Salafi movement

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The Salafi movement or Salafism (

Tabi'in, and the third generation, the Tabi' al-Tabi'in), who are believed to exemplify the pure form of Islam.[8] In practice, Salafis maintain that Muslims ought to rely on the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Ijma (consensus) of the salaf, giving these writings precedence over later religious interpretations.[9][10] The Salafi movement aimed to achieve a renewal of Muslim life and had a major influence on many Muslim thinkers and movements across the Islamic world.[11][12]

Salafi Muslims staunchly oppose

, and those who remain largely faithful to them, but do not restrict themselves to the "final" edicts of any specific madhhab.

The origins of Salafism are disputed, with some historians like

Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 CE/661–728 AH).[20][21][22] These Salafis dismiss the 19th century reformers as rationalists who failed to interpret scripture in the most literal, traditional sense.[23]

Conservative Salafis regard

Etymology

Salafis consider the

Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 C.E/ 728 A.H), which played the most significant role in formalizing the creedal, social and political positions of Ahl al-Hadith; constitute the most widely referred classical works in Salafi seminaries.[33]

Tenets

According to

Sunni Muslims.[34] Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal. They define [their] reformist project first and foremost through creedal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also important in its manhaj (Arabic: منهج i.e. Methodology) are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics.[35]

The Salafi

Salafis place great emphasis on practicing actions in accordance with the known

Ibn Taymiyya's school, also referred by various academics as "al-Salafiyyah al-Tarikhiyah" (trans: "Historical Salafism") consist of:[39]

Views on Taqlid (adherence to legal precedent)

The Salafi thought seeks the re-orientation of Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) away from Taqlid (adherence to the legal precedent of a particular Madhhab) and directly back to the Prophet, his Companions and the Salaf. This preferred return to the pure way of the Prophet is termed "Ittiba" (following the Prophet by directly referring to the Scriptures).[40] In legal approach, Salafis are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four schools of law (madhahib) and others who remain faithful to these.[41][42][43]

Although

Other Salafi movements, however, believe that taqlid is

Muhammad Nasir Al-Din al-Albani (d. 2000), Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sindhī (d. 1163), Ibn 'Amir al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 1182), al-Shawkānī (d. 1250), etc.; who completely condemn taqlid (imitation), rejecting the authority of the legal schools, and oblige Muslims to seek religious rulings (fatwa) issued by scholars exclusively based on the Qur’an and Hadith; with no intermediary involved.[51][52][46] The Ahl-i Hadith ulema would distinguish themselves from the Wahhabis who followed the Hanbali school while they considered themselves as following no particular school.[53] In contemporary era, Albani and his disciples, in particular, would directly criticise Wahhabis on the issue of Taqlid due to their affinity towards the Hanbali school and called for a re-generated Wahhabism purified of elements contrary to doctrines of the Salaf.[54][55][51]

Other Salafi scholars like

Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim, these scholars accept the rich literary heritage of Sunni Fiqh and consider the literature of the four Sunni law-schools as beneficial resources to issue rulings for the contemporary era.[56][46] At the far end of the spectrum, some Salafis hold that adhering to taqlid is an act of shirk (polytheism).[57]

Contemporary Salafis generally discard the practice of adhering to the established rulings of any particular Madhhab, condemning the principle of Taqlid (blind imitation) as a

Zahirite school, historically associated with anti-madhhab doctrines that opposed the canonization of legal schools. Early Zahirite scholar Ibn Hazm's condemnation of Taqlid and calls to break free from the interpretive system of the canonized schools by espousing a Fiqh directly grounded on Qura'n and Hadith; have conferred a major impact on the Salafiyya movement.[58] Salafi legalism is most often marked by its departure from the established rulings (mu'tamad) of the four Sunni madhahib, as well as frequently aligning with Zahirite views mentioned by Ibn Hazm in his legal compendium Al-Muhalla.[59][46]

Scholarly hierarchy

Bernard Haykel notes that due to the peculiarity of its methodology, Salafis enjoy a relatively less rigid scholarly hierarchy of authorities (ulema). Most Salafis unlike other traditional and pre-modern Muslims do not subscribe to a hierarchy that rigorously "constrains and regulates... the output of opinions". As an interpretive community, Salafi tradition, "in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning", is "relatively open, even democratic".[60]

Methodology and hermeneutics

Contemporary proponents of the

Salaf al-Salih, viewing Muhammad and the Sahaba as exemplar role models in religious life, they emulate them through the lens of the classical traditions of the madhahib and its religious clergy. On the other hand, Salafis attempt to follow the Salaf al-Salih through recorded scriptural evidences, often bypassing the classical manuals of madhahib. Nonetheless, both Salafis and Mutakallimun empasize the significance of the Salaf in the Sunni tradition.[63]

Salafi Muslims consider

Ta'wil (metaphorical interpretation), they do not attempt to conceptualize the meanings of the Qur'an rationally; and believe that the real meanings should be consigned to God alone (tafwid).[67] Following the Salafi hermeneutic approach, Salafis differ from that of non-Salafis in some regards of permissibility.[68]

Ibn Taymiyya was known for making scholarly refutations of religious groups such as the

Falsafa etc., through his numerous treatises.[69] Explaining the theological approach of "Salafiyya", Ibn Taymiyya states in a fatwa
:

"The way of the Salaf is to interpret literally the Koranic verses and hadiths that relate to the Divine attributes [ijra’ ayat al-sifat wa ahadith al-sifat ‘ala zahiriha], and without attributing to Him anthropomorphic qualities [ma’ nafy al-kayfiyya wal tashbih]."

— Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyah, Al-Fatawa al-Kubra (Great Religious Edicts), vol. 5, p. 152, [69]

Teachings of Ibn Taymiyya

The followers of the Salafiyya school look to the medieval jurist

Ibn Taymiyyah as the most significant classical scholarly authority in theology and spirituality. Ibn Taymiyya's theological treatises form the core doctrinal texts of Wahhabi, Ahl-i Hadith and various other Salafi movements. According to the monotheistic doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya, Tawhid is categorised into three types: At-tawḥīd ar-rubūbiyya (Oneness in Lordship), At-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya (Oneness in Worship) and At-tawhid al-assmaa was-sifaat (Oneness in names and attributes). Ibn Taymiyya's interpretation of the Shahada (Islamic testimony) as the testimony to worship God alone "only by means of what He has legislated", without partners, is adopted by the Salafis as the foundation of their faith. In the contemporary era, Ibn Taymiyya's writings on theology and innovated practices have inspired Salafi movements of diverse kinds.[70][71] The increased prominence of these movements in the twentieth century has led to a resurgence in interest of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya far beyond traditional Salafi circles. Salafis commonly refer to Ibn Taymiyya by the title Shaykh al-Islām. Alongside Ibn Taymiyya, his disciples Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ibn Kathir, Al-Dhahabi, etc. constitute the most referenced classical scholarship in Salafi circles.[72][73][74][75][76]

