Polaris (UK nuclear programme)
United Kingdom Polaris programme | |
---|---|
Type of project | Deployment of Polaris ballistic missile submarines |
Country | United Kingdom |
Established | 1962 |
Disestablished | 1996 |
The United Kingdom's Polaris programme, officially named the British Naval Ballistic Missile System, provided its first
Polaris itself was an operational system of four Resolution-class ballistic missile submarines, each armed with 16 Polaris A-3 ballistic missiles. Each missile was able to deliver three ET.317 thermonuclear warheads. This configuration was later upgraded to carry two warheads hardened against the effects of radiation and nuclear electromagnetic pulse, along with a range of decoys.
The British Polaris programme was announced in December 1962 following the Nassau Agreement between the US and the UK. The Polaris Sales Agreement provided the formal framework for cooperation. Construction of the submarines began in 1964, and the first patrol took place in June 1968. All four boats were operational in December 1969. They were operated by the Royal Navy, and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland's west coast, a few miles from Glasgow. At least one submarine was always on patrol to provide a continuous at-sea deterrent.
In the 1970s it was considered that the re-entry vehicles were vulnerable to the Soviet anti-ballistic missile screen concentrated around Moscow. To ensure that a credible and independent nuclear deterrent was maintained, the UK developed an improved front end named Chevaline. There was controversy when this project became public knowledge in 1980, as it had been kept secret by four successive governments while incurring huge expenditure. Polaris patrols continued until May 1996, by which time the phased handover to the replacement Trident system had been completed.
Background
During the early part of the
The British government feared resurgence of
During the 1950s, the UK's nuclear deterrent was based around the
Nuclear ambitions
The Royal Navy began seeking a nuclear role as early as 1945, when the Naval Staff suggested the possibility of launching missiles with atomic warheads from ships or submarines.[10] In 1948 it proposed using carrier-based aircraft for nuclear weapons delivery, although atomic bombs small enough to be carried by them did not yet exist. Its "carriers versus bombers" debate with the RAF resembled the similar inter-service dispute in the United States at this time that led to the "Revolt of the Admirals".[11] The demand for a nuclear-capable carrier bomber led to the development of the Blackburn Buccaneer.[12] It required a small warhead, which drove the development of the Red Beard.[13] The Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) considered the prospect of arming submarines with nuclear missiles, but its March 1954 report highlighted technical problems that it did not expect to be resolved for many years.[14]
Studies of
One reason the Royal Navy lagged behind its American counterpart was the lack of a high-ranking champion who would push nuclear submarine development.
In December 1957, Rickover proposed that
Polaris development
One of Burke's first actions as CNO was to call for a report on the progress of
A turning point came during
The idea of moving the nuclear deterrent away from the densely populated UK and out to sea had considerable appeal in the UK. It not only implicitly addressed the drawbacks of Blue Streak in that it was not vulnerable to a pre-emptive nuclear strike, but invoked the traditional role of the Royal Navy, and its second-strike capability made it a more credible deterrent.
Negotiations
With the cancellation of Blue Streak in the air, the British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG) produced a study on 23 December 1959 that argued that Polaris was expensive and unproven, and given the time it would take to build the boats, could not be deployed before the early 1970s.
