Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau

Naval Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau
Part of World War I
British ships seen following the German ships
Date 4 – 10 August 1914 Location Mediterranean Sea Result German victory Successful German retreat to Constantinople
Belligerents
United Kingdom  France	German Empire
Commanders and leaders
Berkeley Milne Ernest Troubridge A. B. de Lapeyrère	Wilhelm Souchon
Strength
3 armoured cruisers 4 light cruisers 14 destroyers	1 battlecruiser 1 light cruiser
Casualties and losses
none	4 sailors[1]

The pursuit of Goeben and Breslau was a naval action that occurred in the

Though a bloodless "battle," the failure of the British pursuit had enormous political and military ramifications. In the short term it effectively ended the careers of the two British admirals who had been in charge of the pursuit. Writing several years later, Winston Churchill—who had been First Lord of the Admiralty—expressed the opinion that by forcing Turkey into the war, Goeben had brought "more slaughter, more misery, and more ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship."^[2]

Prelude

Dispatched in 1912, the Mittelmeerdivision of the

Meanwhile, on 30 July

Milne's instructions were "to aid the French in the transportation of their African Army by covering, and if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly Goeben, who may interfere in that action. You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French Admiral. Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle. The speed of your squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. We shall hope to reinforce the Mediterranean, and you must husband your forces at the outset."[3] Churchill's orders did not explicitly state what he meant by "superior forces." He later claimed that he was referring to "the Austrian Fleet against whose battleships it was not desirable that our three battle-cruisers should be engaged without battleship support."^[4]

Milne assembled his force at Malta on 1 August. On 2 August, he received instructions to shadow Goeben with two battlecruisers while maintaining a watch on the Adriatic, ready for a

First contact

Without specific orders, Souchon had decided to position his ships off the coast of

At 09:30 on 4 August Souchon made contact with the two British battlecruisers, Indomitable and Indefatigable, which passed the German ships in the opposite direction. Neither force engaged as, unlike France, Britain had not yet declared war with Germany (the declaration would not be made until later that day, following the start of the German invasion of neutral Belgium). The British started shadowing Goeben and Breslau but were quickly outpaced by the Germans. Milne reported the contact and position, but neglected to inform the Admiralty that the German ships were heading east. Churchill therefore, still expecting them to threaten the French transports, authorised Milne to engage the German ships if they attacked. However, a meeting of the British Cabinet decided that hostilities could not start before a declaration of war, and at 14:00 Churchill was obliged to cancel his attack order.^[7]

Pursuit

The rated speed of Goeben was 27

The Admiralty ordered Milne to respect Italian neutrality and stay outside a 6-nautical-mile (11 km; 6.9 mi) limit from the Italian coast—which precluded entrance into the passage of the Straits of Messina. Consequently, Milne posted guards on the exits from the Straits. Still expecting Souchon to head for the transports and the Atlantic, he placed two battlecruisers—Inflexible and Indefatigable—to cover the northern exit (which gave access to the western Mediterranean), while the southern exit of the Straits was covered by a single light cruiser, HMS Gloucester. Milne sent Indomitable west to coal at Bizerte, instead of south to Malta.^[8]

For Souchon, Messina was no haven. The Italian authorities insisted that he depart within 24 hours and delayed supplying coal. Provisioning his ships required ripping up the decks of German merchant steamers in harbour and manually shovelling their coal into his bunkers. By the evening of 6 August, despite the help of 400 volunteers from the merchantmen, he had only taken on 1,500 short tons (1,400 t) which was insufficient to reach Constantinople. Further messages from Tirpitz made his predicament even more dire. He was informed that Austria would provide no naval aid in the Mediterranean and that the Ottoman Empire was still neutral and therefore he should no longer make for Constantinople. Faced with the alternative of seeking refuge at Pola, and probably remaining trapped for the rest of the war, Souchon chose to head for Constantinople anyway, his purpose being "to force the Ottoman Empire, even against their will, to spread the war to the Black Sea against their ancient enemy, Russia."^[8]

Milne was instructed on 5 August to continue watching the Adriatic for signs of the Austrian fleet and to prevent the German ships joining them. He chose to keep his battlecruisers in the west, dispatching Dublin to join Troubridge's cruiser squadron in the Adriatic, which he believed would be able to intercept Goeben and Breslau. Troubridge was instructed "not to get seriously engaged with superior forces," once again intended as a warning against engaging the Austrian fleet. When Goeben and Breslau emerged into the eastern Mediterranean on 6 August, they were met by Gloucester, which, being outgunned, began to shadow the German ships.^[9]

Troubridge's squadron consisted of the armoured cruisers HMS Defence, Black Prince, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and eight destroyers armed with torpedoes. The cruisers had 9.2 in (230 mm) guns versus the 11 in (280 mm) guns of Goeben and had armour a maximum of 6 in (15 cm) thick compared to the battlecruiser's 11 in (28 cm) armour belt. This meant that Troubridge's squadron was not only outranged and vulnerable to Goeben′s powerful guns, but it was unlikely that his cruiser's guns could seriously damage the German ship at all, even at short range.^[10] In addition, the British ships were several knots slower than Goeben, despite her damaged boilers,^[11] meaning that she could dictate the range of the battle if she spotted the British squadron in advance. Consequently, Troubridge considered his only chance was to locate and engage Goeben in favourable light, at dawn, with Goeben east of his ships, and ideally launch a torpedo attack with his destroyers; however, at least five of the destroyers did not have enough coal to keep up with the cruisers steaming at full speed. By 04:00 on 7 August, Troubridge realised he would not be able to intercept the German ships before daylight and after some deliberation he signalled Milne with his intentions to break off the chase, mindful of Churchill's ambiguous order to avoid engaging a "superior force." No reply was received until 10:00, by which time he had withdrawn to Zante to refuel.^[12]

