Philosophy of self
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The philosophy of self examines the idea of the self at a conceptual level. Many different ideas on what constitutes self have been proposed, including the self being an activity, the self being independent of the senses, the bundle theory of the self, the self as a narrative center of gravity, and the self as a linguistic or social construct rather than a physical entity. The self (or its non-existence) is also an important concept in Eastern philosophy, including Buddhist philosophy.
Definitions of the self
Most philosophical definitions of self—per
To another person, the way an individual behaves and speaks reflects their true inner self and can be used to gain insight into who they really are. Therefore, the intentions of another individual can only be inferred from something that emanates from that individual. The particular characteristics of the self determine its identity.[citation needed]
Concepts of self
Self as an activity
Aristotle also believed that there were four sections of the soul: the calculative and scientific parts on the rational side used for making decisions, and the desiderative and vegetative parts on the irrational side responsible for identifying our needs. A division of the soul's functions and activities is also found in
If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.[9]
Self independent of the senses
While he was imprisoned in a castle,
Bundle theory of self
David Hume pointed out that we tend to think that we are the same person we were five years ago. Although we have changed in many respects, the same person appears present as was present then. We might start thinking about which features can be changed without changing the underlying self. Hume, however, denies that there is a distinction between the various features of a person and the mysterious self that supposedly bears those features. When we start introspecting, "we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement".[11]
It is plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects."[12]
In Hume's view, these perceptions do not belong to anything. Rather, Hume compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements. The question of personal identity then becomes a matter of characterizing the loose cohesion of one's personal experience. (Note that in the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume said without elaboration that he was dissatisfied with his account of the self, yet he never returned to the issue.)
The paradox of the Ship of Theseus can be used as an analogy of the self as a bundle of parts in flux.
Self as a narrative center of gravity
Self as merely syntactic
Aaron Sloman has proposed that words like self, selves, herself, itself, themselves, myself, etc. do not refer to a special type of entity, but provide powerful syntactical mechanisms for constructing utterances that repeatedly refer to the same thing without tedious and obscure repetition of names or other referring expressions.[14]
Self in Eastern spirituality and philosophy
The spiritual goal of many traditions involves the dissolving of the ego, in contrast to the essential Self,[15] allowing self-knowledge of one's own true nature to become experienced and enacted in the world. This is variously known as enlightenment, nirvana, presence, and the "here and now".[citation needed]
Buddhism
Hume's position is similar to Indian Buddhists’ theories and debates about the self, which generally considers a bundle theory to describe the mind phenomena grouped in
The
"Bhikkhus, form is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.'... Bhikkhus, feeling is not-self... Bhikkhus, perception is not-self... Bhikkhus, determinations are not-self... Bhikkhus, consciousness (vijñāna) is not self.... is form permanent or impermanent?..."[20]
Self-knowledge
Both
A theory about self-knowledge describes the concept as the capacity to detect that the sensations, thoughts, mental states, and attitudes as one's own.[27] It is linked to other concepts such as self-awareness and self-conception. The rationalist theory, which Immanuel Kant has inspired, also claims that our ability to achieve self-knowledge through rational reflection is partly derived from the fact that we view ourselves as rational agents.[27] This school rejects that self-knowledge is merely derived from observation as it acknowledges the subject as authoritative on account of his ability as an agent to shape his own states.[28]
See also
- Ātman (Buddhism) – Buddhist concept of self
- Being and Time – 1927 book by Martin Heidegger
- Centered world – Metaphysical concept
- Gnosis – Common Greek noun for knowledge
- John Locke's view of the self
- Mirror stage – Psychoanalytic concept
- Open individualism – Philosophical view that a single subject embodies all individuals
- Other (philosophy) – Concept in philosophy and psychology
- Personal horizon
- Psychology of self – Study of the representation of one's identity
- Religious views on the self
- Self-realization – Fulfillment of one's character or personality
- Self-schema – in psychology and cognitive science, a pattern that organizes information about one's self
- Subject (philosophy)– Philosophy terms referring to an observer versus the thing observed
- Vertiginous question – Philosophical argument by Benj Hellie
Notes
- ^ Gaynesford, M. de I: The Meaning of the First Person Term, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.
- ^ De Anima 414a20ff
- ^ "For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate." Aristotle, De Anima III, 4, 429b3
- ^ De Anima III, 4
- ^ De Anima 414a27
- ^ S2CID 170184114.
- ^ De Anima, III, 5, 430a22
- ^ Shields, Christopher (2016). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Aristotle's Psychology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- ^ De Anima I, 5
- ISBN 0-415-13159-6.
- ^ Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. I, IV, vi
- ^ Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 4.1, 2
- ^ Dennett, Daniel (1986). "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity". Retrieved 2015-09-02.
- ^ Sloman, Aaron. "'The Self' -- A bogus concept? Yes and no!". School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK. Retrieved 2019-06-16.
- ^ Cottingham, Jenny. From the self to the Self: an exploration of the process of Self-realisation in the context of Indian psychology. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University of Technology. 2015.
- ISBN 9780231509787. p. 410
- ^ Germano, David Francis. Poetic thought, the intelligent Universe, and the mystery of self: The Tantric synthesis of rDzogs Chen in fourteenth century Tibet. Madison: The University of Wisconsin. 1992.
- ^ Priestley, Leonard C. D. C. (1999) Pudgalavada Buddhism: The Reality of the Indeterminate Self. South Asian Studies Papers, 12, monograph 1. University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies.
- PMID 26869984.
- Pali Canon). Translation by Ñanamoli Thera(1993).
- ISBN 9781420889659.
- ISBN 978-0-679-72434-6.
- ISBN 8170993881.
- ^ Alladi, Mahadeva Sastry (1992). The Bhagavad Gita with the commentary of Sri Sankaracharya. Samata Books. p. 22.
- ^ Alladi, Mahadeva Sastry (1992). The Bhagavad Gita with the commentary of Sri Sankaracharya. Samata Books. p. 500.
- ^ Alladi, Mahadeva Sastry (1992). The Bhagavad Gita with the commentary of Sri Sankaracharya. Samata Books. p. 484.
- ^ ISBN 978-0203835678.
- ISBN 9781138385467.
References
- Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Self-knowledge". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Carsten Korfmacher, 'Personal Identity', in "The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy"