Romanian Communist Party

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Not to be confused with Communitarian Party of Romania.

Romanian Communist Party
Partidul Comunist Român
Political positionFar-left[16][17]
National affiliationFND/BPD (1944–1968)
FDUS (1968–1989)
European affiliationBalkan Communist Federation (1921–1939)
International affiliationComintern (1921–1943)
Cominform (1947–1956)
Colours  Red[18]   Gold
Anthem"The Internationale"
Party flag

The Romanian Communist Party (

Romanian People's Republic
in December 1947.

The party operated under the title of the Romanian Workers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Romîn between 1948 and 1964 and Partidul Muncitoresc Român in 1964 and 1965) until it was officially renamed by Nicolae Ceaușescu, who had just been elected secretary general. Other legal, political parties existed in Romania, but their influence was limited and they were subordinate to the constitutionally-authorised leading role of the PCR. All other legal parties and entities were part of the Communist-dominated National Front.[20] The PCR was a communist party, organized based on democratic centralism, a principle conceived by Russian Marxist theoretician Vladimir Lenin, which entails a democratic and open discussion on policy on the condition of unity in upholding the agreed-upon policies. The highest body within the PCR was the Party Congress, which began in 1969 to convene every five years. The Central Committee was the highest body when Congress was not in session. Because the Central Committee met only twice a year, most day-to-day duties and responsibilities were vested in Politburo. The party leader held the office of General Secretary and, after 1945, held significant influence over the government. Between 1974 and 1989, the General Secretary also held the office of President of Romania.

Ideologically, the PCR was committed to

Romanian Revolution, but Romania kept its socialist-era constitution until 1991. Romania also retained its membership in the Warsaw Pact
until its dissolution on 1 July 1991; that role had been largely symbolic since the late 1960s.

The PCR co-ordinated several organizations during its existence, including the

România Liberă
).

History

Establishment

Main article: Socialist Party of Romania
Criticism among socialist groups, as illustrated in a December 1922 caricature by Nicolae Tonitza. The mine owner to the miner: "A socialist, you say? My son is a socialist too, but without going on strike..., that is why he already has his own capital..."

The party was founded in 1921 when the

Comintern (just before the latter's Third Congress): after a delegation was sent to Bolshevist Russia, a group of moderates (including Ioan Flueraș, Iosif Jumanca, Leon Ghelerter, and Constantin Popovici) left at different intervals beginning with January 1921.[22]

The party renamed itself the Socialist-Communist Party (Partidul Socialist-Comunist) and, soon after, the Communist Party of Romania (Partidul Comunist din România or PCdR). Government crackdown and competition with other socialist groups brought a drastic reduction in its membership—from the ca. 40,000 members the Socialist Party had, the new group was left with as much as 2,000

fall of one-party rule in 1989, Romanian historians generally asserted that the party only had around 1,000 members at the end of World War II.[25] Other researchers argue that this figure may have been intentionally based on the Muscovite faction figures and, as such, underestimated to undermine the influence of the internal faction; this estimate was afterwards promoted in post-communist historiography to reinforce a stereotypical image of the regime as illegitimate.[26]

The early Communist Party had little influence in Romania. This was due to a number of factors: the country's lack of

industrial development, which resulted in a relatively small working class (with industry and mining employing fewer than 10% of the active population[27]) and a large peasant population; the minor impact of Marxism among Romanian intellectuals; the success of state repression in driving the party underground and limiting its activities; and finally, the party's "anti-national" policy, as it began to be stated in the 1920s—supervised by the Comintern, this policy called for the breakup of Greater Romania, which was regarded as a colonial entity "illegally occupying" Transylvania, Dobruja, Bessarabia and Bukovina (regions that, the communists argued, had been denied the right of self-determination).[28] In 1924, the Comintern provoked Romanian authorities by encouraging the Tatarbunary Uprising in southern Bessarabia, in an attempt to create a Moldavian republic on Romanian territory;[29] also in that year, a Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, roughly corresponding to Transnistria
, was established inside the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the left-wing political spectrum was dominated by

cooperative farming by Ion Mihalache's Peasants' Party), and usually strongly supported the post-1919 territorial status quo—although they tended to oppose the centralized system it had come to imply. (In turn, the early conflict between the PCdR and other minor socialist groups has been attributed to the legacy of Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea's quasi-Poporanist ideas inside the latter, as an intellectual basis for the rejection of Leninism.)[30]

The PCdR's "foreign" image was because

Hungarians and Bulgarians.[32] Actual or perceived ethnic discrimination against these minorities added to the appeal of revolutionary ideas in their midst.[33]

Part of a series on the
Communist movement in the Kingdom of Romania
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Organizations
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Repression
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Communist Party of Romania (1921–1948)

Comintern and internal wing

See also: Repression of communists in the Kingdom of Romania
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Shortly after its creation, the PCdR's leadership was alleged by authorities to have been involved in

conspiracy, ordered the first in a series of repressions, and, in the context of trial, allowed for several communist activists (including Leonte Filipescu) to be shot while in custody—alleging that they had attempted to flee.[35] Consequently, Argetoianu stated his belief that"communism is over in Romania",[36] which allowed for a momentary relaxing of pressures—begun by King Ferdinand's granting of an amnesty to the tried PCdR.[37]

The PCdR was thus unable to send representatives to the Comintern, and was virtually replaced abroad by a delegation of various activists who had fled to the

Balkan Communist Federation).[42][43]

Around the time of the party's Fifth Congress in 1931, the Muscovite wing became the PCdR's main political factor:

Alexander Stefanski, who was at the time a member of the Communist Party of Poland.[44]

The interior wing began organizing itself as a more efficient conspiratorial network through regained Comintern control.

Grivița Strikes.[47][48]

In 1934, Stalin's

Hungarian People's Union, and the Socialist Peasants' Party), and small Communist groups became active in the leftist sections of mainstream parties.[51] In 1934, Petre Constantinescu-Iași and other PCdR supporters created Amicii URSS, a pro-Soviet group reaching out to intellectuals, itself banned later in the same year.[52][53]

During the

Social-Democrats' refusal to collaborate with the PCdR.[55]

In the years following the elections, the PCdR entered a phase of rapid decline, coinciding with the increasingly

Czechoslovakia.[60]

Consequently, the executive committee of the Comintern called on Romanian Communists to infiltrate the National Renaissance Front (FRN), the newly created sole legal party of Carol's dictatorship, and attempt to attract members of its structures to the revolutionary cause.[50]

Until 1944, the group active inside Romania became split between the "prison faction" (

Alexander Stefanski, Timotei Marin, and Elek Köblös.[62][63][64] It was to be Ana Pauker's mission to take over and reshape the surviving structure.[65][66]

Attacks on Chiaburs in Communist Romania

Chiaburs were defined by the Party as the common enemies of communism in Romania. Thus, they were subjected to abuses by the cadres. A chiabur was, typically, a wealthier peasant that had gained a respected status among their village as a good householder and ambitious worker. Chiaburs could also be loosely defined as people owning the means of production or hiring someone for labor for a minimum of a month out of the year.[67] Because the definition of chiabur was so loose, cadres would sometimes take advantage of the system by naming those they had personal vendettas against as chiaburs or simply mislabeling people. The Party sought to reap the benefits of what the chiaburs produced through the newly introduced quota system, an attempt to put down the rebellions against communist power. These allotted quantities of food left many of the chiaburs starving; however, some managed to evade the process by hiding their grain, and when officials came to collect, they assured them they had nothing left. If it was found that a chiabur would not comply, they were subject to many abuses at the hands of the cadres. It was said that "those who were to bear the brunt of class war were the chiaburs, the rural bourgeoise."[68] The chiaburs could be subject to demeaning manual labor in public areas or brutal physical beatings by the cadres. Additionally, cadres would attack the wives and children of the chiaburs as a means of punishing the chiabur heads of household. They would do this through shaming and kicking chiabur children out of school or physically attacking the families.

World War II

Main article: Romania in World War II
Political prisoners of the Ion Antonescu regime, photographed in Târgu Jiu camp in 1943 (Nicolae Ceaușescu, future leader of Communist Romania, is second from left)

In 1940, Romania had to cede Bessarabia and

German occupation—it included Gheorghe Gaston Marin and the Francs-tireurs' Olga Bancic, Nicolae Cristea and Joseph Boczov.[72]

As Romania came under the rule of

Holocaust in Romania).[75] Most Jews from the PCdR category were held in Vapniarka, where improper feeding caused an outbreak of paralysis, and in Rîbnița, where some 50 were victims of the authorities' criminal negligence and were shot by retreating German troops in March 1944.[76]

In June 1943, at a time when troops were suffering major defeats on the Eastern Front, the PCdR proposed that all parties form a Blocul Național Democrat ("National Democratic Bloc"), in order to arrange for Romania to withdraw from its alliance with Nazi Germany.[77] The ensuing talks were prolonged by various factors, most notably by the opposition of National Peasants' Party leader Iuliu Maniu, who, alarmed by Soviet successes, was trying to reach a satisfactory compromise with the Western Allies (and, together with the National Liberals' leader Dinu Brătianu, continued to back negotiations initiated by Antonescu and Barbu Știrbey with the United States and the United Kingdom).[78]

1944 Coup

Main article:
King Michael's Coup
People in Bucharest greet Romania's new ally, the Red Army, on 31 August 1944

In early 1944, as the

troika formed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Constantin Pîrvulescu, and Iosif Rangheț, Foriș was discreetly assassinated in 1946.[81] Several assessments view Foriș's dismissal as the complete rupture in historical continuity between the PCdR established in 1921 and what became the ruling party of Communist Romania.[82]

On 23 August 1944, King Michael, a number of

King Michael's Coup).[83] King Michael then proclaimed the old 1923 Constitution in force, ordered the Romanian Army to enter a ceasefire with the Red Army on the Moldavian front, and withdrew Romania from the Axis.[84] Later party discourse tended to dismiss the importance of both the Soviet offensive and the dialogue with other forces (and eventually described the coup as a revolt with large popular support).[85]

The King named General

Minister of Justice—the first Communist to hold high office in Romania. The Red Army entered Bucharest on 31 August, and thereafter played a crucial role in supporting the Communist Party's rise to power as the Soviet military command virtually ruled the city and the country (see Soviet occupation of Romania).[86]

In opposition to Sănătescu and Rădescu

October 1944 rally in support of the National Democratic Front, held at Bucharest's ANEF Stadium

After having been underground for two decades, the Communists enjoyed little popular support at first, compared to the other opposition parties (however, the decrease in popularity of the National Liberals was reflected in the forming of a splinter group around

Hungarian community in newly recovered Northern Transylvania.[87]

The Communist Party, engaged in a massive recruitment campaign,

Vladislav Petrovich Vinogradov and other Soviet appointees to the Allied Commission).[92] After 1944, it was leading a paramilitary wing, the Patriotic Defense (Apărarea Patriotică, disbanded in 1948),[93][dubious – discuss] and a cultural society, the Romanian Society for Friendship with the Soviet Union.[94]

On PCdR initiative, the National Democratic Bloc was dissolved on 8 October 1944; instead, the Communists, Social Democrats, the

Union of Patriots formed the National Democratic Front (FND), which campaigned against the government, demanding the appointment of more Communist officials and sympathizers, while claiming democratic legitimacy and alleging that Sănătescu had dictatorial ambitions.[96] The FND was soon joined by the Liberal group around Tătărescu, Nicolae L. Lupu's Democratic Peasants' Party (the latter claimed the legacy from the defunct Peasants' Party), and Anton Alexandrescu's faction (separated from the National Peasants' Party).[97]

Sănătescu resigned in November, but was persuaded by King

Ministry of the Interior, which allowed for the introduction of Communists into the security forces.[98] The Communist Party subsequently launched a campaign against the Rădescu government, including the mass demonstration of 24 February that resulted in four deaths among the participants.[99] According to Frunză, this culminated in a 13 February 1945 demonstration outside the Royal Palace, and followed a week later by street fighting between Georgescu's Communist forces and supporters of the National Peasants' Party in Bucharest.[100] In a period of escalating chaos, Rădescu called for elections. The Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrey Vyshinsky went to Bucharest to request the monarch that he appoint Communist sympathizer Petru Groza as Prime Minister, with the Soviet government suggesting it would reinstate Romanian sovereignty over Northern Transylvania only in such a scenario.[101] Frunză claimed however that Vyshinsky also intimated a Soviet takeover of the country if the King failed to comply,[102] and that, under pressure from Soviet troops who were supposedly disarming the Romanian military and occupying key installations,[103] Michael agreed and dismissed Rădescu, who fled the country.[104]

