Private defense agency
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A private defense agency (PDA) is a theoretical enterprise which would provide personal protection and
A PDA is distinguished from a private contractor employed by a state which is usually subsidized. Instead, such agencies would in theory be financed primarily by competing insurance and security companies.
Theory
Accord to these authors, PDAs have different motives from existing
As a private firm offering individually determined defense, the PDA provides a model for how an entirely private defense would work in a free market.
Lack of monopoly power
Hans Hoppe believes that there is a contradiction in the beliefs of most philosophers and economists in reference to national defense. According to his argument, they generally hold that any monopoly is "bad" for consumers because, shielded from potential new entrants into his area of production, the price of his product X will be higher and its quality lower than otherwise. Yet he says that they simultaneously hold that security must be undertaken by the government, which is a territorial monopoly of law and order (the ultimate decision maker and enforcer). Hoppe holds that the two propositions are clearly incompatible.[9] In his essay The Production of Security, Molinari concluded:
If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this: That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible or intangible needs of the consumer, it is in the consumer's best interest that labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and of trade have as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price. And this: That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should always prevail over the interests of the producer. Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion: That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition. Whence it follows: That no government should have the right to prevent another government from going into competition with it, or to require consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this commodity.[10]
Aggression and abuses by private defense agencies
Randall G. Holcombe argues that "Firms might prey on their competitors' customers, as competing mafia groups do, to show those customers that their current protective firm is not doing the job and thus to induce them to switch protection firms. This action seems to be a profit-maximizing strategy; hence, protection firms that do not prey on noncustomers may not survive." Holcombe states that mafias offers protection for a fee, but it also uses its resources for predation; and thus profit-maximizing firms could be expected to employ them in the dual roles of protection and predation.[12] Peter Leeson and Edward Stringham rebut this argument by claiming that unless the firm were overwhelmingly more powerful than its prey, it could incur substantial costs and risks in attempting to extract wealth by force. They argue that the potential for even a small state to inflict losses on a larger state explains why violent confrontations between states are less common than between individuals in New York City's Central Park; in other words, it is not the size of the group in question that matters, since in either case being the aggressor is likely to bring about undesirable risks and diminution of resources.[13]
In The Market for Liberty, Linda and Morris Tannehill argue that a private defense agency would be unlikely to engage in aggression, as it would not only become a target of retaliatory force, but would become the subject of severe business ostracism. They suggest that honest and productive individuals would dissociate themselves from it, fearing that it might use its aggressive force against them in the event of a dispute; or that they might become accidental casualties when retaliatory force is used by one of its other victims; or that their own reputation would suffer due to their ties to it. Moreover, they say private defense agency's reputation would suffer and it would be regarded as a poor credit and insurance risk, the latter due to the high risk of claims resulting from its involvement in aggression. The employees and leaders of such an agency as well could face personal civil liability for their involvement, and the agency would not be shielded by sovereign immunity. High-quality employees would presumably be less willing to be involved with such an organization.[14]
They also argue that a defense company would be less likely to abuse its power and impose tyranny, noting that it "couldn't extract taxes from them, as a government does...A market relationship is a free relationship, and if a customer doesn't like a company's service or mistrusts its goals, he is free to take his business elsewhere, or to start his own competitive company, or to do without the service and just provide from himself...The objection that a tyrant might take over is actually a devastating argument against government."[15]
Rothbard makes a similar point, arguing, "Of course, some of the private defense agencies will become criminal, just as some people become criminal now. But the point is that in a stateless society there would be no regular, legalized channel for crime and aggression, no government apparatus the control of which provides a secure monopoly for invasion of person and property...To create such an instrument de novo is very difficult, and, indeed, almost impossible; historically, it took State rulers centuries to create a functioning State apparatus."[16]
Alexander Villacampa argued, "If Defense Agency A instead of invading a business decides to invade a more worthwhile target such as a gold warehouse they are left with a much more complicated problem. The gold warehouse is owned by an entrepreneur who has his own defense agency and the gold in the warehouse also have owners that have hired their own respective defense agencies. In essence, Defense Agency A will have to deal with the wrath of the warehouse owner, the warehouse owner's defense agency and the defense agencies of all the owners of the gold in that warehouse."[17][full citation needed]
Robert P. Murphy opines that given the privatization of other services in an anarcho-capitalist society, "We must consider that in such an environment, the law-abiding majority would have all sorts of mechanisms at their disposal, beyond physical confrontation. Once private judges had ruled against a particular rogue agency, the private banks could freeze its assets (up to the amount of fines levied by the arbitrators). In addition, the private utility companies could shut down electricity and water to the agency’s headquarters, in accordance with standard provisions in their contracts."[18]
The argument that customers will be able to hire a competing firm to protect them against a rogue defense agency has been critiqued by Jonathan Bond's essay, The Price of Private Law, which argues, "If two defense firms are engaged in a truly ‘local’ dispute, and the remaining firms are not convinced that either their own interests will be affected or that systemic destabilization will result if the conflict continues, then the costs of intervening and ending the inter-agency war could presumably bar such third parties from stepping into the crossfire." Bond also argues that some firms may not be concerned with the risk of alienating other clients, because their clientele may consist of a small number of, or even only one, enormous multinational corporations. Bond further argues that some PDAs may reduce their risk of retaliation by carrying out anonymous sabotage or terrorist attacks.[19]
Villacampa argues that consumers with large amounts of wealth would likely pay more for private defense, stating "There is no reason for someone void of valuable assets to hire a defense agency that is meant to protect assets other than oneself; but, in an involuntary government payment is demanded for the services regardless of whether they are use or not." He argues an alliance of aggressor private defense agencies would likely be unprofitable: "Chances are high that a mobilization of a mass army of defense agencies will cost more to each individual than his gain from gold, land, and such divided equally amongst themselves. If the region being attacked has large stashes of valuable goods, they will most likely have very effective defense agencies (stronger defense agencies for more valuable assets are logical) and thus the fight against the invading defense agencies will inflict more cost upon the invaders."[17]
Financing of private defense agencies
Defense is often viewed[
Sometimes arguments are made[
Private Dispute Resolution Organization
PDA's would be involved in private dispute resolution lawsuits and only use force to defend the winner of a case against the loser. At the most fundamental level their decisions would fully comply with the non-aggression principle (NAP) principle, physical causation and the principles of contract and tort law, but private contract law would provide for criminal and penal law constructions on top of that. The NAP forms a moral theory of law that combines physical causality theories, conflict resolution principles (including self-ownership and property) and contract theory to create a concept of causal moral accountability.