The
At a conference in the Caribbean, Macmillan insisted that the UK would be retaining an independent deterrent capability.[49] Kennedy's offer of Hound Dog was declined; the British government wanted Polaris.[50] Kennedy backed down and abandoned his attempts to persuade the UK to accept the MLF in return for Macmillan's promise to assign UK Polaris boats to NATO. The two leaders concluded the Nassau Agreement, which would see the purchase of US missiles to serve aboard UK-built submarines, on 21 December 1962.[51] This statement was later formalised as the Polaris Sales Agreement, which was signed on 6 April 1963.[52] British politicians did not like to talk about "dependence" on the United States, preferring to describe the Special Relationship as one of "interdependence".[53]
Reaction
As had been feared, the
There was little dissent in the House of Commons from the government's nuclear weapons policy; it had
Macmillan's government lost a series of by-elections in 1962,[58] and was shaken by the Profumo affair.[59] In October 1963, Macmillan fell ill with what was initially feared to be inoperable prostate cancer,[60] and he took the opportunity to resign on the grounds of ill-health.[61] He was succeeded by Alec Douglas-Home, who campaigned on the UK's nuclear deterrent in the 1964 election.[62] While of low importance in the minds of the electorate, it was one on which Douglas-Home felt passionately, and on which the majority of voters agreed with his position.[63] The Labour Party election manifesto called for the Nassau Agreement to be renegotiated, and on 5 October 1964, the leader of the Labour Party, Harold Wilson, criticised the independent British deterrent as neither independent, nor British, nor a deterrent.[63] Douglas-Home narrowly lost to Wilson.[64] In office, Labour retained Polaris,[65] and assigned the Polaris boats to NATO, in accord with the Nassau Agreement.[66]
Design, development and construction
Design
The first decision required was how many Polaris boats should be built. While the
A mission led by Sir
While the Zuckerman mission was in Washington, R. J. Daniel of the
Daniel was opposed to this on the grounds that it would unduly disrupt the hunter-killer submarine programme, and it would add more new features to a design that already had enough. The chosen design was suggested by Daniel's superior, Sidney Palmer. The reactor section would be similar to that of Valiant, which would be joined with a machinery space to the American-designed but mainly British-built missile compartment. The forward section would be of a new design. The 130-metre (425 ft) boat would have a
Organisation
Polaris Executive Senior Management [83]Chief Polaris Executive
- Rear Admiral Hugh Mackenzie (1963–1968)
- Rear Admiral Allan Trewby (1968–1971)
Technical Director
- Rowland Baker (1963–1968)
- Rear Admiral C. W. H. Shepard (1968–1971)
Assistant Chief Polaris Executive
- Captain J. R. McKaig (1963–1966)
- Captain P. C. Higham (1966–1968)
Chief Administrative Officer
- R. N. Lewin (1963–1966)
- P. Nailor (1966–1967)
- M. G. Power (1967–1969)
Deputy Director of Naval Construction (Polaris)
- S. J. Palmer (1963–1967)
- H. J. Tabb (1967–1969)
Deputy Director, Weapons (Polaris)
- Captain C. W. H. Shepard (1963–1968)
Polaris Logistics Officer
- Captain L. Bomford (1963–1969)
Polaris Project Officer, Ministry of Aviation
- Rear Admiral F. Dossor (1963–1967)
- S. A. Hunwicks (1967–1969)
Royal Navy Liaison Officer (Special Projects)
- Captain P. G. La Niece (1963–1969)
- Captain C. H. Hammer (1963–1969)
Special Projects Liaison Officer
- Captain P. A. Rollings, USN (1963)
- Captain W. P. Murphy, USN (1963–1966)
- Captain J. Love, USN (1966–1968)
The project was formally named the British Naval Ballistic Missile System.
Mackenzie established his own office and that of his immediate staff in London, which he considered was necessary in order to be in immediate contact with the Admiralty, the ministers, and the key departments. He was initially given two rooms and a closet at the Admiralty. Most of the Polaris Executive was located in Bath, Somerset, where the Admiralty's technical and logistics departments had been relocated in 1938,[90] "the connection between bath, water and boats having not escaped the administrative minds in Whitehall."[91] Initially they were accommodated in the Admiralty complex there, spread over three different sites. To allow the Polaris Executive to be co-located, a block of single-storey prefabricated offices was built at Foxhill on the south side of Bath, which was occupied in February 1964. By 1966, including allocated but not designated staff, the Polaris Executive had 38 staff at the London office, 430 in Bath, 5 at the Ministry of Aviation, and 31 in Washington.[90]
An early issue that arose concerned the relationship between the Polaris programme and the hunter-killer programme. At this time point, Valiant was under construction, but the second boat of the class, HMS Warspite, was yet to be laid down at Barrow. The possibility of the two projects competing for resources was foreseen, but the Admiralty elected to continue with its construction.[92] The interdependence between the two projects extended well beyond the shipyard; Valiant would be the first boat powered by the Rolls-Royce pressurised water reactor, which would also be used in the new Polaris ballistic missile submarines. In early 1963 the reactor was still in the prototype stage at Dounreay.[93][94] The overlap between the two projects was sufficiently substantial that in May 1963 it was decided that CPE would be responsible for both.[94]