First Groza cabinet

The Communist Party's National Conference of October 1945. Pictured, left to right: Vasile Luca, Constantin Pîrvulescu, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Ana Pauker, Teohari Georgescu, Florica Bagdasar and Gheorghe Vasilichi

On 6 March, Groza became leader of a Communist-led government and named Communists to lead the

Communications (Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej), Propaganda (Petre Constantinescu-Iaşi) and Finance (Vasile Luca).[105] The non-Communist ministers came from the Social Democrats (who were falling under the control of the pro-Communists Lothar Rădăceanu and Ștefan Voitec) and the traditional Ploughmen's Front ally, as well as, nominally, from the National Peasants' and National Liberal parties (followers of Tătărescu and Alexandrescu's dissident wings).[106]

As a result of the

Ministers without Portfolio (January 1946).[108] At the time, Groza's party and the PCR came to disagree on some issues (with the Front publicly affirming its support for private land ownership), before the Ploughmen's Front was eventually pressured into supporting Communist tenets.[109]

In the meantime, the first measure taken by the cabinet was a new

collectivization.[111]

It was also then that, through Pătrășcanu and

SovRoms (created in the summer of 1945), directing the bulk of Romanian trade towards the Soviet Union.[114]

1945 restructuring and second Groza cabinet

Main article: 1946 Romanian general election

The Communist Party held its first open conference (16–22 October 1945, at the

troika with a joint leadership reflecting an uneasy balance between the external and internal wings: while Gheorghiu-Dej retained his general secretary position, Ana Pauker, Teohari Georgescu, and Vasile Luca became the other main leaders.[115]

The Central Committee had 27 full members

and 8 candidate members

The post-1945 constant growth in membership, by far the highest of all Eastern Bloc countries,[116] was to provide a base of support for Gheorghiu-Dej. The conference also saw the first mention of the PCdR as the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), the new name being used as a propaganda tool suggesting a closer connection with the national interest.[117]

Party control over the security forces was successfully used on 8 November 1945, when the opposition parties organised a demonstration in front of the Royal Palace to express solidarity with King Michael, who was still refusing to sign his name to new legislation, on the occasion of his name day.[118] Demonstrators were faced with gunshots; around 10 people were killed, and many wounded.[119] The official account, according to which the Groza government responded to a coup attempt,[120] was disputed by Frunză.[121]

The PCR and its allies, grouped in the Bloc of Democratic Parties, won the Romanian elections of 19 November, although there is evidence of widespread electoral fraud.[122] Years later, historian Petre Ţurlea reviewed an incomplete confidential PCR report about the election that confirmed the Bloc won around 48 percent of the vote. He concluded that had the election been conducted fairly, the opposition parties could have won enough votes between them to form a coalition government, albeit with far less than the 80 percent support opposition supporters long claimed.[123]

The following months were dedicated to confronting the

People's Republic", firmly aligned with the Soviet Union.[125] According to the king, his signature was obtained after the Groza cabinet representatives threatened to kill 1,000 students they had rounded up in custody.[126]

Romanian Workers' Party (1948–1965)

Creation

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej with delegates to the February 1948 PCR congress (the young Nicolae Ceaușescu stands to his left)

In February 1948, the Communists ended a long process of infiltrating the

leading role
"as a condition of their continued existence. Groza, however, remained Prime Minister.

A new series of economic changes followed: the

vanguard of the working class,[138] reported that people of proletarian origin held 64% of party offices and 40% of higher government posts, while results of the recruitment efforts remained below official expectations.[139]

Internal purges

During the period, the central scene of the PMR was occupied by the conflict between the "Muscovite wing", the "prison wing"led by

bourgeois"and progressively marginalized, it was ultimately decapitated in 1948.[140] Beginning that year, the PMR leadership officially questioned its own political support, and began a massive campaign to remove"foreign and hostile elements"[141] from its rapidly expanded structures.[142] In 1952, with Stalin's renewed approval,[143] Gheorghiu-Dej emerged victorious from the confrontation with Ana Pauker, his chief "Muscovite"rival, as well as purging Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, and their supporters from the party—alleging that their various political attitudes were proof of"right-wing deviationism".[144] Out of a membership of approximately one million, between 300,000[145] and 465,000[139] members, almost half of the party, was removed in the successive purges. The specific target for the "verification campaign", as it was officially called, were former Iron Guard affiliates.[146]

The move against Pauker's group echoed

President of the People's Republic). Executive and PMR leaderships remained in Gheorghiu-Dej's hands until his death in 1965 (with the exception of 1954–1955, when his office of PMR leader was taken over by Gheorghe Apostol).[151]

From the moment it came to power and until Stalin's death, as the

Informbiro).[152]

Gheorghiu-Dej and de-Stalinization

Main article: De-Stalinization in Romania
Băneasa Airport
upon the close of the PMR's 3rd Congress (June 1960). Nicolae Ceauşescu can be seen at Gheorghiu-Dej's right hand side.

Uncomfortable and possibly threatened by the reformist measures adopted by Stalin's successor,

personality cult and encouraged Stalinists to self-criticism).[160]

In this context, the PMR soon dismissed all the relevant consequences of the Twentieth Soviet Congress, and Gheorghiu-Dej even argued that De-Stalinization had been imposed by his team right after 1952.