Historical examples
Some libertarians have presented historical examples of what they think were forms of private defense agencies.
Medieval Iceland
According to David D. Friedman, "Medieval Icelandic institutions have several peculiar and interesting characteristics; they might almost have been invented by a mad economist to test the lengths to which market systems could supplant government in its most fundamental functions."[27] While not directly labeling it anarcho-capitalist, he argues that the Icelandic Commonwealth between 930 and 1262 had "some features" of an anarcho-capitalist society – while there was a single legal system, enforcement of law was entirely private and highly capitalist; and so provides some evidence of how such a society would function. "Even where the Icelandic legal system recognized an essentially "public" offense, it dealt with it by giving some individual (in some cases chosen by lot from those affected) the right to pursue the case and collect the resulting fine, thus fitting it into an essentially private system."[27]
American Old West
According to the research of
The
land clubs and claim associations each adopted their own written contract setting out the laws that provided the means for defining and protecting property rights in the land. They established procedures for registration of land claims, as well as for protection of those claims against outsiders, and for adjudication of internal disputes that arose. The reciprocal arrangements for protection would be maintained only if a member complied with the association's rules and its court's rulings. Anyone who refused would be ostracized. Boycott by a land club meant that an individual had no protection against aggression other than what he could provide himself.[29]
According to Anderson, "Defining anarcho-capitalist to mean minimal government with property rights developed from the bottom up, the western frontier was anarcho-capitalistic. People on the frontier invented institutions that fit the resource constraints they faced."[30]
See also
- Insurance
- Libertarianism in the United States
- Mercenary
- Panarchism
- Pinkerton National Detective Agency
- Polycentric law
- Private governance
- Private military company
- Right-libertarianism
- Security guard
References
- ISBN 978-1498591188.
- ^ Tucker, Benjamin,The Relation of the State to the Individual, 1890
- Liberty.
- ^ The Mises Review (Vol. 10, No. 1; Spring 2004) A summary is given in a review by David Gordon [1].
- ^ Rothbard, Murray N. (January 1975). "Society without a State". The Libertarian Forum. 7 (1).
- ^ David Friedman, Police, Courts, and Laws---on the Market, David Friedman home page.
- Journal of Libertarian Studies.
- ^ John Frederic Kosanke, "Civilization 101 - Elements of Security"
- ISBN 0-945466-37-4.
- ^ "The Production of Security". Archived from the original on 2009-04-26. Retrieved 2014-09-13.
- ^ Cowen, Tyler. "Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy".
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(help) - ^ Holcombe, Randall G. "Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable".
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(help) - SSRN 1674461.
- ISBN 0-930073-08-8.
- ISBN 0-930073-08-8.
- ISBN 0-945466-30-7.
- ^ a b Villacampa, Alexander. "In a State of Anarchy". Grove City College.
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(help) - ^ "But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over?". 27 June 2005.
- ^ Bond, Jonathan C. (11 October 2004). "The Price of Private Law".
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help) - ISBN 0-945466-30-7.
- ISBN 0-945466-37-4.
- ISBN 0-930073-08-8.
- ^ "No Treason » 2001 » June". Archived from the original on 2008-05-22. Retrieved 2008-07-29.
- ISBN 0-945466-37-4.
- ISBN 0-945466-37-4.
- ISBN 0-945466-37-4.
- ^ a b Friedman, David D. (1979) Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case. Retrieved 12 August 2005.
- ^ Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, P. J. An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West, The Journal of Libertarian Studies
- ISBN 978-0-8147-1327-3.
- ^ Probasco, Christian (2008-06-18). "Grilling Terry L. Anderson, Free-Market Environmentalist". New West.
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External links
- Police, Courts, and Law - On the Market - Chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom by David D. Friedman
- Las Portadas (underwriting, arbitration, and government interface)
- Restitution Transfer and Recoupment
- Stateless Defense
- Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia
- Human Rights First; Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity (2008)
- Is Government Inevitable? Comment on Holcombe's Analysis