The Joint Steering Task Group (JSTG) was established by Article II of the Polaris Sales Agreement.[95] It was modelled after the Steering Task Group that oversaw the Special Projects Office.[96] It met for the first time in Washington on 26 June 1963.[97] The respective liaison officers acted as the secretaries of the JSTG.[98] These were appointed in April 1963, with Captain Peter La Niece taking up the position in Washington, and Captain Phil Rollings in London.[97] The agenda for the meetings was normally agreed about three weeks beforehand via an exchange of teletype messages, with position papers exchanged about a week beforehand. Meetings were normally held over three days. Initially the JSTG met quarterly, but this was reduced to three times a year in 1965. The flow of information tended to be towards the UK. The JSTG was not an adversarial forum, but from the start there were disagreements over the scope of the Polaris Sales Agreement, which the staff of CPE saw as open-ended, but that of SPO saw as limited in nature.[98]
Construction
The choice of
Traditional battleship or battlecruiser names were chosen for the Polaris boats, signifying that they were the capital ships of their time.[104] All were named after ships that Mountbatten had served on.[105] The first boat, HMS Resolution, was laid down by Vickers on 26 February 1964;[81][106] the second, HMS Renown, by Cammell Laird on 26 June 1964.[107] They were followed by two more boats the following year, one at each yard:[81] HMS Repulse at Barrow on 16 June 1965,[108] and HMS Revenge at Birkenhead on 19 May 1965.[109] The Polaris boats became known as the Resolution class. Resolution was launched on 15 September 1965, and commissioned on 2 October 1967.[81] Resolution conducted a test firing at the American Eastern Range on 15 February 1968.[110] The first Cammell Laird boat, Renown followed, and was launched on 25 February 1967. The second Vickers boat, Repulse, was launched on 11 November 1967.[111] Concerns about the Walney Channel proved justified; when the launch was delayed by half an hour due to a protest by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the falling tide left insufficient clearance, and the boat became stuck in the mud.[108]
The more experienced Vickers yard worked faster than Cammell Laird, and despite labour problems,[81] Repulse was commissioned on 28 September 1968, before Renown on 15 November 1968.[111] This achievement was all the more remarkable because the Vickers yard still managed to complete the hunter-killer Valiant in 1966 and Warspite the following year.[81] The final boat, Revenge, was completed on 4 December 1969.[111] There was concern in 1966 when it was discovered that the distance between the bulkheads in the torpedo storage department on Renown differed from that on Resolution by 1 inch (25 mm). An even more disturbing revelation occurred in November 1966, when eleven pieces of broken metal were found in the reactor circuits. Their removal set the programme back two months.[112] The Cammell Laird boats had a reputation for not being as well built as those of Vickers,[113] which was a factor in the subsequent 1969 decision by the Treasury and the Royal Navy to restrict future nuclear submarine construction to a single yard. Revenge and the hunter-killer HMS Conqueror were the last built at Cammell Laird.[114]
Fifth boat
When the initial decision to build four Polaris boats was taken in January 1963, neither the financial nor the operational implications of this decision were certain, so an option to acquire a fifth boat was provided for, with a decision to be taken later in the year. By September 1963, CPE came to the conclusion that a fifth boat was absolutely necessary. Due to the required
After Wilson took office, one of the first acts of the incoming Secretary of State for Defence,
Missile
Under Article XI of the Polaris Sales Agreement, the UK contributed five per cent of research and development costs of Polaris incurred after 1 January 1963, plus any costs incurred as a result of purely British requirements.[123] This added about £2 million to the cost of the system.[124] The government denied speculation that the Nassau Agreement permitted the addition of electronic mechanisms in the missile to give the United States a veto over its use.[125]
The A-3 missile that replaced the earlier A-1 and A-2 models in the US Navy had a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km) and a new Mark 2 weapon bay housing three re-entry vehicles. This arrangement was originally described as a "cluster warhead" but was replaced with the term Multiple Re-Entry Vehicle (MRV). They were not independently targeted (as a
Testing of the A-3, with its new guidance and re-entry packages commenced on 7 August 1962, and continued until 2 July 1964. Thirty-eight test firings were carried out, with the longest range achieved being 2,284 nautical miles (4,230 km). The first submerged launch was conducted on 26 October 1963. Most of the problems encountered involved failures of the re-entry body to separate correctly. The A-3 became operational on 28 September 1964, when
Warhead
In the wake of the decision to acquire the A-3, a US-UK Joint Re-Entry Systems Working Group (JRSWG) was created to examine issues surrounding the warhead and re-entry vehicle. The Americans revealed that work was in progress to add penetration aids to the re-entry vehicle, but promised that it would not have any effect on the interface between the missile and the UK re-entry vehicle. The British team did not think they were necessary, and in the end the Americans never deployed them with the A-3. The initial assumption at the Admiralty was that the