Iosif Chişinevschi, criticized Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership and identified him with Romanian Stalinism.[162] They were purged in 1957, themselves accused of being Stalinists and of having been plotting with Pauker.[163] Through Ceaușescu's voice, Gheorghiu-Dej also marginalized another group of old members of the PMR, associated with Constantin Doncea (June 1958).[164]

On the outside too, the PMR, leading a country that had joined the

Hungary in response to the Revolution of 1956, after which Imre Nagy and other dissident Hungarian leaders were imprisoned on Romanian soil.[165] The Hungarian rebellion also sparked student protests in such places as Bucharest, Timișoara, Oradea, Cluj and Iași, which contributed to unease inside the PMR and resulted in a wave of arrests.[166] While refusing to allow dissemination of Soviet literature exposing Stalinism (writers such as Ilya Ehrenburg and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn), Romanian leaders took active part in the campaign against Boris Pasternak.[167]

Despite Stalin's death, the massive police apparatus headed by the

Pitești, and Râmnicu Sărat; another method of punishment was deportation to the inhospitable Bărăgan Plain.[173]

Gheorghiu-Dej and the "national path"

Main article:
National Communism in Romania
Foreign leaders attending Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's funeral (March 1965). Zhou Enlai and Anastas Mikoyan are among them

Emil Bodnăraş persuaded the Soviets to withdraw their remaining troops from Romanian soil.[178] As early as 1956, Romania's political apparatus reconciled with Josip Broz Tito, which led to a series of common economic projects (culminating in the Iron Gates venture).[179]

A drastic divergence in ideological outlooks manifested itself only after autumn 1961, when the PMR's leadership felt threatened by the Soviet Union's will to impose the condemnation of Stalinism as the standard in communist states.

Communist Albania.[183] Romanian media was alone among Warsaw Pact countries to report Chinese criticism of the Soviet leadership from its source;[184] in return, Maoist officials complimented Romanian nationalism by supporting the view that Bessarabia had been a traditional victim of Russian imperialism.[185]

The change in policies was to become obvious in 1964, when the Communist regime offered a stiff response to the

Polish historian Stanisław Schwann),[187] the PMR itself took a stand against Khrushchevite principles by issuing, in late April, a declaration published in Scînteia, through which it stressed its commitment to a "national path" towards Communism[188] (it read: "There does not and cannot exist a "parent" party and a "son" party or "superior" party and "subordinate" parties").[189] During late 1964, the PMR's leadership clashed with new Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev over the issue of KGB advisers still present in the Securitate, and eventually managed to have them recalled, making Romania the Eastern Bloc's first country to have accomplished this.[190]

These actions gave Romania greater freedom in pursuing the program which Gheorghiu-Dej had been committed to since 1954, one allowing Romania to defy reforms in the Eastern Bloc and to maintain a largely Stalinist course.[191] It has also been argued that Romania's emancipation was, in effect, limited to economic relations and military cooperation, being as such dependent on a relatively tolerant mood inside the Soviet Union.[192] Nevertheless, the PMR's nationalism made it increasingly popular with Romanian intellectuals, and the last stage of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime was popularly identified with liberalization.[193]

Romanian Communist Party (1965–1989)

Ceaușescu's rise

Nicolae Ceaușescu and other PCR leaders in August 1968, addressing the Romanian public at a rally to oppose the invasion of Czechoslovakia

Gheorghiu-Dej died in March 1965 and was succeeded by a collective leadership made up of

Central Committee.[195] The circumstances surrounding this process are still disputed, but theories evidence that the support given to him by Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Emil Bodnăraș, as well as the ascendancy of Ilie Verdeț, Virgil Trofin, and Paul Niculescu-Mizil, were instrumental in ensuring legitimacy.[196] Soon after 1965, Ceaușescu used his prerogatives to convoke a Party Commission headed by Ion Popescu-Puțuri, charged with investigating both Stalinist legacy and Gheorghiu-Dej's purges: resulting in the rehabilitation of a large number of Communist officials (including, among others, Ștefan Foriș, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Miron Constantinescu, Vasile Luca, and Romanian victims of the Soviet Great Purge).[197] This measure was instrumental in consolidating the new leadership while further increasing its distance from Gheorghiu-Dej's political legacy.[198]

In 1965, Ceaușescu declared that Romania was no longer a

personality cult, while implying that his was to be a new style of leadership.[200] In its official discourse, the PCR introduced the dogmas of "socialist democracy" and direct communication with the masses.[139] From ca. 1965 to 1975, there was a noted rise in the standard of living for the Romanian population as a whole, which was similar to developments in most other Eastern bloc countries.[201] Political scientist Daniel Barbu, who noted that this social improvement trend began ca. 1950 and benefited 45% of the population, concluded that one of its main effects was to increase the citizens' dependency on the state.[202]

A seminal event occurred in August 1968, when Ceaușescu highlighted his anti-Soviet discourse by vocally opposing the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; a highly popular measure with the Romanian public, it led to sizable enrollments in the PCR and the newly created paramilitary Patriotic Guards (created with the goal of meeting a possible Soviet intervention in Romania).[203] From 1965 to 1976, the PCR rose from approximately 1.4 million members to 2.6 million.[204] In the contingency of an anti-Soviet war, the PCR even sought an alliance with the maverick Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito—negotiations did not yield a clear result.[205] Although military intervention in Romania was reportedly taken into consideration by the Soviets,[206] there is indication that Leonid Brezhnev had himself ruled out Romanian participation in Warsaw Pact maneuvers,[205] and that he continued to rely on Ceaușescu's support for other common goals.[207]

While it appears that Romanian leaders genuinely approved of the Prague Spring reforms undertaken by Alexander Dubček,[208] Ceaușescu's gesture also served to consolidate his image as a national and independent communist leader.[209] One year before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceaușescu opened up diplomatic ties with West Germany, and refused to break links with Israel following the Six-Day War.[210] Starting with the much-publicized visit by France's Charles de Gaulle (May 1968),[211] Romania was the recipient of Western world support going well into the 1970s (significant visits were paid by United States Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, in 1969 and 1975 respectively, while Ceaușescu was frequently received in Western capitals).[212]

Ceaușescu's supremacy

The 1974 ceremony marking Ceaușescu's investiture as President of Romania: Ștefan Voitec handing him the sceptre

Ceaușescu developed a

parallel developed by Kim Il Sung,[214] while incorporating in it several aspects of past authoritarian regimes in Romania (see Conducător).[215] During the early 1970s, while curbing liberalization, he launched his own version of China's Cultural Revolution, announced by the July Theses.[216] In effect, measures to concentrate power in Ceaușescu's hands were taken as early as 1967, when the general secretary became the ultimate authority on foreign policy.[217]

At the time, a new organization was instituted under the name of

Hungarians and Germans, and set up separate workers' councils for both communities.[219]

