Political polarization in the United States

Political polarization is a prominent component of politics in the United States.^[1] Scholars distinguish between ideological polarization (differences between the policy positions) and affective polarization (a dislike and distrust of political out-groups), both of which are apparent in the United States.^[2][3] In the last few decades, the U.S. has experienced a greater surge in ideological polarization and affective polarization than comparable democracies.^[4][5]

Differences in political ideals and policy goals are indicative of a healthy democracy.^[6] Scholarly questions consider changes in the magnitude of political polarization over time, the extent to which polarization is a feature of American politics and society,^[7] and whether there has been a shift away from focusing on triumphs to dominating the perceived abhorrent supporters of the opposing party.^[6]

Polarization among U.S. legislators is asymmetric, as it has primarily been driven by a rightward shift among Republicans in Congress.^[8][9][10] Polarization has increased since the 1970s, with rapid increases in polarization during the 2000s onwards.^[11] According to the Pew Research Center, members of both parties who have unfavorable opinions of the opposing party have doubled since 1994,^[12] while those who have very unfavorable opinions of the opposing party are at record highs as of 2022.^[13]

Definition

According to psychology professors Gordon Heltzel and Kristin Laurin, political polarization occurs when "subsets of a population adopt increasingly dissimilar attitudes toward parties and party members (i.e., affective polarization), as well as ideologies and policies (ideological polarization)".^[1] The Pew Research Center defines political polarization as "the vast and growing gap between liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats".^[14]

Polarization has been defined as both a process and a state of being. A defining aspect of polarization, though not its only facet, is a

A related concept is that of party homogeneity, which describes the similarities of the constituencies of two officials of the same party. There is also party polarization, which refers to the gap between the typical constituency of one party as compared to the other in a two-party system.^[16]

History

Antebellum period

Starting in the early 1830s, the country became progressively more polarized over the issue of

The Gilded Age of the late 19th century (c. 1870 – 1900) is considered to be one of the most politically polarized periods in American history, with open political violence and highly polarized political discourse.^[17] A key event during this era was the election of 1896, which some scholars say led to an era of one-party rule, created "safe seats" for elected officials to build careers as politicians, increased party homogeneity, and increased party polarization. Political polarization was overall heightened, with Republicans strengthening their hold on industrial areas, and Democrats losing ground in the North and upper Midwest.^[16]

1950s and 1960s

The 1950s and 1960s were marked by high levels of political bipartisanship, the results of a post-World War II "consensus" in American politics, as well as ideological diversity within each of the two major parties.^[18]

1990–present

Media and political figures began espousing the narrative of polarization in the early 1990s, with a notable example being Pat Buchanan's speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention. In the speech, he declared a culture war for the future of the country. In 1994, the Democratic Party lost control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. Congress went Republican for the first time since 1952. The narrative of political polarization became a recurring theme in the elections of 2000 and 2004. After President George W. Bush barely won reelection in 2004, English historian Simon Schama noted that the US had not been so polarized since the American Civil War, and that a more apt name might be the Divided States of America.^[15]

From 1994 to 2014, the share of Americans who expressed either "consistently liberal" or "consistently conservative" opinions doubled from 10% to 21%. In 1994, the average Republican was more conservative than 70% of Democrats, compared to more conservative than 94% of Democrats in 2014. The average Democrat went from more liberal than 64% of Republicans to more liberal than 92% of Republicans during the same era.^[19] In contrast, families are becoming more politically homogenous. As of 2018, 80% of marriages had spousal alignment on party affiliation. Parent-child agreement was 75%. Both of these represent significant increases from family homogeneity in the 1960s.^[20] A 2022 study found that there had been a substantial increase since 1980 in political polarization among adolescents, driven by parental influence.^[21]

A Brown University study released in 2020 found that the U.S. was polarizing faster compared to other democratic countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia.^[22] According to Stony Brook University political scientists Yanna Krupnikov and John Barry Ryan, polarization in American politics is primarily a phenomenon among Americans who are deeply involved in politics and very expressive about their political views. Americans who are not as involved in politics are not as polarized.^[23]

