Project E
Project E | |
---|---|
Type of project | Deployment of nuclear weapons |
Country | United States United Kingdom |
Established | 1957 |
Disestablished | 1992 |
Project E was a joint project between the United States and the United Kingdom during the
The British nuclear weapons project,
The first bombers equipped with Project E weapons were
Project E nuclear warheads were used on the sixty
Background
During the early part of the
The British government considered nuclear technology to be a joint discovery, and trusted that America would continue to share it.
In 1949, the Americans offered to make atomic bombs in the US available for Britain to use if the British agreed to curtail their atomic bomb programme.
Negotiation
The first British atomic bomb was successfully tested in
Once production of V-bombers began in earnest, their numbers soon exceeded that of the available atomic bombs. Production of atomic bombs was slow, and Britain had only ten on hand in 1955, and fourteen in 1956. At this rate, there would not be sufficient bombs to arm all the V-bombers until 1961.[23] At the three-power Bermuda Conference with President Dwight D. Eisenhower in December 1953, Churchill suggested that the US allow Britain access to American nuclear weapons to make up the shortfall.[24] There were several technical and legal issues. For American bombs to be carried in British aircraft, the US would have to disclose weights and dimensions, while their delivery would require data concerning their ballistics. The release of such information was restricted by the McMahon Act. There would also be issues of custody, security and targeting.[25]
In May 1954, the
In the lead-up to Churchill's next meeting with Eisenhower in June 1954, the President's assistant for atomic energy,
Dickson visited the US for talks with Twining in September 1955.
In a letter to Macmillan on 25 March 1957, Eisenhower stated:
The United States Government welcomes the agreement to coordinate the strike plans of the United States and United Kingdom bomber forces, and to store United States nuclear weapons on RAF airfields under United States custody for release subject to decision by the President in an emergency. We understand that for the present at least these weapons will be in the kiloton range. The United Kingdom forces could obviously play a much more effective part in joint strikes if the United States weapons made available to them in emergency were in the megaton range, and it is suggested that this possibility might be examined at the appropriate time."[36]
Implementation
Tactical bombers
It fell to the commander of the UK-based US
Four squadrons of Canberras were based in Germany, their Mark 7 bombs being stored at
Strategic bombers
Project E modifications to Valiants commenced at
Under the Project E Memorandum of Understanding, US personnel had custody of the weapons. That meant they performed all the tasks related to their storage, maintenance and readiness. The bombs were kept in secure storage areas (SSAs) on the same bases as the bombers. British staff were not permitted to enter the SSAs; it was therefore impossible to store British and Americans bombs in the same SSA. Bomber Command designated RAF Marham, RAF Waddington and RAF Honington as bases with US SSAs. Another three sites had British SSAs.[48] US custody created operational problems. The procedure for handing over the bombs added an extra ten minutes to the bombers' reaction time,[49] and the requirement that US personnel had guardianship of the weapons at all times meant that neither they nor the bombers could be relocated to dispersal airfields as the RAF desired.[50]
Initially, 72
The Air Council decided on 7 July 1960 that Project E weapons would be phased out by December 1962, by which time it was anticipated that there would be sufficient British megaton weapons to equip the entire strategic bomber force.[57] Project E weapons were replaced by British Yellow Sun bombs at RAF Honington on 1 July 1961 and Waddington on 30 March 1962.[58] Problems encountered in the development of Red Beard meant that the replacement of kiloton weapons took longer.[54] The UK-based Valiants at Honington and Wittering were withdrawn in April and October 1962,[59] and the last Valiants were retired from the V-bomber force in July 1965.[60] The final practice loading at RAF Marham—with the Mark 43s—was in January 1965, and the last US personnel left the base in July.[61]
British Army of the Rhine
Project E was expanded to encompass similar arrangements for providing nuclear weapons to the
The Corporal had several limitations. It was liquid-fuelled, and the
As an interim measure, the US offered the
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
In 1953, the US Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, raised the possibility of a joint
The RAF activated 20 squadrons between September 1958 and December 1959 to operate the 120 Thor missiles. They were located at 20 old wartime airfields so that the government did not have to purchase new land.