The Xth Party Congress, Romanian stamp from 1969

Members of the upper echelons of the party who objected to Ceaușescu's stance were accused of supporting Soviet policies; they included Alexandru Bârlădeanu, who criticized the heavy loans contracted in support of industrialization policies.[220] In time, the new leader distanced himself from Maurer and Corneliu Mănescu, while his career profited from the deaths of Stoica (who committed suicide) and Sălăjan (who died while undergoing surgery).[221] Instead, he came to rely on a new generation of activists, among them Manea Mănescu.[222]

At the XIth Party Congress in 1974,

Romanian People's Army", "honorary president of the Romanian Academy", and "first among the country's miners".[225] Progressively after 1967, the large bureaucratic structure of the PCR again replicated and interfered with state administration and economic policies.[226] The President himself became noted for frequent visits on location at various enterprises, where he would dispense directives, for which the termed indicații prețioase ("valuable advice") was coined by official propaganda.[227]

Despite the party's independent, "national communist" course, the absolute control that Ceaușescu had over the party and the country led to some non-Romanian observers describing the PCR as one of the closest things to an old-style Stalinist party. For instance, Encyclopædia Britannica referred to the last 18 years of Ceaușescu's tenure as a period of "neo-Stalinism", and the last edition of the Country Study on Romania referred to the PCR's "Stalinist repression of individual liberties."[228]

Late 1970s crisis

The renewed industrialization, which based itself on both a dogmatic understanding of

1979 energy crisis.[230] The profound neglect of services and decline in quality of life, first manifested when much of the budget was diverted to support an over-sized industry,[231] was made more drastic by the political decision to pay in full the country's external debt[232] (in 1983, this was set at 10 billion United States dollars, of which 4.5 billion was accumulated interest).[233] By March 1989, the debt had been paid in full.[234]

Two other programs initiated under Ceaușescu had massive consequences on social life. One of them was the plan, announced as early as 1965, to "

Auslandsdeutsche, in return for payments from the latter country.[238] Overall, around 200,000 Germans left, most of them Transylvanian Saxons and Banat Swabians.[239]

Although Romania adhered to the

Ilie Verdeţ, and, despite having reached an agreement with the government, were repressed and some of them expelled (see Jiu Valley miners' strike of 1977).[242] A newly created and independent trade union, SLOMR, was crushed and its leaders arrested on various charges in 1979.[243] Progressively during the period, the Securitate relied on involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospitals as a means to punish dissidence.[244]

1980s

Ceaușescu and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985

A major act of discontent occurred inside the party during its XIIth Congress in late November 1979, when PCR veteran

Minister of the Interior George Homoștean ordered all citizens to hand over their typewriters to the authorities.[248] This coincided with a noted popular rise in support for outspoken dissidents who were kept under house arrest, among whom were Doina Cornea and Mihai Botez.[249]

By 1983, membership of the PCR had risen to 3.3 million,[250] and, in 1989, to 3.7–3.8 million[204]—meaning that, in the end, over 20% of Romanian adults were party members,[139] making the PCR the largest communist group of the Eastern Bloc after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[204] 64,200 basic party units, answering to county committees, varying in number and representing various areas of Romanian society, were officially recorded in 1980.[139] Statistics also indicated that, during the transition from the 1965 PMR (with 8% of the total population) to the 1988 PCR, the membership of workers had grown from 44 to 55%, while that of peasants had dropped from 34 to 15%.[139] In the end, these records contrasted the fact that the PCR had become completely subservient to its leader and no longer had any form of autonomous activity,[204][251] while membership became a basic requirement in numerous social contexts, leading to purely formal allegiances and political clientelism.[252]

At the same time, the ideological viewpoint was changed, with the party no longer seen as the

vanguard of the working class,[253] but as the main social factor and the embodiment of the national interest.[254] In marked contrast with the Perestroika and Glasnost policies developed in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev, Romania adopted Neo-Stalinist principles in both its internal policies and its relations with the outside world.[255]

As recorded in 1984, 90% of the PCR members were ethnic Romanians, with 7% Hungarians (the latter group's membership had dropped by more than 2% since the previous Congress).[139] Formal criticism of the new policies regarding minorities had also been voiced by Hungarian activists, including Károly Király, leader of the PCR in Covasna County.[256] After 1980, the nationalist ideology adopted by the PCR progressively targeted the Hungarian community as a whole, based on suspicions of its allegiance to Hungary, whose policies had become diametrically opposed to the methods of Romanian leaders (see Goulash Communism).[257]

The 65th anniversary of the PCR

Especially during the 1980s, clientelism was further enhanced by a new policy, rotația cadrelor ("cadre rotation" or "reshuffling"), placing strain on low-level officials to seek the protection of higher placed ones as a means to preserve their position or to be promoted.[258] This effectively prompted activists who did not approve of the change in tone to retire, while others—Virgil Trofin, Ion Iliescu and Paul Niculescu-Mizil among them—were officially dispatched to low-ranking positions or otherwise marginalized.[259] In June 1988, the leadership of the Political Executive Committee was reduced from 15 to 7 members, including Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife.[139]

While some elements of the PCR were receptive to Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, Ceaușescu himself wanted nothing to do with glasnost or perestroika. As a result, the PCR remained an obstinate bastion of hardline Communism. Gorbachev's distaste for Ceaușescu was well known; he even went as far as to call Ceaușescu "the Romanian führer. "In Gorbachev's mind, Ceaușescu was part of a "Gang of Four" inflexibly hardline leaders unwilling to make the reforms he felt necessary to save Communism, along with Czechoslovakia's Gustáv Husák, Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov and East Germany's Erich Honecker. At a meeting between the two, Gorbachev upbraided Ceaușescu for his inflexible attitude. "You are running a dictatorship here," the Soviet leader warned. However, Ceaușescu refused to bend.[260]

Downfall

Main article:
Romanian Revolution

Announced by a February 1987 protest of workers and students in

Brașov Rebellion).[262] In December, authorities convened a public kangaroo trial of the movement's leaders, and handed out sentences of imprisonment and internal exile.[262]

Inaugurated by

Radio Free Europe.[263] At around the same time, systematization provoked an international response, as Romania was subjected to a resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which called for an inquiry into the state of ethnic minorities and the rural population; the political isolation experienced by Communist Romania was highlighted by the fact that Hungary endorsed the report,[264] while all other Eastern bloc countries abstained.[265] This followed more than a decade of deteriorating relations between the PCR and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.[266]

In the face of the changes that unfolded in the rest of Eastern Europe in 1988 and 1989, the PCR retained its image as one of the most unreconstructed parties in the Soviet bloc. It even went as far as to call for a Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland after that country's Communists announced a power-sharing agreement with the Solidarity trade union—a sharp reversal of its previous opposition to the Brezhnev Doctrine and its vehement opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia 21 years earlier.[260] It initially appeared that the PCR would ride out the anti-Communist tide sweeping through Eastern Europe when on 24 November—two weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the same day that Communist rule effectively ended in Czechoslovakia—Ceaușescu was reelected for another five-year term as General Secretary.