Politically polarizing issues

As of February 2020, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center highlights the current political issues that have the most partisanship. By far, addressing climate change was the most partisan issue with only 21% of Republicans considering it a top policy priority as opposed to 78% of Democrats.^[24] Issues that are also extremely partisan include protecting the environment, reforming gun policy, and bolstering the country's military strength.^[24] These differences in policy priorities emerge as both Democrats and Republicans shift their focus away from improving the economy. Since 2011, both parties have gradually placed economic stimulation and job growth lower on their priority list, with Democrats experiencing a sharper decline of importance when compared to Republicans.^[24] This is in stark contrast to the 1990s, when both Democrats and Republicans shared similar views on climate change and showed significantly more agreement.^[25] A 2017 poll conducted by Gallup identifies issues where the partisan gap has significantly increased over a period of about fifteen years. For Republicans, the most significant shift was the idea that the "federal government has too much power", with 39% of Republicans agreeing with that notion in 2002 as opposed to 82% agreeing in 2016. On the Democratic side, the largest shift was increasing favorability towards Cuba, changing from 32% in 2002 to 66% in 2017.^[26] Ultimately, as partisanship continues to permeate and dominate policy, citizens who adhere and align themselves with political parties become increasingly polarized.^[26]

On some issues with a wide public consensus, partisan politics still divides citizens. For instance, even though 60% of Americans believe that the government should provide healthcare for its citizens, opinions are split among party lines with 85% of Democrats, including left-leaning independents, believing that healthcare is the government's responsibility and 68% of Republicans believing that it is not the government's responsibility.

Political polarization also shaped the public's reaction to COVID-19. A study that observed the online conversations surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic found that left-leaning individuals were more likely to criticize politicians compared to right-leaning users. Additionally, left-leaning social media accounts often shared disease prevention measures through hashtags, while right-leaning posts were more likely to spread conspiracies and retweet posts from the White House's Twitter account.^[31] The study continues to explain that, when considering geographic location, because individuals in conservative and right leaning areas are more likely to see COVID-19 as a non-threat, they are less likely to stay home and follow health guidelines.^[31]

Potential causes

Congress leads the public

Some scholars argue that diverging parties has been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy platforms have become more distant. This theory is based on recent trends in the

Political scientists have shown politicians have an incentive to advance and support polarized positions.[36] These argue that during the early 1990s, the Republican Party used polarizing tactics to become the majority party in the United States House of Representatives—which political scientists Thomas E. Mann and Norman Ornstein refer to as Newt Gingrich's "guerrilla war".^[33] What political scientists have found is that moderates are less likely to run than are candidates who are in line with party doctrine, otherwise known as "party fit".^[37] Other theories state politicians who cater to more extreme groups within their party tend to be more successful, helping them stay in office while simultaneously pulling their constituency toward a polar extreme.^[38] A study by Nicholson (2012) found voters are more polarized by contentious statements from leaders of the opposing party than from the leaders of their own party. As a result, political leaders may be more likely to take polarized stances.^[39]

Political fund-raisers and donors can also exert significant influence and control over legislators. Party leaders are expected to be productive fund-raisers, in order to support the party's campaigns. After

A 2013 review concluded that there is no firm evidence that media institutions contributed to the polarization of average Americans in the last three decades of the 20th century. No evidence supports the idea that longstanding news outlets become increasingly partisan. Analyses confirm that the tone of evening news broadcasts remained unchanged from 1968 to 1996: largely centrist, with a small but constant bias towards Democratic Party positions. However, more partisan media pockets have emerged in blogs, talk radio, websites, and cable news channels, which are much more likely to use insulting language, mockery, and extremely dramatic reactions, collectively referred to as "outrage".^[79] People who have strongly partisan viewpoints are more likely to watch partisan news.^[20] A 2017 study found no correlation between increased media and Internet consumption and increased political polarization, although the data did confirm a larger increase in polarization among individuals over 65 compared to those aged 18–39.^[80] A 2020 paper comparing polarization across several wealthy countries found no consistent trend,^[81] prompting Ezra Klein to reject the theory that the Internet and social media were the underlying cause of the increase in the United States.^[71]

Along with political scientist Sam Abrams, social psychologist

In 2015, researchers from Facebook published a study indicating that the Facebook algorithm perpetuates an echo chamber amongst users by occasionally hiding content from individual feeds that users potentially would disagree with: for example the algorithm removed one in every 13 diverse content from news sources for self-identified liberals. In general, the results from the study indicated that the Facebook algorithm ranking system caused approximately 15% less diverse material in users' content feeds, and a 70% reduction in the click-through-rate of the diverse material.[92]^[93] At least in the political field, Facebook has a counter-effect on being informed: in two studies from the US with a total of more than 2,000 participants, the influence of social media on the general knowledge on political issues was examined in the context of two US presidential elections. The results showed that the frequency of Facebook use was moderately negatively related to general political knowledge. This was also the case when considering demographic, political-ideological variables and previous political knowledge. According to the latter, a causal relationship is indicated: the higher the Facebook use, the more the general political knowledge declines.^[94] In 2019, Jonathan Haidt argued that there is a "very good chance American democracy will fail, that in the next 30 years we will have a catastrophic failure of our democracy."^[95]

