Roman withdrawal from Africa (255 BC)
Roman withdrawal from Africa, 255 BC | |||||||
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Part of the First Punic War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Carthage | Rome | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Unknown | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 384 warships and 300 cargo ships sunk and over 100,000 men lost in subsequent storm |
The Roman withdrawal from Africa was the attempt by the
The Romans had invaded the Carthaginian homeland (in what is now north eastern
The Romans landed in Aspis, sortied, dispersed the besiegers and raided the surrounding country for food. All then re-embarked and left for Italy. Off the south-east corner of Sicily, a sudden summer storm blew up and devastated the Roman fleet. From their total of 464 warships, 384 were sunk, as were 300 transports; and more than 100,000 men were lost. Despite the heavy losses of both sides, the war continued for a further 14 years, mostly on Sicily or the nearby waters, before ending with a Roman victory.
Primary sources
The main source for almost every aspect of the
Carthaginian written records
Other sources include inscriptions, archaeological evidence and empirical evidence from reconstructions such as the trireme Olympias.[18] Since 2010 a number of artefacts have been recovered from the site of the Battle of the Aegates, the final battle of the war, fought fourteen years later. Their analysis and the recovery of further items are ongoing.[19]
Background
Operations in Sicily
In 264 BC, the states of Carthage and Rome went to war, starting the First Punic War.[20] Carthage was a well-established maritime power in the western Mediterranean; mainland Italy south of the River Arno had recently been unified under Roman control. According to the classicist Richard Miles, Rome's expansionary attitude after southern Italy came under its control combined with Carthage's proprietary approach to Sicily caused the two powers to stumble into war more by accident than design.[21] The immediate cause of the war was the issue of control of the independent Sicilian city state of Messana (modern Messina).[22]
Ships
During this period the standard Mediterranean warship was the
Vessels were built as cataphract, or "protected", ships, with a closed
The Romans had little naval experience prior to the First Punic War; on the few occasions they had previously needed a naval presence they had usually relied on small
Getting the oarsmen to row as a unit, let alone to execute more complex battle manoeuvres, required long and arduous training.
Invasion of Africa
Largely because of the Romans' invention of the
The Roman fleet of 330 warships plus an unknown number of
As a result of the battle, the Roman army, commanded by Regulus, landed in Africa near Aspis (modern Kelibia)[56] and captured it.[57] Most of the Roman ships returned to Sicily, leaving Regulus with 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to continue the war in Africa. Regulus advanced on the city of Adys and besieged it.[57] The Carthaginians, meanwhile, had recalled Hamilcar from Sicily with 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Bostar were placed in joint command of an army which was strong in cavalry and elephants and was approximately the same size as the Romans'.[58] The Romans carried out a night march and launched a surprise dawn attack on the Carthaginian camp from two directions. After confused fighting, the Carthaginians broke and fled.[59]
Roman reversal and withdrawal
Battle of Tunis
The Romans followed up and captured Tunis, only 16 kilometres (10 mi) from Carthage. In despair, the Carthaginians
Battle of Cape Hermaeum
Later in 255 BC the Romans sent a fleet of 350 quinqueremes[note 5] and more than 300 transports to evacuate their survivors, who were under siege in Aspis. Both consuls for the year, Servius Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior and Marcus Aemilius Paullus, accompanied the fleet.[64][65][66] They captured the island of Cossyra en route.[67]
The Carthaginians attempted to oppose the evacuation with 200 quinqueremes. They intercepted the Romans off Cape Hermaeum (the modern Cape Bon or Ras ed-Dar), a little to the north of Aspis. The 40 Roman ships which had been left to support Regulus's force over the winter sortied from Aspis to join the fight. Few details of the battle have survived. The Carthaginians were concerned they would be encircled by the larger Roman fleet and so sailed close to the coast.[68] However, the Carthaginian ships were outmanoeuvred and pinned against the coast, where many were boarded via the corvus and captured, or forced to beach.[69][70] The Carthaginians were defeated and 114 of their ships were captured, together with their crews, and 16 sunk.[69] What, if any, the Roman losses were is not known; most modern historians assume there were none.[64][66] The historian Marc DeSantis suggests that a lack of soldiers serving as marines on the Carthaginian ships, compared with the Romans', may have been a factor in their defeat and in the large number of vessels captured.[71]
Storm off Camarina
The fleet docked at Aspis, where the Roman garrison – reinforced by the fleet's marines – sortied, dispersed the besiegers and raided the surrounding country for food. All then re-embarked and left for Italy.