A month later, both Ceaușescu and the party were overthrown in the

democratic socialist
parties, and remain major players to this day.

Many former members of the PCR have been major players in the

Romanian Socialist Party claim to be the successors of the PCR,[268][269]
with the latter entering Parliament in the 1992–1996 legislature under its former name of Socialist Party of Labour.

General secretaries (1921–1989)

Party congresses

Name/Period Location
1st (May 1921) Bucharest
2nd (October 1922) Ploiești
3rd (August 1924) Vienna
4th (July 1928) Kharkiv
5th (December 1931) Moscow
6th (February 1948) Bucharest
7th (December 1955) Bucharest
8th (June 1960) Bucharest
9th (July 1965) Bucharest
10th (August 1969) Bucharest
11th (November 1974) Bucharest
12th (November 1979) Bucharest
13th (November 1984) Bucharest
14th (November 1989) Bucharest

Electoral history

President of the State Council and Presidential elections

Election Party candidate Votes % Result
President elected by the Great National Assembly
1961 Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej 465 100% Elected Green tickY
1965 Chivu Stoica 465 100% Elected Green tickY
1967 Nicolae Ceaușescu 465 100% Elected Green tickY
1974 465 100% Elected Green tickY
1980 369 100% Elected Green tickY
1985 369 100% Elected Green tickY

Note

In the 1961, 1965, 1967 the head of state was called President of the State Council while after 1973 the post changed to that of president

Great National Assembly elections

Election Party leader Votes % Seats +/– Position
1926 Elek Köblös 39,203

as part of BMȚ

1.5%
0 / 387
 Steady Steady 6th
1927 31,505

as part of BMȚ

1.3%
0 / 387
 Steady Steady 6th
1928 Vitali Holostenco 38,851

as part of BMȚ

1.4%
0 / 387
 Steady Steady 6th
1931 73,716

as part of BMȚ

2.6%
5 / 387
 Increase 5 Decrease 10th
1932 Alexander Danieliuk-Stefanski 9,441

as part of BMȚ

0.3%
0 / 387
 Decrease 5 Decrease 17th
1933 3,515

as part of Labour League

0.1%
0 / 387
 Steady Increase 15th
1937 Boris Stefanov Did not compete
1939 Bela Breiner
1946 Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as part of BPD
68 / 414
 Increase 68 Increase 4th
1948
 as part of FDP
190 / 405
 Increase 122 Increase 1st
1952
428 / 428
 Increase 23 Steady 1st
1957
437 / 437
 Increase 9 Steady 1st
1961
465 / 465
 Increase 28 Steady 1st
1965
465 / 465
 Steady Steady 1st
1969
 Nicolae Ceaușescu as part of
FUS
465 / 465
 Steady Steady 1st
1975
349 / 349
 Decrease 116 Steady 1st
1980
 as part of FDUS
369 / 369
 Increase 20 Steady 1st
1985
369 / 369
 Steady Steady 1st