The scholarly works of Ibn Taymiyya, which advocate

Traditionalist Creedal positions and intensely critique other theological schools, embody the theology of the Salafiyya school.[77] Ibn Taymiyya also cited a scholarly consensus (Ijma), on the permissibility of ascribing ones self to the beliefs of the Salaf, stating:

"There is no shame in declaring oneself to be a follower of the salaf, belonging to it and feeling proud of it; rather that must be accepted from him, according to scholarly consensus. The madhhab of the salaf cannot be anything but true. If a person adheres to it inwardly and outwardly, then he is like the believer who is following truth inwardly and outwardly."[78][79]

History

(d. 1935), leader of the Arab Salafiyya movement

Jamal al-Din Qasimi (1866–1914), 'Abd al-Razzaq al Bitar (1837–1917), Tahir al-Jazai'iri (1852–1920)[85] and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[86] Until the First World War, religious missions of the Salafi call in the Arab East had operated secretively. Following the First World War, the Salafi ideas were spread and established among the intelligentsia.[87] Politically oriented scholars like Rashid Rida had also emphasized the necessity to establish an Islamic state that implements Sharia (Islamic law) and thus laid the intellectual foundations for a more conservative strand of Salafiyya, which would also influence the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[88]

The usage of the term "Salafiyya" to denote a theological reform movement based on the teachings of the

Catholic Orientalist scholar Louis Massignon to mistakenly associate the label with Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, which became the standard practice for Western scholars for much of the 20th century, at the expense of conceptual veracity.[89]

Salafis believe that the label "Salafiyya" existed from the first few generations of Islam and that it is not a modern movement.

non-conformist juristic approach that was based on direct understanding of Scriptures and his practice of issuing fatwas that contradicted the madhabs.[69]

At least one scholar, Henri Lauzière, casts doubt on al-Sam'ani, claiming he "could only list two individuals—a father and his son—who were known" as al-Salafi. "Plus, the entry contains blank spaces in lieu of their full names, presumably because al-Sam'ani had forgotten them or did not know them."[91] In addition, Lauzière claims "al-Sam'ani's dictionary suggests that the surname was marginal at best, and the lone quotation taken from Al-Dhahabi, who wrote 200 years later, does little to prove Salafi claims."[92]

Origins

The Salafi movement emphasizes looking up to the era of the

Western colonialism across many parts of the Islamic world. Between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, these reformist movements called for a direct return to the Scriptures, institutional standardisations and jihad against colonial powers.[93]

The movement developed across various regions of the Islamic World in the late 19th century as an Islamic response against the rising

Ibn Taymiyya, who had strongly condemned philosophy and various features of Sufism as heretical. Ibn Taymiyya's radical reform programme called for Muslims to return to the pristine Islam of the Salaf al-Salih (pious ancestors); through a direct understanding of Scriptures.[94] Further influences of the early Salafiyya movement included various 18th-century Islamic reform movements such as the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula,[95] subcontinental reform movements spearheaded by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, Shah Ismail Dehlawi and Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed[96][97] as well as the Yemeni islah movement led by Al-San'aani and Al-Shawkani.[98][99]

(d. 1834) has profoundly influenced generations of Salafi scholarship

These movements had advocated the belief that the

Fuqaha (jurisconsultants) in the study of hadith, their interpretations and rationalisation. Thus, he was accommodative towards classical structures of Fiqh. In Yemen, influential scholar Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Shawkani (1759–1834) condemned Taqlid far more fiercely, and his movement advocated radical rejection of classical Fiqh structures. The promotion of Ijtihad of these movements was also accompanied by an emphasis on strict adherence to Qur'an and Hadith.[100][101]

Evolution

During the mid-nineteenth century

Zahirite school. In the 19th century, Hanbali traditionism would be revived in Iraq by the influential Alusi family. Three generations of Alusis, Mahmud al-Alusi (d. 1853), Nu'man al-Alusi (d. 1899) and Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1857–1924); were instrumental in spreading the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhabi movement in the Arab world. Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, a defender and historian of the Wahhabi movement, was also a leader of the Salafiyya movement. All these reformist tendencies merged into the early Salafiyya movement, a theological faction prevalent across the Arab world during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, which was closely associated with the works of Sayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[102]

Late nineteenth-century

South Asian Ahl-i Hadith scholar Siddiq Hasan Khan
whose works became popular amongst the Arab Salafi reformers of the 19th century

The first phase of the Salafiyya movement emerged amidst the reform-minded

Mu'tazilite philosophy. Abduh's movement sought a rationalist approach to adapt to the increasing pace of modernisation. While 'Abduh was critical of certain Sufi practices, his writings had Sufi inclinations and he retained love for "true Sufism" as formulated by Al-Ghazali.[103][93]

The Damascene Salafiyya was also influenced by their reformist counterparts in

innovations like tomb-visitations for the purpose of worship.[104]

Tahir al-Jazai'ri (1920), one of the early leaders of the Salafi movement

Salafiyya tradition had become dominant in

Salaf al-Salih (righteous forebears). Like Ibn Taymiyya during the 13th century; they viewed themselves as determined preachers calling to defend Tawhid (Islamic monotheism), attacking bid'ah (religious innovations), criticising the Ottoman monarchy and its clerical establishment as well as relentlessly condemning Western ideas such as nationalism.[105][106] According to historian Itzchak Weismann:

"The Salafi trend of Damascus constituted a religious response to the political alliance forged between the Ottoman State under the modernizing autocracy of Sultan Abdül Hamid II and orthodox sufi shaykhs and ulama who were willing to mobilize the masses in his support."

[107]

Post-WW1 Era

mysticism, as well as the Silsilas (chains of transmission) upon which Tariqah structures were built. In particular, Rida fiercely rebuked political quietism and pacifist doctrines of various Sufi orders. The Salafiyya of Rida and his disciples held onto an ideal of the complete return to the religious and political ways of the salaf.[108][109] In calling for a return to the Salaf, Rashid Rida emphasised the path of the first four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khulafa Rashidin) and the revival of their principles. Rida's revivalist efforts contributed to the construction of a collective imagined Salafi community operating globally, transcending national borders. For this reason, he is regarded as one of the founding pioneers of the Salafiyya movement and his ideas inspired many Islamic revivalist movements.[110][111]

South East Asia

Rashid Rida's religious approach was rooted in reviving Ibn Taymiyya's theology as the solution to rectify the decline and disintegration of the Islamic World. Salafiyya movement took a much more conservative turn under Rida's mantle and became vehemently critical of the clerical establishment. Rida's doctrines deeply impacted

Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Imam, Mazhar al-‘Azma, al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi, Taqiy al-Din al-Hilali, Muhiy al-Din al-Qulaybi, ‘Abd Allah al-Qalqayli, etc. Numerous books of the movement were printed and published through the Islamic Bookstore in Lebanon owned by Zuhayr Shawish.[114]

The early leaders of Salafiyya like

Muslim lands. Hence, Rida held back from adopting an exclusivist attitude against Asharis during the first two decades of the 20th century.[115]

Beginning from the mid-1920s, this leniency gradually disappeared from Salafi activists and scholars to give way to a more partisan stance. Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, for example, was more uncompromising in his defense of Salafi theology than Rida and Qasimi.

