People's Liberation Army Air Force
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People's Liberation Army Air Force | ||
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Air defense | ||
Size | 400,000 active personnel (2023)[2] 3,510+ aircraft (2023) Hanyu Pinyin Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Kōngjūn | |
Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China |
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Executive departments |
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Independent troops |
Special operations force |
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Military districts |
History of the Chinese military |
Military ranks of China |
The People's Liberation Army Air Force,[a] also referred to as the Chinese Air Force (中国空军) or the People's Air Force (人民空军), is an aerial service branch of the People's Liberation Army. The Air Force was officially established on 11 November 1949, and it is composed of five sub-branches: aviation, ground-based air defense, radar, Airborne Corps, and other support elements.[4]
The PLAAF first faced combat in the Korean War against the United States using primarily the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter aircraft, aircraft provided by the Soviet Union, which also assisted with the expansion of the Chinese aerospace industry. Changes in the organization of the PLAAF followed by modernization programs in the 1990s and increased technology development in the 21st century has created the J-20 stealth multirole fighter, the first of its kind for China.
History
Origins
Today's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) traces its roots back to September 1924 when a small group of nine cadets from the still-young Chinese Communist Party graduated from Sun Yat-sen's military flight school in Guangzhou. Having only been founded three years prior in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed a united front with the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party against competing warlords in a bid to reunite a fractionalized China. The eighteen graduate pilots of the military flight school, under Sun's Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, included nine nationalist and nine communist pilots who were sent to the Soviet Union for two years of advanced flight training under the tutelage of the more experienced Soviet Air Force. Two of the CCP's graduates, Chang Qiankun and Wang Bi, continued to serve in the Soviet Air Force for fourteen years until, in September 1938, they returned to Dihua (now Ürümqi) as instructors. Chang and Wang would play instrumental roles in the founding of the PLAAF.[5]
In January 1941, as intensifying clashes between CCP and KMT forces ended the united front against invading Japanese forces, and despite having neither aircraft nor airfields, the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) established the Air Force Engineering School with Wang as commandant and Chang as head instructor. In May 1944, just over a year before the Japanese surrender to Allied forces, the CMC established an Aviation Section in Yan'an with Wang as its director and Chang as deputy director. Two years later in May 1946 and after the withdrawal of Japanese troops, the CMC established the Northeast Old Aviation School in Jilin. By 1949 the Aviation Section of the CMC had 560 trained personnel (125 pilots and 435 ground support specialists), purchased 435 aircraft from the Soviet Union, acquired 115 Nationalist aircraft, and operated seven military flight schools.[5]
Founding
The first organized air unit of the People's Liberation Army was formed in July 1949 at Beijing Nanyuan Airport (built and first operated under the Qing Dynasty) and operated American P-51 Mustangs, PT-19s, and British DH.98 Mosquitos.[6] The squadron had acquired the Western-made aircraft once donated to the KMT for use against the Japanese, through a series of airfield captures and nationalist defections.[7]