See also

Notes

  1. ^ https://www.b1tv.ro/politica/propaganda-fsn-fosta-pcr-este-dusa-mai-departe-de-psd-textele-pe-care-oamenii-lui-iliescu-le-raspandeau-in-90-la-fel-de-actuale-si-acum-170169.html
  2. ^ https://www.dw.com/ro/psd-merge-la-vale-vestea-rea-e-ca-tot-psd-il-impinge-ziarecom/a-44894910
  3. ^ Roger East, Jolyon Pontin, Bloomsbury Publishing, 6 Oct 2016, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Revised Edition, p. 175
  4. ^ (in Romanian) "Scânteia, ziarul cu două fețe" ("Scânteia, the Two-Faced Journal"), in Evenimentul Zilei, 14 January 2006
  5. ^ "Rolul UTC în angrenajul totalitar" ("The UTC's Role in the Regime's Gear Mechanism"), Adrian Cioflancă, 22, 22 December 2006.
  6. ^ "DDR & Ostalgie - Lexikon - Pionierorganisation der SR Rumänien". Archived from the original on 26 April 2008. Retrieved 25 April 2008.
  7. ^ Jurnalul Național: Și verzi și roșii Archived 2018-03-13 at the Wayback Machine, Ilarion Tiu, 10 mai 2006 - Accesat la data de 10 aprilie 2011
  8. ^ "Romania: Information on the percentage of the population that are members of the communist party, from 1987". Refworld. 1 February 1996. Retrieved 31 December 2021.
  9. ^ DECRET Nr. 770 din 1 octombrie 1966-Ministerul Justitiei
  10. ^ Kligman, Gail. "Political Demography: The Banning of Abortion in Ceausescu's Romania". In Ginsburg, Faye D.; Rapp, Rayna, eds. Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995 :234-255. Unique Identifier : AIDSLINE KIE/49442.
  11. ISBN 9780739105924
    .
  12. ^ Viviana Andreescu (2011). "From legal tolerance to social acceptance: predictors of heterosexism in Romania" (PDF). Revista Română de Sociologie. XXII (3–4). București: 209–231. Retrieved 25 March 2017.
  13. ISBN 1-84113-267-5
    .
  14. ISBN 3-05-002590-5
    , S. 87–102.
  15. ^ Petrescu, Cristina. "Rethinking National Identity after National-Communism? The case of Romania". www.eurhistxx.de. Archived from the original on 5 March 2014. Retrieved 3 April 2014.
  16. ^ March, Luke (2009). "Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe: From Marxism to the Mainstream?" (PDF). IPG. 1: 126–143. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 May 2018 – via Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
  17. ^ "Left". Encyclopædia Britannica. 15 April 2009. Retrieved 22 May 2022. ... communism is a more radical leftist ideology.
  18. OCLC 60393965
    .
  19. ISBN 978-3-8329-5609-7
    .
  20. ISBN 978-3-8329-5609-7
    .
  21. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.23-27; Frunză, p.21-22
  22. ^ Frunză, p.25-28
  23. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.45; Communist press, 1923, in Frunză, p.30
  24. ^ Allegations in the Social-Democratic press, 1923, in Frunză, p.30; Iordachi I.2
  25. concentration camps." (Rangheț, 25–27 April 1945, in Colt). In the late 1940s, Ana Pauker
    gave the same estimate (Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.45; Frunză, p.202).
  26. ^ Dumitru Lăcătuşu, "Convenient Truths: Representations of the Communist Illegalists in the Romanian Historiography in Post-Communism", in Brukenthalia. Supplement of Brukenthal, Acta Musei, No. 4, Sibiu, 2014, p.199-200
  27. ISBN 0275928403
    .
  28. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.18-45; Frunză, p.38-48, 63–72; Iordachi, I.2; Pokivailova, p.48; Troncotă, p.19-20; Veiga, p.222
  29. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.36; Frunză, p.71; Troncotă, p.19; Veiga, p.115
  30. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.47-48
  31. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.18, 44
  32. ^ Iordachi, I.2; Pokivailova, p.47
  33. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.18
  34. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.27–30
  35. ^ Troncotă, p.18-19
  36. ^ Argetoianu, June 1922, in Troncotă, p.19
  37. ^ Troncotă, p.19
  38. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.37, 44
  39. ^ a b Deletant & Ionescu, p.4–5
  40. ^ Frunză, p.38–39
  41. ^ Frunză, p.32–33
  42. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.38–39
  43. ^ Frunză, p.49–50
  44. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.41; Frunză, p.51-53
  45. ^ Troncotă, p.20–22
  46. ^ Frunză, p.58–62
  47. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.41–43
  48. ^ Frunză, p.53–62
  49. ^ Frunză, p.85
  50. ^ a b c d e Pokivailova, p.48
  51. ^ a b Veiga, p.223
  52. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.110–118
  53. ^ "Comunismul și cel care a trăit Iluzia"
  54. ^ Veiga, p.235
  55. ^ Frunză, p.84
  56. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii.., p.43, 170–171
  57. ^ Frunză, p.84, 102–103
  58. ^ Veiga, p.223–224
  59. ^ Pokivailova, p.47
  60. ^ Pokivailova, p.46–47
  61. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.42, 44, 48–50
  62. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii.., p.42–43
  63. ^ Frunză, p.90–91, 151, 215
  64. ^ Pokivailova, p.45
  65. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.43, 52, 171–172
  66. ^ Frunză, p.103–104, 149–154, 215
  67. ^ Basic Indicators for Identifying Chiabur Households (ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R–Agrară, file 29/1952, 2–8; ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R.–Cancelarie, file 32/1952, 39–42; DJAN HD, Fond CR PMR, file 430/1952,  252–263)
  68. ISBN 978-0-691-14972-1
    .
  69. ^ Frunză, p.72; Pokivailova, p.48
  70. ^ Frunză, p.72, 105–107, 127
  71. ^ Frunză, p.106-107
  72. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.52; Frunză, p.103, 402
  73. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.42-52, 132–134, 332, 335–336, 343–344; Deletant, p.196, 238–239, 303; Frunză, p.122-123, 138
  74. ^ C. Bărbulescu et al., File din istoria U.T.C, 1971, Bucharest: Editura Politică. p. 199
  75. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.52; Deletant, p.116, 123, 196–198, 219, 225, 254, 303, 311, 332–333, 335–336, 340
  76. ^ Deletant, p.196-197, 225
  77. ^ Frunză, p.123
  78. ^ Frunză, p.123-125; 130–131
  79. ^ Frunză, p.125
  80. ^ Frunză, p.131-133, 139
  81. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.49-50, 62;"Comunismul și cel care a trăit Iluzia"; Frunză, p.400-402
  82. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.50; Frunză, p.213, 218–221, 402
  83. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.50-55; Chant, p.84-85, 124–125, 303; Deletant, p.3-4, 241–246, 265–266, 343–346; Frunză, p.128-137
  84. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.51; Deletant, p.243-245, 257; Frunză, p.126-129
  85. ^ Deletant, p.243, 265–266, 269, 344; Frunză, p.130-145
  86. ^ Frunză, p.171, 178–190
  87. ^ Frunză, p.163-170
  88. cadres
    , party members, by only very, very little, if we are to keep in mind the present legal situation, if we keep in mind that, through our party's work, thousands, tens and hundreds of thousands workers were rallied. [...] During this time, when our party only had 5–6,000 party members, we held large, huge protests against the [daily] realities in our country, in Bucharest as well as throughout the land..." (Rangheț, 25–27 April 1945, in Colt)
  89. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.297; Frunză, p.208
  90. ^ Barbu, p.190
  91. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.51-52; Deletant & Ionescu, p.4-5; Frunză, p.218-219
  92. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.45, 59–61
  93. ^ Frunză, p.176
  94. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.106-148
  95. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.154
  96. ^ Barbu, p.187-189; Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.55-56; Frunză, p.173-174, 220–222, 237–238, 254–255
  97. ^ Frunză, p.186-190
  98. ^ Barbu, p.187-188; Frunză, p.174-177
  99. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.56
  100. ^ Frunză, p.180-181
  101. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.156-157
  102. ^ Frunză, p.180-184
  103. ^ Frunză, p.181-182
  104. ^ Frunză, p.183-184
  105. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.57