Contemporary era

Islamic University of Madinah, an influential religious institution of contemporary Salafi thought

Syrian Salafiyya tradition that emerged in late nineteenth century consisted of two divergent tendencies: an apolitical Quietist trend and a "Salafi-Islamist hybrid". The early Salafiyya led by Rashid Rida was dominated by revolutionary

Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a protege of Rashid Rida, who is generally considered as the "spiritual father" of the Purist Salafi current and respected by all contemporary Salafis as "the greatest hadith scholar of his generation".[118][119][120][121]

As of 2017, journalist Graeme Wood estimated that Salafi "probably" make up "fewer than 10%" of Muslims globally,[122] but by the 21st century, Salafi teachings and ideas had become so mainstreamised that many modern Muslims, even those who do not self-identify as Salafi, have adopted various aspects of Salafism.[123]

At times, Salafism has also been deemed a hybrid of

In the modern era, some Salafis tend to take the surname "Al-Salafi" and refer to the label "Salafiyya" in various circumstances to evoke a specific understanding of Islam that is supposed to differ from that of other Sunnis in terms of 'Aqidah (creed) and approach to Fiqh (legal tradition).[92]

Political trends within Salafism

Some Western analysts, most prominently Quintan Wiktorowicz in an article published in 2006, have classified Salafis into three groups – purists, activists, and Jihadis – based on their approach to politics.[137][138] Purists focus on education and missionary work to solidify the Tawhid; activists focus on political reform and re-establishing a Caliphate through the means of political activities, but not violence (sometimes called Salafist activism); and jihadists share similar political goals as the politicians, but engage in violent Jihad (sometimes called Salafi jihadism and/or Qutbism).[137]

Following the Arab Spring, Salafis across the Arab World have formed various political parties that actively advocate for Islamic social and political causes in the region.[139]

Purists

"Purists" are Salafists who focus on non-violent

da'wah (preaching of Islam), education, and "purification of religious beliefs and practices", who follow the Salafi 'aqida (creed).[140] They dismiss politics as "a diversion or even innovation that leads people away from Islam".[141] Also known as conservative Salafism, its adherents seek to distance themselves from politics. This strand focuses its attention on the study of Islamic sharia, educating the masses and preaching to the society. This methodology is seen as attracting a significant section of pious Muslims who seek to be driven solely by religious objectives but not political objectives. Conservative Salafis are disinterested in getting entangled in the problems and consequences that accompany political activism. According to them, a prolonged movement of "purification and education" of Muslims is essential for Islamic revival through reaping a "pure, uncontaminated Islamic society" and thereby establish an Islamic state.[142]

Some of them never oppose rulers.

Permanent Committee (the country's clerical body) denounced Madkhali personally.[146] Influence of both the movement and its figureheads have waned so much within the Muslim world that analysts have declared it to be a largely European phenomenon.[146]

Salafi activists

Further along the spectrum are the Salafi-Activists (or haraki) who advocate the transformation of societies through political action. They include Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Hizb al-Nour (Party of Light), the Al Islah Party of Yemen, the Al Asalah of Bahrain, and the ulema affiliated to the movement known as Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening). Committed to advancing "the Islamic solution" for all socio-political problems; Salafi-Activists are vehemently hostile to secularism, Israel, and the West. Their strategy involves working within the established order, to achieve the ultimate objective of replacing that order with an Islamic state.[147]

Zakir Naik

Activists are different from the

Safar Al-Hawali and Salman al-Ouda
.

In addition to being strong advocates of

Khomeini, denouncing him as a proponent of Iranian domination over the Arab World.[152]

Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e Islami, etc. are heavily influenced by the Activist Salafi thought.[153] The movement is very popular amongst the followers of the Salafiyya school, and is often referred to as "mainstream Salafism". The activist Salafis condemn violence, yet engage actively in the political processes of their societies to advocate for shari'a.[154] As of 2013, this school makes up the majority of Salafism.[145]

The movement is fiercely attacked by the followers of the

Safar Al-Hawali, Salman al-Ouda, Abu Qatada, Zakir Naik, etc. are representatives of this trend. Because of being active on social media, they have earned some support among youth.[155][157][158]

It's very simple. We want sharia. Sharia in economy, in politics, in judiciary, in our borders and our foreign relations.

— Mohammed Abdel-Rahman, the son of Omar Abdel-Rahman, Time magazine. October 8, 2012[159]

After the eruption of Arab Spring, Salafi Muslims have been becoming increasingly active in the political sphere, championing various Islamic causes. Salafi activists are highly critical of the foreign policies of Western countries as well as Iran's aggressive activities in the region, such as its military intervention in Syrian that backed the Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Assad against Sunnis. Some Quietist Salafis have also began organizing political parties, in response to threats posed by wars and external interference in Arab countries. These include the Al-Nour Party in Egypt and Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan.[160]

Salafi jihadists

"Salafi Jihadism" was a term invented by Gilles Kepel[161][162] to describe those self-claiming Salafi groups who began developing an interest in (armed) jihad during the mid-1990s. Practitioners are often referred to as "Salafi jihadis", "Salafi jihadists", "Revolutionary Salafis" or "armed Salafis". Journalist Bruce Livesey estimates that Salafi jihadists constitute less than 1.0 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims (i.e., less than 10 million).[161][163]

Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of

ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Al-Shabaab
.

All Salafi-Jihadists agree on the revolutionary overthrow of existing ruling order through armed

Ibn Taymiyya, they are strong advocates of takfir (excommunication) and the principles of Al-Wala' wa'l- Bara'. Like Qutb, they also made the belief in the exclusive sovereignty (Hakimiyya) of Allah central to Tawhid, and condemn all other political doctrines as Jahiliyya. Sayyid Qutb's Al-Ma‘alim Fi'l-tariq (The Milestones), a short tract which outlined his militant strategy of destroying Jahiliyya and replacing it with Islam, would become an influential treatise in the Salafi-Jihadi intellectual circles.[166]

An analysis of the

Shi‘a, Salafi, Sufi, Wahhabi, modernists and Islamic neo-traditionalists – have come out strongly against various Salafi-jihadi groups and their doctrines; regarding them as "a perversion" of Islamic teachings.[169]

Academic Review

Wiktorowicz's typology has largely been discarded by recent scholarship due to its simplistic assumptions regarding religion, in addition to other limitations, such as its neglect of the changing social, political and cultural realities occurring across the

Islamic politics; as well as for its rigid compartmentalisation of Salafi Muslims.[170][171] According to Samir Amghar and Francesco Cavatorta:

