Russia–European Union relations
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Russia–European Union relations are the
The bilateral relations of individual
Relations between Russia and the EU became increasingly strained since the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and the EU imposed several
Background
This background is a snapshot of the way things were before the complete breakdown of bilateral relations in the wake of the
Trade
The EU is Russia's largest trading partner, accounting for 52.3% of all foreign Russian trade in 2008 and 75% of foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in Russia also come from the EU. The EU exported €105 billion of goods to Russia in 2008 and Russia exported €173.2 billion to the EU. 68.2% of Russian exports to the EU are accounted for by energy and fuel supplies. For details on other trade, see the table below:[6]
Direction of trade | Goods | Services | FDI | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|
EU to Russia | €105 billion | €18 billion | €17 billion | €140 billion |
Russia to EU | €173.2 billion | €11.5 billion | €1 billion | €185.7 billion |
Russia and the EU are both members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU and Russia are currently implementing the common spaces (see below) and negotiation to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to strengthen bilateral trade.[6]
Energy
Russia has a significant role in the European energy sector as the largest exporter of oil and natural gas to the EU. In 2007, the EU imported from Russia 185 million tonnes of crude oil, which accounted for 32.6% of total oil imports, and 100.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent of natural gas, which accounted for 38.7% of total gas imports.[7] A number of disputes in which Russia was using pipeline shutdowns in what was described as "tool for intimidation and blackmail"[8] caused European Union to significantly increase efforts to diversify its energy sources.[9]
During an anti-trust investigation initiated in 2011 against Gazprom a number of internal company documents were seized that documented a number of "abusive practices" in an attempt to "segment the internal [EU] market along national borders" and impose "unfair pricing".[10] In August 2021 Russia has unexpectedly reduced volumes of gas sent to European Union, causing sudden gas price increases on the European market "to support its case in starting flows via Nord Stream 2".[11] The next month, it announced that "rapid" start up of the newly completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline that has been for long contested by various EU countries would resolve the problems.[11]
Kaliningrad
The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast has, since 2004, been surrounded on land by EU members. As a result, the oblast has been isolated from the rest of the federation due to stricter border controls that had to be brought in when Poland and Lithuania joined the EU and further tightened before they joined the Schengen Area. The new difficulties for Russians in Kaliningrad to reach the rest of Russia is a small source of tension.
In July 2011, the European Commission put forward proposals to classify the whole of Kaliningrad as a border area. This would allow Poland and Lithuania to issue special permits for Kaliningrad residents to pass through those two countries without requiring a
After the
Russian minorities in the EU
The OSCE mission monitoring the 2006 parliamentary elections in Latvia mentioned that
Approximately 400,000 people in Latvia, some 18 per cent of the total population, had not obtained Latvian or any other citizenship and therefore still had the status of "non-citizens." In the vast majority of cases, those were persons who migrated to Latvia from within the former Soviet Union, and their descendants. Non-citizens do not have the right to vote in any Latvian elections, although they can join political parties. To obtain citizenship, these persons must go through a naturalization process, which over 50,000 persons have done since the 2002 Saeima election. The OSCE claimed that the fact that a significant percentage of the adult population did not hold voting rights represented a continuing democratic deficit.[18]
As reported by the European Commissioner for Human Rights 2007 report on Latvia, in 2006 there were 411,054 non-citizens, 66.5% of them belonging to Russian minority.[19]
In 2017, there were 900,000 ethnic Russians in the Baltic States,
Beginning in 2019,
Russian and EU public opinion
A February 2014 poll conducted by the Levada Center, Russia's largest independent polling organization, found that nearly 80% of Russian respondents had a "good" impression of the EU. This changed dramatically in 2014 with the Ukrainian crisis resulting in 70% taking a hostile view of the EU compared to 20% viewing it positively.[25]
A Levada poll released in August 2018 found that 68% of Russian respondents believe that Russia needs to dramatically improve relations with Western countries. 42% of Russians polled said they had a positive view of the EU, up from 28% in May 2018.[26]
A Levada poll released in February 2020 found that 80% of Russian respondents believe that Russia and the West should become friends and partners. 49% of Russians polled said they had a positive view of the EU.[27] However, with the exception of Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece, the share of residents in the rest of the EU countries polled by Pew Research Center with positive views of Russia is considerably below 50%.[28]
Framework initiatives
Several framework initiatives were attempted between Russia and the EU since the end of the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
The legal basis for the relations between the EU and Russia is the
The Four Common Spaces
At the
The Moscow Summit in May 2005 adopted a single package of roadmaps for the creation of the four Common Spaces. These expand on the ongoing cooperation as described above, set out further specific objectives, and determine the actions necessary to make the common spaces a reality. They thereby determine the agenda for co-operation between the EU and Russia for the medium-term.