In March 1949, the CMC elevated its Aviation Section to the shortly-lived Aviation Bureau with Chang and Wang appointed as the bureau's director and political commissar, respectively. On 1 October 1949, the victorious communist forces established the People's Republic of China and, on 11 November 1949, the CMC dissolved its Aviation Section founding instead the People's Liberation Army Air Force. Initially manned by a variety of units from ground forces, the new PLAAF organized its headquarters (PLAAF HQ) in Beijing and organized administrative aviation divisions for each of the PLA's six military regions, later to each be named a Military Region Air Force (MRAF). The new organization, which was not yet seen as a service separate from the army, was headed by ground force commander Liu Yalou with Xiao Hua (former ground force commander and political commissar) as the PLAAF's first political commissar.[5][6] Chang was appointed as a PLAAF deputy commander and as director of the PLAAF's Training Department while Wang was named deputy political commissar and director of the Aeronautical Engineering Department.[5]
In June 1950, the first PLAAF aviation unit, the 4th Composite Air Brigade (混成旅) was established in Nanjing based on the 30th Army's 90th Division and commanding the 10th, 11th and 12th Air Regiments. In the same year, the PLAAF created the 2nd and 3rd Composite Air Brigades. Although the 4th Composite Air Brigade would be renamed in 1950 to the PLAAF 4th Air Division, it would become the 1st Air Division in 1956 with the 2nd and 3rd Composite Air Brigades becoming the 2nd and 3rd Air Divisions, respectively.[5]
Korean War to the Sino-Soviet Split
The PLAAF expanded rapidly during the
The PLAAF emerged from the war as an air defense force. The main role was to support the army by achieving air superiority using fighters, radar, and ground-based weapons.[12] This was reinforced through the 1950s and 1960s when the PLAAF's main activities were skirmishing with the Republic of China Air Force near the Taiwan Strait, and intercepting American aircraft. The PLAAF was passive in applying offensive airpower due to the limited range of capabilities and political considerations.[13] PLAAF was used as a deterrence due to the political culture at the time. The Chinese leadership, in many instances, would cancel offensive bombing missions to prevent escalation, affecting the decision-making autonomy of the PLAAF.[14]
In 1960, Soviet engineers and advisors left China due to the Sino-Soviet split; although the Soviet Union granted licensed rights to MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Il-28, and Tu-16, China didn't retain the technical material or machinery as the Soviet advisory withdrew. China had to reverse-engineer aircraft and missile systems to set up production lines.[10] Internal political and economic chaos from the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward severely impacted the modernization and development of the PLAAF.[15]
The prioritization of the
Between January 1954 and 1971, 22 divisions were created for a total of 50.[8]
1970s to 1980s
In the 1970s, the
PLAAF leadership recognized the importance of modern airpower and the existing weakness of the force in the late 1980s.
In the 1980s, the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the educational level and improve the training of its pilots.
From 1986 to 1988, each military region converted a division into a division-level transition training base (改装训练基地),[19] which replaced training regiments in operational divisions.[20]
In 1987 the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies — especially when compared with its principal threat, the
Although the PLAAF received significant support from Western nations in the 1980s when China was seen as a counterweight to Soviet power, this support ended in 1989 as a result of the Chinese crackdown on the
1990s to 2000s
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, PLAAF still remained a large yet antiqued force. As of 1995, the air force consisted of approximately 4,500 combat aircraft based on the 1950s and 1960s technologies, which were approaching the end of their service life. The overall force strategy is defensive, with the primary objectives limited to protecting cities, airbases, economic and industrial centers, and important institutions and facilities. The air fleet continued to shrink, with RAND Corporation predicting PLAAF being halved by the early 2000s.[16] PLAAF leadership also lacked strategic options, given the severe constraints in China's budgets, manpower, and technology at the time. The force lacked joint operation capabilities, had no combat experience since 1979, and lacked command and control infrastructure to support offensive operations beyond the Chinese borders. The Chinese aviation industrial base was inadequate and weak, and China lacked the capacity to produce modern avionics, composites, turbofan engines, and integrated systems.[16]
Despite the difficulties, PLAAF was determined to introduce modern airpower and secure technological self-sufficiency.