"studies question fundamentally the theoretical and scientific relevance of the typology between quietists, politicians and revolutionaries and argue that it is crucial to refine this typology by affirming that it is no longer apt in explaining Salafism in the contemporary age... If Wiktorowicz’s categorisation has the merit of shedding light on the plural and contradictory character of a movement that is too often caricatured, it prevents us from thinking about its dynamic and evolving character. The changing reality on the ground across the Arab world and beyond demands that traditional categories be revisited."[172]

By making a case study of Egyptian Salafis and the "quietist" Al-Nour party, one scholar Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, demonstrates that Wiktorowicz's "non-dynamic typology" merely denotes "time-bounded pragmatic political strategies" rather than any solid identity. Laurence proposes re-defining the triple classification of "Quietist, Activist and Jihadist" into "proselytizing, politico and revolutionary"; and re-conceptualise these categories as "temporal strategies" instead of a solid spiritual identity. She further calls for a holistic approach that accounts for the "fluidity, diversity, and evolution of Salafi groups" and focus more on the strategic adaptation of Salafi Muslims in their respective environments rather than creedal issues.[173] Based on his study of European Salafi movements, Samir Amghar asserts that Jihadism no longer can be classified as part of proper Salafism since, according to Amghar, both movements have diverged significantly over the course of decades and have no "shared doctrinal background".[174]

Wiktorowicz's proposition that all self-professed Salafi groups have the same "

kufr (unbelief) and takfīr (excommunication), al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and of course violence and jihād, Salafis clearly do not hold the same views precisely because they read social reality, and consequently behave, so differently... Negotiating the constraints and opportunities of the political prods Salafis to engage in thorough and at times painful ideological (re)positioning... the political affects Salafism on both levels: ideational and methodological/practical."[175]

Regional groups and movements

Saudi Arabia

Modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis.

Fuqaha were not considered as authoritative as the Scriptures themselves, since the former were human interpretations while the Qur'an is the Universal, Eternal Word of God.[179]

The Salafi movement in

awliya).[180] It is believed that the Wahhabism is a more strict, Saudi form of Salafism,[181][182] according to Mark Durie, who states that Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" using their considerable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world".[183] Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree with the view that Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis".[184]

However, many scholars and critics distinguish between the old form of Saudi Salafism (termed as Wahhabism) and the new Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Stéphane Lacroix, a fellow and lecturer at

Sciences Po in Paris, also affirmed a distinction between the two: "As opposed to Wahhabism, Salafism refers […] to all the hybridations that have taken place since the 1960s between the teachings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and other Islamic schools of thought". Hamid Algar and Khaled Abou El Fadl believe, during the 1960s and 70s, Wahhabism rebranded itself as Salafism knowing it could not "spread in the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.[185][186]

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.

madrasas to high-level scholarship.[188] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[189] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[190] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools"[191] at a cost of around $2–3bn annually since 1975.[192] To put the number into perspective, the propaganda budget of the Soviet Union was about $1bn per annum.[192]

This spending has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew,[187] and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"[193]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation – or the "gold standard" of Islam – in many Muslims' minds.[194][195]

Salafis are sometimes labelled "Wahhabis", often in a derogatory manner by their sectarian opponents.[196] Some Western critics often conflate Wahhabis and Salafis, although numerous Western academics have challenged such depictions. While Wahhabism is viewed as a Salafist movement in Arabian Peninsula that took inspiration from Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his successors in the Aal al-Shaykh, the broader Salafist movement have deeper roots across the Muslim World. Often times, other Salafis oppose the stance of Gulf-based Wahhabis on various issues and engage in a variety of political activities.[197]

Indian subcontinent

In Indian subcontinent, a number of Salafi streams exist including Ahl i Hadith and Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen. Ahl-i Hadith is a religious movement that emerged in Northern India in the mid-nineteenth century.

Wahhabi,[200] or consider them a variation on the Wahhabi movement.[201][202] In recent decades the movement has expanded its presence in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.[198][199]

Madras to Kashmir. They played an important role in the Rebellion of 1857 and their anti-British Jihad has been described as "the most strident challenge" faced by the British during the 1850s. After the defeat of the revolt, the British would fully crush the Mujahidin through a series of expeditions, "Wahhabi" trials and sedition laws. By 1883, the movement was fully suppressed and no longer posed any political threat. Many adherents of the movement abandoned physical Jihad and opted for political quietism. The Ahl-i-Hadith movement emerged from these circles of religious activists.[203][204][205]

In

Zahirite (literalist) school and adopted a literalist hadith approach. They also rejected the authority of the four legal schools and restrict Ijma (consensus) to the companions. Their ideal was to lead a pious and ethical life in conformity to the Prophetic example in every aspect of life.[206]

Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen (KNM) was founded in 1950 in Kerala as a popular reform movement by the Kerala Jamiyat al Ulama (KJU). It traces its root to Kerala Aikya Sangam established in 1922 by Vakkom Moulavi.[207] KNM witnessed a number of splits since 2002 and all existing fractions maintain a good connection with Arab Salafi groups especially in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.[208]

Jamia Salafia
is their largest institution in India.

Egypt

The Egyptian Salafi movement is one of the most influential branches of the Salafi movement which profoundly impacted religious currents across the Arab world, including the scholars of Saudi Arabia.[213] Salafis in Egypt are not united under a single banner or unified leadership. The main Salafi trends in Egypt are Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, The Salafist Calling, al-Madkhaliyya Salafism, Activist Salafism, and al-Gam’eyya Al-Shar’eyya.[214] Salafi-Wahhabi doctrines were introduced in Egypt by the Syrian scholar Rashid Rida starting from the 1920s.[215] Rashid Rida opposed the Westernising cultural trends adopted by Egyptian liberal elite and denounced nationalist ideas as a plot to undermine Islamic unity. Rida and his disciples campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic state based on Salafi principles; thus becoming the biggest adversary of the Egyptian secularists and nationalists.[216]

Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society

Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, also known as Ansar Al-Sunna, was founded in 1926 by Sheikh Mohamed Hamed El-Fiqi, a 1916 graduate of Al-Azhar and a student of the famed Muslim reformer

Ibn Taymiyyah.[214] Many Saudi scholars became disciples of prominent ulema of Ansar al Sunna like ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAfifi and Muhammad Khalil Harras.[217]

Majority of Egyptian Salafis are affiliated to Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya. Established by Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi (a student of Salafi scholar Rashid Rida) to defend traditionalist Salafism, the movement shares a warm relationship with Arabian Wahhabi scholars and was a major benefactor of Salafi resurgence since the 1970s. The movement traces its initial Wahhabi contacts to Rashid Rida. Al-Azhar shares a close relation with Ansar al-Sunna. Most of the early leaders of Ansar al-Sunna were Azhari graduates and many of its contemporary scholars studied under Al-Azhar. Prominent scholars in the movement include Rashid Rida, Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi, Abd al-Razzaq ‘Afifi, Sayyid Sabiq, Muhammad Khalil Harass, etc.[218]