Influence operations

According to a report by

A change in campaigning in 2022 that has been called "both a symptom of and a contributor to the ills" of American politics is a move away from participation in debates between candidates, in "retail politicking" that has been a political "cliché ... for generations" in American politics: pressing the flesh at "diners and state fairs ... town-hall-style meetings ... where citizens get to question their elected leaders and those running to replace them".[102] Replacing these are "safer spaces" for candidates, "partisan news outlets, fund-raisers with supporters, friendly local crowds," where reporters and their challenging questions are "muscled away".

Candidates in ten of the most competitive contests in 2022 for Senate (Arizona, North Carolina, Ohio, Georgia and Wisconsin) and governor (Texas and Wisconsin) have "agreed to just one debate, where voters not long ago could have expected to watch two or three". Observers see a danger in candidates avoiding those tougher interactions cuts down on the opportunities for candidates’ characters and limitations to be revealed, and for elected officials to be held accountable to those who elected them. For the politicians, it creates an artificial environment where their positions appear uniformly popular and opposing views are angrily denounced, making compromise seem risky.

"They run these campaigns in bubbles to these voters who are in bubbles", said former Representative Tom Davis, a moderate Republican who won seven terms in Congress in a Northern Virginia district and headed his party’s congressional campaign committee.^[102]

Causes suggested for the disinterest include the fewer competitive House of Representative districts, and fewer "swing voters", making attempts to appeal to those voters not cost effective.^[102] According to journalists Lisa Lerer and Jazmine Ulloa, "the trend of avoiding the public was initially driven by Republicans" but has "seeped across party lines" so that now, Democrats also avoid voters.^[102]

Economic inequality, unemployment and cultural issues

Evidence suggests that there is a correlation between high levels of

One common hypothesis for polarization in the United States is the end of the Cold War and a greater absence of severe security threats. A 2021 study disputed this, finding little evidence that external threats reduce polarization.[107]

Effects

Demonization

Potentially both a cause and effect of polarization is "demonization" of political opponents, such as accusing them not just of being wrong about certain legislation or policies but of hating their country, or the use of "what are called ‘devil terms’ — things that are so unquestionably bad that you can’t have a debate about them” (according to

An example of the escalation in aggressive attack is Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy, who after the January 6 insurrection "implored members of his party to tone down their speech", saying, 'We all must acknowledge how our words have contributed to the discord in America ... No more name calling, us versus them.'” However in "dozens of tweets since then" McCarthy has referred to "Democrats as 'radical' leftists" who "prefer China to the United States" and are "ruining America".^[109] (A "few Democrats", such as Representative Bill Pascrell of New Jersey, also have "frequently" used "demonizing speech on Twitter".)^[109] Some political scientists have warned that "factionalism is alarming because it makes compromise harder and normalizes" divisive rhetoric throughout the country.^[109]

Political violence

Some authors have found a correlation between polarization of political discourse and the prevalence of political violence.^[17] For instance, Rachel Kleinfeld, an expert on the rule of law and post-conflict governance, writes that political violence is extremely calculated and, while it may appear "spontaneous," it is the culmination of years of "discrimination and social segregation." Part of the problem lies in partisan politics, as partisanship in the political arena fosters partisan violence. In return, this increases polarization within the public, resulting in a public that ends up justifying political violence.^[110] Politicians may use political polarization as a weapon to further push existing institutions, which may also foster political violence. When applied to the United States, the current polarized climate may create conditions that can lead political violence within the country, unless there is meaningful reform.^[110] In fact, data shows that within three years, both Democrats and Republicans increasingly agree that political violence is at least "a little" justified as long as their party's political agenda is advanced. In 2017, only 8% of both Democrats and Republicans justified the use of political violence, but as of September 2020, that number jumped to 33% and 36%, respectively.^[111]

Trust in science

The General Social Survey periodically asks Americans whether they trust scientists. The proportion of American conservatives who say they place "a great deal of trust" in scientists fell from 48% in 1974 to 35% in 2010^[112] and rose again to 39% in 2018.^[113] Instead, liberals and independents report different levels of trust in science. The COVID-19 pandemic brought these differences front and center, with partisanship often being an indicator of how a citizen saw the gravity of the crisis. In the early stages of the pandemic, Republican governors often went against the advice of infectious disease experts while most of their Democratic counterparts translated the advice into policies such as stay at home orders.^[114]