The London Summit in October 2005 focused on the practical implementation of the Road Maps for the four Common Spaces.
Common Economic Space
The objective of the common economic space is to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. This space is intended to remove barriers to trade and investment and promote reforms and competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and good governance.
Among the wide range of actions foreseen, a number of new dialogues are to be launched. Cooperation will be stepped up on regulatory policy, investment issues,
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice
Work on this space took a large step forward with the conclusion of negotiations on the
Cooperation on combating
With a view to contributing to the concrete implementation of the road map, the
Common Space on External Security
The road map underlines the shared responsibility of the parties for an international order based on effective
).EU activities in this area are done in the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Common Space on Research, Education, Culture
This space built on the long-standing relations with Russia through its participation in EU
Russia and the EU worked together under
Partnership for Modernization
On 18 November 2009, at the Russia-EU summit in Stockholm, one of the main vectors of deepening of strategic relations the initiative "Partnership for Modernization" (PM) was put forward.[36] The goal of the partnership is to assist in the solution of problems of modernization of economy of Russia and the corresponding adaptation of the entire complex of Russia-EU relations based on the experience of the existing dialogue mechanisms "sectoral" interaction of Russia and the EU.
At the summit in Rostov-on-Don (June 2010), leaders of Russia and the EU signed the joint statement on the "Partnership for Modernization".[37][38] The document sets the priorities and the scope for intensification of cooperation in the interests of modernization between Russia and the EU.
In accordance with the joint statement of the priority area of the "Partnership for Modernization" should include the following areas: expanding opportunities for investment in key sectors driving growth and innovation; enhancing and deepening bilateral trade and economic cooperation, and also creation of favorable conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises; promoting alignment of technical regulations and standards, as well as the high level of intellectual property protection; transportation; promote the development of sustainable low-carbon economy and energy efficiency, and support international negotiations on combating climate change; enhancing cooperation in innovation, research and development, and space; ensuring balanced development by taking measures in response to regional and social consequences of economic restructuring; ensuring the effective functioning of the judiciary and strengthening the fight against corruption; promote the development of relations between people and the strengthening of dialogue with civil society to promote the participation of people and business. This list of areas of cooperation is not exhaustive. As necessary can be added to other areas of cooperation. The EU and Russia will encourage implementation of specific projects within the framework of the partnership.
To coordinate this work, Russia and the EU defined the respective coordinators (Russian Deputy Minister A. A. Slepnev and EU Deputy General Director for external relations of the European Commission H. Mingarelli; since 2011, Director for Russia, European External Action Service Gunnar Wiegand).
According to the results of the analysis of existing formats of cooperation with European partners, it was determined that the PM should build on existing achievements within the formation of Four Common Spaces Russia-EU, but not replace, existing "road map" and not be the reason for the creation of new structural add-ons. The main mechanisms of the initiative of PM have been recognized sectoral dialogues Russia-EU.
The national coordinators in cooperation with co-chairs-Russia sectoral dialogues the EU has developed an implementation plan for PM, contains specific joint projects in the priority areas of cooperation.
On 11 May 2011, the Ministry of economic development of Russia held an enlarged meeting of representatives of the sectoral dialogues the EU-Russia involved in the implementation of the initiative "Partnership for modernization", chaired by the national focal points initiative.
During the meeting the parties discussed the progress of the project Work plan PM and has identified priorities for the second half of 2011, measures to support projects, including the attraction of resources of international financial institutions, as well as the participation of business in implementing the tasks of the PM.