Salafist Call (al-daʿwa al-salafiyya)

imprisonment of Ibn Taymiyya in Egypt, to the trials faced by the Muwahhidun movement in Arabia and then finally to scholars like Sayyid Rashid Rida, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, etc. who popularised Ibn Taymiyya's thought during the early twentieth century Egypt. Unlike Ansar al-Sunna which preaches political quietism, Salafist call is a politically activist movement.[213]

The Al-Nour Party

The

2011 Egyptian Revolution. It has an ultra-conservative Islamist ideology, which believes in implementing strict Sharia law.[220] In the 2011–12 Egypt parliamentary elections, the Islamist Bloc led by Al‑Nour party received 7,534,266 votes out of a total 27,065,135 correct votes (28%). The Islamist Bloc gained 127 of the 498 parliamentary seats contested,[221] second-place after the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. Al‑Nour Party itself won 111 of the 127 seats. From January 2013 onward, the party gradually distanced itself from Mohamed Morsi's Brotherhood regime, and was involved in the large-scale protests in late June against Morsi's rule that subsequently led to a military coup removing him from office in July that year.[222] A lawsuit against the party was dismissed on 22 September 2014 because the court indicated it had no jurisdiction.[223] A case on the dissolution of the party was adjourned until 17 January 2015.[224] Another court case that was brought forth to dissolve the party[225] was dismissed after the Alexandria Urgent Matters Court ruled on 26 November 2014 that it lacked jurisdiction.[226]

According to Ammar Ali Hassan of Al-Ahram, while Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood agree on many issues such as the need to "Islamize" society and legally requiring all Muslims to give alms, the former has nevertheless rejected the flexibility of the latter on the issue of whether women and Christians should be entitled to serve in high office, as well as its relatively tolerant attitude towards Iran.[227]

Malaysia

In 1980, Prince Mohammed bin Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia offered Malaysia $100 million for an interest-free finance corporation, and two years later the Saudis helped finance the government-sponsored Bank Islam Malaysia.[228] In 2017 it was reported that Salafi doctrines are spreading among Malaysia's elite, and the traditional Islamic theology currently taught in Government schools is shifted to a Salafi view of theology derived from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.[229][230] The Saudi-backed Salafist wave in Malaysia has particularly manifested itself in the growing trends of anti-Shi’a Muslim rhetoric and the encroaching Arabization of Malay culture.[231][232][233][234][235]

Yemen

Islamic scholar Muhammad Ibn 'Ali ash-Shawkani (1759 - 1839 C.E) is regarded as their intellectual precursor by the Salafis in Yemen, upholding his works to promote Salafi revivalist ideas.[236] Beyond Yemen, his works are widely used in Salafi schools.[237] He also profoundly influenced other Salafi movements across the world such as the Ahl-i Hadith in the Indian subcontinent.[238]

Tunisia

Salafism has been dismissively labeled as "ultra-conservative", in the context of Tunisia after the 2011 revolution.[239]

Turkey

Diyanet), expanding it from 50,000 employees in 1979 to 85,000 in 1989. Pursuing closer ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey involved itself in a more meaningful manner in the pan-Islamic institutions under Saudi tutelage, and Diyanet received Muslim World League
funding to send officials to Europe to develop outreach activities in Turkish immigrant communities." A network of commercial and cultural links was established with Saudi businesses and institutions in banking and financial services, publishing houses, newspapers, magazines, and children's books.

Preachers who had studied at the

Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925-2001) form the core of their references, while they avoid contemporary 'ulama' associated with the Muslim Brotherhood such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), an Egyptian scholar based in Qatar. Turkish is their prime language of communication, but Arabic is prominent in special sections on websites, Arabic-language Salafi texts in their bookshops, and heavy use of Arabic terminology in their Turkish texts. The most well-established among them is Ablullah Yolcu, who is said to do "production of Turkish Salafism from Arabic texts". While Turkey has been outside the discussion on transnational Salafism, Meijer's observation that Salafism may succeed `when its quietist current can find a niche or the nationalist movement has failed' seems to speak surprisingly well to the Turkish case."[242]

China

Salafism is opposed by a number of

Communists took power, Salafis were allowed to worship openly again.[246]

Vietnam

An attempt at Salafist expansion among the Muslim Chams in Vietnam has been halted by Vietnamese government controls, however, the loss of the Salafis among Chams has been to be benefit of Tablighi Jamaat.[247]

Qatar

Similar to Saudi Arabia, most citizens of Qatar adhere to a strict sect of Salafism referred to as Wahhabism.[248] The national mosque of Qatar is the Imam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab Mosque named after the founder of Wahhabism.[249] Similar to Saudi Arabian sponsorship of Salafism, Qatar has also funded the construction of mosques that promote the Wahhabi Salafism.[citation needed]

Unlike the strict practice of Wahhabi Salafism in Saudi Arabia, Qatar has demonstrated an alternative view of Wahhabism. In Qatar, women are allowed by law to drive, non-Muslims have access to pork and liquor through a state-owned distribution center, and religious police do not force businesses to close during prayer times.[250] Also, Qatar hosts branches of several American universities and a "Church City" in which migrant workers may practice their religion.[251][252] The adoption of a more liberal interpretation of Wahhabism is largely credited to Qatar's young Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

Yet, Qatar's more tolerant interpretation of Wahhabism compared to Saudi Arabia has drawn backlash from Qatari citizens and foreigners. The Economist reported that a Qatari cleric criticized the state's acceptance of un-Islamic practices away from the public sphere and complained that Qatari citizens are oppressed.[250] Although Qatari gender separation is less strict than that found in Saudi Arabia, plans to offer co-ed lectures were put aside after threats to boycott Qatar's segregated public university.[250] Meanwhile, there have been reports of local discontent with the sale of alcohol in Qatar.[253]

Qatar has also drawn widespread criticism for attempting to spread its fundamental religious interpretation both through military and non-military channels. Militarily, Qatar has been criticized for funding rebel Islamist extremist fighters in the Libyan Crisis and the Syrian Civil War. In Libya, Qatar funded allies of Ansar al-Sharia, the jihadist group thought to be behind the killing of former U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens, while channeling weapons and money to the Islamist Ahrar al-Sham group in Syria.[254] In addition, Qatar-based charities and online campaigns, such as Eid Charity and Madid Ahl al-Sham, have a history of financing terrorist groups in Syria.[255][256] Qatar has also repeatedly provided financial support to the Gaza government led by the militant Hamas organisation while senior Hamas officials have visited Doha and hosted Qatari leaders in Gaza.[257][258] Qatar also gave approximately $10 billion to the government of Egypt during Mohamed Morsi's time in office.[259]