Similar to other polarizing topics in the United States, a person's attitude towards COVID-19 became a matter of political identity. While the crisis had very little precedent in U.S. history, reactions from both liberals and conservatives stemmed from long-held messaging cues among their parties. Conservatives responded to the anti-elite, states' rights, and small government messaging cues surrounding the virus. This then translated into avid hostility towards any measure that limited a person's autonomy (mask requirements, schools closing, lockdowns, vaccine mandates, etc.). Meanwhile, liberals' attitude towards science made them more likely to follow the guidance from institutions like the CDC and well-known medical experts, such as Dr. Anthony Fauci.^[115]

Congress

Political polarization among elites is negatively correlated with legislative efficiency, which is defined by the total number of laws passed, as well as the number of "major enactments" and "key votes".^[116] Evidence suggests that political polarization of elites may more strongly affect efficiency than polarization of Congress itself, with authors hypothesizing that the personal relationships among members of Congress may enable them to reach compromises on contentiously advocated legislation, though not if elites allow no leeway for such.^[17]

Negative effects of polarization on the United States Congress include increased gridlock and partisanship at the cost of quality and quantity of passed legislation.^{[117][118][119]} It also incentivizes stall tactics and closed rules, such as filibusters and excluding minority party members from committee deliberations.^{[33][116][120]} These strategies hamper transparency, oversight, and the government's ability to handle long-term domestic issues, especially those regarding the distribution of benefits.^[117] Further, they foster animosity, as majority parties lose bipartisan and legislative coordination trying to expedite legislation to overcome them.^[33][119]

Some scholars claim that political polarization is not so pervasive or destructive in influence, contending that partisan agreement is the historical trend in Congress and still frequent in the modern era, including on bills of political importance.^[121][122] Some studies have found approximately 80% of House bills passed in the modern era to have had support from both parties.^[121]

The public

Opinions on polarization's effects on the public are mixed. Some argue that the growing polarization in government has directly contributed to political polarization in the electorate,^[123] but this is not unanimous.^[121][124]

Some scholars argue that polarization lowers public interest in politics, party identification and voter turnout.^[123] It encourages confrontational dynamics between parties that can lower overall public trust and approval in government.,^[125] and causes the public to perceive the general political debate as less civil,^[123][117] which can alienate voters. More polarized candidates, especially when voters aren't aware of the increase, also tend to be less representative of the public's wishes.^{[123][117][125]}

On the other hand, others assert that elite polarization has galvanized the public's political participation in the United States, citing greater voting and nonvoting participation, engagement and investment in campaigns, and increased positive attitude toward government responsiveness.^[125][126] Polarized parties become more ideologically unified, furthering voter knowledge about their positions and increasing their standard to similarly aligned voters.^[123][126]

Affective polarization has risen in the US, with members of the public likely to say that supporters of the other major political party are hypocritical, closed-minded, and selfish. Based on survey results by the

As Mann and Ornstein argue, political polarization and the proliferation of media sources have "reinforce[d] tribal divisions, while enhancing a climate where facts are no longer driving the debate and deliberation, nor are they shared by the larger public."^[33] As other scholars have argued, the media often support and provoke the stall and closed rules tactics that disrupt regular policy procedure.^[33][128]

Media can give the illusion that the electorate is more polarized than it truly is, pushing each end farther from the middle.^[129] The digital environment allows for the customization of information, with individuals never seemingly being exposed to opposing viewpoints. There is a long-standing belief that exposure to both sides of an argument will moderate political attitudes, and there is empirical evidence that voters often do self-moderate, saying that internet users do also search for news in the opposing viewpoint.^[130]

The increased use of social media since 2008 has encouraged those who normally did not consume news coverage to now encounter headlines on their newsfeeds on a regular basis.^[131] The media has become more skilled about framing news stories to create the greatest outrage, regardless of their spot on the political spectrum. With the prevalence of "fake news", voters are more apt to cherry-pick between news sources as mistrust in the mainstream media rises. This mistrust stems from a number of factors. Some of which include, political micro-targeting, bots, trolls, and digital algorithms- research has only just begun to name all of the factors at play. Allowing these perpetrators of political polarization to stand in the way of democracy is the biggest hindrance to healthy party disagreement.^[132]