In the early 1990s, PLAAF continued to invest in domestic aircraft programs, including the
At the same time, PLAAF leadership advocated for more active roles in the Chinese military but was sidelined by the PLA headquarters due to concerns over political reliability and a general lack of capabilities. PLAAF continued persuasive efforts, and their plans were eventually endorsed by the PLA leadership in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[17] In 1999, PLAAF set up a combined arms training base to conduct multi-force joint operations. In 2003, PLAAF began structural reforms and reduced the number of personnel by 200,000 (85% were officials), freeing up resources for the force overhaul. The leadership was consolidated to become more operationally efficient. Three dedicated training bases were established to provide research, testing, training, and combat support.[28] In 2004, PLAAF released the force reform concept "Strategic Air Force", aiming to reconstruct the PLAAF into an integrated fighting force capable of both offensive and defensive operations in air and space.[17] The 2004 reform included changes in doctrine, equipment, training, education, organizational structure, and strategic thinking.[17]
By 2005, PLAAF was in the process of modernizing force composition by retiring obsolete aircraft. The antiquated Shenyang J-6 fighters were completely phased out of the service, and the more competent Chengdu J-7 and Shenyang J-8 platforms were partially retired with the remaining fleet upgraded with improved technologies. The number of second and third-generation aircraft was reduced to about 1,000 planes.[27] Fighters of foreign and domestic origin with modern avionics and missiles began to enter the service more rapidly. From 2000 to 2004, PLAAF incorporated 95 home-built Shenyang J-11A with license,[29] acquired 76 Sukhoi Su-30MKK and 24 Su-30MK2 from Russia with improved composite material, weapons, and avionics akin to Sukhoi Su-35,[30] and negotiated the purchase of 38 Ilyushin Il-76 and Ilyushin Il-78 transport/tanker aircraft.[31] To replace the antiquated Nanchang Q-5 attacker, PLAAF introduced fighter-bomber Xi'an JH-7A with precision strike capabilities.[27] The homegrown Chengdu J-10 platform also matured into a highly capable, multirole fighter as PLAAF continued to accumulate experience in operating modern aircraft since the 1990s.[27] By the mid-2000s, PLAAF had grown familiar with precision-guided munitions, aerial refueling, AEW&C aircraft, and networked command&control systems.[27]
Several uncertainties troubled the PLAAF leadership, including China's inability to produce advanced jet engines, the lack of bombers to conduct long-range strike missions, and the dilemma between procuring foreign designs or supporting the homegrown defense industry that could only produce less capable ones.
2010s
In the 2010s, PLAAF began to transform expeditiously and emerged as one of the significant competitors in airpower. According to the US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center, PLAAF was projected to become one of the most capable air forces in 2020. PLAAF improved capabilities in several areas, including fighters, advanced missiles, early warning systems, and air defense systems; the force also started major reforms in training and doctrines.[36] PLAAF leadership realized the force was insufficient to counter US intervention in the Taiwan strait confrontations, thus invested heavily in a wider range of conventional capabilities to transition the PLAAF from a large, technologically inferior force to hold advantageous positions in both quality and quantity at its own geopolitical theater.[36]
In 2013, it was estimated that China had 400 modern fighters in the fourth-generation class, and the number of fourth-generation aircraft was projected to increase further with improvements in training and force compositions.
From 2014 to 2016, PLAAF intensified its joint operation effort with the
After the reform, analysts noted PLAAF's joint operation and integrated fighting capabilities were considerably improved.
According to International Institute for Strategic Studies, PLAAF had an unprecedented military build-up between 2016 and 2022. The force successfully closed the gap with the West due to improved domestic production, introducing indigenously developed airframes, composite materials, turbofan engines, advanced avionics, and weapon systems. In six years, PLAAF incorporated over 600 fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft in more than 19 frontline combat brigades.
Personnel
Ranks and insignia
The ranks in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force are similar to those of the Chinese Army, formally known as the People's Liberation Army Ground Force, except that those of the PLA Air Force are prefixed by 空军; Kōngjūn; 'Air Force'. See Ranks of the People's Liberation Army or the article on an individual rank for details on the evolution of rank and insignia in the PLAAF. This article primarily covers the existing ranks and insignia.