In order to create financial mechanisms for cooperation in the framework of PM by Vnesheconombank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Vnesheconombank and the European Investment Bank (EIB) has signed the relevant memoranda of understanding. The documents envisage the possibility of allocating the aggregate up to $2 billion to finance projects in the PfP, provided that they meet criteria of financial institutions and approval by the authorized management bodies of the parties.
As priority directions of financing selected areas such as energy efficiency, transport, innovation initiatives related to small and medium enterprises (including business incubators, technological parks, centers of business technology, infrastructure, financial services SMEs), as well as commercialization of innovations in several sectors, including the above, pharmaceuticals, and environmental protection.
On the sidelines of the Russia-EU summit in Nizhni Novgorod on 9–10 June 2011 signed joint report of the coordinators of the PM which summarizes the work accomplished and gives examples implemented to date, practical activities and projects within the work plan.
In the framework of the implementation of the PM work plan during the said summit was signed a provision on the establishment of a new Dialogue on trade and investment between the Ministry of economic development of the Russian Federation and the Directorate General for trade of the European Commission. Co-chair of the Dialogue on the Russian side is Deputy Minister of economic development of the Russian Federation A. A. Slepnev, the EU - Deputy Director General of the Directorate General for trade of the European Commission P. Balazs. The dialogue will cover trade and investment relations EU-Russia, including the obligations of the European Union and Russia in the WTO and current trade and economic agreements between the European Union and Russia.
Visa liberalization dialogue
On 4 May 2010, the EU and Russia raised the prospect of beginning negotiations on a visa-free regime between their territories.
The dialogue was temporarily frozen by the EU in March 2014 during the
EU membership discussion
Russian permanent representative to the EU Vladimir Chizhov commented on this by saying that Russia has no plans of joining the EU.[52] Vladimir Putin has said that Russia joining the EU would not be in the interests of either Russia or the EU, although he advocated close integration in various dimensions including establishment of four common spaces between Russia and the EU, including united economic, educational and scientific spaces as it was declared in the agreement in 2003.[53][54]
Michael McFaul claimed in 2001 that Russia was "decades away" from qualifying for EU membership.[55] Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has said that though Russia must "find its place both in NATO, and, in the longer term, in the European Union, and if conditions are created for this to happen" that such a thing is not economically feasible in the near future.[56] Czech President Miloš Zeman stated that he "dreams" of Russia joining EU.[citation needed]
According to a number of surveys carried out by Deutsche Welle in 2012, from 36% to 54% of Russians supported Russia joining EU, and about 60% of them saw EU as an important partner for their country.[57][58][59][60] Young people in particular have a positive image of the European Union.[61]
Russian destabilization of EU states
In July 2009, central and eastern European leaders – including former presidents Václav Havel, Valdas Adamkus, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Lech Wałęsa – signed an open letter stating:
"Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. [...] It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe."[62]
— Valdas Adamkus, Martin Bútora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demeš, Luboš Dobrovský, Mátyás Eörsi, István Gyarmati, Václav Havel, Rastislav Káčer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kováč, Ivan Krastev, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, János Martonyi, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Wałęsa
Latvian journalist Olga Dragilyeva stated that "Russian-language media controlled by the Russian government and NGOs connected with Russia have been cultivating dissatisfaction among the Russian-speaking part of the population" in Latvia.[63] National security agencies in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have linked Moscow to local pro-Russian groups.[64] In June 2015, a Chatham House report stated that Russia used "a wide range of hostile measures against its neighbours", including energy cut-offs, trade embargoes, subversive use of Russian minorities, malicious cyber activity, and co-option of business and political elites.[65]
In 2015, UK media said that the
On May 9, 2015, on the occasion of the attack by Albanian terrorists in the city of Kumanovo, the Putin-awarded and Russian intelligence agent,[70] as well as pro-Kremlin journalist Daria Aslamova published a commissioned article in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda", in which there was a map of "united Macedonia", including the "liberated" Pirin part of the region, which was declared "occupied" by Bulgaria. Bulgaria was accused of "supporting Albanian terrorists", regardless of the Bulgarian support it provided to the defense of Macedonia in 2001 and was declared "banished" from Orthodox civilization.[71] In the days, weeks and months after it was written, the article was shared on numerous Rashist and Putinist sites.
