Reinsurance Treaty

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The Reinsurance Treaty was a diplomatic agreement between the

St. Petersburg. The treaty played a critical role in German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck
's network of alliances and agreements, which aimed to keep the peace in Europe as well as maintaining Germany's economic, diplomatic and political dominance. It helped calm tensions between both Russia and Germany.

The treaty provided that both parties would remain neutral if the other became involved in a war with a third

First World War.[1]

Background

The Reinsurance Treaty originated after the German-Austrian-Russian Dreikaiserbund (

Turkish Straits from the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck strongly supported the idea, but Alexander III rejected the plan until Foreign Minister Nikolay Girs convinced him that it would be best for Russia in the absence of French friendship. Bismarck refused Russia's request for Germany to stay neutral if Russia went to war against Austria citing that Berlin was in the Triple Alliance with Vienna.[2]

Bismarck had a long-term policy of preserving the peace in

Mediterranean and diplomatic tensions with Vienna
.

The treaty signed by Bismarck and Russian Foreign Minister Nikolay Girs contained two separate agreements:

  1. Germany and Russia agreed to observe benevolent neutrality if either become involved in a war with a third country. If Germany attacked France or if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary, that provision would not apply. In those cases, the distinguished bilateral alliances could come into effect. The Reinsurance Treaty applied only if France or Austria–Hungary were the aggressors.
  2. Germany would declare neutrality if Russia intervened against the Ottoman control of the
    Bosphorus and the Dardanelles
    .

Non-renewal

As part of Bismarck's system of "periphery diversion", the treaty was highly dependent on his prestige.[citation needed] After Kaiser Wilhelm II had removed Bismarck from office in 1890, Russia asked for a renewal of the treaty, but Germany refused. Bismarck's successor, Leo von Caprivi, felt no need to mollify Russia. A main advocate of the non-renewal of the treaty was Count von Berchem, undersecretary at the Foreign Office. During the lead up to the non-renewal of the treaty, Count von Berchem created a memorandum describing why the treaty was unfavorable for Germany and introduced reasons as to why it should not be renewed. The memorandum was given to Chancellor von Caprivi on March 25 and was filed by the Chancellor on March 28 showing its influence over Chancellor von Caprivi.[3] The German foreign policy establishment was unanimous in rejecting a renewal because the treaty contradicted so many other German positions with regard to Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, Romania and Italy. For example, the Reinsurance Treaty contradicted the Austro-Romanian Treaty of 1883, in which Germany and Austria-Hungary promised to protect Romania; Russia knew nothing of that treaty.[4]

Kaiser

Anglo-Russian relations had long been strained by Russia's quest to take control of the Turkish Straits, which link the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Britain feared that Russian expansion to its south would threaten British colonial interests in the Middle East. In the creation of this treaty, Bismarck was aware of Russian desire to control Constantinople and wished to use to influence an Anglo-Russian conflict so that Germany may consolidate more power within Europe.[5] The non-renewal of the treaty pushed Russia away from Germany's alliance and created a need for Russia to have the military and economic security that came with such a strategic deal. France, desperate for an ally, offered financial help to rebuild the Russian economy and successfully developed the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, which ended French isolation. This was a policy that Bismarck utilized to his benefit as he desired to see France ostracized from the complex web of alliances within Europe.[5] The dismissal of Bismarck, the erratic temper of Wilhelm II, and the uncertain policies of the men who succeeded Bismarck were joint causes of the growing international instability.[6] The dismissal of Bismarck as chancellor as well as the non-renewal of the treaty represented a shift in foreign policy strategy for Germany. This is noteworthy because as stated by Peter R. Mansoor and William Murray, this non-renewal was an important feature of Wilhelmine Germany's foreign policy that revealed simplistic thinking in comparison to the foreign policy of Bismarck when he was chancellor.[7]

In 1896, the retired Bismarck caused a huge sensation by revealing the existence of the treaty to a German newspaper. He blamed his successor, Caprivi, as responsible for the non-renewal in 1890. Bismarck said that the failure of the treaty made it possible for France and Russia to draw together.[8]

Most historians, according to Norman Rich, agree that the Reinsurance Treaty itself was not of great importance while it was in operation, but the failure to renew it marked the decisive turning point of Russia's movement away from Germany and toward France; and so was one of the

Sidney Fay agrees that it was a turning point, but also argues that non-renewal was only one of several powerful factors pushing Russia and Germany apart. The German treaty with Britain in July 1890 made the Russians falsely suspect that Berlin was drawing closer to London. Pan-Slavism was growing in Russia, with a determination to dominate the Balkans. As a result, Russia and Austria-Hungary became increasingly alienated from each other, and Germany was forced to support its only true ally, Austria-Hungary. A third factor was the renewal of revanchism in France, which made the French much more eager to find an alliance with Russia, despite Russia's long opposition to republicanism.[10]

See also

References

  1. ^ George F. Kennan, "The Aftermath of the Reinsurance Treaty" in his The Decline of Bismarck's European Order (Princeton UP, 1981) pp. 343–358.
  2. ^ A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918. (1954) pp. 316–319.
  3. JSTOR 1838136
    .
  4. ^ Norman Rich, Great power diplomacy, 1814–1914 (1992) pp. 230, 252
  5. ^
    JSTOR 552495
    .
  6. ^ Bury, J. P. T. (1968). The New Cambridge Modern History: The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898–1945. Vol. XII (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 112.
  7. ISBN 978-1-316-48690-0
    , retrieved 2024-03-23
  8. ^ Jonathan Steinberg, Bismarck: a life (2012). pp. 460–462.
  9. ^ Rich, pp. 260–262, 317, 371.
  10. ^ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (1934), 1:90–97.

Further reading

  • Sempell, Charlotte. “The Constitutional and Political Problems of the Second Chancellor, Leo Von Caprivi.” Journal of Modern History 25#3 (1953), pp. 234–254 online.
  • Eyck, Erich. Bismarck and the German empire (1968) pp. 289–298.
  • Kennan, George Frost. The Decline of Bismarck's European Order (Princeton UP, 1981) pp. 462, 254–408 passim. online
  • Rich, Norman. Great power diplomacy, 1814–1914 (1992) pp. 244–262
  • Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918. (1954) pp. 316–319.
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