The markings of the PLAAF are a red star in front of a red band, very similar to the insignia of the
representing August 1, 1927, the date of the formation of the PLA. PLAAF aircraft carry these markings on the fins as well.Commanders
- Liu Yalou (October 1949 – May 1965)
- Wu Faxian (May 1965 – September 1971)
- Ma Ning (May 1973 – February 1977)
- Zhang Tingfa (April 1977 – July 1985)
- Wang Hai (July 1985 – November 1992)
- Cao Shuangming (November 1992 – October 1994)
- Yu Zhenwu (October 1994 – November 1996)
- Liu Shunyao (November 1996 – May 2002)
- Qiao Qingchen (May 2002 – September 2007)
- Xu Qiliang (September 2007 – October 2012)
- Ma Xiaotian (October 2012 – August 2017)
- Ding Laihang (August 2017 – September 2021)
- Chang Dingqiu (September 2021 – present)
Structure
Headquarters
The highest leadership organization is PLAAF Headquarters (PLAAF HQ). PLAAF HQ's peacetime responsibilities are force generation, modernization, and operational control of some units like the
The Staff Department (空军参谋部) manages the PLAAF organizational structure, personnel management, intelligence, communications, air traffic control, weather support, development of air force military theory, and air force education and safety. The Staff Department is led by the chief of staff who is the "principal organizer and coordinator of military operations." The Staff Department's chief of staff has a number of deputy chiefs of staff. Previously known as the Headquarters Department, the post-2016 Staff Department maintains a number of subordinate bureaus (局) including the Operations Bureau, Information and Communications Bureau, Training Bureau, Ground-based Air Defense Bureau, Air Traffic Control Bureau, Pilot Recruitment Bureau, Flight Safety Bureau, Test Flight Bureau, Aviation Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Unit Management Bureau, and Planning and Organization Bureau.[5]
The Political Work Department (空军政治工作部), sometimes abbreviated PWD, is responsible for managing propaganda, security, political education, personnel records, civil-military relations, party discipline, party organizations within the PLAAF, and cultural activities to include song and dance troupes or public events. The Political Work Department is led by a director (主任) and at least two deputy directors (副主任). Subordinate to the department include bureaus such as a Cadre Bureau, Propaganda Bureau, and a Soldier and Civilian Personnel Bureau.[5]
The Logistics Department (空军后勤部), led by a director and political commissar, oversee the PLAAF's logistics to include transportation, materials, supplies, finance, medical care, and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL). Since the 2016 reform, subordinate bureaus include a Finance Bureau, Transport and Delivery Bureau, Procurement and Supply Bureau, Air Force National Defense Engineering Development Command Bureau, Real Estate Management Bureau, Ordnance General-use Equipment Bureau, Military Facilities Construction Bureau, Combat Service Planning Bureau, Materials Bureau, and Audit Bureau.[5]
The Equipment Department (空军装备部), originally the Air Force Engineering Department, manages the PLAAF's cradle-to-death lifecycle including repair and maintenance of the branch's weapons systems and instruments. Led by a director and political commissar, the department leads bureaus to include the Comprehensive Planning Bureau, Airfield Support Bureau, Scientific Research and Procurement Bureau, Major Type/Model Bureau, Project Management Bureau, Equipment Purchasing Bureau, Testing and Inspection Bureau, Armament General-use Equipment Bureau, Flight Safety Bureau, and Aviation Equipment Bureau.[5]
Commands
Below PLAAF HQ are five Theater Command Air Forces (TCAF), successors of Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs) prior to 2016.[64]
Before 2003, MRAF had subordinate air corps and Bases which exercised direct control over units in their area of responsibility (AOR); MRAF only directly controlled fighter and ground attack divisions in the same province as MRAF headquarters (MRAF HQ). From 2004, leadership of units was consolidated in MRAF HQ, with air corps and Bases downgraded to command posts that acted on behalf of MRAF HQ.[65] From 2012 onwards, the command posts were mostly replaced by Bases that exercised command and control over units (brigades) in their AOR and conducted joint exercises.[66]