In November 2015, the president of Bulgaria,
On numerous occasions Russia was also accused of actively supporting
In February 2016, a film circulating in Hungary, in which recruited students expressed anger at the policy of the US, was identified as a version of a Russian movie with the same script funded by a pro-Putin organisation, Officers' Daughters.
In June 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia will never attack any NATO country, saying: "I am convinced that all serious and honest politicians know perfectly well than Russia will never attack a member state of NATO. We have no such plans."[78] He also said: "In our security doctrine it is clearly stated that one of the main threats to our safety is the further expansion of NATO to the east."[78]
In late 2016, media in a number of states accused Russia of preparing grounds for a possible armed take-over at their territories in future, including Finland,[79] Estonia[80] and Montenegro. In the latter an armed coup was actually in progress but prevented by security services on the day of election on 16 October, with over 20 people arrested.[81] A group of 20 citizens of Serbia and Montenegro "planned to break into the Montenegro Parliament on election day, kill Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and bring a pro-Russian coalition to power" according to Montenegro chief prosecutor Milivoje Katnić, adding that the group was led by two Russian citizens who fled the country before the arrest and "unspecified number of Russian operatives" in Serbia who were deported shortly after.[82][83] A few days after the failed coup Leonid Reshetnikov was dismissed by Putin from his duties as head of Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, which also had its branch in Belgrade where it supported anti-NATO and pro-Russian parties.[84] In 2019, a number of Montenegrin politicians and pro-Russian activists were convicted for the attempted coup as well as two Russian GRU officers Eduard Shishmakov and Vladimir Popov (convicted in absentia).[85]
In 2017, a cache of email was leaked demonstrating funding of far-right and far-left movements in Europe through a Belarusian citizen Alyaksandr Usovsky who funnelled hundreds of thousands of euros from Russian nationalist and oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev and reporting to Russian State Duma Deputy Konstantin Zatulin. Usovsky confirmed the authenticity of the emails.[86]
In 2017, three Alternative for Germany Bundestag deputies confirmed that they together received $29,000 in sponsored private jet visit to Moscow, which caused significant controversy in Germany.[87]
In 2019, a transcript was published from a meeting in Moscow where representatives of Italian nationalist Lega party were offered "tens of millions of dollars" of funding. The delegation to Moscow included Italy's deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini.[88] In 2020 chat transcripts were published by Dutch media of far-right politician Thierry Baudet indicating inspiration on his anti-Ukraine actions and possible financial support from Vladimir Kornilov, a Russian described by Baudet as someone "who works for president Putin".[89]
In 2020, a Spanish court looked at transcripts of calls between a Catalan independence activist Victor Terradellas and a group of Russians who came forward with an offer of up to 10 000 military personnel, pay out of Catalan debt and recognition of Catalan independence by the Russian Federation in exchange for Catalan recognition of Crimea. Frequent arrivals of known GRU operative Denis Sergeev into Spain, coinciding with major Catalan independence events, raised a questions about involvement of GRU Unit 29155 in escalation of the protests.[90]
On 28 April 2021, the
According to a 2022 report, Russia has spent over $300 million since 2014 on covert subsidies to various political parties and movements globally, including European Union, in exchange of pushing for policies favorable for Russian political goals.[92]
In 2023, an international group of journalists published an analysis of documents prepared in 2021 by Russian Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation, part of Presidential Administration, detailing plans for interventions securing "strategic interests of the Russian Federation" in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia planned to grow pro-Russian sentiment in these countries, build fear of "NATO militarization", create a large number of pro-Russian NGOs and increase share of pro-Russian politicians in elections. Similar documents published earlier detailed Russia's plans to include Belarus into Russian Federation and return Moldova on pro-Russian path.[93]
Russian political influence and financial links
Moscow increased its efforts to expand its political influence using a wide range of methods,
Russia has formed close ties with
Luke Harding wrote in
In June 2015, Marine Le Pen launched a new political group within the
The
Two new organisations – European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis and "Agency for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (ASCE) – recruiting mostly European far-right politicians, were also heavily involved in positive
A significant part of the funding of anti-EU and extremist parties passes through St Basil the Great fund operated by Konstantin Malofeev.[134][135]