The decision was therefore taken in March 1964 to substitute the British fission primary, codenamed "Katie", used in the WE.177B developed for Skybolt. The fusion secondary was codenamed "Reggie". This became known as the ET.317.[131][132][133] Its development involved an increase of about 500 staff at Aldermaston compared to that anticipated for Skybolt, with 4,500 staff expected to be working on nuclear weapons by 1969.[134] When it came to the Re-Entry System (RES), the US Navy was using the Mark 2 Mod 0 RES, but had a new version, the Mark 2 Mod 1 under development. In order to meet Polaris in-service deadline of May 1968, the components had to be ordered by May 1964. The Ministry of Aviation and the Admiralty therefore opted for the Mark 2 Mod 0 RES.[135]
To validate the design, a programme of
Operations
It was originally estimated that Polaris would require 6,000 officers and men.[138] Although less than what had been required for the V-bombers, this was still substantial, and the well-trained personnel required had to be found from within the Royal Navy.[139] The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar John, denounced the "millstone of Polaris hung around our necks" as "potential wreckers of the real navy".[140] Even among the submariners there was a notable lack of enthusiasm for lurking in the depths staying out of trouble as opposed to the more active mission of the hunter-killer submarines.[141] In earlier times submarine construction had been low on the Royal Navy's list of priorities, and the Royal Navy Submarine Service had formed, like the Fleet Air Arm, something of a private navy within the Royal Navy. Unlike the Fleet Air Arm though, it had no representation on the Board of the Admiralty such as the Fleet Air Arm enjoyed through the Fifth Sea Lord, and the only submarine flag officer billet was FOSM. Few submariners expected to rise to flag rank, but this was already changing with the ascension of officers like Mackenzie and Luce.[139]
In March 1963, it was decided that the Polaris boats would be based at
To train the required crews, a Royal Navy Polaris School (RNPS) was built adjacent to the base at Faslane, although it was accepted that training of the first two crews at least would have to be conducted in the United States, and arrangements for this were made with SPO.
On 16 October 1964, in the midst of the election campaign that brought the Wilson government to office, China
For submarine captains accustomed to patrols in other submarines, a Polaris patrol required a different mindset. Instead of locating, stalking and closing on prospective targets, the Polaris boat was itself the hunted, and had to avoid any contact with other vessels. For submariners accustomed to diesel-powered boats, the Polaris boats were very pleasant indeed. There was no need to conserve water, as there was distilling capacity to spare, so the crew could have hot showers and laundry facilities. Nor was there any need to conserve battery power, as the reactor supplied enough power for a small town.
Upgrades
The original US Navy Polaris had not been designed to penetrate ABM defences, but the Royal Navy had to ensure that its small Polaris force operating alone, and often with only one submarine on deterrent patrol, could penetrate the ABM screen around Moscow.
The result was
By 1975, the cost of Chevaline had risen to £400 million, but it was protected from the budget cuts that affected the rest of defence spending by its own secrecy.
Chevaline's existence, along with its formerly secret codename, was revealed by the Secretary of State for Defence, Francis Pym, during a debate in the House of Commons on 24 January 1980.[173] Sea trials were held in November 1980.[174] The system became operational in mid-1982 on Renown, followed by Revenge in 1983, Resolution in 1985, and Repulse in 1987. One hundred A-3TK warheads were produced between 1979 and 1982. The final cost reached £1,025 million.[175] However, the Public Accounts Committee noted that due to inflation, £1 billion in April 1981 (equivalent to £3.2 billion in 2019) was not significantly greater than £235 million in April 1972 (equivalent to £2.78 billion in 2019).[176] What disturbed the committee more was that a major project had gone on for a decade without any disclosure of its costs to Parliament or any requirement that they should be. The range of the Chevaline system was 1,950 nautical miles (3,610 km) compared to 2,500-nautical-mile (4,600 km) range of the original system, which reduced the sea-room in which British submarines could hide.[177]
The Polaris system was also upgraded through the replacement of the solid fuel motors after some test-firing failures. The re-motoring programme commenced in 1981, and new motors were installed in all missiles by 1988.[162] This cost £300 million.[178]
Opposition
The
The anti-nuclear movement in the United Kingdom consisted of groups who opposed nuclear technologies such as
Thereafter, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing, internal squabbles, and activists focusing their energies on other causes led to a rapid decline, but it revived in the early 1980s in the wake of the December 1979 decision to deploy US cruise missiles in the UK, and the announcement of the decision to purchase
The 1982 Labour Party Conference adopted a platform calling for the removal of the cruise missiles, the scrapping of Polaris and the cancellation of Trident. This was reaffirmed by the 1986 conference. While the party was given little chance of winning the 1983 election in the aftermath of the Falklands War, polls had shown Labour ahead of the Conservatives in 1986 and 1987. In the wake of Labour's unsuccessful performance in the 1987 election, the Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock, despite his own unilateralist convictions, moved to drop the party's disarmament policy, which he saw as a contributing factor in its defeat.[184][185] The party formally voted to do so in October 1989.[186]
In Scotland there was opposition to the basing of the US Polaris submarines at Holy Loch in 1961.