Below TCAF/MRAF and the air corps/command posts/Bases are corps, division, brigade, and regimental level units (部队).[65]
The first divisions in the 1950s was organized into a HQ and two or three regiments. In 1953, this was standardized to three regiments per division,[28] including one training regiment.[8] Regiments had three or four flight groups, each in turn made of three or four squadrons. Between 1964 and 1970, regiments were called groups.[28] In the late 1980s, operational squadrons lost their training regiments.[20] By 2010, many divisions had only two regiments.[19] In 2019, the bomber, transport, and specialized divisions had not been reorganized into brigades and remained under the control of PLAAF HQ and TCAF headquarters.[67]
Beginning in 2011, and in a similar process as the PLAGF, the PLAAF dissolved the majority of its air division headquarters changing previously subordinate air regiments to brigades and subordinating them directly under military region (now theater command) air forces. Brigades contain several subordinate flight groups; a flight group has one type of aircraft.[19] All fighter and ground attack divisions and regiments were reorganized into air force brigades, organized into a brigade HQ and the flight groups organized under it.[67]
Everything from battalions to squads are considered subunits (分队).[68]
Order of battle
- PLAAF Headquarters
- Staff Department
- Political Work Department
- Logistics Department
- Equipment Department
- Directly reporting units
- Experimental Training Base
- Flight Test Training Base
- Research Institute
- Airborne Training Base
- Command Academy
- Engineering University
- Aviation University
- Early Warning Academy
- Harbin Flight Academy
- Shijiazhuang Flight Academy
- Xi'an Flight Academy
- Medical University
- Service Academy
- Communications Sergeants Academy
- 66th Blue Brigade
- Eastern Theater Command Air Force
- Southern Theater Command Air Force
- Western Theater Command Air Force
- Northern Theater Command Air Force
- Central Theater Command Air Force
Airbases
The PLAAF has over 150 air bases distributed across each theater command.[69]
Aerobatic display team
The August 1st (aerobatic team) is the first PLAAF aerobatics team. It was formed in 1962. Aircraft inventory of PLAAF August 1st Aerobatic Team includes the J-10 and it has previously flown the J-5 and J-7. The Sky Wing and Red Falcon air demonstration teams, which operate Nanchang CJ-6 and Hongdu JL-8 respectively, were established in 2011.
Equipment
The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates a large and varied fleet of some 4,000 aircraft, of which around 2,566 are combat aircraft (fighter, attack, and bombers).[70] According to FlightGlobal, China has the second-largest active combat aircraft fleet and the third-largest total aircraft fleet in the world.[71][72]
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, PLAAF combat pilots acquire an average of 100-150 flying hours annually.[73][74] For a list of aircraft no longer flown by the People's Liberation Army Air Force, see; List of historic aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force. For aircraft and equipment of the Airborne Corps, see People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps#Equipment.
Current inventory
Aircraft | Origin | Type | Variant | In service | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Combat Aircraft | |||||
Xian H-6 | China | strategic bomber | 176[70] | license-built Tupolev Tu-16 variant. | |
Xian JH-7 | China | fighter bomber
|
120[70] | ||
Chengdu J-7 | China | fighter | 489[70] | License built MiG-21 variant - JJ-7s used for conversion training.
| |
Sukhoi Su-27 | Soviet Union | air superiority | Su-27UBK | 32[70] | |
Sukhoi Su-30 | Russia | multirole | Su-30MKK | 73[70] | |
Sukhoi Su-35 | Russia | air superiority | Su-35S
|
24[70] | |
Shenyang J-8 | China | Interceptor | J-8F/H | 78[70] | 48 JZ-8s are used for reconnaissance |
Chengdu J-10 | China | multirole | J-10A/B/C/S | 565[70] | |
Shenyang J-11 | China | air superiority | J-11/B/BS | 225[70] | License built Sukhoi Su-27 variant. |