In February 2015, a group of Spanish nationals was arrested in
In March 2015, the Russian nationalist party
Since 2012, a fund created by the
In June 2015, the European Parliament stated that Russia was "supporting and financing radical and extremist parties in the EU" and called for monitoring of such activities.[4] France's National Front, the UK Independence Party, and Jobbik voted against the resolution.[143] These and other extreme right organisations are part of Russia-sponsored World National-Conservative Movement.[144] In July 2016, Estonian foreign affairs minister Marina Kaljurand said, "The parade that we have seen of former and current European leaders to Moscow calling for rapprochement — and tacitly agreeing to the dismantling of Europe — has been disheartening for those of us who understand that a unified Europe with a strong American partnership is the only reason we have a choice at all about where our futures should be."[145]
In June 2016, Czech foreign minister
In 2018, Czech counter-intelligence service BIS published a report documenting significant increase of activity of Russia and China-backed actors to influence regulators and political bodies.[147] In 2020 a detailed analysis of Russian intelligence actions and active measures between 2002–2011 to prevent ballistic missile defense component from being deployed, involving "manipulation of media events, outputs, and reports and abusing cultural and social events". This also included attempts to recruit the Russian-speaking population in the country, but the majority was not interested in supporting the policy of Vladimir Putin.[148]
There are also ongoing concerns related to allegations that European Parliament members were illegally or unethically influenced by Russia. Such concerns have been raised several tiimes in 2023 and 2024 and dubbed "Russiagate".[149][150][151]
Intelligence activities
A Russian spy, Sergey Cherepanov, operated in Spain from the 1990s to June 2010 under a false identity, "Henry Frith".[152]
In a 2013 report, the Security Information Service noted the presence of an "extremely high" number of Russian intelligence officers in the Czech Republic.[101] The Swedish Security Service's 2014 annual report named Russia as the biggest intelligence threat, describing its espionage against Sweden as "extensive".[153]
According to a May 2016 report for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Russia was engaged in "massive and voracious intelligence-gathering campaigns, fueled by still-substantial budgets and a Kremlin culture that sees deceit and secret agendas even where none exist."[154]
One of the main figures perceived as European far-right and far-left contact in Russia is Sergey Naryshkin,[155] who in 2016 was appointed as the chief of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[156]
In 2018, the head of British MI6, Alex Younger, warned that "perpetual confrontation" with the West is core feature of Russian foreign policy.[157]
Since 2009, in
In March 2021, Bulgarian security services arrested six people, including officials in defence ministry of Bulgaria suspected of collecting intelligence for Russia. One of the arrested who has a double Russian-Bulgarian nationality was operating as the contact person between the suspects and Russian embassy. Earlier in 2020, five Russian diplomats and a technical assistant have been expelled from Bulgaria as involved in illegal intelligence operations.[159]
Cyberattacks
In 2007, following the Estonian government's decision to remove a statue of a Soviet soldier, the Baltic country's major commercial banks, government agencies, media outlets, and ATMs were targeted by a coordinated
In April 2015, the French television channel
British Prime Minister Theresa May accused Russia of "threatening the international order", "seeking to weaponise information" and "deploying its state-run media organisations to plant fake stories".[163] She mentioned Russia's meddling in the German federal election in 2017,[163] after German government officials and security experts said there was no Russian interference.[164]
Concerns about foreign influence in the 2018 Swedish general election have been raised by the Swedish Security Service and others, leading to various countermeasures.[165] According to the Oxford Internet Institute, eight of the top 10 "junk news" sources during the election campaign were Swedish, and "Russian sources comprised less than 1% of the total number of URLs shared in the data sample."[166]
In 2020, German prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for Dmitry Badin, a
Military doctrines
In 2009,
In May 2014, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister
In October 2014, Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service stated that in June of the same year Russian Air Force jets "equipped with live missiles" had simulated an attack on the island of Bornholm as 90,000 people visited for the annual Folkemødet meeting.[174]
In November 2014, the
From April 2013 to November 2015, Russia held seven large-scale military exercises (65,000 to 160,000 personnel) whereas NATO exercises were generally much smaller in size, with the largest composed of 36,000 personnel.[183] Estonia criticised Russia's military exercises, saying that they "dwarfed" NATO's and were offensive rather than defensive, "simulating the invasion of its neighbors, the destruction and seizure of critical military and economic infrastructure, and targeted nuclear strikes on NATO allies and partners."[145]