Non-militarily, Qatar state-funded broadcaster Al Jazeera has come under criticism for selective reporting in coordination with Qatar's foreign policy objectives.[260] In addition, reports have condemned Qatar's financing of the construction of mosques and Islamic centers in Europe as attempts to exert the state's Salafist interpretation of Islam.[261] Reports of Qatar attempting to impact the curriculum of U.S. schools and buy influence in universities have also spread.[262][263] The nearby Persian Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have been among the countries that have condemned Qatar's actions. In 2014, the three Persian Gulf countries withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar referencing Qatar's failure to commit to non-interference in the affairs of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.[264] Saudi Arabia has also threatened to block land and sea borders with Qatar.[265] This blockade came to an end on 5 January 2021, when authorities from both Saudi and Qatar came on common grounds, with the midmanship of Kuwait.[266]

Statistics

It is often reported from various sources, including the German domestic intelligence service (

Bundesnachrichtendienst), that Salafism is the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world.[267][268][269][270] The Salafiyya movement has also gained popular acceptance as a "respected Sunni tradition" in Turkey starting from the 1980s, when the Turkish government forged closer ties to Saudi Arabia. This paved the way for cooperation between the Salafi Muslim World League and the Turkish Diyanet, which recognised Salafism as a traditional Sunni theological school, thus introducing Salafi teachings to Turkish society. Globally, Salafisation of Islamic religious discourse occurred simultaneously alongside the rise of pan-Islamist Movements, with an emphasis on the concept of Tawhid.[271][272]

Other usage

Al-Salafiyya Al-Tanwiriyya (Enlightened Salafism)

As opposed to the traditionalist Salafism discussed throughout this article, some Western academics and historians have used the term "Salafism" to denote

Mu'tazilite and Sufi mystical inclinations opposed by Salafism.[276]

The origins of contemporary Salafism in the modernist "Salafi Movement" of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh is noted by some,

Salafism.[279] However, the former notion has been rejected by majority.[280][281][282]
According to Quintan Wiktorowicz:

There has been some confusion in recent years because both the Islamic modernists and the contemporary Salafis refer (referred) to themselves as al-salafiyya, leading some observers to erroneously conclude a common ideological lineage. The earlier salafiyya (modernists), however, were predominantly rationalist Asharis.[137]

The second stage of Arab Salafiyya movement emerged after the

Western imperialism and Western ideologies. Rida's Salafiyya also championed pan-Islamist fraternity encompassing Ahl-i Hadith in South Asia to the Arabian Wahhabis; and clashed with nationalist and secular trends throughout the Islamic World. These themes would be re-inforced and popularised by a number of similar-minded Islamic revivalists like Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949 C.E/1324-1368 A.H) in Egypt and other Islamic fundamentalists like Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979 C.E/1321-1399 A.H) in India.[283][216]

Groups like Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami etc. are inspired by Salafism as well as the modernist movement.[284] Muslim Brotherhood include the term salafi in the "About Us" section of its website.[285]

Influence on contemporary Salafism

In terms of their respective formation, Wahhabism and Salafism are quite distinct. Wahhabism was a pared-down Islam that rejected modern influences, while Salafism sought to reconcile Islam with modernism. What they had in common is that both rejected traditional teachings on Islam in favor of direct, ‘fundamentalist’ reinterpretation. Although Salafism and

Muwahidun began calling themselves Salafis.[286]

In the broadest sense

In a broad sense, Salafism is similar to

Non-denominational Islam (NDM), in the sense some of its adherents do not follow a particular creed.[287] Salafi (follower of Salaf) means any reform movement that calls for resurrection of Islam by going back to its origin. In line with Wahhabism they promote a literal understanding of the sacred texts of Islam and reject other more liberal reformist movements such as those inspired for example by[288] Muhammad Abduh or by Muhammad Iqbal.[281]

Criticisms

Criticism

Due to its approach of rejecting

wajib (obligatory) for the matter of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).[289][290] Some of these Sunni scholars also accuse Salafis of falling into certain forms of unapparent tajsim and tashbih[291][292][293] in 'Aqidah which they consider as deviation from orthodox Sunni doctrines, while clarifying that this deviancy does not expel them from the fold of Islam.[294][295]

Some scholars of the Al-Azhar University of Cairo produced a work of religious opinions entitled al-Radd (The Response) to refute various views of the Salafi movement.[296] Al-Radd singles out numerous Salafi aberrations – in terms of ritual prayer alone it targets for criticism the following Salafi claims:[297]

  • The claim that it is prohibited to recite God's name during the minor ablution [Fatwa 50];
  • The claim that it is obligatory for men and women to perform the major ablution on Friday [Fatwa 63];
  • The claim that it is prohibited to own a dog for reasons other than hunting [Fatwa 134];
  • The claim that it is prohibited to use alcohol for perfumes [Fatwa 85].

One of the authors of al-Radd, the Professor of Law Anas Abu Shady states that, "they [the Salafis] want to be everything to everyone. They're interested not only in the evident (al-zahir), although most of their law goes back to the Muhalla [of the

Ẓāhirī scholar Ibn Hazm], but they also are convinced that they alone understand the hidden (al-batin)!"[298]

Sunni critics of Salafism accuse Salafis of altering the actual teachings of

Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti wrote a number of works refuting Salafism including Al-La Madhhabiyya (Abandoning the Madhhabs) is the most dangerous Bid‘ah Threatening the Islamic Shari'a (Damascus: Dar al-Farabi 2010) and Al-Salafiyya was a blessed epoch, not a school of thought (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1990).[296] The latter is perhaps the most widespread refutation of Salafism in the twentieth century.[299]

Numerous academic rebuttals of Salafism have been produced in the English language by modernists such as Khaled Abou El Fadl of the UCLA School of Law, and by Sufi intellectuals like Timothy Winter of Cambridge University and G.F. Haddad.[296] According to El Fadl, Islamist militant groups such as Al-Qaeda "derive their theological premises from the intolerant Puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds".[300] He claimed that the intolerance and alleged endorsement of terrorism manifest in the fringe elements of Wahhabism and Salafism was due to a deviation from Muslim historical traditions.[300] El-Fadl also argued that the Salafi methodology "drifted into stifling apologetics" by the 1960s, marked by "anxiety" to "render Islam compatible with modernity". These apologetic efforts sought the defense of Islamic traditions from the onslaught of Westernization; while simultaneously maintaining the supremacy of Islam and its compatibility with modernity. However, according to El Fadl, such efforts were being increasingly tainted by political opportunism and an unwillingness for critical engagement with the Islamic traditions.[301]

The Saudi government has been criticised by the British tabloid The Independent, for its role in the destruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Arabia. There has been controversies over the recent expansionist projects in Mecca and Medina that destroyed historically important Islamic heritage sites to make way for "skyscrapers, shopping malls and luxury hotels". The actions of the Saudi government stirred controversy across the Muslim world and Islamic activists across all sects, including Salafis, Sufis, Shias, etc. ;condemned the actions of the Saudi government.[302][303]