Replacement
On 15 July 1980, Pym announced the government's intention to acquire the Trident I C-4 missile then in service with the US Navy to replace Polaris.[189] When the US government resolved to upgrade to the new Trident II D-5, the UK government, with the experience of Chevaline in mind, decided to purchase Trident II instead.[190] The legal agreement took the form of amending the Polaris Sales Agreement through an exchange of notes between the two governments so that "Polaris" in the original now also covered the purchase of Trident.[191]
Under the agreement, the UK purchased 65 Trident II missiles,[192] They were drawn from a shared pool of weapons based at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in the United States.[192] As with Polaris, the UK manufactured the warheads and Vanguard-class submarines in the UK, but unlike Polaris the US would maintain the missiles.[193]
The first Trident patrol took place in December 1994, and the new boats were progressively introduced into service over the following six years.[194] On 28 August 1996, there was a special ceremony at Faslane to mark the decommissioning of Repulse, the last operational Resolution-class submarine, and the end of the Polaris era.[195] In his speech to mark the occasion, the Prime Minister, John Major, said:
We are here today to pay tribute to the work of the Polaris Force.
The debt we owe is very large. For the last 28 years this Force has mounted continuous patrols that have been vital to ensure this country's peace and security. Because of these patrols any possible aggressor has known that to attack the UK would provoke a terrible response.
In particular, we are here today to pay tribute to the last of the four Polaris submarines, HMS Repulse, which returned from her sixtieth and final deployment in May.
But not only Repulse, of course. I pay tribute, too, to the other three boats and their crews in her Class: the Resolution herself, Renown and Revenge. Each has made its own unique and invaluable contribution to the remarkable record of maintaining a Polaris submarine at sea, on deterrent patrol, undetected by friend or foe, every day, of every year, from 1969 until May this year.[196]
During the 1960s, the V-bomber force had consumed up to 6 per cent of the total defence budget. A decade later, Polaris accounted for just 1.5 per cent.[110] The total cost of the UK Polaris programme from December 1962, including running costs, through to 30 June 1974 came to £520 million. The four submarines cost £162 million, the missiles £53 million, and the base at Faslane, including the storage facility at Coulport, £47 million. Running costs were around £25 million per annum. Adjusting for inflation, the programme cost less than originally envisaged.[197] This does not include Chevaline, which cost another £1 billion.[198] That the project "was completed on time and on budget" was, The Daily Telegraph claimed, "an unprecedented feat in British naval history."[199]
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- ^ Stoddart 2014b, pp. 94–99.
- ^ Stoddart 2014b, pp. 97, 105.
- Gross Domestic Product deflator figures follow the Measuring Worth "consistent series" supplied in Thomas, Ryland; Williamson, Samuel H. (2018). "What Was the U.K. GDP Then?". MeasuringWorth. Retrieved 2 February 2020.
- ^ Stoddart 2014b, pp. 102–105.
- ^ Doyle 2017, pp. 870–871.
- ^ Arnold & Pyne 2001, p. 65.
- ^ Epstein 1966, p. 140.
- ^ Groom 1974, pp. 131–154.
- ^ a b Bowie & Platt 1984, pp. 63–70.
- ^ Scott 2012, pp. 116–118.
- ^ "Politics 97". BBC. Retrieved 13 July 2018.
- ^ Chalmers 1999, p. 62.
- ^ Lavery 2001, p. 143.
- ^ Ritchie 2016, pp. 658–659.
- ^ Stoddart 2014b, p. 143.
- ^ Doyle 2017, pp. 3–5.
- ^ Stoddart 2014b, pp. 154–155.
- ^ a b Stoddart 2014b, pp. 197–199.
- ^ Stoddart 2014b, pp. 245–246.
- ^ Select Committee on Defence. "The UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent". Eighth Report (Report). UK Parliament. Retrieved 19 March 2018.
- ^ The History of the UK's Nuclear Weapons Programme (PDF) (Report). The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. Ministry of Defence. Retrieved 19 March 2018.
- ^ Major, John (28 August 1996). "Mr Major's Speech at Ceremony marking the end of Polaris". johnmajor.co.uk. Retrieved 7 January 2019.
- ^ Nailor 1988, p. 68.
- ^ The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent (Report). UK Parliament. 8 December 2017. Retrieved 13 December 2018.
- ^ Hawkins 1994, p. 218.
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