Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency
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A diverse variety of informal political groups emerged since the presidency of
Background
When Putin came to power in 1999, he had few protégés or long-term associates, and had to balance various competitive elements as he crafted his team. In contrast to the Yeltsin years, Putin's regime was marked by personnel stability, a gradual elevation of trusted associates and coalition-building across competing interests both within the presidential administration and with other political actors.[1]
Overview
As
According to Associate Professor of Political Science John P. Willerton, it is difficult to make general judgements about the various informal groups, their backgrounds and political preferences.[1]
Major groups
This section needs to be updated.(November 2019) |
St. Petersburg economists and lawyers
According to Associate Professor of Political Science John P. Willerton of the University of Arizona in the United States, reformist St. Petersburg economists and lawyers constitute a prominent group in the Putin team. Many of them have career and personal ties to Putin dating back to the early 1990s.[1]
Many of the members of the economic reform team, both in the presidential administration and the government, are drawn from the St Petersburg group. They are academically qualified, have significant administrative experience, and are often focused on the technical complexities of the country's system transformation. They are - in general - committed to market development, privatization and the continued diminution of the state's role in the country's socioeconomic life. The liberal economists contend that the consolidation of democracy comes with improving the population's standard of living and developing the private sector. Prominent St Petersburg economists include Alexei Kudrin, Herman Gref and Putin's economic adviser Andrey Illarionov.[1]
The St Petersburg lawyers focus on constitutional-legal-administrative arrangements to bolster an efficient democratic system, favouring reforms that strengthen simultaneously the market economy and political stability. Prominent members included the former presidential administration head Dmitry Medvedev and Dmitry Kozak.[1]
Siloviki
Much foreign attention has been given to the security-intelligence elements, what Russians refer to as the siloviki. They began coming to power under Yeltsin, but this accelerated during Putin's premiership and presidency. A common view in Russia is that these siloviki are generally non-ideological, are corrupt, have a pragmatic law and order focus and have Russian national interests at heart. They do not form a cohesive group.[1] It is worth noting that Putin himself is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the KGB.
Remnants of the Yeltsin family
Another identifiable group are the remnants of the so-called "Family" - a term which originally referred to relatives and associates of the former president Yeltsin. Most senior members of the group have left the highest corridors of power, but some have been able to survive and secure influential positions.[1]
Ozero
Ozero is the name of a co-operative society headed, inter alia, by Putin. The co-operative administers Putin's substantial personal wealth generated over the course of his presidency. The immense financial power of members of the co-operative fundamentally creates a wealthy clique of new oligarchs capable of replacing the financial power of Yeltsin era oligarchs.
Outside opinion
According to a The Washington Quarterly article written by Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap in 2006–2007, at the start of his presidency, Vladimir Putin announced that he would consolidate political powers in Russia into the so-called power vertical. However, despite being considered successful by many, this controversial endeavour partially backfired and led to the increasing factionalism within the president's inner circle. Although other institutions now became largely irrelevant, disputes and clashes between Kremlin factions, rather than the president's will, are getting more and more important in determining major policy outcomes, Bremmer and Charap write.[7]
History
During the final years of
In 1999, the Family group, Vladimir Putin, Boris Berezovsky and their allies united their efforts in order to prevent coming to power of the
The Family group has also almost entirely lost its influence by 2004 after the dismissals of Alexander Voloshin (October 2003), Prime Minister
As the Family group had lost its influence, especially during Vladimir Putin's second four-year presidential term (since 7 May 2004), some conflicts between parts of the new elites of Saint Petersburg origin became evident, as witnessed e.g. by the disputes over the fate of
See also
References
- ^ ISBN 0-8223-3522-0.
- ^ Pribylovsky, Vladimir (2005). Происхождение путинской олигархии [Origins of Putin's oligarchy] (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2010-08-19.
- The Financial Times. Archived from the originalon 2007-05-10.
- ^ Walsh, Nick Paton (2005-07-06). "Meet the chief exec of Kremlin inc ..." The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2022-03-02.
- ^ Koptev, Dmitry (2004-07-28). "St. Petersburg Team Building Their Own 'Family'". The Moscow News. Archived from the original on 2006-11-13.
- ^ Finn, Peter (2005-04-27). "As Russian's Trial Ends, So Does Era Of First Oligarchs". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2017-03-20.
- ^ Bremmer, Ian; Charap, Samuel (Winter 2006–2007). "The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want" (PDF). The Washington Quarterly. 30:1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-29.
- ^ Rafael Behr (2003-05-17). "Putin & Voloshin". Johnson's Russia List. Financial Times (UK). Archived from the original on 2012-03-09. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Vladimir Pribylovsky (1–15 May 2003). "Oligarchs, Putin". Johnson's Russia List. Translated by Frolov, Kirill. WPS Monitoring Agency. Archived from the original on 2003-05-27. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Владимир Прибыловский, Юрий Фельштинский. Операция "Наследник". Главы из книги. lib.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2017-08-24. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Агония в виде кадровых перестановок у силовиков. stringer-news.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2007-09-27. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ ВОЙНА ДВУХ БАШЕН. novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2007-01-28. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Газета Русский Курьер: Толчея среди кандидатов в "преемники". ruscourier.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2007-09-27. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ "Антикомпромат.Ру. Путин". Archived from the original on 2007-01-09. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Белковский: Фрадков и Сечин усилились. apn.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2007-09-27. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Сатаров [Satarov], Георгий [Georgy]. Эхо Москвы Власть: Георгий Сатаров. Эхо Москвы. Archived from the original on 2007-12-29. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ "Радиостанция «Эхо Москвы»: Власть, Пятница, 16 Февраль 2007". Archived from the original on 2008-01-21. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ Walsh, Nick Paton (2005-11-15). "Putin reshuffle gives clues to choice of heir". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2022-03-02. Retrieved 2016-12-16.
- ^ "The Appetite Increases during the Struggle - Kommersant Moscow". kommersant.com. Archived from the original on 2007-09-27. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ "Things to Come - Kommersant Moscow". kommersant.com. Archived from the original on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ "Damage Control - Kommersant Moscow". kommersant.com. Archived from the original on 2007-09-20. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- ^ "The Service Oil Pipeline - Kommersant Moscow". kommersant.com. Archived from the original on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
Further reading
- Yenikeyeff, Shamil (2011-11-23). "BP, Russian billionaires, and the Kremlin: a Power Triangle that never was" (PDF). Oxford Energy Comment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.