Escape

Milne ordered Gloucester to disengage, still expecting Souchon to turn west, but it was apparent to Gloucester′s captain that Goeben was fleeing. Breslau attempted to harass Gloucester into breaking off—Souchon had a

Shortly after midnight on 8 August Milne took his three battlecruisers and the light cruiser HMS Weymouth east. At 14:00 he received an incorrect signal from the Admiralty stating that Britain was at war with Austria; war would not be declared until 12 August and the order was countermanded four hours later, but Milne chose to guard the Adriatic rather than seek Goeben. Finally, on 9 August, Milne was given clear orders to "chase Goeben which had passed Cape Matapan on the 7th steering north-east." Milne still did not believe that Souchon was heading for the Dardanelles, and so he resolved to guard the exit from the Aegean, unaware that Goeben did not intend to come out.

Souchon had replenished his coal off the Aegean island of

Turkey was still a neutral country bound by treaty to prevent German warships from passing the straits. To get around this difficulty it was agreed that the ships should become part of the Turkish navy. On 16 August, having reached Constantinople, Goeben and Breslau were transferred to the Turkish Navy in a small ceremony, becoming respectively Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli, though they retained their German crews with Souchon still in command. The initial reaction in Britain was one of satisfaction, that a threat had been removed from the Mediterranean. On 23 September, Souchon was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman Navy.[13]

Consequences

In August, Germany—still expecting a swift victory—was content for the Ottoman Empire to remain neutral. The mere presence of a powerful warship like Goeben in the Sea of Marmara would be enough to occupy a British naval squadron guarding the Dardanelles. However, following German reverses at the First Battle of the Marne in September, and with Russian successes against Austria-Hungary, Germany began to regard the Ottoman Empire as a useful ally. Tensions began to escalate when the Ottoman Empire closed the Dardanelles to all shipping on 27 September, blocking Russia's exit from the Black Sea—that accounted for over 90 percent of Russia's import and export traffic.

Germany's gift of the two modern warships had an enormous positive impact on the Turkish population. At the outbreak of the war, Churchill had caused outrage when he "requisitioned" two almost completed Turkish battleships in British shipyards, Sultan Osman I and Reshadieh, which had been financed by public subscription at a cost of £6,000,000. Turkey was offered compensation of £1,000 per day for so long as the war might last, provided she remained neutral. (These ships were commissioned into the Royal Navy as HMS Agincourt and HMS Erin respectively.) The Turks had been neutral, though the navy had been pro-British (having purchased 40 warships from British shipyards) while the army was in favour of Germany, so the two incidents helped resolve the deadlock and the Ottoman Empire would join the Central Powers.^[14]

Ottoman engagement

Continued diplomacy from France and Russia attempted to keep the Ottoman Empire out of the war, but Germany was agitating for a commitment. In the aftermath of Souchon's daring dash to Constantinople, on 15 August 1914 the Ottomans canceled their maritime agreement with Britain and the Royal Navy mission under Admiral Limpus left by 15 September.

Finally, on 29 October, the point of no return was reached when Admiral Souchon took Goeben, Breslau and a squadron of Turkish warships and launched the

While the consequences of the Royal Navy's failure to intercept Goeben and Breslau had not been immediately apparent, the humiliation of the "defeat" resulted in Admirals de Lapeyrère, Milne and Troubridge being censured. Milne was recalled from the Mediterranean and did not hold another command until retirement at his own request in 1919, his planned assumption of the Nore command having been cancelled in 1916 due to "other exigencies." The Admiralty repeatedly stated that Milne had been exonerated of all blame.[15] For his failure to engage Goeben with his cruisers, Troubridge was court-martialled in November on the charge that "he did forbear to chase His Imperial German Majesty's ship Goeben, being an enemy then flying." The charge was not proved on the grounds that he was under orders not to engage a "superior force." However, he was never given another sea-going command but did valuable service, co-operating with the Serbs on the Balkan and being given command of a force on the Danube in 1915 against the Austro-Hungarians. He eventually retired as a full Admiral.^[16]

Long-term consequences

Although a relatively minor 'action' and perhaps not widely known historical event, the escape of Goeben to Constantinople and its eventual annexation to Turkey ultimately precipitated some of the most dramatic naval chases of the 20th century. It also assisted in helping to shape the eventual splitting up of the Ottoman Empire into the many states we know today.

General Ludendorff stated in his memoirs that he believed the entry of the Turks into the war allowed the outnumbered Central Powers to fight on for two years longer than they would have been able on their own, a view shared by historian Ian F.W. Beckett.^[17]

The war was extended to the

In allying with the Central Powers, Turkey shared their fate in ultimate defeat. This gave the allies the opportunity to carve up the collapsed Ottoman Empire to suit their political whims. Many new nations were created including Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Notes