Islamic faith, he has stated his disagreement with the methodological approach of Salafism.[307]

Western criticism

In 2012,

German government officials[308] alleged that Salafi Muslims in Germany had links to various Islamist militant groups but later clarified that not all Salafis are terrorists. The statements by German government officials criticizing Salafism were televised by Deutsche Welle during April 2012.[309][310]
According to the German political scientist Thorsten Gerald Schneiders, despite the Salafi claims to re-establish Islamic values and defend Islamic culture, some members of the movement interpret it in a manner which does not match with Islamic traditions and regard certain elements of Muslim culture such as poetry, literature, singing, philosophy, etc. as works of the devil.[311] According to the French political scientist Olivier Roy, most of the third generation Western Muslim immigrants tend to adopt Salafism and some of them may break off from their family heritage, marrying other converts, rather than a bride from their country of origin, chosen by their parents.[312] According to ex-CIA officer Marc Sageman, sections of the Salafi movement are linked to some Jihadist groups around the world, like Al-Qaeda.[313]

However, according to other analysts, Salafis are not inherently political. Salafis may exhibit all sorts of diverse relations with the state depending on the environment, like the general populations to which they belong. They exhibit no demonstrable proclivity toward violence as a monolithic group. Those Salafis who engage in political participation or armed insurgencies, do so as part of a wider umbrella of political projects.

colonial era.[315]