In 2016, Sweden revised its military strategy doctrine. Parliamentary Defense Committee chairman Allan Widman stated, "The old military doctrine was shaped after the last Cold War when Sweden believed that Russia was on the road to becoming a real democracy that would no longer pose a threat to this country and its neighbors."[184] In April 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia would "have to take the necessary military-technical action" if Sweden joined NATO; Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven responded, "We demand respect [...] in the same way that we respect other countries' decisions about their security and defence policies."[185]
Russian military activities in Ukraine and Georgia caused particular alarm in countries which are geographically close to Russia and those which experienced decades of Soviet military occupation.[186][187] Poland's foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski stated, "We have to reject any type of wishful thinking with regard to pragmatic cooperation with Russia as long as it keeps on invading its neighbours."[188] Following the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania reinstated conscription, increased its defense spending, called on NATO to deploy more troops to the Baltics, and published three guides on surviving emergencies and war.[189] Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė stated, "I think that Russia is terrorising its neighbours and using terrorist methods".[190] Estonia increased training of Estonian Defence League members and encouraged more citizens to own guns. Brigadier General Meelis Kiili stated, "The best deterrent is not only armed soldiers, but armed citizens, too."[187] In March 2017, Sweden decided to reintroduce conscription due to Russia's military drills in the Baltics and aggression in Ukraine.[191]
In his speech at the
In 2020, German media reported that members of German far-right extremist National Democratic Party (NPD) and The Third Way party attended military training in the Russian Federation.[196]
Russia's assassinations and abductions
Alexander Litvinenko, who had defected from the FSB and become a British citizen, died from radioactive polonium-210 poisoning carried out in England in November 2006. Relations between the U.K. and Russia cooled after a British murder investigation indicated that Russia's Federal Protective Service was behind his poisoning. Investigation into the poisoning revealed traces of radioactive polonium left by the assassins in multiple places as they travelled across Europe, including Hamburg in Germany.
In September 2014, the FSB crossed into Estonia and abducted
Between 2015 and 2017, officers Denis Sergeev, Alexey Kalinin and Mikhail Opryshko, all from GRU Unit 29155 were frequently traveling to Spain, allegedly in relation to the upcoming
On 4 March 2018,
In 2019, a Russian operative was arrested in Germany after he assassinated a Chechen refugee, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili. In response Germany expelled two Russian diplomats.[200]
In January 2016, several Finnish authorities suspected that Russians were assisting
In Bulgaria, a number of Russian citizens (most notably Igor Zorin and Yevgeniy Shchegolikhin) are involved in cooperation with far-right and anti-immigrant movements, for example organization of paramilitary trainings for "voluntary border patrols".[204]
Sabotage
In April 2015, the Russian Navy disrupted NordBalt cable-laying in Lithuania's exclusive economic zone.[205][206]
In April 2021,
After the October 2022 German railway attack, the Green politician Anton Hofreiter told FUNKE media group that the sabotage reminded him of the disruption of the Nord Stream pipelines where the "trail leads to the Kremlin." "Maybe both were warning shots because we support Ukraine," Hofreiter added.[209] Meanwhile german police stated that there was no sign of any involvement by a foreign state.[210]
Propaganda
Russian government funded media and political organisations have primarily targeted far-right circles in Europe, attempting to create an image of Russia as the last defender of traditional, conservative and Christian values:[211]
Putin, in his annual address at the end of 2013, when defending the discriminative "anti-gay propaganda law" from international criticism before the Sochi Olympic Games, practically put Russia in the role of the global "moral compass" of conservatism. Putin claimed that banning "propaganda of non-traditional relations" should not be regarded as discriminative, it is only about strengthening traditional family values, which is a guarantee of Russia's greatness. He also downplayed the Western approach of "so-called tolerance — genderless and infertile", and said that the "destruction of traditional values from the top" in the West is "inherently undemocratic because it is based on abstract ideas and runs counter to the will of the majority of people
— The Weaponization of Culture: Kremlin's Traditional Agenda and the Export of Values to Central Europe
Russian and pro-Russian media and organisations have produced fake stories and distorted real events. One of the most widely distributed fake stories was that of