  106. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.93; Frunză, p.187-189
  107. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.61-64, 159–161
  108. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.63, 159–160
  109. ^ Cioroianu, p.161-162
  110. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.58-59; Frunză, p.198-200, 221
  111. ^ Frunză, p.200, 221
  112. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.295-296; Deletant, p.245-262; Frunză, p.228-232
  113. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.77-93, 106–148; Frunză, p.240-258
  114. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.67-71, 372–373; Frunză, p.381
  115. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.62, 91–93, 174–176, 194–195; Frunză, p.219-220
  116. ^ Barbu, p.190-191
  117. ^ Frunză, p.220
  118. ^ Frunză, p.233
  119. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.62; Frunză, p.233
  120. ^ Frunză, p.234
  121. ^ Frunză, p.234-239
  122. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.64-66; Frunză, p.287-292
  123. ^ Petre Ţurlea, "Alegerile parlamentare din noiembrie '46: guvernul procomunist joacă şi câştigă. Ilegalităţi flagrante, rezultat viciat" ("The Parliamentary Elections of November '46: the Pro-Communist Government Plays and Wins. Blatant Unlawfulness, Tampered Result"), p. 35–36
  124. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.95-96; Frunză, p.287-308
  125. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.97-101
  126. ^ Cioroianu, p.99; Craig S. Smith, "Romania's King Without a Throne Outlives Foes and Setbacks", in The New York Times, 27 January 2007; Retrieved on 7 December 2007
  127. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.93-94; Frunză, p.259-286, 329–359
  128. ^ US Library of Congress: "The Communist Party"; Frunză, p.274, 350–354
  129. ^ Deletant & Ionescu, p.2
  130. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.292; Frunză, p.355-357
  131. ISBN 978-3-8329-5609-7
  132. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.72-73
  133. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.73-74
  134. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.74
  135. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.74-75
  136. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.75-76
  137. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.76, 251–253; Deletant & Ionescu, p.3-4; Frunză, p.393-394, 412–413
  138. ^ US Library of Congress:"The Communist Party"; Deletant & Ionescu, p.3
  139. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k US Library of Congress: "The Communist Party"
  140. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.194-195, 200–201; Frunză, p.359-363; 407–410
  141. ^ Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.299
  142. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.297, 298–300
  143. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.180
  144. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.180-182, 200–203; Frunză, p.403-407; Tismăneanu, p.16
  145. ^ Cioroianu, p.299
  146. ^ Deletant & Ionescu, p.5
  147. ^ Deletant & Ionescu, p.5-6; Frunză, p.403-407
  148. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.103; Deletant & Ionescu, p.3
  149. ^ 1952 Constitution, in Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.103-104
  150. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.195-196; Tismăneanu, p.19, 22–23
  151. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.204
  152. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.197-198
  153. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.76, 181–182, 206; Frunză, p.393-394
  154. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.391-394; Deletant & Ionescu, p.7, 20–21; Tismăneanu, p.12, 27–31
  155. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.201
  156. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.210-211
  157. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.207, 375; Frunză, p.437
  158. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.375; Frunză, p.437
  159. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.204; Deletant & Ionescu, p.7; Tismăneanu, p.10-12
  160. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.206, 217–218; Deletant & Ionescu, p.7-8, 9; Frunză, p.424-425; Tismăneanu, p.9, 16
  161. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.206, 217; Deletant & Ionescu, p.8, 9; Frunză, p.430-434; Tismăneanu, p.15-16, 18–19
  162. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.136, 206–207; Deletant & Ionescu, p.8-9; Frunză, p.425; Tismăneanu, p.11-12, 16–19, 24–26
  163. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.136, 208; Tismăneanu, p.22, 23–24, 27
  164. ^ Tismăneanu, p.29-30
  165. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.198-200, 207; Deletant & Ionescu, p.9-13; Frunză, p.426-428-434; Tismăneanu, p.19-23
  166. ^ Deletant & Ionescu, p.10-11, 34; Tismăneanu, p.21, 31
  167. ^ Frunză, p.429
  168. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.291-294; Deletant & Ionescu, p.4
  169. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.221, 314–315; Deletant & Ionescu, p.19
  170. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.268-318; Frunză, p.367-370, 392–399
  171. ^ Barbu, p.192
  172. ^ a b c Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.313
  173. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.300-319; Frunză, p.394-399
  174. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.212-217, 219, 220, 372–376; Frunză, p.440-444
  175. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.208
  176. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.218-219, 220; Deletant & Ionescu, p.19; Frunză, p.456-457
  177. ^ Frunză, p.442
  178. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.345-352; Deletant & Ionescu, p.13-15
  179. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.214; Frunză, p.442, 445, 449–450
  180. ^ Tismăneanu, p.37-38, 47–48
  181. ^ Tismăneanu, p.34-36
  182. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.215, 218; Frunză, p.437, 449, 452–453; Tismăneanu, p.14-15, 43–44, 50
  183. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.215; Frunză, p.437, 449; Tismăneanu, p.14-15, 50
  184. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.215; Frunză, p.438
  185. ^ Frunză, p.452-453
  186. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.216; Frunză, p.440-441, 454–457; Deletant & Ionescu, p.17; Iordachi I.2, II.1; Tismăneanu, p.45-46
  187. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.220; Deletant & Ionescu, p.18; Frunză, p.453
  188. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.220, 321–325; Deletant & Ionescu, p.18; Iordachi I.2, II.1; Tismăneanu, p.34, 48–49
  189. ^ Scînteia, 1964, in Iordachi I.2; in Tismăneanu, p.49
  190. ^ Deletant & Ionescu, p.18-19
  191. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.216-217, 220–221; Deletant & Ionescu, p.15-19; Frunză, p.445-449, 458–461; Tismăneanu, p.32-34
  192. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.320-325
  193. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.221-223, 275–276; Frunză, p.458
  194. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.392-394
  195. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.393-397; Deletant & Ionescu, p.29-30; Frunză, p.472
  196. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.393-397; Deletant & Ionescu, p.29-30; Tismăneanu, p.51-53
  197. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.398-399; "Comunismul și cel care a trăit Iluzia"; Deletant & Ionescu, p.25; Frunză, p.472-474
  198. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.397-400; Frunză, p.473-474
  199. ^ Deletant, p.266-269; Frunză, p.474, 504–509, 513–518
  200. ^ Frunză, p.474
  201. ^ Deletant & Ionescu, p.25-26
  202. ^ Barbu, p.193-195
  203. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p.403-412, 414; Deletant & Ionescu, p.27; Frunză, p.475; Negrici, p.221
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References

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