Prominent Salafis

See also

References

  1. apolitical
    sect favoring a literalist reading of the Quran and Sunnah.
  2. . These men adhere to the Salafi branch of Islam
  3. ^ a b c "The Rise of European Colonialism". Harvard Divinity School. Archived from the original on 9 April 2018. Retrieved 9 April 2018.
  4. . Retrieved 5 December 2015.
  5. . The Salafi movement emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth in the context of European intellectual and political dominance in the Muslim World
  6. . Salafi Muslims: As a social movement within Sunni Islam, Salafi Muslims ARE a global revivalism movement
  7. ISBN 978-0-19-539589-1. Salafism, in its varying guises, has been an important trend in Islamic thought for more than a century.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link
    )
  8. .
  9. ^ Bin Ali Mohamed Roots Of Religious Extremism, The: Understanding The Salafi Doctrine Of Al-wala' Wal Bara World Scientific, 14.09.2015 9781783263943 p. 61
  10. ISSN 0955-2340
    .
  11. . SALAFIYAH... It aimed at the renewal of Muslim life and had a formative impact on many Muslim thinkers and movements across the Islamic world.
  12. ISBN 978-0-19-539589-1. Salafism has evolved under a number of key reformers, each of whom has brought his own unique insights and vision to the movement in response to the challenges of his national context.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link
    )
  13. ^ a b "Salafism: Politics and the puritanical". The Economist. 27 June 2015. Retrieved 29 June 2015.
  14. ^ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, 219-220
  15. ^ "Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism". Jamestown. Retrieved 9 May 2022.
  16. ISBN 978-1-4411-2788-4. It is common to distinguish two kinds of Salafism, which are quite different in many ways. One may be called "modernist" Salafism, or some would say "enlightened" Salafism. This form was... associated with such figures as Muhammad 'Abduh. ... The other form may be called "conservative" or "text-oriented" Salafism. This was the form of Salafism before the mid-nineteenth century and variants of it have become prominent since the mid-twentieth century... Muhammad 'Abduh's views.. are not usually labeled Salafi today... al-Afghani and 'Abduh referred to the salaf and have been called Salafi, they did not themselves adopt Salafi as a label for their thinking in general.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
    )
  17. ISBN 978-1-4411-2788-4. "Rashid Rida (1865–1935), moved in the direction of a conservative Salafism.. He was more polemical than 'Abduh and more rigid in his thinking. Where al-Afghani stressed the dynamism of early Islam and 'Abduh stressed its rationalism, Rida wanted to apply the model of the salaf as precisely as possible. He was more strongly opposed to Sufi practices and very critical of Shi'is. His basic concerns were Muslim activism (jihad in the broadest sense), unity of the umma (at least moral if not political), and truth, the true Islam that had been taught by the salaf. He did not reject the madhhabs but hoped for their gradual approximation and amalgamation... In the face of the growing secularism of the early twentieth century he welcomed and supported the Wahhabi movement{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
    )
  18. .
  19. ISBN 978-1-3502-2868-9. Religious fervor crystallized in the writings of Rashid Rida, the pioneer of the new Wahhabi Salafi movement and the editor-in-chief of al-Manar{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
    )
  20. ISBN 978-0-02-866269-5. SALAFIYYA.. Contemporary Salafism can be defined as a Sunni reform movement that finds its roots in the Middle Ages, especially in the teachings of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
    )
  21. . Salafism (Arabic: al-Salafiyya) Salafism refers to a cluster of different Sunni renewal and reform movements and ideologies in contemporary Islam
  22. ISBN 978-1-4411-2788-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
    )
  23. ^ a b Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements". The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: Bloomsbury. pp. 170–171.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  24. ISBN 978-1-107-16366-9.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
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  25. ISBN 978-0-7556-3444-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
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  27. ISBN 978-1-4411-2788-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
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  28. .
  29. ^ Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom, Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. New York: Viking. p. 9.
  30. ^ "What ISIS really wants", The Atlantic, February 2015
  31. ^ "The way of the Sufis is the way of the Salaf, the Scholars among the Sahaba, Tabi'in and Tabi' at-Tabi'in. Its origin is to worship Allah and to leave the ornaments of this world and its pleasures." (Ibn Khaldun (733–808 H/1332–1406 CE)) Muqaddimat ibn Khaldan, p. 328, quoted in Pahary Sheikh Mohammad Yasser, Sufism: Origin, Development and Emergence of Sufi Orders Archived 27 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine, retrieved March 2012
  32. .
  33. .
  34. .
  35. . Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers who are engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal. Indeed, Salafis are determined to create a distinct Muslim subjectivity, one with profound social and political implications.It is important to understand Salafis as constituting a group that defines its reformist project first and foremost through credal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also important, though secondary, for their self-definition are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics. I hope to show in this study that Salafism is a term that is heuristically useful because it is a marker of a distinctive form of engagement with the world, and one that is identifiable as such to many Muslims
  36. ISBN 978-984-33-4799-2. In different books of Hadeeth and in reliable books of Fiqh, the Ahle hadeeth have been described as Ahle hadeeth, Ashabul Hadeeth, Ahle Sunnah wal Jama'at, Ahlul Athar, Ahlul Haq, Muhadditheen etc. As the followers of Salaf-i-Saleheen, they are also known as Salafi.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link
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  37. .
  38. . Retrieved 13 October 2016.
  39. .
  40. – via tandfonline.
  41. ^ .
  42. .
  43. ^ The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, p. 484
  44. . While Wahhab personally rejected the practice of adhering (taqlīd) to a particular legal school, the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ who follow his thought do, in effect, practice a taqlīd of the Hanbali school..
  45. .
  46. ^ a b c d Qadhi, Dr. Yasir (22 April 2014). "On Salafi Islam". Muslimmatters. Archived from the original on 17 January 2017.
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  50. ISBN 0-8078-2923-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
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  51. ^ a b "From there he [Albani] learned to oppose taqlid in a madhab." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. "Al-Albani had denounced Wahhabi attachment to the Hanbali school." Stephane Lacroix, George Holoch, Awakening Islam, p. 85
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  53. ISBN 978-3-11-028534-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
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  54. .
  55. .
  56. . In setting forth these premises, Rida appears to prepare the ground to steer a middle course.. Rida did not ignore the rich heritage of Islamic law, as did a number of his strict Salafi contemporaries. Instead, following Ibn Taymiyya and especially his student Ibn al-Qayyim, he viewed the literature of the four Sunni law-schools (without committing himself to the teachings of one school in particular) as a resource from which to draw guidance and inspiration for adapting the law to changing circumstances
  57. ^ "For many Salafis, both modernist and conservative, "worship" of created beings includes practicing taqlid within a madhab of fiqh." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 165
  58. ^ Khan, Rehan (5 February 2020). "Salafi Islam and its Reincarnations- Analysis". Eurasia Review. Archived from the original on 5 February 2020.
  59. . the identity of many modern Salafis is dependent upon their departure from the established rulings of the four Sunni law schools (madhahib), including that of Ibn Hanbal. Modern Salafis generally dislike the practice of following the established rulings of any particular law school and view the principle of legal "imitation" (taqlid) as a significant factor in the overall decline of the Muslim Umma... Zahiri influence on modern Salafi legal thought occurs almost entirely through the Muhalla of Ibn Hazm, .... more important than Ibn Hazm's individual opinions to the Salafi scholars and ritual practitioners mentioned here is the unyielding Zahiri-style logic that underscores them... modern Salafis are endeavouring to shift Zahiri legal from the margins of orthodoxy into its centre
  60. . And because of their adherence to a particular form of textual interpretation-one that emphasises a direct interfaçe with the texts of revelation.Salafis enjoy a relatively shallow and limited hierarchy of scholarly authoritics. Most Salafis -though not all- are unlike traditional, and pre-modern, Muslinms in that they do not subscribe to a developed and layered scholastic tradition of religious interpretation, which otherwise constrains and regulates, in rigorous tashion, the output of opinions. As such, it is striking how relatively easy it is to become an authority figure among the Salafis. In fact, as an interpretive community Salafıs are, in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning, relatively open, even democratic
  61. ^ Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 38–48
  62. ^ a b Michael Cook, On the Origins of Wahhābism, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July, 1992), p. 198
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  64. ^ Evstatiev, Simeon. "Salafism as a contested concept." Knowledge, Authority and Change in Islamic Societies. Brill, 2021. p. 187
  65. ^ Bin Ali Mohamed Roots Of Religious Extremism, The: Understanding The Salafi Doctrine Of Al-wala Wal Bara World Scientific, 14.09.2015 9781783263943 p. 61
  66. ^ Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36 "For the Atharis, the “clear” (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur’an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden. A strictly literal, or perhaps amodal, reading of the Qur’an, as opposed to one engaged in ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation), or an attempt to rationally conceptualize its meanings, cannot be questioned and the “real” meanings should be consigned to God."
  67. ^ Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36–7 "For the Atharis, the “clear” (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur’an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden. A strictly literal, or perhaps amodal, reading of the Qur’an, as opposed to one engaged in ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation), or an attempt to rationally conceptualize its meanings, cannot be questioned and the “real” meanings should be consigned to God."
  68. ^ Bin Ali Mohamed Roots Of Religious Extremism, The: Understanding The Salafi Doctrine Of Al-wala Wal Bara World Scientific, 14.09.2015 9781783263943 pp. 62-63
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  71. . Ibn Taymiyya also speaks of the priority of worship and ethics over metaphysics in theological terms that later became widespread among Wahhābīs and modern Salafīs. He distinguishes two tawḥīds, or two ways of confessing God's unity. Ibn Taymiyya's first tawḥīd is that of God's divinity (ulūhiyya). Al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya signifies God's sole worthiness to be a god, that is, God's sole right to be an object of worship (ʿibāda). Al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya is exclusive worship of God that refuses to give devotion and love to anything or anyone else. Then flowing out from this is the second tawḥīd, the tawḥīd of God's lordship (rubūbiyya). God's lordship refers to His creative power, and al-tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya means confessing that God is the only source of created beings
  72. .
  73. .
  74. ISBN 90-04-10422-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
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  310. ISBN 978-0-19-939624-5. They do not represent an Islamic tradition; on the contrary they break with the religion of their parents. When they convert or become born-again, they always adopt some sort of Salafism, which is a scriptualist version of Islam that discards traditional Muslim culture. They do not revert to traditions: for instance when they marry, it is with the sisters of their friends or with converts, and not with a bride from the country of origin chosen by their parents.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
    )
  311. ^ Third public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of Marc Sageman to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9 July 2003
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  313. .
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  317. ^ Bowen, Innes Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam, Quote: "He remained a Salafi but became a popular speaker at events organised by a wide range of Islamic organisations"
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  321. ^ The Globe and Mail: "Controversial imam Bilal Philips says banning him won’t stop his message" 15 September 2014 |"If Salafi means that you’re a traditionalist that follows the scripture according to the early traditions, then yeah. I’m not a modernist. I’m not a person who makes his own individual interpretations according to the times."
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    ISBN 978-1-349-94965-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
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  328. ^ Al Jazeera Studies: "Arab World Journalism in a Post-Beheading Era" by Thembisa Fakude Archived 23 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine 2013 |"Al-Munajjid is considered one of the respected scholars of the Salafi movement, an Islamic school of thought whose teachings are said to inspire radical movements in the Arab world, including al-Qaeda and a group called al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wal Sham (also known as the Islamic State, IS or Daesh)."
  329. ^ Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010). "A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 6 May 2014. First, there is the void created by the 1999 death of the elder Bin Baz and that of another senior scholar, Muhammad Salih al Uthaymin, two years later. Both were regarded as giants in conservative Salafi Islam and are still revered by its adherents. Since their passing, no one "has emerged with that degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment," said David Dean Commins, history professor at Dickinson College and author of The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.
  330. . (Rida).. is often seen as one of the fathers of the modern Salafist movement.
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  332. . To examine this infrastructure, it is useful to consider the case of Zakir Naik, perhaps the most influential Salafi ideologue in India.
  333. ^ https://agami24.com/biography/articles/2081/abdur-razzak-bin-yousuf

Further reading