European Union has taken a number of steps at various levels to counter hostile propaganda and disinformation. EU Action Plan Against Disinformation of 2018 explicitly mentions Russia as the main threat source and East StratCom Task Force is an EU body working since 2015 on recording, fact-checking and debunking hostile disinformation. Council of the EU also runs a Council disinformation working group (ERCHT) dedicated to analysis and planning on response to disinformation. A number of Eastern and Central Europe countries run their own open-source intelligence institutions whose objective is to analyze events and influence from Russia. Among these are Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDIP), the Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership, or the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW).[216]
In November 2016, the EU Parliament passed an anti-propaganda resolution.[217] EU Disinformation Review is a news feed analysing and debunking most notable fake stories distributed in Russian media.[218] In 2018 the European Commission initiated a new Action Plan to counter "disinformation that fuels hatred, division, and mistrust in democracy" as well as interference with elections, "with evidence pointing to Russia as a primary source of these campaigns".[219]
In June 2021, a Russian advertising firm Fazze attempted to recruit numerous YouTube and Instagram influencers for paid posts spreading false claims about several COVID-19 vaccines manufactured by European companies.[220]
In 2022, European Parliament Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE) draft "Report on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation" condemned activities of RT (Russia Today), Sputnik and numerous other Russia agencies:[221]
The Kremlin's efforts to instrumentalise minorities in EU Member States by implementing so-called compatriot policies, particularly in the Baltic states and the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, as part of the geopolitical strategy of Putin's regime, whose aim is to divide societies in the EU, alongside the implementation of the concept of the 'Russian world', aimed at justifying expansionist actions by the regime; notes that many Russian 'private foundations', 'private enterprises', 'media organisations' and 'NGOs' are either state-owned or have hidden ties with the Russian state; stresses that it is of the utmost importance when engaging in dialogue with Russian civil society to differentiate between those organisations which stay clear of Russian governmental influence and those that have links to the Kremlin; recalls that there is also evidence of Russian interference and manipulation in many other Western liberal democracies, as well as active support for extremist forces and radical-minded entities in order to promote the destabilisation of the Union; notes that the Kremlin makes broad use of culture, including popular music, audiovisual content and literature, as part of its disinformation ecosystem; deplores Russia's attempts not to fully recognise the history of Soviet crimes and instead to introduce a new Russian narrative;
— European Parliament INGE draft report
Disputes and notable events
Russian opposition to the invasion of Iraq
Russia strongly opposed the U.S.-led
Meat from Poland
In 2007, Russia imposed a ban on Polish meat exports (due to allegations of low quality and unsafe meat exported from the country[224]), which caused Poland to veto proposed EU–Russia pacts concerning issues such as energy and migration; an oil blockade on Lithuania; and concerns by Latvia and Poland on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline.[225] Later, Polish meat was allowed to be exported to Russia.[citation needed]
Gas disputes
The
In September 2012, the
The commission's investigation was delayed due to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine.[236] In April 2015, the EC accused Gazprom of unfair pricing and restricting competition.[237] The European Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, stated that "All companies that operate in the European market – no matter if they are European or not – have to play by our EU rules. I am concerned that Gazprom is breaking EU antitrust rules by abusing its dominant position on EU gas markets."[238] Gazprom said it was "outside of the jurisdiction of the EU" and described itself as "a company which in accordance with the Russian legislation performs functions of public interest and has a status of strategic state-controlled entity."[239] Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė said that the Kremlin was using Gazprom as "a tool of political and economic blackmail in Europe".[240]
In October 2016, general
Tensions over association agreements
The run-up to the 2013 Vilnius Summit between the EU and its eastern neighbours saw what The Economist called a "raw geopolitical contest" not seen in Europe since the end of the Cold War, as Russia attempted to persuade countries in its "