A concern with the increasing trend of political polarization is the social stigma stemming from either side towards their perceived opposition. It contributes to the chronic lack of compromise and uncivilized discourse leading to both extremism and policy stalemates. The media takes advantage of such discord and shares anecdotal headlines meant to stoke the flames of polarization, rather than sharing generalized and subsequently tamer broad statistics.^[129]

While the media are not immune to general public opinion and reduced polarization allows them to appeal to a larger audience,^[133] polarized environments make it easier for the media and interest groups to hold elected officials more accountable for their policy promises and positions,^[116][128] which is generally healthy for democracy.^[116]

Trust in the democratic process

The issue of political polarization in the US has also had noticeable effects on how citizens view the democratic process. In both of the two last presidential elections, a large segment of voters among the losing party raised concerns about the fairness of the election. When

Political scientists argue that in highly polarized periods, nominees become less reflective of the moderate voter as "polarization impacts the appointment and ideological tenor of new federal judges."[120] It also influences the politics of senatorial advice and consent, giving partisan presidents the power to appoint judges far to the left or right of center on the federal bench, obstructing the legitimacy of the judicial branch.^[137][120]

Ultimately, the increasing presence of ideology in a judicial system impacts the judiciary's credibility.^[116] Polarization can generate strong partisan critiques of federal judges, which can damage the public perception of the justice system and the legitimacy of the courts as nonpartisan legal arbiters.^[120][138]

Foreign policy

Political polarization can undercut unified agreement on foreign policy and harm a nation's international standing;^[116][139] divisiveness on foreign affairs strengthens enemies, discourages allies, and destabilizes a nation's determination.^[116]

Political scientists point to two primary implications of polarization with regards to the foreign policy of the United States. First, when the United States conducts relations abroad and appears divided, allies are less likely to trust its promises, enemies are more likely to predict its weaknesses, and uncertainty as to the country's position in world affairs rises.^{[139][140][141]} Second, elite opinion has a significant impact on the public's perception and understanding of foreign policy,^[140] a field where Americans have less prior knowledge to rely on.^{[139][140][142]}

Democratic backsliding

A 2021 study in Public Opinion Quarterly found evidence that polarization contributed to reductions in support for democratic norms.^[143]

In a 2021 report Freedom House said that political polarization was a cause of democratic backsliding in the U.S. since political polarization undermines the "idea of a common national identity" and impedes solutions to governance problems. Gerrymandering was singled out as a cause for this since it creates safe seats for one party that can lead it to become more radical so its candidates can win their primary elections.^[144]

Proposed solutions

As polarization creates a less than ideal political climate, scholars have proposed multiple solutions to fix or mitigate the effects of the political polarization in the United States. The country is more politically divided now than it has been in the past twenty years. Not only is there less collaboration and mutual understanding between Democrats and Republicans, but members of both political parties increasingly view each other in an extremely negative way.^[145] As a result, partisan politics has begun to shape the relationships individuals have with others, with 50% of Republicans and 35% of Democrats likely to surround themselves with friends who share similar political views. Towards the respective ends of the political spectrum, nearly two-thirds (63%) of consistent conservatives and about half (49%) of consistent liberals say most of their close friends share their political views.^[145] Additionally, increased animosity and distrust among American politicians and citizens can be attributed to the increased skepticism of American institutions, which is a problem that is extremely catalyzed by political polarization and may lead to democratic backsliding.^[146]

Voting process reform

Various changes to voting procedures have been proposed to reduce political polarization. Two proposed reforms would potentially move the U.S. from a two-party system to a multi-party system. A form of proportional representation would divide Congressional seats based on the percentage of people who voted for a specific political party. For instance, if Democrats won 20% of the vote, they would receive roughly 20% of the Congressional seats.^[147][148] Advocates of instant-runoff voting (or its multi-member equivalent, single transferable vote) say it encourages more moderation in political campaigns by allowing candidates to argue they should be the second choice for supporters of an opponent. It could potentially be used to replace the Electoral College with a less partisan popular vote. IRV also makes third parties more viable because it removes the spoiler effect.^[148]

Elaine Kamarck of the Brookings Institution suggest ways to work within the two-party system, such as taking measures to increase voter turnout to elect more moderate representatives in Congress.^[149] She reasons that abolishing closed primaries may invite independents or individuals from the opposing political party to vote for a representative other than their registered party's candidate. In doing so, the strict ideological divides may subside, allowing for more moderate representatives to be elected. Thus, as a result there would be an increasing ideological overlap in Congress and less polarization.^[150] Kamarck also proposes instituting a nationwide voting process like "California's top-two method," where there is only one general election for all political parties, and the top two candidates advance into the general election. Once again, this process is meant to elect more moderates into government, but there is no evidence that this has happened.^[150]

Advocates for setting fixed terms for selection of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States argue it will reduce the partisanship of confirmation battles if both major parties are satisfied they will have the chance to make a certain number of appointments.^[71]

Intergroup contact

Shifting to a more societal-based solution, social psychologists state that more social contact with those holding opposing political views may help mitigate political polarization.

