O'Connor, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell
Concurrence
Brennan, joined by Blackmun
Dissent
Stevens, joined by Burger, White, Rehnquist
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case decided April 21, 1986.[1]
Facts and prior history
Maurice S. Hepps was the principal
Philadelphia Inquirer published a series of articles on Hepps being linked to organized crime and using some of those links to influence the State’s governmental processes. They accused Hepps of being linked to organized crime and capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature through articles that were published in the Philadelphia newspaper The Inquirer, owned by Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. Hepps brought a defamation suit into a Pennsylvania
state court against Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. and the authors of the articles.
The Pennsylvania statute gave The Philadelphia Newspaper Inc. the
burden of proof
on the question of truth or falsity. The jury ruled in favor of the Philadelphia Newspaper Inc. The case was remanded for a new trial.
The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
favored Hepps, holding that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.
Decision
Majority
On Monday, April 21, 1986 the United States Supreme Court overruled the state court in a 5–4 decision written by
Brennan wrote a short concurrence in which Justice Blackmun joined. He notes his belief that where "allegedly defamatory speech is of public concern" that the First Amendment requires a plaintiff (be it a public official, public figure, or private individual) prove the statements to be false. He writes to note his adherence to his view that a distinction based on whether or not the defendant is part of the media is not reconcilable with a First Amendment principle that states that "the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public is not dependent on the identity of the source".[2]
Dissent
Justice
libeled
by a defendant who was at least negligent. He writes that as long as publishers are protected by having the burden of proof be on the plaintiff, there is little basis for a concern that a large amount of true speech is deterred unless a private person who is the victim of malicious libel can prove falsity.
