "Rome, AD ... Rome, DC Archived 2016-10-22 at the Wayback Machine", The Guardian (September 18, 2002)
- ^ Ronald Dworkin, "The Threat to Patriotism Archived 2016-12-24 at the Wayback Machine", The New York Review of Books (February 28, 2002)
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- ^ Jonathan Freedland, "Rome, AD ... Rome, DC Archived 2016-10-22 at the Wayback Machine", The Guardian (September 18, 2002)
- ^ Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 14.
- ISBN 9780262288293.
- S2CID 162321437.
- .
- ^ "America: The New Roman Empire", p. 145.
- ^ "America: The New Roman Empire", p. 147.
- ^ "America: The New Roman Empire", pp. 148, 151.
- ^ a b "America: The New Roman Empire", p. 152.
- ^ "America: The New Roman Empire", p. 155.
- ^ The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 216.
- S2CID 57569142.
- JSTOR 40209641.
- ^ Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Vintage Books, 2003.
- ^ Charles Kupchan, "Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future Archived 2022-02-24 at the Wayback Machine", Democracy Journal, 23, Winter 2012
- ^ Grinin, Leonid; Ilyin, Ilya V.; Andreev, Alexey I. 2016. "World Order in the Past, Present, and Future Archived 2017-12-01 at the Wayback Machine". In Social Evolution & History. Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 58–84
- ^ "BREMMER: 'The Pax Americana, as of tomorrow, is over'". Yahoo!. January 19, 2017. Retrieved April 16, 2022.
- ^ "It really is the end of the world as we know it…". eurasiagroup.net. Retrieved April 16, 2022.
- ^ Cheng, Evelyn (January 3, 2017). "'Pax Americana' is over, and that could mean a much more turbulent world: Ian Bremmer". CNBC. Retrieved April 16, 2022.
- ISBN 978-0-300-02697-9. p. 3.
Further reading
- Ankerl, Guy (2000). "Global communication without universal civilization". Coexisting Contemporary Civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese and Western. INU Societal Research. Vol. 1. Geneva: INU Press. pp. 256–332. ISBN 978-2-88155-004-1.
- Brown, Michael E. (2000). America's Strategic Choices. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 9780262265249.
- Burton, Paul J. (2013). "Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010". International Journal of the Classical Tradition. 20 (1–2): 15–40. S2CID 162321437.
- Clarke, Peter. The last thousand days of the British empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the birth of the Pax Americana (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010)
- Gottlieb, Gidon (1993). Nation against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty. New York: ISBN 9780876091562.
- Hull, William I. (1915). The Monroe Doctrine: National or International. New York: G.P. Putnam.
- Kahrstedt, Ulrich (1920). Pax Americana; ein historische Betrachtung am Wendepunkte der europäischen Geschichte [Pax Americana, a historical look at the turning points in European history] (in German). Munich: Drei Masken Verlag.
- Kiernan, V. G. (2005). America, the New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World Hegemony. London: Verso. ISBN 9781844675227.
- Kupchan, Charles (2002). The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st-century. New York: A. Knopf.[permanent dead link]
- Layne, Christopher (2012). "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana". International Studies Quarterly. 56 (1): 203–213. JSTOR 41409832.
- LaFeber, Walter (1998). The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0801485954.
- terrorist attack should be a US war or an international police action. [...] Debating tortureor other abuses, while indisputably valuable, has diverted Americans from 'deliberating on the deeper choice they were making to ignore constraints on starting war in the first place.' [W]ar itself causes far more suffering than violations of its rules." (p. 40.)
- Louis, William Roger (2006). "The Pax Americana: Sir Keith Hancock, The British Empire, and American Expansion". Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 999+. ISBN 9781845113476.
- Mee, Charles L. The Marshall Plan: The launching of the pax americana (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)
- Narlikar, Amrita; Kumar, Rajiv (2012). "From Pax Americana to Pax Mosaica? Bargaining over a New Economic Order". The Political Quarterly. 83 (2): 384–394. .
- Nye, Joseph S. (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 9780465007448.
- Snow, Francis Haffkine (1921). "American as a World Tyrant: A German Historian's Attempt to Prove That Europe is Becoming a Serf of the United States". Current History. 13.
External links
- The end of the Pax Americana? by Michael Lind
- Why America Thinks it Has to Run the World by Benjamin Schwarz
- It’s Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations by Christopher Layne
- War in the Contest for a New World Order by Peter Gowan
- So it must be for ever by Thomas Meaney
- Instrumental Internationalism: The American Origins of the United Nations, 1940–3 by Stephen Wertheim
- What are we there for? by Tom Stevenson
- Peter Gowan interview on U.S. foreign policy since 1945, Interview with Against the Grain