Polybius is critical of what he considers the poor judgement and seamanship displayed immediately prior to the storm.[78][79] Both consuls survived and, despite the loss of most of their fleet, each was awarded a triumph in January 254 for their victory at Cape Hermaeum.[80][72] Scullard says this is a clear indication "the subsequent tragedy was regarded as due to natural causes rather than to bad seamanship".[72]
Aftermath
Paullus built a column at his own expense on the Capitoline Hill in Rome celebrating the victory.[80] In keeping with tradition[81] he adorned it with the prows of captured Carthaginian ships. The column was destroyed by lightning in 172 BC.[80]
The war continued, with neither side able to gain a decisive advantage.[82] The Romans rapidly rebuilt their fleet, adding 220 new ships, and captured Panormus (modern Palermo) in 254 BC.[83] The next year they lost 150 ships to another storm.[84] Slowly the Romans had occupied most of Sicily; in 249 BC they besieged the last two Carthaginian strongholds – in the extreme west.[85] They also launched a surprise attack on the Carthaginian fleet, but were defeated at the Battle of Drepana.[86] The Carthaginians followed up their victory and most of the remaining Roman warships were lost at the Battle of Phintias; the Romans were all but swept from the sea.[87] It was to be seven years before Rome again attempted to field a substantial fleet, while Carthage put most of its ships into reserve to save money and free up manpower.[88][89]
After several years of stalemate,
Notes, citations and sources
Notes
- ^ The term Punic comes from the Latin word Punicus (or Poenicus), meaning "Carthaginian", and is a reference to the Carthaginians' Phoenician ancestry.[2]
- ^ Sources other than Polybius are discussed by Bernard Mineo in "Principal Literary Sources for the Punic Wars (apart from Polybius)".[17]
- ^ He was known as Hanno the Great, the second (of three) Carthaginians named Hanno to be awarded that sobriquet.[50]
- ^ The modern historian Boris Rankov writes that it "may have involved the largest number of combatants of any naval battle in history";[51] a view also put forward by the classicist John Lazenby.[52]
- ^ The figure of 350 warships comes from Polybius. However, for most of the 20th century prominent historians – including Karl Julius Beloch, Gaetano De Sanctis and F. W. Walbank – argued for lower figures of 210 or 250, claiming that Polybius's figure was based on an error, a miscalculation, or even Roman propaganda. In 1985 the historian G. K. Tipps published an influential article favouring Polybius' figure and his conclusions have been generally followed since by modern scholars.[63]
- ^ This assumes, per G.K. Tipps, that all 114 captured Carthaginian vessels were sailing with the Romans.[66]
Citations
- ^ Champion 2015, p. 102.
- ^ Sidwell & Jones 1998, p. 16.
- ^ a b c Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Shutt 1938, p. 53.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 20.
- ^ Walbank 1990, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. x–xi.
- ^ Hau 2016, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 23.
- ^ Shutt 1938, p. 55.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 21.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. x–xi, 82–84.
- ^ Curry 2012, p. 34.
- ^ Hoyos 2015, p. 102.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 21–23.
- ^ a b c Goldsworthy 2006, p. 98.
- ^ Mineo 2015, pp. 111–127.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 23, 98.
- ^ Royal & Tusa 2019, pp. 13–18.
- ^ Warmington 1993, p. 168.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 175–176.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 74–75.
- ^ Coates 2004, p. 138.
- ^ Casson 1995, p. 283.
- ^ a b de Souza 2008, p. 358.
- ^ Meijer 1986, p. 120.
- ^ Coates 2004, pp. 129–130, 138–139.
- ^ Casson 1995, p. 101.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 179.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 66.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 91–92, 97.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 97, 99–100.
- ^ Murray 2011, p. 69.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 104.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 100.
- ^ a b Tipps 1985, p. 435.
- ^ Casson 1995, p. 121.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 102–103.
- ^ Casson 1995, pp. 278–280.
- ^ Curry 2012, pp. 35–36.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, p. 14.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 155.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 110.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 83.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 110–111.
- ^ Tipps 1985, pp. 445–446.
- ^ Walbank 1959, p. 10.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 84–85.
- ^ a b Hoyos 2007, p. 15; p.15, n. 1.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 156.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 87.
- ^ Tipps 1985, p. 436.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 112–113.
- ^ a b Bagnall 1999, p. 69.
- ^ Warmington 1993, p. 176.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 186.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 85.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 86.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 87.
- ^ a b c Miles 2011, p. 188.
- ^ a b Rankov 2015, p. 157.
- ^ Tipps 1985, pp. 432–465.
- ^ a b c Goldsworthy 2006, p. 115.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 111.
- ^ a b c d Tipps 1985, p. 438.
- ^ Rankov 2015, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Meijer 1986, p. 159.
- ^ a b Casson 1991, p. 164.
- ^ Andrei & Nedu 2010, p. 208.
- ^ DeSantis 2016, p. 108.
- ^ a b c d e Scullard 2006, p. 557.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 109.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 189.
- ^ DeSantis 2016, p. 109.
- ^ Erdkamp 2015, p. 66.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 112, 117.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 158.
- ^ Meijer 1986, p. 160.
- ^ a b c Briscoe 2012, p. 221.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 109.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 559.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 80.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 189–190.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 190.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 117–121.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 88–91.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 121–122.
- ^ a b Rankov 2015, p. 163.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 49.
- ^ a b Scullard 2006, p. 565.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 196.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 96.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 157.
- ^ Collins 1998, p. 13.
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Further reading
- William Heinemann, Ltd. Retrieved 4 May 2020 – via Bill Thayer's Web Site (University of Chicago Penelope).