A third solution recognizes that American society, history, and political thought are more complex than what can be conveyed by only two partisan positions. Joel Garreau's The Nine Nations of North America, first published in 1981, was an early attempt to analyse such multiple positions. Colin Woodard revisited Garreau's theories in his 2011 book American Nations. Frank Bruni wrote that America was emerging from the 2016 election with four political parties: Paul Ryan Republicans, a Freedom Caucus, establishment Democrats, and an Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders party.^[153] Similarly, David Brooks in 2016 identified four political parties: Trump's populist nationalism, a libertarian Freedom Caucus, a Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren progressive party, and a Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi Democratic establishment party.^[154]

In Talking Sense about Politics: How to Overcome Political Polarization in Your Next Conversation, Jack Meacham argues that four fundamental, impartial perspectives have powered our economic and social progress and enabled Americans to better understand themselves and others. People holding the first of these four perspectives, the loyal perspective, aim to compete, be in charge, and win. The aim of people holding the second perspective, tactful, is to negotiate and get along with others. The third perspective, detached, is represented by people who want to disengage from others and work things out for themselves. People who reflect the fourth perspective, caring, aim to cooperate with and look out for others.^[155]

George Packer, in Last Best Hope: America in Crisis and Renewal, also argues that America can best be understood not as two polarities but instead as four American narratives:

• Free America, focuses on personal freedom, consumer capitalism, and hostility to government.
• The smart America narrative includes professionals who value novelty and diversity, embrace meritocracy, and welcome globalization.
• The real America narrative includes the working class—anti-intellectual, nationalist, religious, and white supremacist.
• And the just America narrative includes educated younger people for whom American institutions are unjust, corrupt, and fail to address issues of environment, race, and gender.^[156][157]

There are eight social classes in America, according to David Brooks.

• The four classes of a red hierarchy include (1) corporate executives and entrepreneurs; (2) large property-owning families; (3) middle managers and small-business owners; and (4) the rural working class.
• The four classes of a blue hierarchy include (5) tech and media executives, (6) foundation heads and highly successful doctors and lawyers; (7) a creative class of scientists, engineers, lawyers, professors, doctors, and other professionals; a younger educated elite with growing cultural power; and (8) low-paid members of the service sector.^[158]

The Pew Research Center's political typology, based on a survey of 10,221 adults in July 2021, includes nine groups. There are substantial divisions within both the Democratic and Republican parties.

• The Democrats include (a) progressive left, (b) establishment liberals, (c) democratic mainstays, and (d) outsider left.
• The Republicans include (e) faith and flag conservatives, (f) committed conservatives, (g) populist right, and (h) ambivalent right.
• Stressed sideliner is a ninth group with no partisan leaning.

Outsider left, ambivalent right, and stressed sideliners have low interest in politics and low rates of voting.^[159]

Accommodation

Some commentators propose accommodating partisan differences by taking advantage of federalism and moving more authority away from the federal government and into state and local governments.^[28] Ezra Klein proposes that having clear differences between the two main parties gives voters a better choice than having two political parties that have mostly the same views. But he suggests reducing the negative consequences of partisanship by eliminating "ticking time bombs" like fights over raising the federal debt ceiling.^[160]

Secession along party lines

Various editorials^[161][162] have proposed that states of the U.S. secede and then form federations only with states that have voted for the same political party. These editorials note the increasingly polarized political strife in the U.S. between Republican voters and Democratic voters. They propose partition of the U.S. as a way of allowing both groups to achieve their policy goals while reducing the chances of civil war.^[163][164] Red states and blue states are states that typically vote for the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively.

A 2021 poll found that 52% of Trump voters and 41% of Biden voters support partitioning the United States into multiple countries based on political party lines.^[165][166] A different poll that same year grouped the United States into five geographic regions, and found that 37% of Americans favored secession of their own region. 44% of Americans in the South favored secession, with Republican support at 66%; while Democratic support was 47% in the Pacific states.^{[167][168][169]}

See also

• 2020s anti-LGBT movement in the United States
• Problem Solvers Caucus

References