Project N
A maritime version of Project E was created, known as Project N. Providing American atomic bombs for Royal Navy ships would have involved similar dual key arrangements and detachments of
Impact on British nuclear weapon development
As well as meeting the needs of the UK forces, Project E affected the design and development of British nuclear weapons. Interim designs like Violet Club were no longer required, as Project E weapons could do the job pending the development of a British weapon. The British designers were particularly impressed by the Mark 28, which was not only lighter than the British Green Grass warhead used in Yellow Sun, but considerably more economical in its use of expensive fissile material. An Anglicised version of the Mark 28 was developed, known as Red Snow, and a Yellow Sun Mark 2 using Red Snow cost £500,000 compared with £1,200,000 for the Mark 1 with Green Grass.[89]
End of Project E
When the
Notes
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 108–111.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 277.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 340–342.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 236–242.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 372.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 372–373.
- ^ Goldberg 1964, p. 410.
- ^ Paul 2000, pp. 80–83.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 106–108.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 181–184.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 23–24, 48, 57.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 307–308.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, p. 310.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 281–283.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, p. 220.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, p. 309.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 312–314.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 493–495.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 92.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Baylis 1995, p. 180.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 55–56.
- ^ Young 2016, p. 201.
- ^ a b Paul 2000, pp. 200–201.
- ^ Young 2016, pp. 200–201.
- ^ Young 2016, pp. 201–203.
- ^ Young 2016, pp. 203–204.
- ^ Botti 1987, pp. 147–149.
- ^ a b c Young 2016, pp. 204–205.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 253.
- ^ a b c Moore 2010, p. 114.
- ^ a b c Wynn 1997, pp. 254–256.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 258.
- ^ Baylis 1995, p. 258.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 259.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 258–259.
- ^ a b Young 2016, pp. 207–211.
- ^ "Lieutenant General Roscoe C. Wilson". United States Air Force. Retrieved 4 March 2017.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, pp. 98–99.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, p. 215.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 363.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 371–372.
- ^ a b Norris, Burrows & Fieldhouse 1994, p. 151.
- ^ Norris, Burrows & Fieldhouse 1994, pp. 155–156.
- ^ a b c Young 2016, p. 212.
- ^ Bronk 2014, p. 980.
- ^ Darling 2012, p. 50.
- ^ Bronk 2014, pp. 978–980.
- ^ Bronk 2014, p. 985.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 262–263.
- ^ a b Wynn 1997, pp. 264–265.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 114, 256.
- ^ a b c d Young 2016, pp. 213–214.
- ^ a b Bronk 2014, p. 994.
- ^ Baylis 1995, p. 275.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 266–267.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 114, 210.
- ^ Moore 2010, p. 214.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 494–500.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 269.
- ^ Moore, Richard (March 2004). "The Real Meaning of the Words: a Pedantic Glossary of British Nuclear Weapons" (PDF). Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton. Retrieved 14 February 2016.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 56–57.
- ^ MacDonald 2006, pp. 59–60.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, p. 130.
- ^ a b c Stoddart 2012, pp. 108–109.
- ^ a b c d e Stoddart 2012, p. 313.
- ^ a b c d Moore 2010, pp. 132–133.
- ^ "47th Regiment RA". British Army units from 1945 on. Retrieved 5 March 2017.
- ^ "27th Regiment RA". British Army units from 1945 on. Retrieved 5 March 2017.
- ^ Stoddart 2012, pp. 110–112.
- Flight. 8 November 1962. p. 751.
- Flight. pp. 1192–1195.
- ^ Boyes 2015, pp. 34–37.
- ^ Boyes 2015, p. 40.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 287.
- ^ Young 2016, p. 98.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 340.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, p. 99.
- ^ Boyes 2015, p. 77.
- ^ Boyes 2015, p. 117.
- ^ Wynn 1997, pp. 357–358.
- ^ Wynn 1997, p. 362.
- ^ Boyes 2015, pp. 152–153.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 221–222.
- ^ Stoddart 2012, pp. 220, 314.
- ^ Norris, Burrows & Fieldhouse 1994, p. 85.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 104–105.
- ^ Ritchie 2014, pp. 14–16.
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- OCLC 637004643. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
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