Russia views some of the countries that applied to join the EU or NATO after the fall of the Iron Curtain as part of its sphere of influence.[245] It has criticised their admission and frequently said that NATO is "moving its infrastructure closer to the Russian border". The expansion of NATO into the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as well as the proposed ascension of Georgia and Ukraine are among Russia's main claims to NATO's encroachment of its sphere of influence.[249][250] NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow responded that NATO's major military infrastructure in Eastern Europe is no closer to the Russian border than since the end of the Cold War, and that Russia itself maintains a large military presence in neighbouring countries.[251]
Sanctions over Ukraine
EU sanctions Russia over Ukraine
The 2014
Over the period when the
In May 2020, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel responded to calls from Russia for relaxation of the sanctions to facilitate the COVID-19 response explaining that the EU sanctions are "deliberately narrowly framed in order to limit the risks of unintended consequences or harm to the wider population" and none of them prevents "export of food or medicines, vaccines or medical equipment". As the original reasons for sanctioning were not removed by Russia, the sanctions were extended for another year.[267]
The "personalized sanctions" imposed on individuals such as Russian functionaries and oligarchs have broadened since their inception in 2014.[266] The following non-exhaustive list gives a flavour of the type and breadth of the sanctions as well as particular events in the relationship:
- 17.03.2014 Sanctions initiated[253]
- 22.07.2015 MH17
- 02.03.2022 SWIFT code ban for seven Russian banks
- 02.03.2022 suspension of broadcasting of Sputnik
- 03.03.2022 Misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds: EU prolongs restrictive measures
- 09.03.2022 EU agrees new measures targeting Belarus and Russia
- 13.04.2022 EU introduces exceptions to restrictive measures to facilitate humanitarian activities
- 21.07.2022 "Maintenance and alignment" package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 20.10.2022 EU sanctions three individuals and one entity in relation to the use of Iranian drones in Russian aggression
- 23.11.2022 European Parliament declares Russia a state sponsor of terrorism[5]
- 28.11.2022 EU adds violation of sanctions to list of EU crimes
- 04.02.2023 EU agrees on level of price cap for Russian petroleum products
In March 2022, the EU initiated a "Freeze and Seize Task Force" under
On 25 March 2022 the European Commission and the United States made a joint statement on European Energy Security, which committed the EU amongst other things "to terminate EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels by 2027."[271][272]
According to the
This article may contain an excessive amount of intricate detail that may interest only a particular audience. |
- 23.02.2022 1st package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 25.02.2022 2nd package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 02.03.2022 3rd package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 15.03.2022 4th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 08.04.2022 5th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 03.06.2022 6th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 21.07.2022 7th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine[273]
- 06.10.2022 8th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 16.12.2022 9th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 15.02.2023 10th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
- 23.06.2023 11th package of sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine[274][needs copy edit]
Russia sanctions EU in retaliation
Russia has imposed its own set of retaliating counter-sanctions on the EU since the deterioration in relations started. A Russian embargo on food imports from the EU, originally as a response to EU sanctions, has been in force since 6 August 2014.[275]
At the end of May 2015, Russia banned 89 Europeans.[276]
ICC arrest warrant of Putin
The
See also
- Common Economic Space of the CIS
- East StratCom Task Force
- EU-Russia Centre
- European Union Association Agreement
- Northern Dimension
- Russia in the European energy sector
- Russia–NATO relations
- Borders with EU members
Russia's bilateral relations with EU member states
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Further reading
- Bordachev, Timofei. Europe, Russia and the Liberal World Order: International Relations after the Cold War. (Routledge, 2022), by a senior aide to Putin online book review
- Van der Loo, Guillaume (2013). "EU-Russia Trade Relations: It Takes WTO to Tango?". Legal Issues of Economic Integration. 40 (1): 7–32. S2CID 247810094.
External links
- Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union
- The official site of the EU's delegation to Russia
- European External Action Service: The EU's relations with Russia
- European Union Institute for Security Studies: Research on EU-Russia Relations
- Trade information between EU and Russia, Animated infographic, European Parliamentary Research Service
- The Russo-Georgian War and Beyond: towards a European Great Power Concert, Danish Institute of International Studies
- The EU and Russia cease to be a priority for each other: The squabble over WTO membership reveals the defunct state of the strategic partnership Archived 3 March 2016 at the The Finnish Institute of International Affairs