Shenyang J-16 | China | strike fighter | 250[70] | Completely redesign with new internal structure and Material | |
Chengdu J-20 | China | stealth multirole | 210+[75][76] | ||
Shenyang J-16D | China | Electronic-warfare aircraft | 12 J-16D variants provide radar jamming | ||
AEW&C | |||||
KJ-2000 | China / Russia | AEW&C | 4[70] | Chinese radar installed on an Ilyushin Il-76 airframe | |
Shaanxi KJ-200 | China | AEW&C | 4[70] | ||
Shaanxi KJ-500 | China | AEW&C | 20[70] | ||
Reconnaissance | |||||
Challenger 850 | Canada | SIGINT | 5[72] | ||
Shaanxi Y-8 | China | surveillance | 1[72] | ||
Electronic Warfare | |||||
Shaanxi Y-8 | China | electronic warfare | Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ | 14[70] | |
Shaanxi Y-9 | China | electronic warfare | Y-9G/XZ | 5[70] | |
Antonov An-30 | Ukraine | electronic warfare | 3[72] | ||
Tupolev Tu-154 | Russia | SIGINT / ELINT | Tu-154M/D | 4[70] | |
Maritime patrol | |||||
Boeing 737 | United States | patrol | 2[70] | ||
Shaanxi Y-8 | China | patrol | 3[70] | ||
Tanker | |||||
Ilyushin Il-78 | Russia | aerial refueling | 3[70] | ||
Xian H-6
|
China | aerial refueling | H-6U
|
10[70] | |
Xian YY-20A
|
China | aerial refueling | 8[70] | ||
Transport | |||||
Shijiazhuang Y-5
|
China | transport | 70[70] | ||
Xian Y-7
|
China | transport | Y-7H | 41[70] | |
Shaanxi Y-8 | China | transport | Y-8C | 30[70] | |
Shaanxi Y-9 | China | transport | 30[70] | ||
Xian Y-20
|
China | strategic airlifter / tanker
|
50[70] | ||
Xian MA60
|
China | transport | 16[72] | ||
Harbin Y-12 | China | transport | 11[72] | ||
Ilyushin Il-76 | Russia | strategic airlifter
|
20[70] | ||
Tupolev Tu-154 | Russia | transport | Tu-154M | 8[70] | |
Helicopter | |||||
Mil Mi-8 | Soviet Union | utility / transport | Mi-17/171 | 6[70] | |
Harbin Z-9 | China / France | utility | 20[70] | license built AS365 Dauphin variant | |
Changhe Z-8 | China / France | transport | 18[70] | license built 321 Super Frelon variant | |
Eurocopter AS332
|
France | transport | 6[70] | ||
Eurocopter EC225
|
Multinational | VIP transport | 3[70] | ||
Trainer aircraft
| |||||
Nanchang CJ-6 | China | basic trainer | 400[70] | ||
Hongdu JL-8 | China | jet trainer | 350[70] | ||
Guizhou JL-9 | China | jet trainer | 30[70] | ||
Hongdu JL-10
|
China | jet trainer | 50+[70] | ||
Xian HYJ-7
|
China | two-engine trainer | 15[70] |
Air defense
The People's Liberation Army Air Force operates a multi-layered, integrated air defense system combining
Chinese air defense systems are highly distributed and mobile, in order to improve survivability against SEAD missions.[77][78]
Name | Origin | Type | Variant | In service | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
SAM | |||||
HQ-9 | China | Long-range SAM | HQ-9/9B | 260[70] | derivative of the S-300 missile system[79] |
HQ-22 | China | Long-range SAM | 130+[70] | ||
S-300 | Russia | Long-range SAM | S-300PMU/U1/U2 | 216[70] | |
S-400 | Russia | Long-range SAM | 32[70] | ||
HQ-12 | China | Medium-range SAM | 150[70] | ||
HQ-6 | China | Short-range SAM | HQ-6A/6D | 74[70] | |
HQ-7 | China | Short-range SAM | 30[78] | ||
Anti-aircraft gun | |||||
LD-2000[78]
|
China | Anti-aircraft gun | |||
Oerlikon GDF | Switzerland | Anti-aircraft gun | PG-99 | 1000[78] | |
AZP S-60 | Soviet Union | Anti-aircraft autocannon | PG-59 | 1000 |
See also
- List of historic aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force
- People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force
- People's Liberation Army Ground Force
- List of aircraft produced by China
- List of Chinese aircraft engines
- People's Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps
Notes
References
Citations
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中国空军网_蓝天回眸_空军简史
- ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2020, p. 264.
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Further reading
- Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper: Modern Chinese Warplanes, Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation, Harpia Publishing (2012), ISBN 978-0985455408
- Gordon, Yefim and Komissarov, Dmitry. Chinese Aircraft. Hikoki Publications. Manchester. 2008. ISBN 978-1-902109-04-6